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Abstract

Multi-agent systems have emerged as a new ﬁeld that addresses issues among distributed, 
interconnected and intelligent systems such as conﬂicts of interests, global constraints, and 
sharing of resources. Our research addresses an important aspect of multi-agent systems 
study, specifying interaction protocols, that ensures proper coordination among agents’ ac­
tivities. 
Because traditional approaches to specifying protocols tend to pre-specify sequences of 
interactive behaviors that agents should exhibit, protocols are likely prone to failure when 
the operating environment, such as the Internet, changes quickly. Our work aims to spec­
ify protocols with a richer degree of ﬂexibility in agent interaction and gives agents more 
autonomy over their interactive actions to cope with on-going changes. 
In order to achieve that, we take a declarative approach to protocol speciﬁcation and make 
use of the notion of commitment, which provides a mechanism for coordinating interactive 
behaviors among agents, as a structural element. We show how agents can reason about 
commitments and protocol actions, choices and changes to achieve the desired results. Such 
a reasoning system is based on temporal linear logic, which incorporates both temporal and 
resource-sensitive reasoning. We also provide logic mechanisms that enable agents to reason 
about partial handling of resources and commitments as well as various strategies on agents’ 
choices and changes from the environment. Our speciﬁcation and execution frameworks are 
shown to include many features that increase ﬂexibility in agent interaction. 
Chapter 1

Introduction

Recently, software development has evolved toward the development of intelligent and inter­
connected systems working in a distributed manner. These systems are designed to handle 
complex tasks and work independently on behalf of humans, and are often implemented as 
agent systems. As they are used to represent human interests and objectives, agents usu­
ally have to deal with issues such as conﬂicts of interest, global constraints, and sharing 
of resources when taking actions or interacting with other agents. Accordingly, reaching 
agreement and coordinating actions with other agents are critical issues for agent systems. 
Multi-agent systems have been developed as a means of addressing these issues, in which the 
concept of computing is primarily a process of interaction [Woolridge, 2002]. This means 
that correctly designing interaction protocols is vital to the success of the applications. 
1.1 Research Problem 
In traditional approaches to specifying interaction protocols, such as those used in distributed 
computing or computer networks, protocols are typically speciﬁed by predeﬁning the roles of 
the agents, which sometimes includes a very detailed speciﬁcation of the interactive behavior 
of the agents. Agents have to follow pre-deﬁned plans and interactions are usually subject to 
strict constraints, such as the order in which messages arrive. Often there is little real choice 
for agents to make in these protocols. The success of an interaction is often dependent on 
how well environmental changes can be predicted, and whether an appropriate pre-speciﬁed 
plan can be designed in advance. 
However, in frequently changing environments like the Internet, changes are diﬃcult 
to predict, and hence devising pre-speciﬁed plans is not feasible. Protocols speciﬁed via 
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traditional approaches are too rigid, and unlikely to lead to successful agent interactions. 
What is missing is the ability for the agent to reason about the appropriate interactive 
behaviour and adapt its sequence of actions accordingly. In other words, the problem we are 
addressing is to make interaction protocols more ﬂexible so that agents have the ability to 
ﬁnd the appropriate behaviour in a changing environment. 
1.2 Background 
As discussed by [Chopra and Singh, 2004], in order to make interaction more ﬂexible, it is 
important that an agent is able to negotiate with other agents about what interactions should 
take place. Protocols can then be speciﬁed in terms of constraints on interactions, leaving 
agents with the autonomy to determine how to act subject to these constraints. 
One way to specify the protocol constraints is to use a declarative approach based on 
logic. 
Logic has been used as formalism to model and reason about agent systems and agent 
interaction. Various agent logic systems have been based on BDI logic [Rao and Georgeﬀ, 
1991], which models agents by using an intentional stance to describe agents’ behaviors using 
beliefs (B), desires (D) and intentions (I). However, there is a gap between these BDI logics 
and their implementations [Harland and Winikoﬀ, 2004], which makes it diﬃcult to use these 
logics in agent systems. 
Among other logics, linear logic has a large body of well-developed proof theories which 
allow a direct computational interpretation of the logic [Alexiev, 1994]. Linear logic is also 
very well suited for modeling resources that are produced and consumed [Alexiev, 1994], 
updating processes [Girard, 1995] and concurrency [Girard, 1987b], which makes it a good 
candidate for modeling resource-conscious, concurrent interactions (as found in agent sys­
tems). Linear logic has been used in agent systems to support reasoning about cooperation 
in problem solving [Ku¨ngas, 2003], and to strengthen the links between proactive and reac­
tive reasoning about actions [Harland and Winikoﬀ, 2004]. The links between proof search 
and agent planning in linear logic have also been investigated [Jacopin, 1993]. In addition, 
agent negotiation has been modeled in terms of proof search using linear logic [Harland and 
Winikoﬀ, 2002]. 
In modeling systems, time is a critical dimension to be addressed. However, while linear 
logic is a good candidate for modeling systems which are both resource-conscious and con­
current, it does not address time relationships directly. Therefore, a combination of temporal 
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logic and linear logic is desirable. Linear logic has been extended with temporal operators 
[Hirai, 2000b; Kanovich and Ito, 1997; Tanabe, 1997] to further describe and reason about 
relationships and changes in time. In particular, temporal linear logic (TLL) [Hirai, 2000b] 
introduces time more naturally to linear logic without removing any connective of linear logic 
nor using extra non-logical axioms nor abandoning sequent calculus [Hirai, 2000a]. TLL has 
been used to model negotiation between agents [Ku¨ngas, 2004b] and linked to timed Petri 
nets and used to express synchronous communication [Hirai, 2000a]. Hence TLL is an obvious 
candidate for modeling agent interactions which are resource-conscious and time dependent. 
Specifying protocols more abstractly also allows us to make explicit linkages between 
protocols and multi-agent concepts such as commitments. In fact, the notions of commitment 
and convention have been used as a basis for interaction [Jennings, 1993]. Commitments are 
promises made by agents to undertake some course of action. Persistence due to commitments 
introduces a certain level of stability [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1994] and predictability 
into an agents’ view of another agent’s actions, especially concerning interdependencies, 
global constraints or resources sharing [Jennings, 1993]. This is important for interactions as 
agents can choose to act based on their assumptions about another agent’s commitments and 
hence overcome some of the uncertainty caused by the distribution of control among agents 
[Jennings, 1993]. Moreover, (social) commitments to other agents emerge as agents interact 
and hold agents accountable for their commitments and hence contribute to coordination 
and coherence of agent activities [Singh, 1996]. Conventions also determine the degree of 
ﬂexibility and reactivity in agents’ interactive behaviors [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1994]. 
Much work has been focused on using commitments to model interaction between agents 
[Haddadi, 1995; Yolum and Singh, 2002a; Chopra and Singh, 2004; Mallya et al., 2003]. In 
much of this work, commitments have also been recognized as a means of making agent 
interaction more ﬂexible, by allowing agents to perform means-end reasoning about how act 
to fulﬁll commitments. However, most of this work has used logics which are not natural for 
modeling both time and resources. 
Our work reinforces the use of commitments to model ﬂexible interactions by using tem­
poral linear logic. 
1.3 Our Approach 
1.3.1 Research Questions 
In our work, we will address the following research questions: 
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1. What is an appropriate framework for specifying ﬂexible interactions that naturally 
deal with resources with respect to time? 
2. What is an appropriate execution framework for turning such speciﬁcations into ﬂexible 
interaction? 
3. What is a framework that enables agents to reason about their choices and changes 
from the environment to take advantages of opportunities and deal with exceptions? 
1.3.2 Approach 
We take a declarative approach to protocol speciﬁcation, i.e. specifying what is to be achieved 
rather than giving a detailed speciﬁcation of how it is to be done. Declarative speciﬁcation 
of protocols provides agents with autonomy over their interactive behavior, in that once a 
particular commitment is speciﬁed, it is up to the agent to determine how it is to be fulﬁlled. 
Moreover, declarative speciﬁcation of protocols allows an agent to utilise mean-end reasoning 
techniques over commitments, as the agent does for goals, states and actions. The notion of 
commitment, which is a key concept for coordination among agents [Jennings, 1993; Singh, 
1997], can be used for both of these aspects. 
In real world situations, achieving goals involves the consumption and production of 
resources over time. Given that linear logic [Girard, 1987a] can naturally model consumable 
resources [Girard, 1995] and temporal logic has operators suitable for describing time-varying 
behaviors [Emerson, 1990], we make use of a natural combination of them, temporal linear 
logic (TLL) [Hirai, 2000b]. 
We therefore propose using a fragment of TLL as the underlying logic system for specify­
ing protocols. We investigate how various major interaction concepts like resource, resource 
exchange, resource transformation, capability, state, state update, goal, base commitment, 
and conditional commitment can be modeled in TLL. 
Furthermore, proof search techniques in TLL can be used to provide reasoning capabilities 
for agents to help them determine what actions they should take. This reasoning could be 
testing whether a given property is true or not, or ﬁnding a series of actions that should 
be taken in order to achieve a given property. Another possibility is to commence with the 
current state, and apply inference rules to see what new states may occur. These reasoning 
methods correspond to proactive and reactive behaviors respectively [Harland and Winikoﬀ, 
2004]. Hence, proof search in TLL will be investigated to see how agents may reason about 
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commitments, the use of resources and interactive behaviors and handling environmental 
changes. 
Speciﬁcations of protocols are deﬁned as a set of potential conditional commitments (pre­
commitments) for each agent and expressed in TLL. Our execution model then uses proof 
search in TLL as a mechanism for agent reasoning and a basis for converting speciﬁcations 
into interactive actions. In particular, agents interact by exchanging requests, proposals and 
responses to them, in which pre-commitments are oﬀered as services to each other. Agents 
use the above-mentioned reasoning capabilities to ﬁnd out how to utilize their resources, 
actions, capabilities, and pre-commitments to fulﬁll their goals, commitments and answer 
requests from others. They also use such reasoning to choose suitable pre-commitments 
about which to negotiate. Interactions are hence formed as commitments are resolved and 
new commitments emerge among agents. 
We also extend the proof search methods of TLL in order to enable agents to reason 
about choices and environmental changes. In particular, we model the dependencies between 
choices and changes, and then develop appropriate inference rules for agents which allow 
them to apply a variety of strategies, such as as deciding choices in advance or delaying 
as long as possible, and taking either a bold or cautious approach to dealing with changes. 
In addition, we develop mechanisms in TLL to enable agents to partially handle resources, 
actions, goals and commitments as appropriate. 
We then consider the strengths and weaknesses of the modeling and speciﬁcation frame­
work. Numerous examples are given throughout to facilitate discussion. In addition, given 
the existing links between TLL and timed Petri nets (TPNs) [Hirai, 1999], we further explore 
a theoretical base for a mapping between formulas of a fragment of TLL and states of TPNs. 
This mapping allows TPNs to be used as an execution model for speciﬁcations in TLL, and 
hence existing TPN techniques can be used for examining properties of execution. This app­
roach, however, has some limitations that makes it less attractive than the approach that 
uses proof search. 
1.3.3 Rationale 
The agent paradigm is well-suited to dealing with complex systems consisting of many in­
teracting components. However, traditional approaches to interaction protocol speciﬁcations 
are too rigid, which severely hinders the agents’ ability to interact. Recent approaches pro­
vide some of the required ﬂexibility, but their underlying logic systems are quite limited when 
Contributions 7 
it comes to the modeling of resources and time. 
Our logic-based approach has many advantages. Firstly, logic is a well-known formalism 
which has often been used to model and reason about software systems. Secondly, the logic 
that we use is a combination of linear logic and temporal logic, and hence is advantageous 
to modeling resources, updates, concurrent and ongoing interactions. Thirdly, our approach 
aims to equip agents with reasoning abilities in the same logic that the protocol speciﬁcations 
are deﬁned, which enables agents to reason directly about speciﬁcations. Lastly, interaction 
protocols are based on the concept of commitment, which also enables agents to reason about 
the protocols in a meaningful way. Overall, our approach provides a bridge between logic and 
multi-agent systems, using a logic well-suited to computation and utilizing the modeling of 
agent interaction protocols based on commitment. Accordingly, our framework will be able 
to support applications in electronic commerce, such as online auctions, automated travel 
agents, and the packaging of Web services. 
1.4 Contributions 
The thesis makes several contributions. 
Firstly, modeling of various major interaction concepts using TLL has been achieved. 
Secondly, a framework for declarative speciﬁcation of protocols that centers on the notion 
of commitment is derived. The speciﬁcation framework is shown to provide agents with 
autonomy and ﬂexibility in interaction. Several methodological steps for designing protocol 
speciﬁcations are also established. 
Thirdly, an inference system, choice calculus, is developed based on the TLL sequent 
calculus to provide agents with an ability to reason about (internal) choices and indeterminate 
possibilities and strategies in dealing with them. These strategies include deciding (internal) 
choices and indeterminate possibilities in advance or at their associated time, and taking a 
safe approach or a bold approach in dealing with indeterminate possibilities. 
Fourthly, mechanisms for partial handling of goals, commitments, resources, and actions 
are also developed based on the results we derive concerning the splitting of formulas in a 
fragment of TLL. 
Fifthly, an execution framework for such speciﬁcations in TLL that makes use of proof 
search in choice calculus is identiﬁed. This framework is also shown to bring more ﬂexibility 
to agent interaction. 
Lastly, the relationships between TLL and timed Petri nets are clariﬁed by a formal result 
Thesis Structure 8 
that timed Petri nets are models of an intuitionistic fragment of TLL. This result makes it 
possible for converting speciﬁcations in TLL into timed Petri nets and hence existing TPN 
techniques can be deployed in the execution and veriﬁcation of protocols. 
1.5 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses background on 
agent interaction protocols, commitment-based approaches to agent interaction, linear logic, 
temporal linear logic, Petri nets and timed Petri Nets. Chapter 3 presents our modeling 
of agent interaction concepts. Chapter 4 presents a speciﬁcation framework for interaction 
protocols and identiﬁes an execution framework for such speciﬁcations. Chapter 5 discusses 
the modeling of choices and strategies on them. Chapter 6 applies the results developed in 
Chapter 5 to partial handling of goals, commitments, actions and resource formulas. Chapter 
7 further examines a possible implementation of the execution framework introduced in 
Chapter 4. We then discuss the strengths and weaknesses of the modeling of interaction 
concepts and the speciﬁcation and execution framework in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 presents 
our conclusions and possibilities for future work. 
Chapter 2

Background

We begin our discussion of background work by discussing agents, BDI-model for agents, 
interaction protocols, commitments, temporal logic, linear logic, temporal linear logic and 
Petri nets. 
2.1 Agents 
Recently, software development has evolved toward the development of intelligent and inter­
connected systems working in a distributed manner. These systems can handle increasingly 
complex tasks and are often designed to work autonomously, i.e. without direct human over­
sight. Accordingly, often these systems have to deal with conﬂicts of interests or sharing of 
resources. They also need to be able to cooperate with other systems. Multi-agent systems 
have emerged as a new ﬁeld that addresses these issues and reﬂects the concept of computing 
as primarily a process of interaction [Woolridge, 2002]. 
Intelligent autonomous agents are considered as a computer system situated in an envi­
ronment, sensing its inputs and performing actions to modify the environment. Operating 
environments can be physical, i.e. in the real world, or be software environments, where 
agents’ actions change values of data and sensory inputs are the output of reading such data. 
Intelligent autonomous agents embody these following properties [Wooldridge and Jen­
nings, 1995a;b; Franklin and Graesser, 1997]: 
•	 autonomy: agents exhibit their own control over their behaviors and internal states 
without human direct intervention. 
•	 reactivity: agents respond to changes in their environment in a timely manner. 
9 
Agents	 10 
•	 pro-activeness: agents actively initiate actions to achieve their goals. This is a form 
of goal-directed behavior. 
•	 situated: agents exert inﬂuences on the operating environment and perceive their 
eﬀect. 
•	 social ability: agents interact with other agents (and humans) to meet their objectives. 
The importance of agent-based computing has been recognized widely in research and 
development of complex software systems [Jennings et al., 1998b]. [Jennings, 2000] argued 
that in modeling, designing and building complicated distributed software systems, the agent 
paradigm has signiﬁcant potential. In fact, converging changes in system architecture, soft­
ware engineering and human computer interface technology have shifted the emphasis from 
algorithms to interaction [Wegner, 1997]. Interactive systems are believed to be more power­
ful than algorithms in problem solving and agents are proposed as a new theoretical model of 
computation to reﬂect current computing reality more closely than Turing machines [Wegner, 
1997]. 
Agents are often developed as parts of a multi-agent system. A multi-agent system 
contains many agents which may be of diﬀerent designs, architectures, and objectives but 
interact with each other either as collaborators or competitors. The organisation of the indi­
vidual agents into a multi-agent system can vary from being homogeneous to heterogeneous, 
from having a hierarchical control structure to a democratic one, and from independent to 
controlled execution of member agents [Huhns and Singh, 1998]. Multi-agent systems also 
diﬀer in their approach to communication languages, protocols, speciﬁcation of goals, beliefs, 
ontology and procedures. 
Multi-agent systems are diﬀerent from “traditional” distributed systems in two main 
aspects [Woolridge, 2002]. The ﬁrst is that agents normally do not share common goals 
nor ultimately follow overall system objectives. Instead, they must follow such strategies 
that achieve their respective goals. Therefore, interactions among them are more like games. 
Secondly, autonomous agents are supposed to decide at run time how they coordinate their 
activities and cooperate with others in a dynamic manner rather than follow hardwired 
speciﬁcations. 
The agent paradigm has become well-suited as a design metaphor to deal with complex 
systems comprising many components each having their own thread of control and purposes 
and involved in dynamic and complex interactions. Some examples include OASIS [Ljungberg 
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and Lucas, 1992] — an air traﬃc control system; ADEPT [Jennings et al., 1998a] — a business 
process management system, and the computer game Creatures [Grand and Cliﬀ, 1998]. 
Applications of multi-agent technology have covered a wide range of important industrial 
areas such as information management, process control and electronic commerce [Moulin 
and Chaib-draa, 1996]. 
2.1.1 BDI Agents 
There are many approaches to designing rational agents. A physical stance refers to modeling 
systems based on information about their physical states and natural laws. An intentional 
stance refers to modeling systems as an intentional system having beliefs, desires and in­
tentions. A design stance takes into account information on functionalities of the systems. 
Among these, an intentional stance has been commonly adopted. 
In an intentional stance, an agent’s behavior is based on its beliefs (B), desires (D) and 
intentions (I). In particular, beliefs represent information that an agent has about the world, 
which is often incomplete or may be in many cases incorrect. Desires indicate the states 
that agent wish to be brought about. Intentions are regarded as partial plans that the agent 
commits to carrying out to achieve its goals [Bratman, 1987]. Intentions are used as the causes 
for actions and involve consideration of future actions. Bratman argued that intentions are 
not reducible to beliefs and desires as agents have bounded resources and therefore rather 
than continually weighing up their competing desires and variable beliefs, they must settle on 
some particular course of action. Intentions act as constraints on the reasoning that agents 
use to select an action to perform. Also, the agents must have some form of commitment 
in order to coordinate and plan future actions [Cohen and Levesque, 1990]. In this way, 
intentions provide a screen of admissibility for other future intentions and act as a milestone 
for agents to measure the “success” of their attempts. In relation to desires, intentions are 
regarded as those desires that agents have chosen to commit to achieving [Wooldridge, 2000]. 
[Cohen and Levesque, 1990] proposed a formalism in which intention is deﬁned as a 
temporal sequence of beliefs and desires while Rao and Georgeﬀ developed a formalism for 
BDI systems which treats intention with equal importance as desires and beliefs and also 
speciﬁed the relationships among them [Rao and Georgeﬀ, 1991]. 
Rao and Georgeﬀ ’s formalism utilizes a notion of possible-worlds for rational agents. 
While Cohen and Levesque address each possible world in a time-line structure [Rao and 
Georgeﬀ, 1991], Rao and Georgeﬀ represent them in a time-branching (tree like) structure in 
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a similar manner to CTL* ([Emerson, 1990]). To account for the possibilities in the future, 
many possible-worlds are used to specify the possible circumstances of the environment. 
Options for agents to select are speciﬁed within each possible world. From each particular 
time point in a time tree-like structure that models the world, a set of worlds represents 
the worlds that agents believe to be possible. These are belief-accessible worlds. Similarly, 
there are desire-accessible worlds and intention-accessible worlds. Rao and Georgeﬀ also 
speciﬁed an inter-relationship among these worlds and their compatibility, which helps to 
avoid unwanted side eﬀects. They also formalized inner determinism (self) on the agents’ 
actions and outer determinism (decided by the world) on the outcomes of actions. 
[Wooldridge, 2000] took a further step by adding a temporal component and an action 
component in the LORA framework. The resulting logic uses constructs built on top of 
classical logic and modal logic to capture properties and relations of agents, their beliefs, 
desires and intentions together with their actions and resulting eﬀects in a temporal dynamic 
manner [Wooldridge, 2000]. 
However, as discussed in [Harland and Winikoﬀ, 2004], there is a gap between BDI model 
theories and BDI implementations. Indeed, while BDI theories focus on relationships among 
possible worlds of beliefs, desires and intentions, most implemented BDI architectures are 
built around beliefs, events and plans. 
2.2 Flexible Protocols 
2.2.1 Agent Interaction Protocols 
In single-agent systems, agents reason about choices for their own actions while considering 
changes in the environment. In multi-agent systems, agents are often self-interested, aiming 
to maximizing their own utility and achieving their own goals. Agents are also of diﬀerent 
designs and come from diﬀerent sources. One agent’s interests may be in conﬂict with others. 
Due to the presence of other agents, more possibilities are required in the agents’ reasoning. 
On the one hand, agents have to co-exist with each other as they share the same environment 
and many resources. On the other hand, they exercise their social abilities in such a way 
that they interact to take advantage of each other’s resources and capacities to achieve their 
respective goals more eﬀectively or more eﬃciently than they could alone. Communication 
among agents enables them to coordinate their actions and behavior to achieve system overall 
coherence. Indeed, the ability to engage in high-level social interactions and to operate in 
ﬂexible organizational structures is a fundamental requirement of agent systems [Jennings, 
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2000]. 
To understand how interactions can be constructed, we consider an approach [Kinny, 
1999; d’Inverno et al., 1998] that deploys the notions of services and tasks. Services refer to 
the work provided by agents to meet requests of other agents or humans. When a request for 
services is sent, the other agent must either decline or accept. If it accepts, a service agreement 
is formed which imposes certain obligations on the involved parties. These obligations are 
decomposed into tasks. Tasks are smaller units of work which are part of the services and 
are assigned when agents accept a service request. Tasks are then the main medium for 
interaction during the provision of services. The involved agents may need to perform tasks 
for the execution of the service. During service execution, the requester of services may 
cancel the agreed services or suspend or resume them. When all tasks of the service have 
been carried out, the service agreement is fulﬁlled. If there are no pending requests or 
execution of services, the interaction ends. 
Agent interactions are underpinned by communication protocols at various levels includ­
ing the lowest level of interconnection, the level of format and syntax of exchange information, 
and the highest level, which is concerned with the meaning and semantics of the informa­
tion. Once communication protocols are deﬁned and agreed upon, interaction protocols can 
be used. Unlike communication protocols, interaction protocols are more concerned with a 
series of messages rather than the exchange of a single message. To be more speciﬁc, interac­
tion protocols include structured sequences or patterns of interactive actions and involve two 
or more roles and exchanges of communicative messages among the agents. Usually, agents 
are presented with several alternative interactive actions of the protocol and they have to 
choose according to their own internal strategies. The protocols are, indeed, concerned with 
the perspective of the interaction rather than of a particular agent. 
A growing area of research on Agent Communication Languages (ACLs) addresses the 
concerns regarding issues such as format of exchange messages, semantic models of these 
messages, conversation policies (or protocols), and shared ontologies and content languages 
[Kone et al., 2000]. In particular, issues regarding message format usually include primitive 
communicative acts and message parameters like sender, receiver, ID, and language. Com­
municative acts are deﬁned in most traditional ACLs based on Speech Act theory [Searle, 
1969], which reﬂects ideas from language philosophy. Moreover, making sure that messages 
are interpreted correctly and consistently relies on the semantics of ACLs. While many ap­
proaches to semantics are centered around agent mental attitudes (beliefs and intentions), 
others emerge from the concept of social agency [Singh, 1998]. Conversation policies which 
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can be thought of as [Greaves et al., 1999] “general constraints on the sequences of semanti­
cally coherent messages leading to a goal ”, are made up of pre-deﬁned patterns of interaction 
that govern agent communication. Typical patterns include implementations of direct com­
munication protocols, the contract net protocol, and the mediated communication protocol. 
Several examples of ACLs include The Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language 
(KQML) [Patil et al., 1998], the ARTIMIS Communication Language(ARCOL) [Sadek et al., 
1997], the FIPA standard ACL [FIPA, 1999], the InterAgent Communication Language (ICL) 
[Martin et al., 1999] and social semantics approaches like [Singh, 1998; Colombetti, 1998; 
2000]. [Kone et al., 2000] provides a comprehensive review of ACLs. Among approaches to 
ACLs, increasingly popular are those based on the notion of social agency. As argued in 
[Singh, 1998], traditional approaches like KQML and ARCOL have several drawbacks. In 
particular, for example, KQML and ARCOL lack a public perspective in the meaning of 
their communicative acts, which hinders eﬀorts to check for compliance with standardized 
meanings. Also, coverage of communicative acts (assertive, directive, commissive, permis­
sive, prohibitive, declarative, and expressive) is very limited and hence it prevents agents 
from functioning eﬀectively in complex social relationships. A commitment-based semantics 
approach to ACLs overcomes these drawbacks and promotes design autonomy and execution 
autonomy of agents [Singh, 1998]. 
Our approach also embraces the idea of social agency semantics for agent communication, 
although designing a particular ACL is beyond our scope of research. We instead focus on 
the higher levels of protocol interaction. 
In a multi-agent environment, agents act under global constraints and must deal with 
issues such as conﬂicts over shared resources, deadlock, livelock, dependencies between agent 
actions, and a potential inability to accomplish system goals due to a lack of competence, 
resources or information. This makes it critical for agents to coordinate their actions with the 
anticipated actions of other agents. In particular, they must have the ability to to determine 
shared goals and common tasks, prevent unnecessary conﬂicts, and to accumulate and share 
knowledge [Huhns and Stephens, 1999]. 
The design of interaction protocols should observe the following criteria [Fornara and 
Colombetti, 2003]: 
•	 interaction consists of legal sequences of communicative acts whose meanings are well-
deﬁned in an application-independent library of communicative acts in a standard agent 
communication language 
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•	 accommodation of both purely reactive agents (which blindly follow the protocols) and 
deliberate agents (which reason about their actions) 
•	 eﬀective veriﬁcation of the protocols’ speciﬁcations is supported 
In traditional approaches to specifying agent interaction protocols, such as those used in 
distributed computing or computer networks, protocols are often predetermined sequences of 
interactive behaviors with predeﬁned roles for agents. Agents play their roles by following a 
pre-determined set of instructions. Any choices in these protocols are hardwired in advance 
with pre-speciﬁed conditions, leaving the agent no scope for any autonomous choice of its 
own. Accordingly, the success of these interaction protocols depends crucially on how well 
any changes in the environment can be predicted in advance. 
Many formal description techniques have been used to specify these protocols. Finite 
State Machines are a well-known formalism which have been used in many context, and 
also to deﬁne agent interaction protocols [Barbuceanu and Fox, 1995; Kuwabara et al., 1995; 
Haddadi, 1995]. Formal speciﬁcation languages like Z [Spivey, 1992] or those based on tem­
poral logic [Finger et al., 1993; Fisher and Wooldridge, 1994] have also been used to formally 
specify protocols. For example, Z was deployed [d’Inverno et al., 1998] to specify protocols 
used for the Agentis agent interaction model [Kinny, 1999]. There are approaches that make 
use of Petri nets to specify protocols [Cost et al., 1999; 2000; Mazouzi et al., 2002]. Other 
approaches build bridges between agents and tools like standard UML to develop methods 
to specify agent interaction protocols [Lind, 2002] with a focus on activity diagrams. 
An extension of UML was derived as Agent UML to model agent interactions [Odell et al., 
2001]. Agent UML uses three layers which contain templates and packages to represent the 
overall protocol and various principal types of diagrams to capture both intra-agent and 
inter-agent dynamics. Another approach applies modiﬁcations to many aspects of UML 
such as protocol diagrams, agent roles, extended UML message semantics and nested and 
interleaved protocols [Bauer et al., 2000]. Others recast description techniques for Agent 
UML interaction diagrams using UML 2.0 [Huget and Odell, 2004] or extend UML with 
features appropriate for electronic commerce and supply chain management [Huget, 2002]. 
Given a speciﬁcation of an interaction protocol, it is important to verify that agent 
interactions actually conform to the speciﬁcation. Several techniques have been designed 
to address the veriﬁcation task with respect to speciﬁcations. Veriﬁcation can be done at 
design time, at run time or after the interactions ﬁnish. Approaches to ensuring that agents 
respect interaction protocols vary in the way the speciﬁcation is given and the veriﬁcation 
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techniques used. In one approach, formal speciﬁcation techniques for interaction protocols 
are used as a basis for veriﬁcation of protocols [d’Inverno et al., 1998]. In another approach, 
model checking is utilized to verify speciﬁcations [Wen and Mizoguchi, 1999]. Model checking 
is based on explicit enumeration of all possible computation paths to check for satisfaction 
of desirable system properties, and then returns either that all properties are satisﬁed or 
a counterexample. Some approaches are based on theorem proving techniques [Fisher and 
Wooldridge, 1997], which makes use of the underlying logic of the system. Others [Endriss 
et al., 2003] represent protocols as if-then rules which can be checked for conformance in 
advance or enforced at run time, based on the logical interpretation of the system, and not 
the dialogue history and conditions related to the agents’ private knowledge base. 
However, traditional approaches to protocol speciﬁcation specify protocols which are 
too rigid for agent systems. Predeﬁned sequences of interactive behaviors demand that 
only actions that are within the speciﬁcations are legal. As a result, agents cannot adopt 
new actions or alter their interactive action sequences to deal with changes. Hence, when 
critical changes in the environment take place frequently, these protocols can quickly become 
obsolete. 
2.2.2 Flexibility in Agent Interaction Protocols 
To cope with frequent and unexpected changes in operating environments, protocols should 
be designed not only to capture the legitimate sequences of actions but also to be altered 
at run time as appropriate. Speciﬁcation of protocols should accommodate various run time 
options and allow agents to reason about appropriate actions and cope with ongoing changes. 
In other words, protocols should be ﬂexible. In more concrete terms, the desirable ﬂexibility 
of protocols is characterized [Yolum and Singh, 2002b] as: 
•	 ensuring preservation of an agent’s autonomy in its interactive behaviors, and con­
straining agents only to the extent necessary to run the protocol; 
•	 accommodating agents of diﬀerent architectures, designs and strategies; and 
•	 allowing agents to explore arising opportunities to make a better choice or simplify 
the interaction and handle exceptions that result from unexpected behaviors of other 
agents or from the environment. 
The ﬁrst item addresses the vital property of agents as being autonomous in the context of 
structured interaction. Rigid protocols are those that dictate interactive behaviors for agents 
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— what and when to carry out a pre-determined course of action. Flexible speciﬁcations 
permit agents to follow their respective strategies and internal deliberation as far as possible 
and do not constrain agents beyond the core nature of the interaction they describe. 
The second item is concerned with how speciﬁcation of protocols is not designed for 
a particular design group of agents but generally enough for agents having numerous dif­
ferent designs and/or architectures. Also, protocols should be speciﬁed without imposing 
constraints on the set of strategies that agents can deploy. Our approach however does not 
focus on achieving this second criterion, although we do not make any particular assumptions 
about our agents’ design, architecture, or set of interaction strategies. 
In order to achieve ﬂexibility in interaction protocols, several approaches have been used. 
For example, one approach provides formal speciﬁcations of agent interaction which are a 
part of a wider concept of electronic institution [Esteva et al., 2001]. The approach considers 
agents’ roles and the meanings of exchange messages but to a limited extent. 
Another approach [Cheong and Winikoﬀ, 2006a] aims to achieve ﬂexibility and robust­
ness in interaction by using the Hermes methodology for goal-oriented design of interaction. 
Instead of pre-deﬁning sequences of interactive actions, the protocols designers can spec­
ify high level concepts like goals, available actions and temporal constraints. Interactive 
messages then emerge as agents decide which actions to take to fulﬁll the interaction goals 
while satisfying the constraints. The Hermes methodology starts with identifying the roles of 
agents and interaction goals. Interaction goals are reﬁned into a hierarchy of sub-goals with 
temporal constraints (dependencies) among them. Roles in interaction are then assigned to 
these sub-goals to determine the participation of agents. Actions that are available to achieve 
goals and their temporal constraints are determined for each goal, which is reﬂected in action 
maps. While the action maps show all possible execution sequences, action sequence dia­
grams are used to capture possible sequences of actions and can be used to check for coverage 
of action maps with respect to the goal hierarchy. Interactive messages can be determined 
between actions in action sequence diagrams. Action failures can be handled by retrying the 
actions or selecting another possible action. Goal failures can be handled by terminating the 
current interaction and/or rolling back to a previous goal. This handling of goal failure can be 
speciﬁed in terms of permissions for termination and/or rollback of each goal. Furthermore, 
design artifacts are mapped into collections of plans for agents [Cheong and Winikoﬀ, 2006b]. 
Such collections contain coordination plans for coordinating the agents’ actions via rules on 
temporal constraints and relationships among subgoals in the goal hierarchy; achievement 
plans for pursuing interaction goals; and interface plans for converting interaction messages 
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into events and goal events for the agents’ internal processing. Overall, the Hermes method­
ology adds a certain degree of ﬂexibility and robustness to agent interaction by allowing 
interaction messages to emerge as agents act to fulﬁll interaction goals under constraints and 
by the inclusion of failure handling mechanisms [Cheong and Winikoﬀ, 2006a]. 
[Kakas et al., 2004; 2005] provides a framework which represents protocols at two levels — 
normal and exceptional sets of preferred interactive actions in accordance with the contexts 
of interaction. Various context-dependent protocol versions captured in a uniform theory 
can cover diﬀerent aspects of the protocol under diﬀerent circumstances or as perceived by 
diﬀerent agents, which oﬀers a high degree of ﬂexibility. The authors went further to model 
a theory that describes individual strategies of agents. Strategies of agents are modeled con­
sidering a variety of situations in which interactions can take place as well as the dynamically 
changing circumstances of the interactions. This modeling helps agents to exhibit adaptable 
behaviors according to the interaction contexts and their particular roles. The two theories, 
one describing public protocols and the other describing individual agent strategies, can then 
be uniﬁed under one expressive representation framework. The overall decision of which ac­
tions to use is based on a consideration of both theories via argumentation-based reasoning 
that depends on the contexts, which, as a result, provides ﬂexibility in agent interaction. 
The interplay between research in formal dialectics and in multi-agent systems has demon­
strated its potential via much recent work in the ﬁeld of dialectic models of protocols [Reed, 
1998]. Research in dialectics is concerned with study of dialectical contexts within which 
arguments are suggested [Hamblin, 1970]. In particular, diﬀerent kinds of fallacies involved 
in argumentation as well as formal notions and tools that deal with them are studied [Maudet 
and Chaib-draa, 2002]. Two diﬀerent approaches that share most of the dialectical principles 
of interaction are dialog-game based approaches and commitment-based approaches. 
Approaches that are based on the notion of commitment deﬁne and attach meanings 
to the agents’ interactive actions, communicative acts or ACL using social commitments 
([Jennings, 1993; Singh, 1998; 2000]) to make protocols more ﬂexible. In particular, Yolum 
and Singh utilized the notion of social commitments to capture the meanings of states and 
actions of protocols, which, as a result, allows agents to reason about them during interaction. 
They view interactions as exchange and manipulation of commitments in a commitment 
machine [Yolum and Singh, 2002a]. Another approach that also deﬁnes interactive actions as 
operations to create or manipulate commitments among agents makes use of event calculus to 
formalize the domain-independent reasoning rules and operations on commitments [Yolum 
and Singh, 2002b; 2004]. These approaches based on social commitments make protocol 
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execution more dependent on the state of the conversation than on the previous messages 
[Singh, 2000]. They provide agents with the ability to follow their commitments, but the 
agents are not obliged to, which hence adds a certain level of ﬂexibility. We will discuss these 
approaches further in Section 2.3.2. 
Nevertheless, many commitment-based approaches to ﬂexible protocols have certain lim­
itations. Firstly, commitment machines require prior speciﬁcation of the commitments to 
be processed during interaction [Yolum and Singh, 2002a]. Agents, however, should be al­
lowed to negotiate the commitments by themselves. Secondly, commitment machines do not 
provide a mechanism for agents to acquire resources or capacities by exchanges with other 
agents. Thirdly, the underlying logic is centered on temporal and classical logic, which are 
not natural for modeling resources. 
While the commitment-based approach utilizes the notion of social commitment to deﬁne 
the semantics of agent communication languages or interactive actions to model protocols 
with ﬂexibility, the dialog-game based approach can be regarded as an extension of it, with 
a treatment of protocols as agent communication structures [Maudet and Chaib-draa, 2002]. 
Several such approaches have been developed [Reed, 1998; Dastani et al., 2001; McBurney 
and Parsons, 2002; Maudet and Evrard, 1998; Chaib-draa et al., 2003], and a critical review 
of these works can be found in [Maudet and Chaib-draa, 2002]. 
Overall, a declarative logic based approach to protocol speciﬁcation, i.e. what is to be 
achieved rather than how to achieve it proves several advantages. A declarative approach 
allows explicit declaration of rules composing protocols. It also supports formal veriﬁcations 
of some properties of the protocols [Singh, 2000] like safety, and liveness. Some examples 
of declarative approaches to speciﬁcations include using a fragment of linear logic — LO 
[Andreoli and Pareschi, 1990], Forum [Miller, 1996] and [Kanovich et al., 1998]. 
Our approach is to specify protocols in a declarative manner. The speciﬁcation also uses 
the concept of commitment to capture the meaning of interaction goals, states and actions to 
allow mean-ends reasoning over them. The next section describes the concept of commitment 
and related literature in detail. 
2.3 Commitments and Related Works 
2.3.1 Coordination 
In distributed and decentralized environments containing many self-interested agents, often 
there are dependencies among the agents’ actions, conﬂicts between shared resources, and 
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global constraints. To work eﬀectively, agents need to coordinate their activities with each 
other [Jennings, 1996]. Coordination is a process in which agents reason about their own 
actions and anticipated actions of others and try to enforce coherence to the behaviors of the 
community. Approaches to provide coordination mechanisms include ([Jennings, 1996]): 
•	 organizational structuring, which deﬁnes the pattern of information and control re­
lationships (authority) among participating entities [Cockburn and Jennings, 1996; 
Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1992; Decker, 1996]; 
•	 exchanging meta-level information, which refers to sending control level information 
about current priorities and focus to each other, such as Partial Global Planning [Dur­
fee, 1996]; and 
•	 multi-agent planning, which details plans for participating agents about their future 
actions and interactions to achieve their respective objectives, which can be either 
centralized [Georgeﬀ, 1983; Cammarata et al., 1988] or decentralized [Corkill, 1979; 
Rosenschein and Genesereth, 1988]. 
Another approach is to use human teamwork models. In particular, like human beings, 
agents need to trust that others are performing their allocated roles and use a governing 
system (conventions) which manage unacceptable behaviors [Fornara and Colombetti, 2002]. 
When humans work together in a team, their mental states have vital roles in coordination 
[Levesque et al., 1990; Cohen and Levesque, 1991]. The use of intentions creates stability and 
predictability in the agents’ actions [Woolridge, 2002]. Moreover, having individual intentions 
toward a common goal and having a kind of collective intention toward that goal diﬀer in 
that the latter exerts a certain level of responsibility toward the other members of the team 
[Levesque et al., 1990]. Hence, intentions embody aspects that are of vital importance to 
agent interactions. 
Breaking down the mechanism of intention, [Cohen and Levesque, 1990] derived the pre­
liminary importance of interpersonal commitments. Prior to the work, [Fikes, 1982] indicated 
that in an informal domain like oﬃce work, its functioning relies heavily on the formation, 
negotiation, satisfaction, monitor and discharge of workers’ commitments to one another. 
[Winograd and Flores, 1987] also recognized social commitments as foundation for social 
interaction in such environments. Later, [Jennings, 1996] also discussed how commitment 
underlines intention. It went further to argue that commitment and its governing mecha­
nism (convention) lay the foundation for coordination among agents in multi-agent systems 
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[Jennings, 1993; 1996]. 
2.3.2 Commitments 
“All coordination mechanisms can ultimately be reduced to commitments and their associ­
ated conventions” - Jennings [Jennings, 1993]. 
We investigate the use of the notion of commitment to facilitate agent interaction. 
Commitments refer to strong promises of the agents to undertake some course of action. 
Commitments hence are mainly concerned with future actions. For example, a sales agent is 
supposed to deliver the goods once the customer has paid. The agent makes a promise that 
it will deliver the goods in time whenever customers pay. This promise is expected to be kept 
under standard conditions and hence will aﬀect the agent in its subsequent behaviors. This 
promise is captured by the concept of a commitment of the sales agent, which is advertised 
to customers as an incentive to make payments. 
Agents can have internal commitments involving only themselves [Bratman, 1987; Cohen 
and Levesque, 1990], social commitments made from one agent to another agent to carry 
out a certain course of action [Castelfranchi, 1995; Singh, 1999] or joint commitments to an 
overall goal [Levesque et al., 1990]. Singh further analyzed the roles of internal commitments 
(psychological commitments) and social commitments [Singh, 1996]. Internal commitments 
arise within agents as in their intention to achieve certain conditions and do not require 
the agents to be liable to others. Social commitments emerge as agents interact and hold 
agents accountable to others and hence contribute to coordination and coherence of agents’ 
activities. Social commitments are a powerful abstraction mechanism for agent interaction. 
The role of commitment has been recognized as signiﬁcant in agent interaction. In­
deed, persistence of commitments oﬀers a certain level of stability [Wooldridge and Jennings, 
1994] and predictability, which is especially useful when agents deal with issues of inter­
dependencies, global constraints or resources sharing [Jennings, 1993]. Commitments allow 
other agents to make assumptions about the agent’s actions and determine their own actions 
accordingly. Hence, the notion of commitment helps agents to overcome the uncertainty 
caused by the distribution of control among agents, which is typical in multi-agent systems 
[Jennings, 1993]. 
There have been approaches treating commitments as psychological constructs [Grosz 
and Sidner, 1990; Levesque et al., 1990] which are related to BDI models of agents and social 
constructs [Singh, 1997]. The former captures persistence in agent intentions and relies on 
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mutual beliefs among agents. For example, cancellation of commitments is approached by 
demanding that participating agents must reach a mutual belief that the commitments have 
been cancelled [Singh, 1997]. However, mutual beliefs require agents to hold beliefs about 
each others’ beliefs to an unbounded level of nesting, which is quite impractical without 
simplifying assumptions, especially when communication is not guaranteed [Singh, 1996]. 
The latter approach, using social constructs, argues that social constructs are not dependent 
on psychological constructs [Singh, 1997]. Social commitments bind the committing agents 
to other agents or a community and makes a distinction between debtor and creditor of the 
commitments. 
While the notion of commitment imposes constraints on the agents’ subsequent behav­
iors, conventions provide a monitoring mechanism for commitments, such as under which 
circumstances commitments are reassessed, and then retained or corrected or broken [Jen­
nings, 1993]. In fact, conventions determine the degree of ﬂexibility and reactivity of agents’ 
behaviors [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1994]. 
Moreover, in conventions, the constraints on commitments are speciﬁed in accordance 
with characteristics of the operating environment. In particular, how often an agent re­
assesses its commitments depends on the characteristics of the environment such as the 
frequency of changes, and the degree of uncertainty. The corresponding penalties and reme­
dies for an agent’s breaches or rectiﬁcation of commitments depend on the degree of trust, 
interdependencies and the level of complexity present in the environments of interactions 
[Jennings, 1993]. Conventions indeed provide the ﬂexibility necessary for cooperating agents 
to cope with changes in dynamic environments [Jennings, 1996]. 
Much work has been focused on using the concept of commitment to model agent inter­
action. 
Commitment is well recognized via the interplay between commitments and the struc­
ture of multi-agent systems [Singh, 1999]. This also shows that many other concepts like 
obligations, taboos, and conventions can be captured as diﬀerent kinds of commitments. 
To implement agent interaction, Jennings argued the use of commitments and conventions 
as a foundation [Jennings, 1993]. Commitment has been recognized as an essential mechanism 
for coordinating activities among cooperative agents [Sen and Durfee, 1994]. Indeed, explicit 
interactions among agents base their meaning on commitments among communicating agents 
[Singh, 1999]. Commitment has been used to express the meaning of communication mes­
sages among interactive agents, whether it is deﬁned operationally using the object-oriented 
paradigm [Fornara and Colombetti, 2002] or as a construct in a logic system [Yolum and 
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Singh, 2002b]. Interaction protocols can be deﬁned in this way, based on the meanings of 
communicative acts [Fornara and Colombetti, 2003; Flores and Kremer, 2004]. 
Resolving conﬂicts among commitments within agents then becomes essential to ensure 
coordination among the agents’ activities. Eﬀective handling of commitments among agents 
requires timely dissemination of information on commitments, keeping participating agents 
aware of relevant conventions as well as knowledge about interdependencies among commit­
ments [Jennings, 1993]. 
Haddadi developed a theory that takes an internal perspective of agents to reason about 
their behaviors, based on BDI architectures which focused on the interplay between beliefs, 
desires and intentions [Haddadi, 1995]. The theory extends to reasoning about cooperating 
with other agents using commitment as the fundamental construct for interaction. An agent 
to agent commitment is one that once it is reached between a pair of agents, it becomes a 
mutual promise to be followed by both agents. Commitments between two agents are for­
malized in terms of the conditions under which commitments are formed and maintained. 
Various stages of commitment formation such as determining potential for cooperation, mak­
ing pre-commitments and making commitments are also formalized. A framework in which 
agents can reason about these stages to form interaction is provided [Haddadi, 1995]. 
Several other approaches deﬁne the semantics for agent communication languages and 
communicative acts (and to a variety of extents, interaction protocols) based on social com­
mitments. In the ALBATROSS framework, [Colombetti, 2000] deﬁned the semantics of agent 
language based on social commitments in a temporal logic based on CTL* ([Emerson, 1990]). 
It also recognized the notion of pre-commitment, which, when accepted by the agent it is 
addressed to, becomes a commitment. Another approach [Fornara and Colombetti, 2003] 
makes use of commitment-based meanings of exchange messages and allows the speciﬁcation 
of the preconditions and eﬀects of the performance of communicative acts and veriﬁcation of 
protocol’s soundness according to criteria that are related to the meaning of the exchanged 
messages. Similarly, the approach [Flores and Kremer, 2002] further emphasized that com­
mitments are also the binding factors of the conversations via the notion of conversational 
commitments. 
The notion of social commitment has also been used to attach meanings to agents’ inter­
active actions and states in a declarative manner and allowed protocols to be captured via 
the concept of a commitment machine [Yolum and Singh, 2002a]. A commitment machine is 
deﬁned as the possible states of the interaction, operations for state transitions and possible 
ﬁnal states. These states and actions have declarative semantic content in terms of commit­
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ments. In particular, a state is speciﬁed by those commitments that are in force. Actions 
are determined by the eﬀects they have on commitments. New states can then be logically 
inferred from the meanings of current states and actions performed. 
Hence, rather than specifying protocols as sequences of interactive actions, their approach 
speciﬁes protocols in terms of laying out the meanings that are legal in the protocol and the 
ﬁnal meanings. Executing a protocol then becomes reaching a desirable state by logical 
inference of actions that alter the meaning of intermediate states appropriately. The use of 
commitments make the protocol more ﬂexible as it allows diverse sequences of interactive 
actions as long as they can reach desired ﬁnal states. The commitment machine approach also 
has the advantage that commitment machines can be formally compiled into deterministic 
ﬁnite state machines which are sound and complete with respect to the computations allowed 
by the commitment machines. 
This line of work on commitment machines is furthered by an attempt to provide the 
ability to reason about cancellation of commitments under exceptional cases. For example, 
a commitment to pay is canceled when the goods delivered are damaged and returned to the 
company. The attempt uses non-monotonic causal logic [Giunchiglia et al., 2004] to allow 
such defeasible reasoning about commitments [Chopra and Singh, 2004] instead of classical 
logic in which it is quite cumbersome to implement such an ability. 
Another approach to specifying interaction protocols as operations on commitments uses 
event calculus [Kowalski and Sergot, 1986] to formalize the reasoning rules and operations on 
commitments [Yolum and Singh, 2002b]. Event calculus has been shown to have advantages 
for representing traditional network protocols clearly and precisely, when compared with 
traditional approaches using process algebra [Denecker et al., 1996]. Moreover, to reach a 
higher degree of ﬂexibility of agent interactions, rather than specifying conditions or ﬁxed 
penalties for breaking commitments via conventions, agents are provided with a reasoning 
ability such as weighting the ongoing cost of executing current commitments at various stages 
together with penalties for replacing commitments [Excelente-Toledo et al., 2001]. 
Other works address several issues concerning the use of the notion of commitment to 
facilitate agent interaction [Amgoud et al., 2000b;a; Guerin and Pitt, 2001]. One approach 
[Mallya et al., 2003] represents explicitly the time constraints of commitments using Compu­
tational Tree Logic [Emerson, 1990] on commitment constructs and provides reasoning about 
those temporal aspects in a domain-independent manner. Another [Xing and Singh, 2003] 
also addresses the handling of time constraints of commitments and further identiﬁes several 
commitment patterns and agent behavior models and their compatibility. Normal interactive 
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conversations of agents are converted into commitments and their relationships are identiﬁed 
in order to construct behavioral models of the participating agents which can successfully 
capture commitment-level interaction protocols [Wan and Singh, 2003]. Yet another [Sen 
and Durfee, 1994] also argues for the use of commitments to deal ﬂexibly with dynamic en­
vironments. Adaptive strategies for making commitments in the domain of distributed task 
scheduling are also investigated in relation to environment factors. 
For applications in the domain of e-commerce, a meta-model for inter-operation that is 
particularly suitable for ﬂexible agent interactions in e-commerce was proposed [Xing et al., 
2001]. Moreover, commitment-based speciﬁcation is also applied to business processes in Web 
applications based on protocols [Singh et al., 2004]. A methodology and software tool for 
specifying interaction as rule-based commitment protocols using the Web Ontology Language 
(OWL) and the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL) were also derived to facilitate business 
process designers [Mallya et al., 2005]. 
In summary, ﬂexibility of protocols can be obtained by the use of the notion of commit­
ment in several aspects. Commitments bring meaning into an agents’ goals and interactive 
actions. Moreover, commitments facilitate coordination as they motivate agents to perform 
expected behaviors. Our work reinforces the use of commitments to model interactions ﬂex­
ibly. 
2.3.3 A Model of Agent Negotiation on Commitments 
The process of means-end reasoning is reasoning about how to achieve a goal state. It can 
be expressed as reasoning about “chance + choice + commitment” [Rao and Georgeﬀ, 1993]. 
From the perspective of BDI agents, reasoning about choices means reasoning about the 
decisions that an agent can make based on what it believes possible and what it desires to 
achieve. Chances refer to the possibilities brought by the environment. An agent’s commit­
ment to itself or to another agent expresses situations in which the agent should carry out a 
chosen course of action and under what conditions it should release the commitment. 
[Haddadi, 1995] considered commitments between agents in the form of joint intentions 
[Cohen and Levesque, 1991; Rao et al., 1992] to achieve joint goals. Taking an internal per­
spective, the work deﬁnes a joint goal as a goal that is delegated to another agent or adopted 
from another agent. Commitments in this setting are referred to as mutual commitments 
in which both agents agree on the terms of cooperation and in the case of BDI agents, also 
mutually believe that they both want to commit. 
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Engagement of two agents in a mutual commitment can be achieved in two phases: a 
pre-commitment phase and a commitment phase [Haddadi, 1995]. 
In the pre-commitment phase, agents exchange proposals indicating what they are willing 
to commit. The proposals are in a form of pre-commitment that shows an agent is willing 
to commit to doing an action or achieving a state (under some conditions) if the other agent 
also wants it to. A pre-commitment is not an commitment but a willingness to commit and 
requires an agreement from the other party before it can become a commitment. 
Haddadi’s work further considers two cooperative contexts — task delegation and task 
adoption [Haddadi, 1995]. Task delegation means delegating achievement of a goal to another 
agent, while task adoption means adopting achievement of another agent’s goal. Task dele­
gation and adoption are essential aspects of the cooperative problem solving process among 
agents. 
Pre-commitments can then be classiﬁed into pre-commitments for task delegation and 
pre-commitments for task adoption. We denote a subscript “d” for task delegation and “a” 
for task adoption. Given ϕ is a TTL formula, pre-commitments are [Haddadi, 1995]: 
•	 (Pre commitd α β ϕ) which means that agent α pre commits to delegating to agent β 
the task of achieving ϕ. 
•	 (Pre commita β α ϕ) which means that agent β pre commits to adopting the task of 
achieving ϕ for agent α. 
With similar denotation as above, mutual commitments can be classiﬁed as ([Haddadi, 1995]): 
•	 (Commitd α β ϕ) means that agent α commits to choosing agent β to achieve ϕ. 
•	 (Commita β α ϕ) means that agent β commits to achieving ϕ for agent α 
To respond to a proposal of a pre-commitment, the other agent can agree or disagree 
to the proposal or propose another pre-commitment. Negotiation can be carried out in this 
manner on pre-commitments. 
In the two contexts of task delegation and adoption, to accept a proposal of a pre-
commitment of task delegation, an agent needs to make the corresponding pre-commitment 
of task adoption and vice versa. The other agent can then indicate its acceptance by informing 
its respective pre-commitment or its later derived commitment. For example, when agent 
α makes a pre-commitment of delegating the task ϕ to agent β (Pre commitd α β ϕ), it 
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also requires the agent β to make a pre-commitment of adopting the task ϕ from agent α 
(Pre commita β α ϕ). 
A pre-commitment can turn into a commitment when itself and its corresponding pre-
commitment of task delegation/adoption are both evident to both parties [Haddadi, 1998]. 
When two pre-commitments turn into commitments, the process moves to the commitment 
phase. In the commitment phase, both parties are engaged in a mutual commitment on the 
task via their respective commitments on the task’s delegation/adoption. The two agents 
then actually commence performing the relevant actions. 
Having discussed the role of commitment in agent interaction and commitment-based 
approaches to achieve ﬂexibility in interaction, we now turn to work describing the use of 
logic as a formalism for modeling interaction. 
2.4 Temporal Logic - Computational Tree Logic* 
2.4.1 Temporal Logic 
Temporal logic (TL) can be regarded as a formal system which addresses the description and 
reasoning about the changes in truth values of logic expressions over time [Emerson, 1990]. 
Temporal logic is a special class of modal logic ([Lewis, 1918]). One of the main themes of 
use of TL is for reasoning about concurrent programs. Temporal logic introduces temporal 
operators like “sometimes”, “always”, “next” and “until” to encode the time relationships 
among logic formulas. In particular, “� A” means A is true sometimes, “ � A” means that  
A is always true, “ �A” means that A is true from the next time point, and A B asserts 
that A is true until a time when B is true. 
There are diﬀerent kinds of temporal logic systems. A review of their diﬀerent kinds and 
their applications can be found in [Emerson, 1990]. Temporal logic systems can be classiﬁed 
along various dimensions — as either propositional or ﬁrst order, as global or compositional, 
as branching or linear, as points-based or intervals-based, as discrete or continuous and as 
referring to past tense or future tense. Propositional TL is the natural extension of classi­
cal propositional logic while ﬁrst-order TL contains expressions constructed from variables, 
constants, functions, predicates, and quantiﬁers. There are “global” TL systems that al­
low global reasoning about a complete concurrent program and also “compositional” TL 
systems that allow reasoning about program fragments and combining correctness proofs of 
constituent sub-programs (as lemmas) into a proof of the whole program. The treatment of 
time in TL systems can be linear where at each moment, there is only one future moment, 
28 Temporal Logic - Computational Tree Logic* 
or branching (tree-like nature), where there may be several diﬀerent possible alternative fu­
tures for each moment. Moreover, when temporal operators are evaluated regarding truth 
values against points in time, the TL systems are referred to as points-based systems. In 
contrast, intervals-based TL systems have temporal operators evaluated over periods of time, 
which may simplify checking certain correctness properties. The structure of time as discrete 
– where consecutive moments correspond to consecutive program states – or continuous – 
such as containing real numbers rather than non-negative integers – is also a diﬀerentiating 
factor. Lastly, temporal operators of TL systems can be intentionally regarded as describing 
past or future occurrences of events, corresponding to past tense or future tense TL sys­
tems respectively. Most TL systems for reasoning about concurrency are future tense where 
they consider only the starting state and its (future) subsequents. However, the inclusion of 
past tense operators can make speciﬁcations more natural and expressive [Lichtenstein et al., 
1985]. Overall, research has been concentrated on global, points-based, discrete time and 
future tense TL systems [Emerson, 1990]. 
Regarding its contribution to reasoning about multi-agent systems, temporal logic was 
proposed in 1977 [Pnueli, 1977] as a tool for reasoning about reactive systems. For example, 
it is quite elegant to express in temporal logic a typical property of reactive systems such 
as “if a request is sent, then a response is eventually given”. Temporal logic operators are 
quite suitable for describing and reasoning about continuously operating programs or non­
terminating computations for ongoing interactions which are referred to as reactive systems 
[Emerson, 1990]. 
Moreover, temporal logic can be also used for the speciﬁcation and veriﬁcation of con­
current and reactive programs [Emerson, 1990]. In these systems, the principle task is main­
taining an ongoing interaction with the environment in which intermediate outputs of the 
systems might be used as feedback to subsequent intermediate inputs to the systems. As the 
systems can continuously operate for an arbitrary long period or be non-terminating, ﬁnal 
states generally cannot be determined. Hence, approaches that use initial state/ﬁnal state 
semantics to specify the system behaviors are no longer adequate. Temporal operators like 
sometimes or always, however, can be suitable for asserting reactive systems’ behaviors and 
properties. 
In verifying of such concurrent and reactive systems, correctness properties like liveness 
and safety are typically of major concern [Pnueli, 1977; Emerson, 1990]. Safety or invari­
ance properties demand that each ﬁnite preﬁx of a (possibly inﬁnite) computation satisﬁes 
certain requirements. Liveness properties require that some ﬁnite preﬁxes of a computation 
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meet requirements a certain number of times. Informally, safety properties states that “noth­
ing bad happens” while liveness properties express the notion that “something desired will 
(eventually) happen”. 
Veriﬁcation can then be carried out in two main ways – proof-theoretic and model-
theoretic [Emerson, 1990]. The heart of the proof-theoretic approach is making use of a 
formal deductive system of TL which contains axioms and inference rules while manually 
composing the program’s correctness proof for a certain TL speciﬁcation. The advantage of 
this approach lies in human intuition that guides the proof search; the disadvantage is that 
carrying out the proof manually is often diﬃcult and tedious. On the other hand, the model-
theoretic approach automates the tasks of program construction and veriﬁcation by using 
decision procedures to manipulate the corresponding temporal models of the program and 
speciﬁcations. A decision procedure takes a TL speciﬁcation formula P and decides if P is 
satisﬁable or not. In particular, for the case of protocols, which are often considered as ﬁnite 
state concurrent systems, model checking is more likely to be done automatically in practice. 
In fact, when the global state transition graph of ﬁnite state concurrent systems is treated 
as a ﬁnite temporal logic structure, a model checking algorithm can be applied to check 
if the structure is a model of a TL formula representing a certain correctness speciﬁcation 
and hence, meets the requirement of the speciﬁcation. Compared with the proof-theoretic 
approach, the model checking approach seems to be more widely applicable in practice. For 
example, model checking was successfully used for a mutual exclusion problem [Clarke et al., 
1986], and in the areas of designing sequential circuits [Browne et al., 1985; Dill and Clarke, 
1990]. 
2.4.2 Computational Tree Logic* (CTL*) 
CTL* refers to an inﬁnite tree-like branching structure of time [Emerson, 1990]. CTL* is a 
more expressive extension of CTL [Clarke and Emerson, 1982]. In CTL*, the past is regarded 
as deterministic with a linear structure and the future has a branching structure. CTL* takes 
into account the uncertainty of the future by associating possibilities with branches. Formulas 
have their values either determined at each time point or remained static along some future 
paths. As CTL* has a branching structure for time rather than a linear structure, it has 
greater expressiveness, such as allowing quantifying operators over branches to be followed 
by an arbitrary time formula of linear structure [Emerson, 1990]. It also allows Boolean 
combinations and nesting over temporal operators, which makes CTL* in eﬀect a “full” 
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branching time logic [Emerson, 1990]. 
While temporal logics are suitable for modeling temporal properties and relationships, 
when it comes to modeling systems with a resource-conscious view, linear logic and its ex­
tensions seem to be an appropriate choice. In the next section, we will discuss linear logic 
and its use in modeling systems. 
2.5 Linear Logic 
2.5.1 Linear Logic and Its Connectives 
In real life, resources are consumed to bring about new resources or to achieve objectives 
and once being consumed, the resources are no longer available. In logics such as classical or 
temporal logic, however, a direct mapping between resources and formulas is likely to cause 
trouble. In fact, formulas are interpreted as truth values and throughout their existence, they 
can be used again and again, inﬁnitely, in derivations of other formulas. In other words, by 
their truth value interpretation, they inherently demonstrate a sense of unlimited resources. 
In particular, when we consider an implication A ⇒ B, if A is true, then we can derive 
B. After the derivation, A remains unchanged and hence can be reused. If we make a direct 
association of classical logic formulas with resources, for example, we denote: 
• A as “having one dollar”, 
• B as “having a chocolate bar”, 
then it can be read for A ⇒ B as “having one dollar leads to having a chocolate bar”. 
The problem is that the implication allows us to get a chocolate bar while we still have the 
one dollar. The one dollar can then be reused to buy another chocolate bar. This process 
can be repeated countlessly to get unlimited chocolate bar while retaining the one dollar. 
Though this problem can certainly be overcome by careful modeling using extensions of 
classical logic, such a direct and simple mapping between formulas and resources as above is 
diﬃcult to obtain. 
In providing such simple and natural mapping between resources and formulas in linear 
logic, Girard proposed the constraints according to which every formula should be used 
exactly once and its copies should no longer be freely added (duplication) or removed (discard) 
in logic derivations [Alexiev, 1994]. In the above example, such an implication in linear logic 
like A � B will allow A to be removed in deriving B, which means that after using one dollar 
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to buy a chocolate bar, the dollar is gone, hence, providing a natural treatment of formulas 
as resources. Indeed, as a linear implication can not be iterated due to that its conditions 
are consumed (or modiﬁed) after use, it can truly reﬂect the sense of causal relationship in 
real life. 
As a result of these constraints, linear logic [Girard, 1987a] (LL) was introduced by Girard 
in 1987 as a resource-conscious logic. 
Deduction in LL is typically based on sequent calculus rules. In particular, a logical 
consequence can be written in a form of a sequent: A � B where A is the antecedent 
and B is the succedent. Sequent calculus rules provide ways of transforming sequents while 
preserving deductibility. A proof or a derivation of a goal sequent can be then constructed via 
a sequence of applications of sequent calculus rules which transform a set of system axioms 
into the conclusion sequent. If a proof of a sequent can be regarded as a way to verify a 
logical consequence based on a set of axioms, then LL sequent calculus rules are regarded as 
strategies for the veriﬁcation. 
In terms of sequent calculus, at the heart of the diﬀerences between linear logic and 
classical logic (CL) and most other extensions of CL is the abandonment of two structural 
rules of CL — contraction and weakening. 
Contraction Rule - classical logic 
Γ, ϕ, ϕ � Δ 
Γ, ϕ � Δ 
Γ � ϕ, ϕ, Δ 
Γ � ϕ, Δ 
Weakening Rule - classical logic 
Γ � Δ 
Γ, ϕ � Δ 
Γ � Δ 
Γ � ϕ, Δ 
In a common sense reading, the contraction rule suggests that if we can buy one of the goods 
using several ϕ, then we can buy it with just one ϕ. The weakening rule says that if we can 
buy one of the goods with Γ, then it is acceptable to spend some more ϕ’s without getting 
anything more in exchange. Hence, weakening allows causes without eﬀect. In a more formal 
sense, from a bottom up reading, these rules correspond to the mechanisms of duplication 
and discarding of formulas respectively. 
As a result of removing two classical structural rules, while sequents in CL comprise of 
sets of formulas which are expandable or contracted via duplication and merging, sequents in 
LL are composed of multi-sets of formulas in which the number of occurrences of formulas is 
� 
32 Linear Logic 
important. Moreover, the idempotent property of logic connectives is also adjusted [Alexiev, 
1994] — only some connectives (additive connectives) remain idempotent. 
Another result is that classical conjunction (and) and disjunction (or) were recast sub­
ject to diﬀerent uses of contexts (passive formulas) — multiplicative use as combining and 
additive as sharing. Multiplicative means that contexts are totally separated and must be 
concatenated in the conclusion of inference rules that involves a use of these contexts. Ad­
ditive means a complete sharing of contexts and requires these contexts to be the same. 
[Girard, 1995] described the resulting four logic connectives: 
1.	 Multiplicative conjunction ⊗ (times) with neutral element 1, for example A ⊗ B, 
means that one has both A and B at the same time. 
2.	 Additive conjunction � (with) with neutral element �, for example A�B, stands 
for one’s own choice either of A or B but not both. 
3.	 Additive disjunction ⊕ (plus) with neutral element 0, for example A ⊕ B, stands 
for the possibility of either A or B, but we don’t know which. 
4.	 Multiplicative disjunction � (par) with neutral element ⊥, for example A � B, 
means that if not A then B or vice versa but not both A and B. 
There is a distinction between two conjunctions ⊗ and �. Though both conjunctions express 
the availability of two objects, but with ⊗, we have both, and with � , we have only 
one, according to our choice. For example, given one dollar we can buy a chocolate bar: 
dollar � choc or we can buy a cup of tea: dollar � tea. dollar � choc ⊗ tea means that we 
can buy both with only one dollar, which is not right. On the other hand, dollar � choc � tea 
means that using one dollar, we can buy only one, a chocolate bar or a cup of tea and we 
have a choice. 
Multiplicative disjunction � is also diﬀerent from additive disjunction ⊕. A � B, which 
can be deﬁned as A⊥ � B or B⊥ � A, requires that if A is present then there must be a 
negation of B (as a cause for the presence of A) or vice versa. On the other hand, A ⊕ B 
requires that one is present while a negation of the other may or may not be present. Hence, 
as compared to ⊕, � further exhibits a dependency between two objects A and B. 
Regarding and ⊕, apart from the apparent diﬀerence between a conjunction and a 
disjunction in an additive context, there is also a distinction between them with respect to 
the choice made. With � , the choice is internally determined while with ⊕, the choice is 
externally determined. 
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Negation in LL (.)⊥ still enjoys the property of being involutive as in classical logic, 
i.e. A⊥⊥ = A, while being constructive. The involutive property makes the De Morgan 
laws applicable to all connectives and quantiﬁers. For example, (α ⊗ β)⊥ is equivalent to 
α⊥ � β⊥. Moreover, linear negation was referred to by Girard as expressing duality or a 
change of standpoint. An action of type A is a reaction of type A⊥. With a use of negation, 
linear implication A � B is deﬁned as A⊥ � B. 
In addition, in order to regain the power of the two structural rules — contraction and 
weakening — they are re-introduced in a diﬀerent form. In fact, contraction and weakening 
are maintained in a more controlled manner by having them applicable only to formulas 
marked by the exponential “!” (of course) and its dual “?” (why not). 
Contraction Rule - Linear logic 
Γ, !ϕ, !ϕ � Δ 
Γ, !ϕ � Δ 
Γ �?ϕ, ?ϕ, Δ 
Γ �?ϕ, Δ 
Weakening Rule - Linear logic 
Γ � Δ 
Γ, !ϕ � Δ 
Γ � Δ 
Γ �?ϕ, Δ 
The connective “!” suggests the iterability of an action or the absence of any reaction (cor­
responding to that action). For example, !A means to spend as many As as one may need. ! 
recovers the notion of inﬁnite use of an object in classical logic. For example, implication in 
classical logic A B is modeled as !A � B in linear logic. ⇒ 
Regarding its expressiveness, linear logic is more expressive than classical logic. Indeed, 
the exponentials of linear logic allow it to represent the classical meaning of logic formulas. 
The linear connectives further add more expressive power to linear logic as they can express 
features like updating, and concurrency which demand more complicated handling in classical 
logic. 
The expressiveness of linear logic, however, comes at the price of its computational com­
plexity in deciding provability of linear logic formulas. A survey of the computational com­
plexity of various fragments of linear logic can be found in [Lincoln, 1995]. Some impor­
tant results are that the full propositional linear logic is undecidable and the propositional 
multiplicative-additive fragment of linear logic (MALL) which excludes exponentials ! and 
? is PSPACE-complete [Lincoln et al., 1992]. The propositional multiplicative fragment of 
linear logic which contains only the connectives ⊗ and �, their respective constants and 
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propositions is NP-complete [Kanovich, 1991]. So is the Horn fragment of LL [Kanovich, 
1992]. Even a very limited part, constant-only multiplicative fragment of linear logic, still 
remains NP-complete [Lincoln and Winkler, 1994; Kanovich, 1994]. 
However, the high complexity of LL does not hinder much of its wide applicability [Alex­
iev, 1994]. For example, regarding logic programming, various restrictions can be imple­
mented on the set of allowable formulas and proof search space, such as the work by Andreoli 
on focusing proofs [Andreoli, 1992]. Also, undecidability is not a barrier in the areas of ap­
plications where proof search is not of concern. This is the case when a fragment of linear 
logic is applied as a functional programming language whose logical content of functional 
programs correspond to proofs and computation corresponds to proof reduction, not proof 
search. Examples of applications of linear logic or its fragments in the area of functional 
programming languages include the work [Abramsky, 1993] which gives a computational in­
terpretation of linear logic based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism (or “formulas as types” 
paradigm) [Howard, 1980]; the Linear Abstract Machine [Lafont, 1988], and LILAC [Mackie, 
1994], a functional programming language. 
2.5.2 Proof Theory 
Linear logic has the desirable Cut Elimination property [Alexiev, 1994]. 
Γ � F, Δ Γ�, F � Δ� 
cut
Γ, Γ� � Δ, Δ� 
In the proof search process, the cut rule makes computation diﬃcult as its premises 
contain a formula which is not present at the conclusion, which consequently forces the 
search procedure to make a guess. The Cut Elimination property allows proofs that use the 
Cut rule to be turned into those without using it or into those that have all the instances of 
it pushed up to the leaves of the proof trees. In the latter case, leaves of these proof trees are 
logical axioms or non-logical axioms which can be handled by existing indexing techniques. 
Therefore, the property makes the proof search more eﬃcient. 
Moreover, the sub-formula property can be made applicable in linear logic. The sub-
formula property states that if there is a proof of a formula then there is also a proof of that 
formula in which all formula occurrences are sub-formulas of the conclusion and assumptions. 
This property can signiﬁcantly reduce the set of formulas to be tried in the search. Moreover, 
proof can be, to some extent, encoded directly into the formula to be proved [Andreoli and 
Pareschi, 1991], which corresponds to “syntax-directed proof search”. 
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An investigation [Andreoli, 1992] into proof-theoretical properties of linear logic further 
reveals an eﬀective way for proof search [Alexiev, 1994]. Connectives of linear logic can be 
classiﬁed based on whether they demand a choice to be made in the proof procedure. A 
wrong choice may lead to dead-ends and backtracking. The connectives � , �, ?, and the 
quantiﬁer ∀ require no choice to be made and hence decomposition of the goal formulas can 
be carried out immediately. The connectives ⊗, ⊕, ! and the quantiﬁer ∃ require a choice. 
The choices involved with these connectives can be of which way to split the context, of 
which of the two disjuncts to try on, of whether to remove the exponential, and of which 
concrete term to assign to the variable respectively. If the goal contains only formulas of these 
connectives then one of these formulas is selected for the proof to focus on. This technique 
of focusing proof pays less attention to proof permutations on the order of inference rules 
applied. Also, focusing proofs are complete with respect to full linear logic, which means 
if there is a general proof, then it has a corresponding focusing proof. A language LinLog 
is also provided as a natural base for focusing proofs, together with its mapping from full 
linear logic. Moreover, a constraint-based approach to deal with partial information in proof 
construction was introduced in relation to a formulation of “focusing” property [Andreoli, 
1992]. 
Well-developed proof theories of LL allow a direct computational interpretation of the 
logic [Alexiev, 1994] and constructive proofs of satisﬁability, and hence our approach to 
interactions can closely link the speciﬁcation of protocols with the execution of them. 
2.5.3 Advantages of Linear Logic with respect to Modeling Systems 
Comparing to classical logic and other extensions of it, linear logic has the advantage of taking 
the number of occurrences of formulas into account. This, together with the ability to model 
production and consumption of resources, makes it a natural basis for applications in the 
areas such as object-oriented programming, databases, and natural language parsing [Alexiev, 
1994]. As also remarked by [Girard, 1995], compared to (classical) logic programming, linear 
logic programming is advantageous with respect to updates, inheritance and parallelism. 
A particular area in which linear logic is more advantageous than classical logic is mod­
eling concurrency and parallelism [Girard, 1987b]. The multiplicative connectives of linear 
logic can be used directly as a means of expressing parallelism [Girard, 1987a]. The theo­
retical basis for concurrency based on linear logic has resulted in the development of Linear 
Objects [Andreoli and Pareschi, 1990]. Linear Objects (LO) enjoys properties of both logic 
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and object-oriented programming, such as declarative reading of programs, dynamic changing 
of object states, and structured representation of knowledge via built-in inheritance. Built-in 
inheritance, which means that methods of the “super class” objects are still applicable in the 
specialized objects, stems from the way methods can be invoked. Applicability of an object 
method is determined by having all of the logic literals of its head matched with a subset 
of the literals of the current object states. Consequently, adding more attributes (literals) 
to the object states (specialization) does not make these “superclass” methods inapplicable. 
Moreover, not only do LO clauses make use of � but also they are enriched with � in their 
body. While � can express external concurrency, the use of � can simulate parallel running 
of independent threads, which is referred to as internal concurrency [Bozzano et al., 2004]. 
Furthermore, Linear Objects was extended [Miller, 1996] to incorporate abstraction as well. 
Linear logic manifests its suitability to modeling concurrency also via its tight corre­
spondence with various models of concurrency, such as Petri nets [Brown, 1989; Mart´ı-Oliet 
and Meseguer, 1989; Engberg and Winskel, 1993; 1994], Process Calculi [Kobayashi and 
Yonezawa, 1993a;b], and Chemical Abstract Machines [Andreoli et al., 1993]. 
Process Calculi are concerned with interactions among independent processes and provide 
a tool for manipulation and analysis of process descriptions as well as formal reasoning about 
them. ACL [Kobayashi and Yonezawa, 1993a;b] is a framework that models concurrent 
computation based on asynchronous communication. In ACL, computation is treated as 
proof construction in linear logic and mechanisms for concurrent computation like message 
passing, asynchronous communication, and identiﬁer creation are also expressed in terms of 
linear logic. 
The Chemical Abstract Machine (CHAM) [Berry and Boudol, 1990] treats a system of 
distributed processes as a chemical solution which contains ﬂoating molecules and membranes 
dividing the solution into a hierarchy of sub-solutions. When two matching molecules get 
in contact, a chemical reaction occurs following reaction rules and consequently consumes 
some of their parts and creates products. A major point of the CHAM concept is that 
interactions among disjoint sets of molecules can be in parallel. The Interaction Abstract 
Machine (IAM) [Andreoli et al., 1993] extends this notion further, and is also based on linear 
logic. IAM works on interactions among independent, and locally deﬁned sub-systems, which 
moves “from pure chemistry to an elementary form of social-biology”. The concurrency is 
indeed dealt at two levels in IAMs — the level of competitive agents and the level of agents’ 
components. 
At the core of many of these systems is the notion of update which is inherent to linear 
�� 
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logic. In classical logic, a theory about a system is normally modeled by the use of classical 
logic and axioms. They, however, remain unchanged throughout, which hinders its ability 
to model updates. Linear logic, in contrast, allows an explicit separation of current state as 
linear information, which is available for only a single use [Girard, 1995]. Hence, after use, 
information on the current state will be erased, giving way to new information. Transitions 
from old states to new states are realized by means of linear implication. For example, if 
S � S� is provable from the transitions, taken as axioms, then state S� is accessible from 
state S. Given state S and the transition S � S�, the system updates from state S to state 
S�. As a result, in linear logic, the updating or revision process can be performed naturally by 
means of logical consequences between states. The four connectives ⊗, �, � and ⊕ also make 
linear logic more natural for modeling real life relationships. ⊗ allows a natural expression 
of proportion. For example, if A encodes “having one dollar” then by A and A, we mean 
having two dollars. In classical logic, A ∧ A = A, which steals away one dollar. Linear logic 
overcomes this problem by using ⊗ for “and”, hence A ⊗ A = A and two A are available for 
use. 
[Harland and Winikoﬀ, 2002] also emphasized that the diﬀerence between internal and 
external choices is natural in linear logic. For instance, we can specify that the choice of 
places A or B for the delivery of goods is made by the supplier (us) as “Place A” � “Place 
B” and made by the customer as “Place A” ⊕ “Place B”. 
A good example of the suitability of linear logic to naturally model choices in compu­
tations is an analog between the computer instruction IF...THEN...ELSE and the use of 
additive conjunction � [Girard, 1995]. In particular, consider two transformation actions 
A � B and A � C, and an instruction IF α THEN A � B ELSE A � C. The 
computations that follow this instruction require making the choice between the THEN part 
and ELSE part based on the condition α which is determined internally in the computations 
up to the point of consideration. Likewise, in order to perform an action A � B C, 
it requires a choice between the two actions A � B and A � C to be decided internally so 
that the selected one is carried out. 
Furthermore, the duality exhibited by linear negation can be natural for modeling dual 
sides such as input/output, answer/question, consumption/production, etc. For example, in 
modeling agent interaction, positive formulas can be regarded as what is already provided 
while their negations can be treated as what is required. Moreover, as two sides of a linear 
implication can be considered as dual to each other, like consumption � production, formulas 
can be moved from one side to another by being converted to their linear negated forms. This 
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allows reasoning about state transitions to take place with the owing resources/formulas be 
carried to be the next state. 
2.5.4 Applications of Linear Logic to Agent and Multi-agent Research 
In multi-agent environments, resources are distributed among agents and resources produced 
by some agents can be supplied to other agents and in turn, will be consumed for further 
production. Hence, the ability to match consumption and supply of goods among agents can 
help them to cooperate and negotiate. [Harland and Winikoﬀ, 2002] has pointed out that 
linear logic is a natural way to represent this mechanism. Indeed, negotiations among agents 
on who supply what can be supported by searching among linear logic representations. 
[Ku¨ngas, 2003] also emphasized the use of a set of linear formulas to model a set of con­
sumable resources which represents states of agents and to use linear implication to model 
transitions among states. Moreover, capacities of agents, which drive the transformation 
of resources, can also be modeled via linear implication. A deduction mechanism, Partial 
Deduction [Komorowski, 1981], was also introduced and adjusted particularly to the setting 
of linear logic [Ku¨ngas and Matskin, 2005]. Partial deduction, regarded as an optimization 
technique in logic programming, partially evaluates logic programs to derive a more special­
ized program which is more eﬃcient for execution while keeping the meaning of the original 
program unchanged. Soundness and completeness of partial deduction techniques have been 
deﬁned and proved [K¨ ungas, 2004a] in the !HLL fragment around ungas and Matskin, 2005; K¨
the notion of “executability” of applications of computation speciﬁcation clauses which are 
essentially based on an extra-logical axiom. !HLL is the Horn fragment of linear logic that 
contains the ⊗ and ! connectives. Partial deduction can be applied to help agents to de­
termine the missing capabilities they require to reach their goals and the appropriate trade 
with other agents to supply the missing capabilities. Negotiation among agents based on 
these trades can then be performed as a form of distributed cooperative problem solving. 
However, the authors made an underlying assumption that all agents are altruistic, i.e. that 
they will supply maximum resources whilst requiring minimal resources in return, which is 
quite restrictive, as agents are often self-interested. 
The work [Harland and Winikoﬀ, 2004] suggested modeling agents in a logic programming 
framework based on linear logic which covers both planned actions and reactive behaviors 
of agents. While planned actions of agents can be realised by standard backward-chaining 
techniques, reactive behaviors are likely to demand forward-chaining techniques which can 
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be based on standard sequent calculus of linear logic [Harland et al., 2000]. Informally, 
backward-chaining techniques start with a goal, identify intermediate required premises and 
work backwards until axioms are found. Backward-chaining techniques correspond to goal-
directed proofs in which inference rules are chosen in favor of reducing the goal formulas 
rather than reducing the program clauses. On the contrary, a forward-chaining technique 
begins with axioms and applicable rules and results in new formulas. The combination of 
backward-chaining and forward-chaining techniques results in a mixed mode computation 
in linear logic, which provides a ﬁrm basis for the reactive and proactive characteristics of 
autonomous agents. 
As discussed above, Interaction Abstract Machines [Andreoli et al., 1993] can be used 
to conceptually model concurrent interactions among multiple agents, via broadcast com­
munication, and within agents, as blackboard systems. Both forms of communication can 
be implemented via message type asynchronous communication. The main restriction is the 
assumption that all agents speak the same language. 
A speciﬁcation language µACL [Pe´rez, 2002] for agents was derived based on linear logic, 
extending the Asynchronous Communications in linear logic (ACL) language [Kobayashi and 
Yonezawa, 1993a;b], which is intended for concurrent and distributed logic programming. It 
is claimed that µACL can naturally express essential aspects of agent programming such 
as communication, concurrency, resources, state update, modularity and inferences [Pe´rez, 
2002]. Likewise, another linear logic programming language Lygon [Winikoﬀ and Harland, 
1995; Winikoﬀ, 1997] was investigated for adaptation to agent programming [Amin, 1999]. 
Another approach is a theoretical foundation for algorithmic veriﬁcation techniques for 
speciﬁcations based on a fragment of linear logic, which is Linear Objects (LO) [Andreoli 
and Pareschi, 1990] extended with universally quantiﬁed goal formulas [Bozzano et al., 2004]. 
The underlying mechanism is bottom-up evaluation of speciﬁcations based on eﬀective “ﬁx 
point operator” and a ﬁnite symbolic representation of a potentially inﬁnite collections of 
ﬁrst-order provable goals. Potential applications of this approach are in proving properties or 
veriﬁcation of speciﬁcations of protocols and concurrent systems such as multi-agent systems. 
Examples have been developed that prove properties of speciﬁcations of mutual exclusion 
protocols in multi-agent systems [Bozzano, 2002] and automatically verify authentication 
protocols in cryptography [Bozzano and Delzanno, 2002]. 
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2.5.5 Interpretations of Linear Logic 
Formulas in linear logic can be interpreted as either resources or processes. We will discuss 
this duality as a starting point for our work on encoding agent interactions in temporal linear 
logic. 
While linear logic propositions can be used to encode a resource item or a process of 
consumption or production of resource, its connectives can deal with relationships among 
resources or among processes. Examples of these interpretations are below. Note that we 
interpret multiplicative disjunction A � B as A⊥ � B or B⊥ � A. 
Formulas as Resources 
The interpretation is based on the work of Lincoln [Lincoln, 1992]. 
•	 Multiplicative conjunction ⊗ (times): A ⊗ B means that both resources A and B are 
available concurrently. 
•	 Linear implication � (times): A � B means that a use of the resource A causes the 
resource B to be available. 
•	 Additive conjunction � (with): A � B stands for one’s own choice of either resource 
A or B to be available but not both. 
•	 Additive disjunction ⊕ (plus): A ⊕ B stands for the possibility of either resource A or 
B being available, but we don’t know which. 
•	 Linear negation (.)⊥: A⊥ means a negative resource (debt) that cancels A. 
•	 Modality (!): !A means that we have as much of the resource A as we want. 
•	 Modality (?): ?A means that we demand as much of the resource A as possible (po­
tentially an inﬁnite amount). 
Formulas as Processes 
The interpretation is based on work [Mitchell, 1995]. A combined formula via a connective 
is treated as a process that produces resources. 
•	 A ⊗ B means a process that can produce exactly A and B and then halts. 
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•	 A � B means a process that takes as input A (consumes A) and produce as output B 
then halts. 
•	 A � B stands for a process which has two buttons labeling A or B. If we press button 
A, the process will produce exactly A before halting, similarly for pressing B. 
•	 A ⊕ B stands for a process covered by a black box contains either a process to produce 
A or a process to produce B. 
•	 A⊥ means a process that consumes exactly A then halts. 
•	 !A means a process that can produce A(s) as many times as required to satisfy other 
processes that consume A. 
•	 ?A means a process that can consume A(s) as many times as provided by other processes 
that produce A. 
Sequent Calculus 
Treating formulas as resources, we present some informal interpretations of some relevant 
sequent calculus rules, based partly on [Alexiev, 1994] and [Girard, 1995]. 
Negation Rule 
Γ, A � Δ 
Γ � A⊥, Δ 
As linear negation (.)⊥ means a transposition or a change of standpoint, the rule means a 
change from a view of the process of producing A to a view as of consuming A. 
Γ � A, Δ 
Γ, A⊥ � Δ 
This means a change from a view of a process as consuming A to a view as producing A. 
Right multiplicative conjunction rule 
Γ � A, Δ Γ� � B, Δ� 
Γ, Γ� � A ⊗ B, Δ, Δ� 
We can produce both resources A and B concurrently by combining the separate productions 
of each resource. 
Right additive disjunction rule 
Γ � A, Δ Γ � B, Δ 
or
Γ � A ⊕ B, Δ Γ � A ⊕ B, Δ 
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Using either a process of producing A or producing B, we can come up with a process of 
producing A ⊕ B. This rule can be thought as a process of hiding – putting A or B into a 
black box and afterward only knowing that it must contain one of A or B, but we cannot 
tell which one from the box. 
Left additive disjunction rule 
Γ, A � Δ Γ, B � Δ 
Γ, A⊕ B � Δ 
When using A ⊕ B to produce Δ, which A or B is available is not our choice. Therefore, we 
must have previously the capabilities to use either of them to derive Δ. 
Right additive conjunction rule 
Γ � A,Δ Γ � B,Δ 
Γ � A�B,Δ 
In order to produce the outcome A � B, which allows us to choose either A or B to be 
available (but not both), we must have concurrently the capability to produce A and the 
capability to produce B. 
Left additive conjunction rule 
Γ, A � Δ Γ, B � Δ 
or
Γ, A�B � Δ Γ, A�B � Δ 
When consuming A � B to produce Δ, the choice of whether A or B to be used is ours, 
therefore, we need only one capability that uses A (or B). 
Left linear implication rule 
Γ � A,Δ Γ�, B � Δ� 
Γ,Γ�, A � B � Δ,Δ� 
We can chain a process that produces A together with a process that consumes B in separate 
contexts into one with concatenated context in which A can be replaced by B. 
Left modality ! rule 
Γ, A � Δ 
Γ, !A � Δ 
When a single A is used to produce Δ, with a capability to supply A as many as required, 
we can still produce Δ. 
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Right modality ! rule 
!Γ � A, ?Δ 
!Γ � !A, ?Δ 
If there is an unlimited supply of resources to produce A, then we can also produce as many 
A as desired. 
Weakening for modality ! 
Γ � Δ 
Γ, !A � Δ 
Given an extra capability to supply A as many as required (or no supply at all), we can still 
produce Δ. 
Left modality ? rule 
!Γ, A � ?Δ 
!Γ, ?A � ?Δ 
In a context of unlimited supply (and/or demand) or resources, if a single A is consumed in 
the process then as many A as are available can also be consumed. 
Right modality ? rule 
Γ � A, Δ 
Γ � ?A, Δ 
When a process satisﬁes a demand for a single A, that process also satisﬁes a demand for as 
many as A as are available. 
Weakening for modality ? 
Γ � Δ 
Γ � ?A, Δ 
Given an extra demand of as many A as are available, we can still produce Δ. 
2.6 Temporal Linear Logic 
Linear logic has been extended to deal with time relationships [Kanovich et al., 1998; Kanovich 
and Ito, 1997; Tanabe, 1997; Hirai, 2000b]. 
Time is introduced [Kanovich et al., 1998] as a unary predicate like T ime(t), which 
means the time is t. Events and actions are associated with their corresponding unary time 
predicates by means of linear connective ⊗, which implies concurrent co-existence among 
them. The author claimed that the approach deals with time qualitatively and quantitatively 
and also provides an easy and transparent way of specifying real-time ﬁnite state systems. 
However, rather than relying purely on inference rules such as the sequent calculus, its form of 
reasoning about time requires diﬀerent treatments for time predicates and timeless predicates 
as well as external handling of time variable (such as arithmetic operations). 
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Linear logic has also been extended [Kanovich and Ito, 1997] with the temporal operators 
“next” �, “sometime” �, and “later” �. “Later” is a restricted form of “sometime” which 
does not include the present. Logical formulas are then regarded as speciﬁcations of sets of 
processes connected with time points. The author claimed that the resulting hybrid system is 
comprehensive with respect to describing temporal behaviors of resource-sensitive concurrent 
processes. 
Another approach [Tanabe, 1997] also integrates temporal logic and linear logic. For­
mulas in the hybrid system are of two types, temporal formulas and (marking) formulas. 
Formulas of these two types can be combined together in the form [X]A or < X > A, 
where X is a temporal formula and A is a (marking) formula. The former type behaves like 
intuitionistic propositional linear logic formulas with exponentials except that they have an 
inverse operator. Formulas of the latter can be preceded by modal operators to express tem­
poral aspects. They are governed not only by standard intuitionistic linear sequent calculus 
but also by specialized axioms from modal logics and cut rules on temporal formulas. The 
resulting system can be used as a speciﬁcation tool for certain classes of timed Petri nets. 
However, as pointed out in [Hirai, 2000a], the former approach [Kanovich and Ito, 1997] 
does not include the modal operator !, hence is not an extension of linear logic. Also, the 
latter approach [Tanabe, 1997] includes non-logical axioms and does not have a completeness 
theorem for timed Petri nets. 
In contrast, temporal linear logic (TLL) [Hirai, 2000b] naturally extends linear logic 
with an inclusion of temporal logic S4 and the resulting logic system has the cut elimination 
property. Given the strengths of temporal logic and linear logic, temporal linear logic can be 
more expressive in terms of modeling resources, and state updates as well as time relationships 
in reactive and concurrent systems. 
[Hirai, 2000b] used three operators to denote temporal aspects, � (next), � (anytime), 
and � (sometime) and recast the meaning of !. Adding � to a formula A, i.e. �A, means 
that A can be used at the next time point and exactly once. Similarly, �A means that A 
can be used exactly once and anytime. �A means that A can be used once sometime. Hirai 
used !A to express that A can be used at anytime and for any desired number of times. As a 
result, the relationships in time among events and actions can be modeled naturally in TLL. 
Our work makes use of TLL developed by Hirai in a framework of modeling agent rules 
for interaction. 
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Sequent Calculus for Temporal Linear Logic 
Apart from the normal sequent calculus rules for linear logic, TLL has extra rules to deal 
with time. The relevant rules are: 
Anytime - Left 
Γ, A � Δ 
Γ, �A � Δ(�Lef t) �A here means that the resource A is available at a time point of our choice. Therefore, with �A, we can choose to consume A at the appropriate time - now - as in the hypothesis Γ, A 
� Δ — so that we can conclude Γ, �A � Δ. 
Sometime - Right 
Γ � A 
(�Right)
Γ � �A 
�A here means that the resource A is to be produced at a time point of our choice. We can 
choose to produce A now as in the hypothesis Γ � A, Δ so that we can conclude Γ � �A. 
Anytime - Right 
!Γ, �Π � A 
(�Right)
!Γ, �Π � �A 
In the context that all resources can be consumed anytime of our choice, if we can derive A 
now, we can also derive A at any time point. 
Sometime - Left 
!Γ, �Π, A � �Λ 
!Γ, �Π, �A � �Λ(�Lef t) 
In the context that all other resources can be consumed and produced anytime we choose, 
we can choose to consume A now or anytime as required. 
Next time 
!Γ, �Π, Ξ � A 
!Γ, �Π, �Ξ � �A (�) 
In the context that all other resources can be utilized anytime we choose, if now consuming 
Ξ can help produce A, then consuming Π at the next time point can help produce A at the 
next time point. 
2.6.1 Diﬀerences of Temporal Operators in TLL 
In most temporal logics, “� A” means A is true sometimes, “ � A” means that A is always  
true, “ �A” means that A is true from the next time point, and A B asserts that A is true 
until a time when B is true. However, as TLL is not particularly concerned with changing 
of truth values but manipulation of resources over time, the meanings of these temporal 
� 
46 Temporal Linear Logic 
operators need to be clariﬁed in this new context. 
The temporal “next time” “ �” still refers to the next time point but has diﬀerent im­
plications. In temporal logic, the formula after “ �” is valid at the next time point and still 
valid at the subsequent time points whereas in TLL, the formula can only be used at the 
next time point and is removed when the time passes beyond the next time point. 
The discrepancies in meanings of � and � between temporal logics and TLL are revealed 
by examining the TLL sequent calculus rules associated with them. � preceding a linear logic proposition means that the corresponding resource is available 
at any time point but exactly only at that chosen time [Hirai, 2000b]. This can be seen as 
follows. Considering proofs constructed via sequent calculus rules, in all the rules regarding 
the passage of time, especially the rule �, we can see that any formulas preceded by � in the 
context of the antecedent, for example, �Π, will survive over the passage of time - appearing 
as �Π in the context of the consequence. This property means that without being used, �Π 
lasts over time. 
Regarding the derivation of �A, it is governed by the rule: 
!Γ, �Π � A, �Λ, ? 
!Γ, �Π � �A, �Λ, ? � �right 
which means that �A is resulted from the capability to derive A at any time (the antecedent). 
In other words, given this capability, we can choose to utilize �A as A at any time of our 
choice. 
Together with the continuance of �A over time, this means that if we do not take �A 
as A now, we can reserve our choice for the future. Hence, in a model of discrete time as 
of TLL, �A lasts until the time point it is instantiated into A. This property enables � to 
reﬂect the continuance of resource A over time. 
The dual of � is �. Though � also models the continuance of resource A over time, the 
diﬀerence lies in the rule 
Γ � A, Δ 
Γ � �A, Δ �right 
which means that �A is resulted from a capability to derive A at a speciﬁc time. Hence, �A 
can not be safely instantiated into A at any other time of our choice. 
Therefore, though both � and � refer to a point in time, the choice of which time is 
diﬀerent. Regarding �, the choice is internally decided, as appropriate to one’s own capability. 
With �, the choice is external. Strictly speaking, � refers to outer non-determinism and � 
Temporal Linear Logic 47 
refers to inner non-determinism. 
Example 
To illustrate the expressiveness of temporal linear logic, we use an example adapted from 
[Harland and Winikoﬀ, 2004]. We consider a restaurant menu, comments are provided in 
italic: 
chicken soup or seafood soup (in season)-one kind of soup will be served, depending 
on the availability in the season and we cannot choose which one 
main course 
chips (all you can eat)-we can eat as much as we want - chips are “unlimited” 
tea or coﬀee-we can choose either one, tea or coﬀee 
as a result of having a meal, if we don’t pay in cash then we pay by check or vice-versa. 
Assume that the meal costs us $80. 
A representation in linear logic can be derived as follows: 
[(chicken soup ⊕ seafood soup) ⊗ main ⊗ !chips ⊗ (tea � coﬀee)] � ($80 cashpay � 
$80 checkpay) 
A consumption of a meal above results in $80 dollars of payment either in cash or by 
check but not both. 
A TTL’s representation includes also temporal operator next �. Here, we take into 
account the time order in serving food. After the soup is the main course, then tea or coﬀee 
is provided next. Payment is done after having the meal. Chips can be served anytime during 
the meal (! operator). 
[(chicken soup ⊕ seaf ood soup) ⊗ �main⊗!chips ⊗ (�� tea ��� cof f ee)] � 
[���$80 cashpay ����$80 checkpay] 
2.6.2 Encoding in Temporal Linear Logic 
We consider temporal operators of TLL next �, anytime � and sometime �. The meaning 
of ! is recast to extend the meaning in LL to be applied to all the time points. 
Time operator next � refers to the next time point. It can be used to provide a time 
order or a separation in time of formulas. For example, A ⊗ �B � C ⊗ ��D is a way to 
replace A (A is consumed) now and B (B will be consumed) at the next time point to get C 
(C is produced) now and D (D will be produced) at the second next time point. 
�. 
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The use of multiple � allows to express any speciﬁc future time point. �n is used as 
a shorthand for n applications of �. �nA means A will be available at the nth next time 
point. 
The notion anytime �A and its dual sometime �A both denote that “as long as” resource 
A is available or action A is done, either at present or in the future. For example A ⊗ �B � �C means that A is consumed now and it also requires that B is consumed either now or in 
the future to derive C at the next time point. Though both � and � refer to a point in time, 
in our interpretations, they exhibit diﬀerent behaviors when it comes to deciding the actual 
time point. The choice of which time is internally decided for � and externally decided for 
Combining time operators adds more expressive power. For example, 
•	 at or after a time point n, we can make A available anytime: �n−1 �A. 
•	 at the time of our choice, A becomes available and B becomes available from the next 
time point: �(A ⊗ ��B) 
•	 A is available once during a speciﬁc period (m to n) and we can choose the actual time: 
m+1A � ... �n A.�mA � �
2.6.3 Comparison between TLL encoding and LL encoding 
Using TLL, we can encode the time notion directly onto LL formulas by adding temporal 
operators - next �, anytime � and sometime �. As a result, we can specify the availability 
of resources and execution of actions over time. These enable agents’ state information to be 
speciﬁed against time points. Moreover, as rules are constructed on TLL formulas, resource 
utilization via applications of rules or state transitions is also encoded as processes over 
time. The inclusion of temporal operators in TLL allows a more faithful speciﬁcation of 
agent interactions. 
TLL allows detection of time constraints. Agents can place time constraints into requests 
or proposals made to other agents. Using temporal operators, we can 
1. specify the constraints in time of resources consumption or production. 
2. allow agents to ﬁnd the appropriate time points so that commitments can be carried 
out to satisfy those time constraints 
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3. allow agents to attempt to construct a time sequence of actions and resource consump­
tion and production. 
2.6.4 Relevant Properties in TLL 
The properties below clarify the interplay between the LL connectives and temporal opera­
tors. The reverse direction does not hold for these properties. 
1. �nA � �A; �n(A�B) ��n(A ⊕B) 
�(A�B) � �A��B2. �n(A�B) ��nA��nB; �(A�B) � �A��B; 
3. �nA ⊗�nB ��n(A ⊗B); �A ⊗ �B � �(A ⊗B);�A ⊗�B � �(A ⊗B) 
4. �nA ⊕�nB ��n(A ⊕B); �A ⊕ �B � �(A ⊕B); �A ⊕�B � �(A ⊕B) 
5. In particular, �(A ⊗B) � �A ⊗�B; �(A ⊗B) � �A ⊗ �B; 
�(A ⊗B) � �A ⊗�B 
which means that we cannot guarantee to derive the separate existence of A and B at 
the next time point (respectively anytime, sometime) from the joint existence of A and 
B at the next time point (resp. anytime, sometime). 
TLL has three ways in which formulas can be removed. The ﬁrst is having the positive 
formulas being connected with the corresponding negative formulas via the multiplicative 
conjunction ⊗, for example A ⊗ A⊥ � ⊥. The second is via an application of the linear 
implication �, which removes formulas on its left hand side. The third, which is not in 
linear logic, is due to passing the formula’s expiration time. This is the case when formulas 
are available only at a particular time point and hence no longer exist when the time passes 
that point. 
However, there is a trade oﬀ between expressiveness and complexity or decidability among 
fragments. One of the weaknesses of linear logic and hence temporal linear logic is their 
decidability. The full fragment of linear logic is not decidable [Lincoln, 1992]. This also 
makes full fragment of TLL not decidable as TLL introduces more operators on top of linear 
logic. 
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2.6.5 Modeling Agent Systems using TLL 
As in LL, the two sides of a TLL consequence are dual to each other. In the context of 
resource manipulation among agents, the two sides can be used to model DEMAND (the 
right side) and SUPPLY (the left side). State formulas of agents can be viewed as occurring 
on the SUPPLY side while goals formulas can be viewed as occurring on the DEMAND side. 
As a result of an application of the consequence, formulas on the left side - what is required 
- are consumed to make formulas on the right side available. 
In particular, the views on the determinism of � and ⊕ are diﬀerent on each side. On 
the SUPPLY side, if A � B is available, then we can freely choose A or B, i.e. � is internally 
determined. If A ⊕ B is available, one of them is available but we do not know which, i.e. 
⊕ is externally determined. On the contrary, on the DEMAND side, if A � B is demanded, 
the ability to choose between A and B is also required. Hence, one has to prepare both A 
and B even though only one will be used, i.e. � is externally determined. If A ⊕ B is on 
the DEMAND side, as there is no particular requirement for either one, supplying any of A 
or B is suﬃcient, i.e. ⊕ is internally determined. 
Moreover, on the SUPPLY side, �A means that we have A to be used exactly once anytime 
while on the DEMAND side, �A requires the ability to provide A anytime as requested. �A 
on the SUPPLY side states that we have A available for use exactly once but we do not know 
at which time. On the DEMAND side, �A only requires A to be provided at a time of our 
choice. 
Regarding agent reasoning, due to its basis in sequent calculus, TLL can be used for 
reasoning in a similar manner to LL. 
2.7 Timed Petri Nets 
2.7.1 Petri Nets 
Petri nets (PNs) [Petri, 1966] are graphical and mathematical techniques useful for modeling 
concurrent systems. 
The primitive concepts of Petri nets are places, transitions, directed arcs and tokens. 
PNs is underpinned by a directed, weighted, bipartite graph whose nodes are either places or 
transitions and arcs are connecting between places and transitions. Tokens are used to deﬁne 
execution of Petri nets. Each place can potentially hold a non-negative number of tokens. 
Transitions deﬁne how tokens may be transferred from the transitions’ input places to output 
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places. Directed arcs connect (input) places to transitions and transitions to (output) places. 
Directed arcs indicate which input places the tokens come from and which output places they 
go to for the transitions. 
During PNs’ execution, ﬁrings of transitions occur and tokens are moved from places to 
places and the number of tokens in the Petri nets may change. An assignment of tokens to 
places of a Petri net in which each place is assigned a non-negative number of tokens is called 
a marking. 
Formally, a Petri net is described as a 5-tuple N = (P, T, I, O,Mo) where: 
• P = {p1, p2, p3, ..., pm} is a ﬁnite set of places 
• T = {t1, t2, t3, ..., tn} is a ﬁnite set of transitions, P ∪ T = ∅, P ∩ T =� ∅ 
• I = (P × T ) N is an input function. I speciﬁes directed arcs from places to → 
transitions. N is a set of non-negative integers. 
• O = (T × P ) N is an output function. O speciﬁes directed arcs from transitions → 
to places. 
• Mo = P N is the initial marking. → 
Often, weights of arcs correspond to the number of tokens required from the connected input 
places or the number of tokens that will be deposited in the connected output places. 
A transition is enabled if each of its input places is marked with at least the number of 
tokens corresponding to the weight of the connecting arc. An enabled transition may be ﬁred 
if the associated event occurs. Firing of an enabled transition removes tokens at the input 
places and adds tokens to the output places. The exact numbers of tokens removed or added 
correspond to the weights of the connected arcs. Mathematically, ﬁring of a transition τ at 
the marking M yields: 
M �(p) = M(p) − I(p, τ) + O(τ, p) 
for any place p of the Petri net, where M(p) returns the number of tokens present at the 
place p, I(p, τ) returns the number of tokens (zero or positive) will be removed as input of 
the transition from the place p, and O(τ, p) returns the number of tokens (zero or positive) 
that will be inserted as output of the transition at the place p. Moreover, transitions can 
take place without any input places (source transitions) or without any output places (sink 
transitions). 
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We consider a typical example of modeling by Petri nets. Places represent conditions and 
transitions represent events. The presence of a token in a place indicates that the condition 
is true. Another view is that the number of tokens present in a place corresponds to the 
number of data items or resources available. An event is modeled as a transition; input places 
are then pre-conditions while output places are post-conditions. The initial marking speciﬁes 
the initial conditions of the modeled system. Changes in markings of the Petri net during an 
execution then indicate changes in behaviors of the system regarding its states and updates. 
We consider a chemical reaction 2H2 + O2 = 2H2O [Murata, 1989]. Each molecule can 
be regarded as a token. It can be seen that two tokens at the place H2 can be combined 
with a token from the place O2 to form two tokens at the place H2O. The initial marking is 
assumed to include two tokens at each input place — H2 and O2. A ﬁring of the transition 
will remove two tokens at the place H2 and one token at O2 and add two tokens to H2O. 
The resulting marking contains one token at O2 and two tokens at H2O. 
By representing (updating) actions and events as transitions, pre-conditions as input 
places, post-conditions as output places, resources or data items as tokens, we can see that 
Petri nets can be quite expressive and advantageous regarding modeling many important 
aspects of systems [Wang, 1998]. This include modeling: 
•	 sequential order of execution or precedence relations as among transitions. Even causal 
relationships can be modeled in this manner. 
•	 conﬂicts as between transitions that use shared tokens; 
•	 concurrency as concurrent transitions; 
•	 synchronization as ﬁring of the transition. Tokens may arrive diﬀerently at each input 
places and when there are suﬃcient tokens to enable the transition, a synchronization 
among available tokens at diﬀerent input places takes place as the transition is ﬁred. 
•	 merging as combining various token sources from diﬀerent places and transitions onto 
one place; 
•	 confusion as which transitions will take place when two concurrent transitions have 
their respective inputs both shared by another transition. 
•	 mutual exclusion as transitions that can not take place concurrently or sequentially 
due to constraints on shared resources. 
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•	 priorities as that a transition takes place under a condition which is determined by 
another transition already being ﬁred. One way to achieve this is to use inhibitor arcs. 
An inhibitor arc can prevent a transition from being ﬁred if there is a presence of 
tokens at the input places of the inhibitor arc. Hence, making the required tokens at 
input places of inhibitor arcs present or absent can turn on or oﬀ the ﬁring of some 
transitions permanently or before or after some other transitions, hence expressing 
priorities among transitions. 
There are a number of advantages that PNs bring to modeling systems. Visual modeling 
allows PNs to add comprehension and unambiguity to communication of models among users, 
such as engineers and customers. With the help of computer tools, interactive graphical 
simulation of PNs can be produced, which can be quite advantageous in developing complex 
engineering systems. Having a ﬁrm mathematical basis permits Petri net models to be 
expressed as sets of linear algebraic equations or other mathematical models. This in turn 
makes PNs suitable for formal analyses such as checking for correct synchronization, freeness 
from deadlock, true concurrency, and mutual exclusion of shared resources. In fact, properties 
of Petri nets can be mapped on to the context of the modeled systems to reveal if some 
functional properties of the system are present [Wang, 1998]. Such important properties 
include reachability, boundedness, conservativeness and liveness. 
2.7.2 Timed Petri Nets 
One of the essential limitations of Petri nets is a lack of consideration of duration. To 
overcome this, PNs have been extended to cover time aspects. In particular, each place, 
transition or directed arc can be associated with a deterministic ﬁring time or time interval 
and the resulting PNs are deterministic timed Petri nets. In another form, each transition 
of PNs is associated with a somewhat random ﬁring time, which corresponds to stochastic 
timed Petri nets. As a result of such extensions, such time extended PNs or timed Petri 
nets (TPNs) oﬀer a full treatment of discrete event systems, regarding design, modeling and 
performance analysis. 
Timed Petri nets ([Merlin and Farber, 1976]) are a particular variation of this extension 
to Petri nets in which there is a speciﬁcation of two time values for each transition [Wang, 
1998]. The ﬁrst value deﬁnes the minimum time that a transition must wait for after it is 
enabled and before it is ﬁred. The second time value speciﬁes the maximum time for waiting 
of the transition before ﬁring if it is still enabled. These two time values are taken to be 
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relative to the ﬁrst enabling time of the transition. Such extension is likely to be suitable for 
dealing with constraints on ﬁring durations. 
2.7.3 Applications of (timed) Petri Nets 
PNs have been extended to modeling a variety of information systems whose characteris­
tics may be being concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel, nondeterministic, and/or 
stochastic [Murata, 1989]. For example, PNs serve as a popular tool for ﬂexible and au­
tomated manufacturing systems [Moore and Gupta, 1996], for performance evaluation [Ra­
mamoorthy and Ho, 1990], for communication networks [Gressier, 1985; Zhu and Denton, 
1988], for traﬃc control systems [Mandrioli et al., 1996], and for military and control systems 
[Wang and Zhou, 1997]. Indeed, Petri nets can represent ﬁnite state machines, data ﬂow com­
putation, and synchronization control among multiprocessors sharing the same information 
or resources, and readers-writers & producers-consumers problems [Murata, 1989]. 
Variations of time-extensions of Petri nets have also gained popularity in modeling real-
time concurrent systems. For example, timed Petri nets have been applied to the modeling 
and veriﬁcation of such systems [Bucci and Vicario, 1995; Deng et al., 1998; Tsai et al., 1995]. 
Moreover, such real-time systems as the Command and Control System (C2 System) used 
in battle ﬁelds is also modeled and has been analyzed by timed extensions of Petri nets. 
C2 Systems involve a vast and complex integration of multiple techniques and hardware. 
The performance of C2 Systems is based on measuring the time delay in execution of their 
generic functions such as target detection, target tracking, and discrimination among targets 
[Wang, 1998]. In particular, the performance of C2 Systems depends on how well information 
variables can be reﬂected in real-time properties of quickly changing physical entities like 
targets and weapons. Timed Petri nets were used for modeling and performance analysis for 
a generic naval C2 (command and control) battle group system [Choi and Kuo, 1988] and 
to evaluate time-related performance of decision making organizations when regarded as an 
asynchronous concurrent system [Hillion, 1986]. Stochastic Petri nets with exponential ﬁring 
time transitions were also used to address the information processing capacity of a C2 system 
[Wang and Zhou, 1997]. 
2.8 Summary 
The chapter discussed relevant work in the areas of ﬂexible protocols, commitments, tem­
poral logic, linear logic, temporal linear logic and (timed) petri nets. On the one hand, 
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commitment-based approaches explore the beneﬁts of using the notion of commitment in 
the context of agent interaction, especially making interaction more ﬂexible by structuring 
protocols around commitments. On the other hand, much existing work in linear logic and 
temporal linear logic addresses the modeling of exchanging and utilizing resources which is 
an important and practical aspect of agent interaction. Interesting issues remain as how 
combining the commitment-based approaches with resource-conscious modeling approaches 
can beneﬁt the study of agent interaction, especially making it natural to address practical 
issues of resource exchange and utilization as well as making it more ﬂexible. The next chap­
ters will discuss our modeling, speciﬁcation and execution frameworks for agent interaction. 
Also, the links between our frameworks and the popular modeling tool - timed Petri nets ­
will be discussed. 
Chapter 3

Modeling Agent Interaction

As discussed above, traditional approaches to the speciﬁcation of protocols are too rigid for 
agent systems. Two criteria for ﬂexibility in agent protocols [Yolum and Singh, 2002b] that 
we focus on are preserving the agents’ autonomy in their interactive behaviors and allowing 
agents to explore opportunities and handle exceptions in the face of changes. 
In order to model interaction among agents, we make use of the commitment concept, 
which includes both internal and social commitments. The concept of social commitment 
has been used as a basis for agent interactions [Singh, 1996] and used to develop execution 
mechanisms such as commitment machines [Yolum and Singh, 2002a]. Our approach also 
uses the concept of commitment to capture the meaning of interaction goals, states and 
interactive actions, and to to allow agents to perform mean-ends reasoning over them. 
The underlying logic in our declarative approach to protocol speciﬁcation is temporal 
linear logic (TLL). As discussed in Section 2.6, TLL has advantages in modeling resources 
and updates in time. In this chapter, we use TLL to model interaction among agents. In 
particular, we show how concepts like resources, actions, capabilities, and commitments can 
be expressed as TLL formulas. We also discuss the roles of these concepts in agent interaction, 
especially commitments. 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.1 describes a running example of 
agent interaction — Cricket Bat Sales. Section 3.2 discusses how TLL formulas can be used 
to model various concepts in resource based interaction. Section 3.3 discusses the modeling 
of various forms of commitments and their roles in agent interaction. 
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3.1 Cricket Bat Sale Example 
In this example, the interaction scenarios take place between a merchant agent named Mer, 
a customer agent named Cus, and a bank agent named Ebank. 
Mer has 200 junior cricket bats and 300 heavy cricket bats available for sale. Cus has $50 
that can be used to pay via Paypal or by credit card. Cus has a goal of obtaining from Mer 
two junior cricket bats, and a gift at some time. 
Cus initiates the interaction by making a request to Mer. Mer can choose the time to 
make a sale to meet Cus’s goals. By default, Mer charges $10 per junior cricket bat with no 
gift. Also, Mer can oﬀer a gift for every purchase of two junior cricket bats. Cus’s address is 
required for delivery. There are two options for payment, either Cus pays via Paypal or Mer 
charges by credit card. 
If Cus prefers credit payment, Mer needs Ebank to help with charging Cus. There are two 
possibilities. If Cus’s credit is approved, Ebank will arrange the credit payment. Otherwise, 
Ebank will indicate to Mer that Cus’s credit is not approved. As a result, Cus may then 
take the option to pay via Paypal. The interaction ends when goods are delivered, payment 
is arranged and Cus receives the gift. 
The interaction involves exchanges of resources and information among the participating 
agents Cus, Mer and Ebank. The resources of Mer include junior cricket bats and heavy 
cricket bats. Cus has money and relevant information such as his address and credit card 
number. Ebank has the knowledge of how to determine whether a particular credit card 
transaction is approved or not. There are exchanges of resources such as a junior cricket bat 
for money and transfers of information such as sending the customer’s credit card number 
to the merchant, and sending the result of the bank’s decision on a credit card payment to 
the merchant. 
As these agents interact, they explore the capabilities of each other. The capabilities of 
Mer are, for example, those that allow it to make a sale of cricket bats given the payment is 
properly arranged. Ebank has the capability to determine whether to approve a payment or 
not. 
There are also various choices that are involved in the interaction and hence alter the 
interaction sequence. These include the choice of the time Mer does the sale, the sale option 
Mer chooses to oﬀer Cus, which payment method Cus uses, and, in case of a credit card 
payment, whether Cus’s credit check is approved. 
A key aspect of the ﬂexible approach is that we do not want unnecessary constraints on 
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the order of actions such as sending address, making payment, and sending junior cricket 
bats. 
We then look at the modeling of the consumption/production aspect of resources and 
updating of information. Other concepts like actions, capabilities, choices are also examined. 
3.2 Resource Based Interaction 
Resources are usually used to produce other resources. For example, brewed coﬀee, milk and 
sugar are raw materials used to produce a cappuccino. Resources can also be relocated from 
one place to another and have their ownership changed, such as when a cup of cappuccino 
is purchased. In the context of agent interaction, agents usually exchange their resources 
and explore each other’s ability to transform resources to achieve their respective goals. We 
discuss how temporal linear logic might be used to naturally model the use (consumption) 
of resources and provide a mechanism for handling resource utilization. 
3.2.1 Resources 
Using linear logic is a natural way to model the consumption and transformation of resources, 
as has been discussed in section 2.5. In this section, we focus on using of linear logic for agent 
interaction. 
Each agent possesses a set of resources which can be consumed, produced or transformed 
into other resources or exchanged with other agents’ resources. As linear logic propositions 
can be produced, consumed exactly once or transformed from or into other propositions’ 
formulas, they are quite suitable for modeling resources. We model each unit of resource as 
a linear logic proposition. It is important to stress that what we are concerned with is the 
use of resources in agent interaction but not the physical resources themselves. As a result, 
we are not concerned with the resources’ persistence over time and our modeling does not 
keep track of the physical existence of resources but only their use. 
For example, let cof cup represent a cup of coﬀee. An introduction of the formula means 
a cup of coﬀee is made, while removing it means the cup of coﬀee is consumed, and $5 � 
cof cup denotes an exchange of a resource of ﬁve dollars for a cup of coﬀee at a coﬀee shop. 
Quantity of resources is addressed by the corresponding number of linear logic proposi­
tions joined together via the ⊗ connective. As a shorthand, we denote 
cof cup ⊗ cof cup ⊗ cof cup as 3 cof cup. 
The use of next time operator � allows us to model when the resource is available. For 
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example, denoting a junior cricket bat (jr cb) which will be available at the second next time 
point is by �� jr cb. We use a short hand �nA for �� ... �A, where there are n number 
of �s. 
As the � operator is only associated with a speciﬁc time point (i.e. not a duration), the 
corresponding resource it addresses is not available after that time point, even if it is not 
used. The operator � is used to overcome this by addressing that the use of the formula 
can be anytime and if the formula is not used now, then it can be used later. Like �, �A 
also means that the corresponding resource A is available for exactly one use [Hirai, 2000b]. 
Because we do not model the persistence over time of physical resources, � is used to with 
the intended meaning that the resource can be used any time, and not that the resource lasts 
for a long time. 
The interpretation of � in temporal logic corresponds to “always” which makes an as­
sertion true at all future moments [Emerson, 1990]. Our interpretation, in which � makes a 
formula available at any time of choice but exactly once, is hence diﬀerent. 
The dual of � is �. �A means that A is available for use but at a time that we do not 
know. For example, consider a customer who has ordered a pizza by phone. After two time 
units, the pizza is made and ready for the customer to pick up, which can occur at any time 
from then on. This is expressed as �2 � pizza. From the restaurant’s viewpoint, it does 
not know the exact time that the customer will collect the pizza, i.e. the restaurant sees this 
resource as �2�pizza. 
The presence of a LL formula means the encoded resource is available for use. However, 
in TLL, the presence of a TLL formula means that there is a resource whose availability also 
depends on the time operators. For example, �2A means that the resource A is available at 
the second next time point, but not at any other time. 
Moreover, given the ability to describe the time points associated with resources’ avail­
ability by using TLL formulas, changes in resource availability can also be described with 
precise time points. Such changes include resource consumption, production, relocation, 
change of ownership and expiration. Indeed, resource consumption is regarded as removing 
the availability of a resource at a particular time by consuming its formula at that time. 
Resource production is modeled by creating a resource formula representing the availability 
of the resource and associating it with temporal operators. Resource transformation can be 
regarded as consumption of resources followed by production of (other) resources. Resource 
relocation is changing its location but not its availability. Similarly, a change of ownership 
of a resource means a change in its owner but not in its availability. Resource relocation and 
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ownership change are discussed further in the next section. 
Resource Location and Ownership 
In practical systems, resources generally have to be exchanged between agents in order to 
achieve their goals. In these exchanges, some resources are relocated and/or have their 
ownership changed. Therefore, it is important to address such changes in location and 
ownership of resources. We discuss how TLL can be used to naturally to model the updating 
of location and ownership. 
We use a special marker @ to indicate location of resources. Resource A located at agent 
α is denoted as A@α. Changes in the names of the agents where the resource is located then 
reﬂect the changes in locations of the resources. Relocation of resources can be modeled by 
using � to signal a transition from the formula representing the resource at its old location 
to the formula representing the resource at its new location. For instance, if resource A is 
moved from agent α to agent β, the updating process is modeled as A@α � A@β. The 
updating process applies to A@α hence results in A@β. 
Moreover, to recognize the ownership of a resource, we include a footnote to indicate the 
owner agent. For example, a cricket bat owned by the merchant M is denoted as crik b . The M 
footnote, together with the resource formula, can be similarly expressed in logic as crik b(M ) 
or as a proposition crik bM . To change ownership of a resource, the updating process makes 
use of linear implication. For example, when a cricket bat is purchased, ownership passes 
from the merchant to the customer. The updating is modeled as crik b � crik b .M C 
Combining the notation for both location and ownership, we have the form A@α , which 
β 
indicates there is a resource A at agent α and owned by agent β. 
The updating of information about location and ownership can be illustrated in an ex­
ample of buying a cup of coﬀee. A customer walks into a coﬀee shop to buy a cappuccino 
which costs 4 dollars. Items of concern are: 
•	 4$@CC : four dollars is currently located at and owned by the customer 
•	 capu@shopC : a cappuccino is located at the shop but owned by the customer. This cor­
responds to a ticket or receipt handed to the customer who will receive the cappuccino 
when it is ready. 
•	 capu@CC : a cappuccino is located at and owned by the customer and hence is available 
for drinking 
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The purchase of a cappuccino can be regarded as a two phase process. The ﬁrst one is gov­
erned by a rule for buying a cappuccino, which is 4$@CC � �3capu@shopC . The rule states 
that if the customer pays 4 dollars (providing 4$@CC ), he will receive a ticket/receipt which 
says that a cappuccino will be available for pick up in three time units (�3capu@shopC ). 
This is depicted in logic as follows 
4$@CC ⊗ (4$@CC � �3capu@shopC ) � �3capu@shopC 
The second phase is at the third next time point, the customer hands in the ticket/receipt 
and gets the cappuccino (capu@CC ) according to the rule capu@shopC � capu@C . Now C 
the cappuccino is at the customer and he can drink it. 
capu@shopC ⊗ (capu@shopC � capu@CC ) � capu@CC 
In this example, the ownership of the cappuccino is appropriately recognized at the time 
of payment: the customer pays and hence owns the cappuccino. Also, a distinction is made 
between where the cappuccino is located and who (currently) owns it. The packaging of 
information about location and ownership into the resource representation hence allows us 
to faithfully model the process of resource exchanges. 
3.2.2 Status Information 
As mentioned above, we model the use of resources, rather than their physical state. As 
information is retained after accesses, such modeling of information is troublesome because 
the formula representing information is removed after use. One way to ﬁx this is to make use 
of ! to indicate an unlimited number of accesses to the information (anytime). For example, 
consider a credit card number encoded as !cred no. This approach, however, is limited. In 
particular, the information of concern is about the knowledge of the credit card number, 
which is a dynamic entity and hence is subject to changes. Modeling temporary information 
using ! is problematic because it is impossible to remove all instances of the formula and 
hence impossible to update the information. 
Another approach is to model information by providing suﬃcient copies of the formula 
for use through out the information’s lifetime. For instance, ”customer has not paid” is 
encoded as η � not paid, where η is a chosen number which is large enough to the context. 
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In this approach, there are a number of ways to update the information. One is to remove 
all the instances of the formulas, which indicates that the resource has been exhausted. 
This, however, may cause confusion with the state of no information. Another way is to 
add a number of formulas of the new value after removing formulas of the old value. This 
method, however, requires keeping track of the number of formulas and maintaining the 
mutual exclusive occurrences of formulas corresponding to opposite values. 
Our approach, however, keeps information as a single proposition with temporal opera­
tors. We ensure that information is not lost by maintaining control over the way it is accessed 
or updated. In particular, we model access to a piece of information as a use of the formula, 
followed by a creation of another copy of the formula. This allows us to express both the use 
of the information and that it persists. Control over the use of information is expressed by 
using linear implication. For example, accessing the customer’s credit card number is mod­
eled as cred no � cred no. Accessing information can be ”bundled” with other processes, 
such as 
cred no ⊗ sale quote � cred no ⊗ sale quote ⊗ (cred paym ⊕ cred disappr) 
which expresses a process of credit payment, taking information about the credit card 
number and a quotation to determine if a credit payment is approved or not. Note that this 
is dependent on the checking process, and hence is not an internal choice to the agent. 
The updating of information is also modeled by the use of linear implication �. For 
example, the process not paid � has paid updates the payment status of the customer by 
replacing the formula not paid by has paid. 
Moreover, we use the ownership notation (subscript) to mark the source of information. 
For example, as the information about the credit card number of the customer comes from 
the customer, this is expressed as cred no . When a piece of information is brought to an C 
agent, we assume that the agent becomes aware of it. For example, to indicate that the 
merchant knows the customer’s credit card number, we use cred no@M . Hence, information 
exchange, such as when agents need updates from other agents, can be modeled by the 
relocation of information. Passing information from agent α to agent β is done by replacing 
the location of the information. For instance, cred no@CC � cred no@CC ⊗ cred no@MC 
expresses sending a customer’s credit card number to the merchant. 
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3.2.3 Capabilities and Actions 
We model agents’ capabilities to produce, consume, relocate and change ownership of re­
sources by declaring the eﬀects they have. In particular, the conditions before and after an 
application of the capability are speciﬁed. The ability to transform from pre-conditions to 
post-conditions is captured by linear implication �. 
The general form for capabilities is time op[Γ � Δ] in which Γ is the pre-conditions and 
Δ is the post-conditions. Γ and Δ may contain any TLL formulas. time op indicates the 
time when the capability is available and can be applied. 
Any resources in the pre-conditions of a capability are consumed and as a result, resources 
in the post-conditions are produced. This can be thought as a resource transformation 
process. Resource relocations, as discussed in previous section 3.2.1 are realized by keeping 
the respective resource and changing the names of the agents where those resources are 
located. Similarly, changes in ownership of resources are modeled by keeping the resources 
and changing the names of the owners. 
To illustrate a capability to consume and produce resources, we consider a resource trans­
formation process that produces a cappuccino. A cappuccino is made of sugar, milk and 
brewed coﬀee. This is modeled as brewed cof f ee⊗milk ⊗sugar � capu. The pre-conditions 
contain some units of brewed coﬀee, milk and sugar. When they are provided, the capability 
can be applied. An application of the capability removes all the formulas of brewed coﬀee, 
milk and sugar and produces a formula of the cappuccino, which reﬂects the transformation 
process. 
An example of resource exchange is selling cricket bats. The formula below 
$20@CC ⊗ 2crik b@M � $20@MM ⊗ 2crik b@CM C 
encodes a capability of a merchant (M) to sell 2 cricket bats for 20 dollars to customers 
(C). As can be seen, the 20 dollars is relocated from the customer to the merchant and the 
cricket bat is relocated from the merchant to the customer. Ownership of those resources is 
also changed accordingly. 
Moreover, the operator ! is also suitable to express those capabilities that can be applied 
an inﬁnite number of times. Their formulas are preceded by !. What then constrains the ap­
plication of these capabilities is the limited availability of the resources of the pre-conditions. 
Application times of a capability are bounded by the time constraints described by its 
time operator. If the time operator is �n, n > 0 then the rule can not be applied after n 
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time points. If the time operator is � then the application times of the rule can be anytime 
(but may be constrained by other factors). If the time operator is � then the application 
time of the rule will be sometime that the agent does not know. The operator ! does not 
impose any constraint on time or the number of rule applications. 
Application times of capabilities depend on a number of factors. Firstly, for a capability 
time op [Γ � Δ] to be applied, it is necessary that the pre-condition time op Γ is provided 
so that time op [Γ ⊗ (Γ � Δ)] � time op Δ. We can perform the capability now as in 
�nΓ ⊗ �n[Γ � Δ] � �nΔ, 
or at �n as in 
�n[Γ ⊗ (Γ � Δ)] � �nΔ 
or at some time in between, �m, as in 
�m[�n−mΓ ⊗ �n−m(Γ � Δ)] � �nΔ. 
The application time can be quite ﬂexible, at any time between now and �n . Lastly, 
if pre-condition formulas and the capability formula are available over a time range instead 
of at a speciﬁc time, the application time of the capability can be chosen such that the 
post-conditions are available at the most desirable time. 
Note that capabilities and resources are modeled as separate and independent formulas. 
Creation or applications of capabilities are automatically reﬂected in the state by the pres­
ence or removal of their corresponding formulas. Therefore, the loss of a resource does not 
aﬀect the capabilities (but may reduce the chance of having enough resources to apply the 
capability). The capabilities either exist or are removed as a result of their application, and 
have no partial updates. 
Furthermore, actions for which we do not wish to model any changes in resources or system 
properties as a result of their application can be modeled as TLL propositions in a similar 
manner as modeling resources. In particular, a formula representing the action denotes that 
the action is available. When the action is used, its formula is also removed. For instance, 
the action of blending (blend) can be added to the pre-conditions of the capability of making 
cappuccino: brewed cof f ee ⊗ milk ⊗ sugar ⊗ blend � capu. In this example, removal of the 
pre-conditions’ formulas means that the raw materials are consumed and the action blending 
is carried out. 
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Actions of agents that involve resource changes or changing system properties can be 
represented in a similar manner to that of capabilities by connecting their pre-conditions 
with their post-conditions via linear implication. As linear implication involves a deﬁnite 
transition, fulﬁlling the pre-conditions always leads to the post-conditions, which means the 
action is successful. To model actions that can fail, the post-conditions can be modeled 
with the use of an internal choice or an indeterminate possibility. Speciﬁcally, to model an 
action (to produce B) that has pre-conditions A and post-conditions B, instead of modeling 
as A � B, we could use A � (1 ⊕ B) or A � (1 � B). Note that 1 means nothing has been 
derived. The post-condition 1⊕B means that the outcome of the action is possibly 1 (failure) 
or B (success) and the agent cannot control which. Hence the outcome 1 ⊕ B means that 
the action (to produce B) can possibly fail. On the other hand, the post-condition 1 � B 
means that the action can fail or succeed, depending on our choice. 
It can be seen that with such modeling, the pre-conditions are always consumed whether 
the action fails or not. To model actions which do not consume their pre-conditions on 
failure, we could use such modeling as A � (A ⊕ B) (or A � (A � B)), where if A results, 
the action (to produce B) fails and the pre-conditions are fully restored. 
Given that we are mainly concerned with the modeling of interactions and their protocols, 
to simplify the handling of actions, we assume that actions of agents are always successful, 
bearing in mind that it is possible to cater for failures of actions (as mentioned above). 
The modeling of actions (with and without using linear implication) treats execution time 
of an action as a single time point. The modeling is suitable to address the declaration aspect 
of actions or capabilities, which is important in agent planning. For actions whose execution 
is over a period of time, TLL does not have any temporal operator that naturally models a 
duration. For actions modeled without pre-conditions and post-conditions, we model such 
actions that have continuous execution by spreading copies of the action’s formula over these 
time points to simulate a continuance in such discrete time system like TLL. For example, 
in the coﬀee making example, we can describe the action of blending over three time points 
as blend ⊗ �blend ⊗ �2blend. The use of all these formulas means repeating executing the 
action blending over three consecutive time points, which simulates continuous execution 
over the period. 
For actions that have pre-conditions and post-conditions, we can model the action of 
these as a series of sub-actions, with each having a separate set of pre- and post- conditions. 
These sub-actions can in turn be modeled as actions whose execution time is at a single time 
point. 
� 
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Furthermore, given actions that involve resource or changing system properties are rep­
resented in the same way as capabilities, for convenience, we refer to them as a form of 
capabilities. We then refer to actions as only those that we do not wish to model their eﬀects 
as changes in resources or system properties. 
3.2.4 Internal Choices and Indeterminate Possibilities 
As discussed in section 2.5, internal choices and external choices can be modeled using the 
connectives and ⊕ in linear logic, and hence TLL. Our approach to modeling internal 
choices and indeterminate possibilities is similar in that internal choices are modeled by using � and indeterminate possibilities are modeled using ⊕. Indeterminate possibilities here refer 
to the possibilities that the agents do not know their actual outcomes (which possibilities 
will turn out to be true). We will further discuss the modeling and strategies in dealing with 
internal choices and indeterminate possibilities in Chapter 5. 
3.2.5 Cricket Bat Sale Example 
Various concepts of resource, action, capability, goal, choice and information in the cricket 
bat sale example (section 3.1) are modeled as follows. 
At agent Mer 
Mer has 200 junior cricket bats and 300 heavy cricket bats available for sale. The avail­
ability of these cricket bats is anytime and hence encoded with �. The shorthand for 200 
junior cricket bat formulas that are “and”ed (⊗) together is 200 � jr cb. All are at Mer and 
owned by Mer: 200 � jr cb@M . The encoding of 300 heavy cricket bats is similar. M 
200 � jr cb@M ⊗ 300 � heavy cb@M .M M 
Mer can perform the action of issuing a quotation anytime and can repeat this action a 
number of times: η � issue quote@M .M 
We consider a number of capabilities of Mer. 
Capability 1. Mer has a sale capability in that it sells junior cricket bats for 10 dollars 
each. 
Pre-conditions of the capability include payment by the customer and having an address 
for delivery (addr@CC ) as well as an available junior cricket bat at the merchant (jr cb@MM ). 
Payment by the customer is arranged by having 10 dollars available (10$@CC ) and being car­
ried out via a payment method — by credit card (by cred@MC ) or via Paypal (via P P @MC ). 
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The choice of payment method is the customer’s choice (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) and C 
Mer accepts either of them. 
The pre-conditions of the capability are expressed as: 
(10$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@C ⊗ jr cb@MM )C C C 
Post-conditions of the capability specify that the customer’s address is received at the 
merchant (�addr@MC ), a junior cricket bat is received by the customer (�jr cb@CC ), and 
the money is received by the merchant (�10$@MM ). These post-conditions reﬂect the results 
of applying the sale capability to the pre-conditions. The post-conditions are expressed as: 
10 � $@M ⊗ �jr cb@C ⊗ �addr@MM C C 
As the merchant can sell anytime, the capability is preceded by the � operator. Also, the 
capability can be applied η number of times, where η is big enough in the context so that 
the merchant is capable of selling any amount of stock available. 
Combining all elements, the sale capability of the merchant is expressed as 
η � [10$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@C ⊗ jr cb@MC C C M 
� 10 � $@M ⊗ �jr cb@C ⊗ �addr@M ]M C C 
Capability 2. The merchant is also capable of making a sale of two junior bats at once 
plus a gift oﬀer. Modeling this capability is similar, with an addition of a gift from the mer­
chant (gif t@MM ) in the pre-conditions and the gift being received by the customer in the 
post-conditions (gif t@CC ). The capability is represented as follows. Note that the merchant 
is capable of making at most 20 sales of this kind. 
20 � [(20$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@CC ) ⊗ 2jr cb@M ⊗ gif t@MC C M M 
� (20 � $@M ⊗ �2jr cb@C ⊗ �gif t@C ⊗⊗ � addr@MC )]M C C 
Capability 3. Mer has the capability to accept payment by credit card which is per­
formed by giving EBank Cus’s credit number and getting EBank to arrange a credit payment 
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to Mer. The action of sending Cus’s credit card number to EBank is provided in the capa­
bility and hence given a negative form on the left hand side of � (similar issues arise with 
Capability 5, as discussed below). 
η � [(cred no@M � cred no@BC )⊥ ⊗ cred paym@M � �cred paym@M ]C B M 
Capability 4. Mer is capable of giving EBank a quotation (quote@BM ) given a request 
for a quotation (quote req@MB ) from Ebank. When this capability is performed, an action 
of issuing a quote (issue quote@MM ) is also carried out. 
η � [issue quote@M ⊗ quote req@M � �quote@B ]M B M 
At agent Ebank 
Capability 5. Ebank is capable of checking a customer’s credit rating and arranging 
a credit payment. This capability requires the credit card number of the customer, and a 
quotation from the merchant. A request for a quotation is also given to Mer in this capability. 
The outcome of performing the capability includes an arrangement of the credit payment or 
an indication of failure of the customer credit check. The choice here depends on Ebank’s 
internal processing. 
[quote@BM ⊗cred no@BC ⊗quote req@M ⊥ � �cred paym@MB ⊕�cred disappr@M ]η � B B 
Note that on the left hand side of � in the capability, quote req@M is given in itsB 
negated form quote req@M ⊥. Because the left hand side of � is the pre-conditions — what 
B 
is required — the negation of quote req@M then indicates a provision. This can be seenB 
clearly in the following proof steps (abstract). Consider a capability A⊥ � B in the following 
context of using Γ, Γ� to derive � Δ, Δ�: 
Γ, A � Δ 
Γ � A⊥, Δ −
⊥R 
Γ�, B �
�
Δ� 
L
Γ, Γ�, A⊥ � B � Δ, Δ� 
It can be seen that A⊥ appears in the pre-conditions of the capability A⊥ � B means a 
provision of A (as in Γ, A � Δ) to what have been required (Γ, Γ�). An application of the 
capability A⊥ � B provides both A and B to what is currently available. 
At agent Cus 
Cus has a resource of 50 dollars available for use anytime, information about his credit 
card number and an address: 
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�$50@CC ⊗ η � addr@CC ⊗ η � cred no@CC 
Cus also can perform an action of paying via Paypal: η � via P P @C .C 
Capability 6. Cus has a capability of paying by credit card. This capability includes 
an action of providing Mer with the credit card number 
((cred no@C � cred no@MC )⊥)C 
This action is given in its negation form and as explained earlier, negation form on the 
left hand side of � means a supply rather than a demand. The capability also requires Mer 
to arrange the credit payment (cred paym@MM ). 
η � [(cred no@C � cred no@MC )⊥ ⊗ cred paym@M � by cred@M ]C M C 
Agents interact to exchange resources and explore each other’s capabilities. The next 
question is how to coordinate agent interactive actions and provide agents with a ﬂexibility 
over their actions. The following section discusses the use of commitment to achieve ﬂexibility 
in agent interaction. 
3.3 Commitment based Interaction 
The notion of social commitment is an important mechanism to agent coordination. Com­
mitments are persistent. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, they provide certain level of stability 
and predictability, which allows agents to coordinate their activities with others. 
Furthermore, the notion of social commitment captures the meaning of interactive actions 
and hence protocols speciﬁed in terms of commitments provide agents with more ﬂexibility 
over their interactive behaviors. Our approach makes use of the concept of social commitment 
as a means to construct agent interaction. 
Commitments are pledges or promises [Jennings, 1993] such as that some resources will 
be made available or that some actions will be carried out by the agent. 
Commitments have been modeled as abstract data types [Yolum and Singh, 2002a; 
Chopra and Singh, 2004; Mallya et al., 2003; Yolum and Singh, 2002b] or as objects of 
an abstract (commitment) class [Fornara and Colombetti, 2002]. However, we try to take 
advantage of properties of the TLL to model commitments as dual to the resources and 
actions required to fulﬁll them. 
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We discuss how various type of commitments are modeled and handled and also their 
relationships to resources, actions and capabilities. 
3.3.1 Internal Commitments and Social Commitments 
Internal commitments are commitments by an agent to itself. We do not address the notion 
of internal commitment in relation to mental states of agents but refer to the scope of 
commitment. Internal commitments can be regarded as matters private to the agent and 
hence information about them is not intended for other agents. Social commitments are 
commitments made by one agent to another. Internal commitments are diﬀerent from social 
ones in that social commitments are, in principle, made known to other agent(s) in the 
interaction. Being known to other agent(s) is essential for social commitments to provide a 
certain level of predictability. 
We take the view that the distinction between social and internal commitments is pri­
marily based on the context in which they occur. If the context is within a single agent, 
the commitments refer to internal commitments. If the context is an interaction with other 
agent(s), the commitments are social. In our modeling, we do not make a distinction between 
representations of internal and social commitments. We assume that diﬀerent treatments of 
them are determined appropriately by the context in which they appear. This assumption al­
lows us to simplify the representation of commitments by not explicitly specifying the agents 
involved in the commitment. 
Both social commitments and internal commitments can be base commitments and con­
ditional commitments which are described in the sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4. 
Base commitments are interpreted within the context of conditional commitments agreed 
upon by the interacting agents. Speciﬁcally, in a conditional commitment Γ � Δ from agent 
α to agent β, the base commitments Γ and Δ are the social commitments of agent α and 
agent β respectively. An example of such social commitments is a social commitment from 
a merchant to give a cricket bat to a customer who pays. 
Our approach focuses on modeling commitments as dual to the resources & actions re­
quired to fulﬁll them; in other words,we focus on the handling of commitments. As men­
tioned above, we do not diﬀerentiate between internal and social commitments, nor do we 
keep track of to whom the commitment is made. It is important to know this when delib­
erating whether to fulﬁl a commitment or not, or to analyse what commitments have been 
broken. However, such issues are outside the scope of this thesis (although our approach does 
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not exclude the possibility of keeping track of the agent to whom a commitment is made). 
3.3.2 Base commitments 
Non-conditional commitments are referred to as base commitments. For example, in the 
cricket bat sale example, once the customer has paid, the merchant has a base commitment 
of sending the customer two cricket bats. We consider modeling base commitments as dual 
to what is required to fulﬁll them by exploring the duality between positive and negative 
formulas. If we consider positive formulas as what is already provided, due to the duality 
of negation, their negations can be treated as of what is demanded. In this context, base 
commitments are formulas in demand and hence can be modeled by negative formulas. 
In particular, we assume that agents have a common overall goal to satisfy all the de­
mands, which means removing formulas in negated form. Achieving this goal then exerts a 
driving force over the manipulation of agents’ formulas to arrive at a state of no negative 
formulas. This force can be used to implement the notion of base commitment. In particular, 
trying to remove negative formulas can be used to realize trying to fulﬁll base commitments. 
Hence, to model a base commitment of deriving a resource or performing an action, 
we negate formulas of the resource or action. A base commitment to derive resource A is 
expressed as A⊥. Referring to our example, the base commitment to send two cricket bats 
to the customer is expressed as (2 crik b@CC )
⊥. If the formula of a resource includes time 
operators, then the corresponding base commitment can be in one of the two possible forms. 
One is the negation of the whole resource’s formula. A negation of �nA is (�nA)⊥. The 
second is a formula formed from a negation of the linear logic part, preceded by the same 
time operators. For example, �n(A)⊥ (or shortly �nA⊥) is the second form. Variations of 
them can be �n1 (�n2 A)⊥, where n1 + n2 = n. Regarding the second form, it can still exert 
the same eﬀect given a presence of the positive formula of the resource but only at the same 
time point as of the positive formula. 
Negative formulas will not be removed until the corresponding positive formulas are 
present to remove them or until they expire. However, removal of negative formulas as a 
result of time passing (unfulﬁlled commitments) is considered not acceptable for a successful 
interaction. 
In order to fulﬁll a base commitment, a corresponding positive formula is required such 
that their multiplicative conjunction yields ⊥. Indeed, if agent α has a base commitment 
to bring about resource A or to do action A, represented as A⊥, removing this negative 
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formula means deriving the corresponding positive A such that A⊥ ⊗ A � ⊥, and hence 
fulﬁlling the base commitment. Similarly to the negative formulas’ cases, the corresponding 
positive formulas can be in two forms. The ﬁrst form is a negation of the base commitment’s 
formula. The second form comprises a negation of the linear logic proposition part of the base 
commitment’s formula, preceded by the same time operators as of the base commitment’s 
formula. For example, a base commitment formula �3A has two corresponding positive 
formulas that can remove it. They are (�3A)⊥ and �3A⊥. 
Moreover, breakable commitments which are in place to provide agents with the desired 
ﬂexibility to remove itself from its commitments (i.e. the ability to cancel commitments) can 
also be modeled naturally in our framework. A base commitment Com⊥ to derive Com 
can be turned into a breakable base commitment as (cond ⊕ Com)⊥. The extra token 
cond and ⊕ reﬂect the agent’s internal deliberation about whether the base commitment 
to derive Com is broken (i.e. if the base commitment is broken then cond is derivable and 
vice versa). Hence, (cond ⊕ Com)⊥ means a base commitment to derive the expected 
Com or to derive an indication that the base commitment is broken (cond). After a base 
commitment (cond ⊕ Com)⊥ is made, in order to fulﬁll it, the agent can produce cond or 
Com. If cond is produced, due to the logic deduction cond ⊗ (cond ⊕ Com)⊥ � ⊥, the 
commitment (cond ⊕ Com)⊥ is removed without Com being derived. In other words, the 
base commitment to derive Com is deliberately broken. 
In addition, commitments, due to their persistence, make the agents’ actions more pre­
dictable. The modeling of base commitments as negative formulas also reﬂects that. Indeed, 
under our assumption, all negative formulas are expected to be fulﬁlled by the respective 
agents to make the interaction successful. Hence, other agents can reasonably assume that 
an agent will derive the appropriate resources and actions to fulﬁl its commitments. As 
negative formulas remain until the agents fulﬁll them, they provide a level of predictability. 
3.3.3 Goals 
In the modeling of goals, we explore the duality and symmetry between what is desired 
(goals) and what is provided (resources and actions). Hence, goals are also modeled by 
negative formulas. Such modeling blurs the distinction between goals and base commitments. 
However, in our scope of research, we only consider those goals that agents are committed 
to achieving. Therefore, an agent’s goals can also be implemented as commitments to bring 
about the resources or actions corresponding to the goals. With this approach, goal formulas 
Commitment based Interaction 73 
can be treated in the same manner as base commitments and become an integral part of the 
reasoning about resources and commitments. 
3.3.4 Conditional Commitments 
A conditional commitment [Yolum and Singh, 2002a] requires some conditions to be satisﬁed 
prior to making the base commitment(s) active. 
Indeed, the relationship between satisfaction of the conditions and the base commitments 
can be regarded as causal. To model this causal relationship, we make use of the linear 
implication connective. In particular, � models an automatic and deﬁnite transition from 
a satisfaction of the conditions to the activation of base commitments. A general form is 
Γ � Δ where Γ is the condition part and Δ is the commitment part and typically contains 
some base commitments. A conditional commitment Γ � Δ of an agent α is interpreted as 
that agent α commits that whenever the condition Γ is satisﬁed, agent α will ensure that the 
commitment Δ results. The commitment is enforced by the use of linear implication which 
makes a deﬁnite transition. If the condition is not satisﬁed, the linear implication can not be 
applied and hence the commitment Δ will not be derived. When its time frame, as speciﬁed 
by its time operators, is exceeded, the conditional commitment becomes invalid. 
Commitments to relocate or change ownership of resources can be regarded as a form of 
conditional commitment whose conditions are that the resources are available at the original 
places or belong to the original owner. Speciﬁcally, if a commitment is to relocate the resource 
A from agent α to agent β, we take advantage of using �. Given a resource A at agent α 
(A@α), the commitment A@α � A@β will replace A@α by A@β and consequently relocates 
resource A to agent β. Similarly, a commitment to change ownership of a resource A can be 
modeled as Aα � A . Together, a commitment to both relocate a resource A and change β 
its ownership is modeled as A@α � A@β
β 
.α 
We consider conditional commitments in the context of agent interaction. As agents 
are self-interested, making a promise to another agent of doing some tasks often requires 
something in return, such as ”I promise that if you do something for me, I will do this 
and that”. Hence, conditional commitments from one agent to another often include in the 
conditions what is required of the other in exchange for what is promised to be done. 
For the purpose of supporting modular designs of interactions as series of base and con­
ditional commitments, each conditional commitment (and hence its pre-commitment form) 
is simply designed to be an independent item in the sense that its application only depends 
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on the satisfaction of its conditions and does not depend on how other commitments may be 
satisﬁed. This design simpliﬁes the negotiation process in that it takes place over one condi­
tional commitment, not a set or sequence of them. This allows us to focus on the mechanism 
to represent and execute protocols rather than the complexities of negotiation over multiple 
inter-related items. On the other hand, our mechanism is not restricted to such a simple 
design but can be extended to cover richer themes of negotiation. 
Regarding interaction, a conditional commitment Γ � Δ can be put forward as a proposal 
from agent α to agent β. The conditional commitment is read as agent α if agent β makes 
Γ available for use, agent α will make the commitment Δ. When two agents agree on the 
proposal, the conditional commitment is established between the two agents. In particular, 
agent β derives Γ and agent α commits that fulﬁllment of Γ by β will result in the derivation 
of Δ. If Γ is not derived within the valid time frame of the conditional commitment, then 
the conditional commitment is released. 
Some examples of conditional commitments from an agent α to agent β include: 
•	 If agent β does action A, agent α will commit to doing action B (a base commitment 
B⊥ results):
α 
A � B⊥
β α 
•	 If agent β brings resource A to agent α (from A@β to A@αα ), then agent α will commit β 
to bringing resource B to agent β at the second next two time point (from B@α toα 
B@β
β 
, of which deriving B@α is in a form of a base commitment: (B@αα )⊥)α 
A@β
β 
� A@αα ⊗ �2B@ββ ⊗ (�2B@αα )⊥ 
Moreover, when there is a time bound on the conditional commitment, which is usually 
described in its time operators, exceeding the time bound will render the conditional com­
mitment invalid. If the agent responsible for fulﬁlling the condition part fails to do so in time, 
the conditional commitment is then regarded as being released. Otherwise, the conditional 
commitment turns into base commitments (a transition from the conditions to the eﬀects 
takes place) and hence, these base commitments are subject to the time bound instead. 
Furthermore, a breakable conditional commitment is modeled as A � (1 � B) (or A � 
(1 ⊕ B)), instead of A � B. When the condition A is provided, the linear implication brings 
about (1 � B) (or 1 ⊕ B) and it is now up to the owner agent’s internal choice (or external 
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choice) whether 1 or B results. If 1 is the outcome, then the conditional commitment is 
broken. 
However, in order to focus on modeling protocols of interaction, we limit our consideration 
to unbreakable commitments while keeping in mind that it is largely an issue of implementa­
tion to include breakable commitments (like the above mentioned modeling) in the modeling 
framework. 
3.3.5 Pre-commitments 
We have discussed the modeling of conditional commitments. It still remains to determine 
how a conditional commitment is formed between two interacting agents. In particular, 
•	 How does an agent decide to make a conditional commitment to another agent? 
•	 How does the agent know that the other agent also wants the conditional commit­
ment and hence is likely to make attempts to fulﬁll the conditions of the conditional 
commitment? 
•	 Should the owner stop making a conditional commitment if the other agent does not 
want the conditional commitment? 
•	 If the owner agent has multiple potential conditional commitments that can serve the 
same purpose, should it allow other agents to pick the one that they prefer? 
•	 How do we allow an agent to disagree about a conditional commitment and suggest the 
use of another conditional commitment which might be more suitable to both agents? 
Regarding the ﬁrst question, agents can decide to make a conditional commitment based on 
whether it can serve a goal or a pending commitment. These goals and commitments can 
arise from the agents themselves or from other agents in the interaction. 
The next questions essentially involve negotiation between agents over some conditional 
commitments, so that in the end, the chosen conditional commitments are what the owner 
agent wants to make and also what the other parties want to fulﬁll their conditions. The 
involving agents can negotiate over the conditional commitments and alternatives proposed 
by each other to reach an agreement on one. 
During the negotiation phase, conditional commitments are pending (i.e. not yet agreed 
to). There is a need for another distinct form of conditional commitment to reﬂect this inac­
tive state due to negotiation. As our approach does not focus on various forms of negotiation 
Commitment based Interaction 76 
among agents, we make use of the concept of pre-commitment to capture this state, while 
simplifying the negotiation process. 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2, pre-commitment can be thought of as a potential commit­
ment that one agent is willing to commit, but which has not (yet) been accepted by the 
other agent. This form of pre-commitment is diﬀerent from the form in which the agent 
decides in advance that it will commit. Acceptance by the other party is the key to turn the 
pre-commitment into a conditional commitment. 
Both conditional commitments and base commitments can be considered in the form 
of pre-commitments prior to negotiation. Base commitments are like oﬀers without condi­
tions and hence are assumed to be readily accepted by other agents, especially self-interested 
agents. Conditional commitments, on the other hand, may require a certain level of con­
tribution on the accepting agents, as reﬂected in the conditions, and consequently are more 
likely to involve negotiation to reach agreement among parties. Our work hence focuses on 
modeling pre-commitments for conditional commitments. 
We model pre-commitments in a similar way to commitments but the modeling of pre-
commitment also contains universal quantiﬁcation of variables, which refer to the applicable 
agents. These agents might be the agents that the conditional commitment is to and/or the 
agents that the conditions are supposed to be satisﬁed by. When a pre-commitment becomes 
a commitment, the variables in the representation of the pre-commitment are assigned to 
speciﬁc agents. 
For example, consider a conditional commitment that if a customer pays 10 dollars, the 
merchant commits to giving the customer a cricket bat. This is expressed as follows 
10$@CC � (cricket b@CC )⊥ 
A pre-commitment of the merchant (to any customer) is then expressed using universal 
quantiﬁcation over a variable X that represents a customer: 
∀X 10$@X � (cricket b@XX )⊥X 
Note that X is a variable quantiﬁed over the domain of agents. 
3.3.6 Formation of Commitments by Reasoning and Negotiating Pre-commitments 
Modeling concepts about agent interaction has been introduced and discussed in previous 
sections. These concepts include resources, actions, capabilities, base commitments, condi­
tional commitments, goals, and pre-commitments. A summary of these concepts and their 
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Table 3.1: Summary of Interaction Concepts Modeling 
Concept Modeling in TLL Section 
Resource T ime proposition@α
β 
3.2.1 
Unlimited resource !proposition@α
β 
3.2.1 
Status information T ime proposition@α
β 
3.2.2 
Action label 
(no system change) 
T ime proposition@α
β 
3.2.3 
Action 
(with system changes) 
T ime(preconditions � postconditions) 3.2.3 
Capability T ime(preconditions � postconditions) 3.2.3 
Base commitment [f ormula]⊥ 3.3.2 
Goal [f ormula]⊥ 3.3.3 
Conditional commitment T ime(preconditions � postconditions) 3.3.4 
Pre-commitment ∀X[T ime(preconditions � postconditions)] 3.3.5 
Legend: T ime: a combination of temporal operators �, �, and �; proposition: TLL proposition; 
f ormula:TLL formula; α,β: names or IDs of agents; preconditions, postconditions: multiplicative 
conjunctions of TLL formulas. 
modeling in TLL is provided in the table 3.1. More precise notations of the modeling are 
provided in a grammar formulation form in Section 4.2.1. It can be seen that the notations of 
various concepts are similar, which reﬂects the pragmatic similarities of these concepts with 
respect to resource handling. For example, as also mentioned in their modeling discussion, 
actions that aﬀect resources and system properties have similar eﬀects to capabilities. Read­
ing status information can be thought as using a kind of resource. Moreover, our modeling 
focuses on the dynamic interactions and relationships between them so that capabilities and 
actions are considered with respect to the eﬀects they have on resources and state proper­
ties; base commitments are modeled as dual to the resources and actions required to fulﬁll 
them; and pre-commitments and conditional commitments emerge from capabilities. Over­
loading notations, however, has its own issues as discussed in Section 8.2.3 and can be can 
be overcome by instrumenting extra (uncomplicated) steps in handling the notations. 
We then describe further interactions among these concepts in the presence of pre-
commitments. In particular, we examine how agents utilize their sets of pre-commitments. 
In general, pre-commitments can be regarded as services that agents can provide to other 
agents. In these services, the owner agent performs transformations from pre-conditions 
to post-conditions. To use a service, an agent has to provide the pre-conditions. Pre-
commitments can then be used in a proactive manner in which the agents propose them to 
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other agents, given that these pre-commitments upon being resolved can lead to fulﬁllment 
of their goals and commitments. Pre-commitments can also be used in reactive manner in 
which the agents propose them as a (helpful) response to requests from other agents. 
Either way, agents need to be able to determine and act on the relevance of pre-commitments 
with respect to a goal or a commitment or a request. This relevance can be modeled sim­
ply as matching what the pre-commitment can provide with what the goal/commitment 
demands. Such matching is described in detail in Section 4.3.7. A proposed pre-commitment 
that is determined to be irrelevant will be rejected and hence no corresponding commitment 
is formed. Another pre-commitment may then be proposed. If a pre-commitment is found 
relevant by the receiving party, it is accepted and this acceptance allows the owner of the 
pre-commitment to make a conditional commitment out of the pre-commitment. Only then, 
a conditional commitment is formed and binds the two agents. The receiving agent is sup­
posed to satisfy the conditions of the conditional commitment. For the owner (proposing) 
agent, it is tied to the commitment that upon the conditions being satisﬁed, the owner agent 
fulﬁlls the commitment part of the conditional commitment. 
3.3.7 Evolution of Commitments 
It can be seen that conditional commitments can be based on the agents’ capabilities. Capa­
bilities of agents can be viewed as services that the agents provide to other agents. As agents 
are self-interested, for each capability that an agent can perform for others, it can attach 
a price that the other has to pay in exchange. The price can be given in terms of money 
or resources. To ensure that the capability will be performed when its price is paid, the 
concept of commitment can be used. In particular, from a capability that an agent can per­
form as a service, information about the price is attached as conditions to form a conditional 
commitment that the agent can make to other agents. To further support negotiation over 
conditional commitments, a pre-commitment is used and formed out of the capability. Pre-
commitments show a willingness to commit to performing the capabilities under the speciﬁed 
conditions. This translation from a capability to a pre-commitment makes the agent able to 
provide the capability as a service during interaction. 
The evolution of commitments is described as follows. Agents have capabilities, goals and 
possibly some commitments to be fulﬁlled. Those capabilities that can used to serve others 
are put in a form of pre-commitments. As agents interact, they can be proactive by proposing 
their pre-commitments to other agents if these commitments can help to fulﬁll their goals or 
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commitments. Also, they can react to requests by proposing pre-commitments that can help 
to satisfy the requests. Conditional commitments emerge from the agreed pre-commitments. 
The conditions and possibly base commitments of conditional commitments need their corre­
sponding positive formulas (i.e. desired resources and/or actions) to be derived. Once these 
positive formulas are provided, they will resolve the conditional commitments, possibly into 
base commitments and subsequently remove all the base commitments. 
3.3.8 Conventions 
The modeling of breakable base commitments and conditional commitments has been dis­
cussed in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4. However, to focus on demonstrating the modeling of 
ﬂexible interactions based on the notion of commitment, we limit the scope of our work to 
deal with those situations where base commitments and conditional commitments cannot be 
broken. Handling of broken commitments with penalties and compensation is one item of 
further work. 
3.3.9 Rules for Protocols 
Protocols are commonly speciﬁed in terms of rules for interaction. In particular, each rule 
guides the participating agents on their interactive actions. Agents then interact by uti­
lizing the pre-determined rules to fulﬁll their goals and objectives. In our approach, pre-
commitments and capabilities can also be viewed as rules for interaction. 
We deﬁne a rule as an encoding of the form time op [Γ � Δ], where time op refers to 
a temporal operator or a combination of operators and Γ, Δ refer to TLL formulas. With 
this encoding, rules can be regarded as capabilities, conditional commitments and even some 
actions. 
Each rule can also be regarded as a speciﬁcation of a transformation process which de­
scribes the conditions before (Γ) and after (Δ) as a result of executing the rule. When a rule is 
applied, it takes an appropriate condition time op Γ, and replaces it with the post-condition 
time op Δ. 
Rules can be classiﬁed as local or interaction, according to its scope of use. Local rules 
are not used directly for interacting with other agents (such as answering a request) but can 
be used internally by the owner agent. Interaction rules are used to guide the interaction 
with other agents. In interaction rules, there are variables quantiﬁed over the domain of 
agents. An assignment of these variables to agents determines the participating agents in 
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the interaction with the owner agent. The other agents are expected to play some roles in 
the rules. In our case, they are expected to fulﬁll the conditions of the rules and the owner 
agents are expected to deliver the outcomes by applying the rules. 
It can be seen that local rules correspond to capabilities, which can be used internally. 
Interaction rules correspond to pre-commitments. However, if variables in pre-commitments 
are assigned to the owner agent, these pre-commitments are then local rules as the rules are 
carried out entirely by the owner agent. 
An example of interaction rules of an agent α is 
[∀X 20$@XX � ticket@X
X ⊗ ticket@α
⊥α ⊗ 20 � $@α
α ] 
in which X is an agent variable. The rule allows agent α to sell its ticket to any agent who 
is willing to pay 20 dollars. By assigning X = β during an interaction with agent β, the rule 
becomes �[20$@β

β
� ticket@β

β
⊗ ticket@α
⊥
α
⊗ 20 � $@α
α ]

in which agent β is responsible to pay 20 dollars and as a result of such payment, agent α 
will commit to providing the ticket and agent β will receive the ticket. 
Applications of interaction rules can be dynamic as rules can be combined or extended 
without changing provability. Some examples of rule manipulation are: 
• (A � B) ⊗ (C � D) � (A ⊗ C � B ⊗ D) 
• (A � B) � (A � C) � A � (B � C) 
• A � B � A � C � B 
• A � B � A � (B ⊕ C) 
• (A � C) � (B � C) � (A ⊕ B) � C 
3.3.10 State 
As we are not concerned with BDI agents per se, but with the planning and utilization 
aspect of resources and actions, we are more concerned with which resources are consumed 
and produced, and which actions are carried out during the agent’s lifetime. We limit the 
concept of a state of an agent to capturing the status of these. Similar work in this direction, 
[K¨ ungas, 2004b] also consider states of agents in terms of resources. ungas, 2003] and [K¨
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The state of an agent in our framework includes all resources that the agent has, actions 
and capabilities that can be performed by the agent and the agent’s commitments. As the 
multiplicative conjunction ⊗ allows speciﬁcation of items without any constraints on their 
order, we can represent a state by a multiplicative conjunction of TLL formulas representing 
resources, actions, capabilities and commitments. For example, a merchant’s state might be 
having 50 dollars and 100 junior cricket bats which is represented as 50$@M ⊗ 100jr cb@M . 
Moreover, being connected via ⊗, items of states can also be used in independent contexts, 
which supports concurrent utilization. 
State changes of agents can take place as a result of actions, applications of capabilities, 
resolution of commitments or time passage. For instance, a successful application of a capa­
bility of the form Γ � Δ subtracts formulas in Γ and the capability’s formula from the set 
of state formulas and adds to it the formula Δ. Moreover, when the time moves to the next 
time point, all the formulas associated only with the present (excluding those with � and � 
operators), are removed. 
Moreover, because agents are operating in an environment, they constantly receive inputs 
from the environment. Such inputs, for example, are obtained either by agents actively 
collecting information through their observations or getting feedback from the environment. 
The inputs that are relevant to our context of modeling interaction can be classiﬁed in terms 
of status information, resources, commitments and eﬀects of actions or capabilities being 
performed. Given our focus on modeling interaction, we do not provide a speciﬁc agent 
mechanism for receiving and processing environment inputs but assume a typical environment 
input processing mechanism for agent systems to be in place. Such a mechanism also updates 
agents’ states and hence aﬀects agent interaction processes. In order to make sure that the 
updates are reﬂected in agent interaction, in our speciﬁcation and execution framework for 
interaction, the states of agents are always referred to as the most current and up-to-date 
states. Given that state formulas are connected via ⊗ connective, adding new formulas to the 
states is simple. Removing obsolete formulas can also be done easily using the � connective 
via applications of actions, capabilities, resolution of commitments, or time passage. Hence, 
the mechanism to keep the agents’ states updated remains largely an implementation issue 
and hence is not discussed in detail in the thesis. 
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3.3.11 Cricket Bat Sale Example 
We provide an illustration of what a pre-commitment is and how it evolves into a conditional 
commitment and then is fulﬁlled with respect to our example of cricket bat sale (section 3.1). 
In the example, the merchant pre-commits that given that the customer pays 20 dollars 
via Paypal or by credit card and provides an address, the merchant will give the customer 
2 junior cricket bats and a gift. Note that as a result of fulﬁlling the pre-commitment, the 
merchant receives 20 dollars and the customer’s address, and have the internal commitment 
of getting 2 junior cricket bats and a gift ready. 
20 � [(20$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@CC )C C 
� (20 � $@M ⊗ �2jr cb@C ⊗ 2jr cb@MM C ⊥M ⊗ �gif t@C ⊗ gif t@MC ⊥M ⊗ �addr@MC )] 
A pre-commitment, like that of the merchant, can be proposed to the involving party and 
once it gets accepted, it becomes a conditional commitment by the owner agent. Once the 
conditions are provided, for example, (20$@CC ⊗ (via P P @MC ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@CC ) 
are provided, the owner agent is expected to fulﬁll the conditional commitment, which means 
that 
(20 � $@M ⊗ �2jr cb@C ⊗ 2jr cb@MM C ⊥M ⊗ �gif t@C ⊗ gif t@MC ⊥M ⊗ �addr@MC )] 
are derived. The outcome might contain internal commitments, like 2jr cb@M
⊥
M 
⊗ 
gif t@M⊥
M 
, which further require to be fulﬁlled by the owner agent (in this case, the mer­
chant). 
3.4 Summary 
Chapter 3 has described how various agent interaction concepts such as resources, resource 
location, resource ownership, resource exchange, action, capability, goal, base commitments, 
conditional commitments and pre-commitments are modeled. We also mentioned how model­
ing of such concepts might be put into work in the context of resource-based and commitment-
based interaction. In the next chapter, we will discuss a speciﬁcation framework of agent 
interaction based on such modeling. 
Chapter 4

Specifying Flexible Interaction

In the context of open systems, agents may have diﬀerent designs and architectures. To 
support such diversity, it is important to make the speciﬁcations of agent interactions in­
dependent of the agents’ internal designs and architectures. Hence, the only aspect of an 
agents’ internal systems that concerns is the parts that can be utilized for agent interaction. 
These include resources, actions, and capabilities of agents. 
We take the approach that interactions are driven by the agents’ goals and commitments. 
However, we do not impose the notion of shared goals or joint goals among agents. This 
facilitates the notion that interaction is at the agents’ discretion and is not imposed on 
agents as a means to achieve shared or joint goals. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, interaction between agents can be structured in terms of com­
mitments. Commitments can occur in various forms such as pre-commitments, conditional 
commitments, internal commitments, and base commitments. Pre-commitments are speciﬁed 
as services that an agent can be oﬀer to other agents. Conditional commitments result from 
the pre-commitments that are agreed upon by the involving parties. Internal commitments 
may arise as a result of interaction and can be regarded as a form of goals. Base commit­
ments can result from resolving conditional commitments or be part of the speciﬁcation of 
interaction. 
In our framework, given the assumption that goals are also treated as internal commit­
ments, commitments in general are what govern agent behaviors. Commitments inﬂuence 
agents’ decisions in selecting actions, transformations and exchanges of resources as well as 
further commitments. Moreover, resolving commitments and fulﬁlling requests from other 
agents may result in some further commitments being made. This process goes on until all 
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goals and commitments are fulﬁlled. 
4.1 Speciﬁcation of Interaction 
A protocol can be deﬁned in terms of a set of active commitments among participating 
agents. In our approach, we make use of the notion of pre-commitment and a protocol speci­
ﬁcation includes speciﬁcations of pre-commitments at each participating agent. Moreover, as 
interaction is driven by the agents’ goals and commitments, we consider speciﬁcation of an 
interaction in a broader context. In particular, a speciﬁcation of interaction includes speciﬁ­
cations of the protocols and speciﬁcations of the agents’ goals and base commitments. While 
goals can be regarded as internal to agents, base commitments are a public responsibility 
that agents are expected to fulﬁll. Interaction is then guided by an agent’s goals (internal 
commitments) and base commitments, and the logic of the protocol (or rules of encounter) 
is embodied in the speciﬁed pre-commitments. 
Note that the speciﬁcation of protocols (as a set of pre-commitments) in our approach is 
an inseparable part of the speciﬁcation of agent interaction. From now on, for simplicity of 
discussion, unless otherwise stated, we will use the broader term speciﬁcation of interaction, 
on the understanding that this includes protocol speciﬁcation. 
Speciﬁcation at each participating agent reﬂects their respective roles in the intended 
interactions. The role of each agent is detailed via the goals that the agent aims to achieve, 
the base commitments the agent is required to fulﬁll, and the services (pre-commitments) 
the agent can provide. For example, in our cricket bat sale example, the role of the customer 
manifests itself via its goal of obtaining cricket bats and a gift, and that it can provide money 
and information to facilitate payment for the goods it purchases. 
The speciﬁcation at each participating agent is considered as private information, acces­
sible only to that agent. Agents then discover other agents’ goals, commitments and services 
via interaction. This design allows agents to avoid disclosing private information to the ad­
vantage of others. Indeed, maintaining such privacy is desirable among self-interested agents 
and promotes agent autonomy over the control of information regarding its goals, internal 
commitments and pre-commitments. 
Our speciﬁcation allows goals and base commitments to be fulﬁlled internally by the 
agents, i.e. without interaction. This increases the ﬂexibility of interaction, as commitments 
and goals can either be fulﬁlled internally or via interaction. How a commitment or goal is 
fulﬁlled will depend on a number of factors, such as the internal resources and actions that 
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are available, the preferences of agents about interaction, what others are willing to oﬀer as 
services, and changes due to the environment or other interactions. 
Our speciﬁcation can also be viewed as a rule-based approach in which interaction pro­
tocols are speciﬁed by deﬁning interaction rules for each participating agent. Each agent is 
described in terms of its resources, commitments (goals) and capabilities. Interaction rules 
are structured as “conditions → eﬀects”, so that successful applications of the rules will 
replace the condition formulas by the eﬀect formulas and hence drive state changes. In­
teraction rules provide constraints on how the respective agents might interact with other 
agents and are speciﬁed to naturally reﬂect the agents’ capabilities speciﬁc to their role in 
the interactions. They are speciﬁed in terms of which resource transformations, resource 
exchanges or actions are to be carried out, and how existing commitments can be fulﬁlled or 
new commitments emerge. 
Furthermore, it can be seen that rather than specifying protocols as a set of commitments, 
our approach speciﬁes protocols as a set of pre-commitments and allows commitments to be 
dynamically formed when the agents utilize the pre-commitments to fulﬁll their goals and 
commitments. Our approach hence makes clear the separation between the agents’ goals 
and commitments and the ways the agents interact with each other (as speciﬁed in pre-
commitments) to achieve them. Hence, it can be seen that interaction emerges from a set 
of suitably chosen commitments rather than from a pre-determined set. In other words, 
protocols are dynamically and ﬂexibly utilized. 
4.2 Designing Interaction Speciﬁcation 
4.2.1 The Speciﬁcation Language 
The formulas that represent resources, actions, capabilities, base commitments and condi­
tional commitments are deﬁned as follows. 
Each resource can be represented by a proposition or an atomic formula preceded with 
temporal operators. Let A be an atom in TLL. Let @− and −− be markers that represent 
agent location and ownership of the resource formulas respectively, as described in 3.2.1. Let 
x, y be variables in the domain of agents. For example, a value of x can be agent α. The 
notation A@x y means that formula A is at agent x and is owned by agent y. 
Relationships between resources are co-existence or mutual exclusiveness due to internal 
choices or indeterminate possibilities. Having no resource is expressed by the constant 1. 
Resource formulas together with their relationships then have the following grammar: 
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R ::== A@x y |1@αβ �R R ⊗ R R � R R ⊕ R| � R| � R| | | |
Each action is represented declaratively and hence in a similar way as resources (except 
for the constant 1). Action formulas have the following grammar. 
AC ::== A@x y � AC � AC �AC AC ⊗ AC AC � AC AC ⊕ AC| | | | | |
Capabilities are modeled with respect to their eﬀects and hence can be a resource trans­
formation or state update. The transformation and updating processes are modeled by the 
connective � and the formulas are possibly preﬁxed by � and/or �. Because it does not 
seem natural to have a capability over which the agent has no control and no information 
about when it can be used, we do not use � to preﬁx a capability formula. Hence, capability 
formulas have the following grammar: 
CA ::== R � R � CA � CA | | 
Base commitments are modeled as a negative form of resources and actions formulas and 
have the grammar: 
B ::== R � ⊥ 
Conditional commitments are modeled as a linear implication from pre-conditions to 
post-conditions (the commitment part). Such pre- and post- conditions can be speciﬁed in 
terms of resources, actions and base commitments which can be combined together via the 
connective ⊗. Hence, conditional commitments formulas have the following grammar: 
CC ::== C � C � CC � CC | | 
where C is a pre- or post-condition formula, as in the grammar below. 
C ::== B R C ⊗ C| |
Pre-commitments are deﬁned as potential conditional commitments. Hence, their formu­
las can be conditional commitments with some variables over the domain of agents. Pre-
commitments formulas then have the following grammar: 
P ::== CCx 
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where CCx is similar to CC but contains at least one agent variable. 
State formulas can be formulas of resources, actions, capabilities, base commitments or a 
combination (multiplicative conjunction) of states. Hence, state formulas have the grammar: 
S ::== ⊥|R AC CA B S ⊗ S| | | |
We also deﬁne basic TLL formulas as formulas of the form: 
�nA, 0 ≤ n 
where A is an atomic LL formula. 
We denote R(rule) as the formulas on the right hand side of the linear implication and 
L(rule) as the formula on the left hand side. 
Examples of various forms of formulas are as follows. 
The merchant Mer has 200 junior cricket bats and 300 heavy cricket bats available any­
time. They are formulated as 200 � jr cb@M ⊗ 300 � heavy cb@MM M 
The merchant Mer can carry out the action of issuing quote of sale: issue quote@MM 
The merchant Mer also has a capability of informing the customer Cus if the Cus’s credit 
check result is a failure: 
η � [cred disappr@M � cred disappr@C ]C C 
A pre-commitment of the merchant Mer that can be oﬀered as a sale is 
[∀X, 20$@X ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MX ) ⊗ addr@XX X X 
� 20 � $@M ⊗ �2jr cb@X ⊗ 2jr cb@MM X ⊥M ⊗ �gif t@X ⊗ gif t@MX ⊥M ⊗ �addr@M ]X 
When this pre-commitment is accepted as a deal between the merchant Mer and the 
customer Cus, the corresponding conditional commitment is as follows: 
�[20$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@CC C C 
� 20 � $@M ⊗ �2jr cb@C ⊗ 2jr cb@MM C ⊥M ⊗ �gif t@C ⊗ gif t@MC ⊥M ⊗ �addr@M ]C 
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4.2.2 Designing Goals 
As discussed above, we do not use the notion of shared goal or joint goals nor goals of 
interaction but consider individual goals of agents. As we focus on interaction, we limit our 
consideration to those individual goals which interaction between agents can help to achieve. 
In Section 3.3.3, we discuss a simpliﬁcation of the modeling of agents’ individual goals by 
treating goals as a form of internal commitments. Goals are then formed as a dual to what 
is provided to fulﬁll the goals and hence are negative formulas. 
4.2.3 Designing Pre-commitments 
A pre-commitment is comprised of pre-conditions and post-conditions. On the one hand, a 
pre-commitment can act as a form of capability that the owner agent can utilize together 
with its other resources, actions and other capabilities. On the other hand, pre-commitments 
can be designed as a constructing unit of agent interaction. 
In particular, a pre-commitment can encode an exchange of goods or a sale. The pre­
conditions then include the resources and actions required for the exchange or the price that 
agent has to pay to obtain the goods. The post-conditions are the resources and actions or 
the goods to be purchased that the owner agent are required to provide. 
Moreover, a pre-commitment can encode a resource transformation process in which two 
agents can participate. The pre-conditions include the resources and actions required of one 
partner and/or the price its has to pay to use the process. The post-conditions include the 
resources and actions required of the other partner (the owner agent) as well as the outcomes 
of the process. The outcomes may also include gains for many agents. 
Furthermore, a pre-commitment can be utilized as a service provided by one agent to 
another agent. In this service, the agent provides certain outcomes and commitments as 
described in the post-conditions at the cost of what is described in the pre-conditions. As 
discussed in Section 3.3.4, our approach aims to design conditional commitments in a modu­
lar fashion. Hence we also aim for a modular design for pre-commitments. Speciﬁcally, this 
means that what is required in the pre-conditions is solely an exchange for the transformation 
service plus any outcomes and commitments of the owner agent in the post-conditions. In­
deed, such an assumption also facilitates independent use of pre-commitments by their owners 
in interaction and hence enables a modular approach to utilization of pre-commitments. 
As agents can be viewed as possessing resources and capabilities, it is natural to design 
pre-commitments based on an agent’s capabilities. We discuss a design process that translates 
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a capability to a pre-commitment. 
Firstly, a capability Γ � Δ of agent α is turned into a deal that the owner agent can 
oﬀer to another agent. The pre-conditions part then speciﬁes requirements of resources and 
actions as well as monetary units that an agent has to fulﬁll for one part of the deal. Monetary 
units refer to the price an agent has to pay for obtaining the outcomes or goods in the post-
conditions and/or using the service. The post-conditions part then speciﬁes the outcomes of 
the exchange or transformation for each agent, including any further base commitments of 
the owner, which together form the other part of the deal. 
Given a capability Γ � Δ of agent α which can be used as a service to some agent X, 
we denote what is required of X as Γ1 and what is provided by α as Γ2. Apart from Γ1, 
what X has to pay for the service is denoted as P . Hence, Γ is comprised of Γ1, Γ2 and P . 
Moreover, as a result of paying P and deriving Γ1, X receives Δ1, which is part of what is 
produced (Δ) by the capability. We denote Δ2 as what the owner agent α gets initially from 
the capability. Δ is then comprised of Δ1, Δ2 and P . Attaching further information about 
location and ownership, the capability then becomes 
P @XX ⊗ Γ1@XX ⊗ Γ2@αα � Δ1@XX ⊗ Δ2@αα ⊗ P @αα 
where P @XX denotes the price X pays and P @α denotes what α receives as a result. α 
To turn the capability into a pre-commitment of the agent α to be oﬀered to the agent 
X, which is also of the form Γ� � Δ�, we match the pre-conditions Γ� with the price P @XX 
and the resources and actions Γ1@XX to be provided by the agent X and turn Γ1@α into α 
an internal commitment required at the agent α: 
P @XX ⊗ Γ1@XX � (Γ2@αα )⊥ ⊗ Δ1@XX ⊗ Δ2@αα ⊗ P @αα 
Note that this translation still preserves what is demanded in the capability, which now 
contains P @XX ⊗ Γ1X and an internal commitment ((Γ1@αα )⊥) of deriving Γ1@α for the α 
agent α to fulﬁll. 
Moreover, the translation to a pre-commitment does not prevent the capability from 
being used internally. Indeed, the owner agent can turn a pre-commitment to a conditional 
commitment to itself. In doing so, as in the above example, the above agent X can be 
regarded as a variable and can be assigned as α. The conditional commitment becomes: 
P @αα ⊗ Γ1@αα � (Γ2@αα )⊥ ⊗ Δ1@αα ⊗ Δ2@αα ⊗ P @αα 
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P @αα is still required but will be returned afterward, meaning that there is no extra 
cost. Hence, the conditional commitment can be thought of as 
Γ1@αα � (Γ2@αα )⊥ ⊗ Δ1@XX ⊗ Δ2@αα 
while the agent α makes a debt of P @α and immediately returns the debt after fulﬁlling α 
the commitment. 
Note that regarding those base commitments in the post-conditions that involve changing 
resource location and/or ownership, we can simply specify them as internal commitments to 
derive the respective resources. The tasks of changing resource location and/or ownership 
can then be speciﬁed as having the resources with the expected location and/or ownership in 
the post-conditions. Such modiﬁcations still produce the same eﬀects when the conditional 
commitment is resolved. 
Furthermore, this translation from capabilities to pre-commitments conveys an important 
property. Unlike capabilities, pre-commitments have pre-conditions which contain only what 
is required of the recipient agent. What is required of the proposing agent in pre-commitments 
is not put in the pre-conditions but in the post-conditions. Hence, there is no guarantee in 
pre-commitments that what is required of the proposing agent will be fulﬁlled. This lack of 
certainty directly reﬂects the nature of conditional commitments as promises but not their 
actual fulﬁllment. 
In addition, while capabilities can be regarded as what an agent can perform, pre-
commitments can be considered as capabilities that the agents can perform together plus 
information on the distribution of tasks, costs (prices to pay) and outcomes among par­
ticipating agents. As can be seen from the translation procedure from a capability to a 
pre-commitment above, these steps can be automated. To derive a fair distribution of tasks, 
costs and outcomes, agents should be equipped with information on their utility values and 
strategies on dealing with them. This is beyond the scope of the thesis and hence we assume 
the tasks of designing pre-commitments is done by humans. 
4.2.4 Speciﬁcation for Cricket Bat Sale Example 
We will illustrate the design of speciﬁcations of agent interaction via an example below. 
The interaction scenarios of concern are described in Section 3.1. We then describe how 
the speciﬁcation of the interaction can be done based on the agents’ capabilities which are 
described in Section 3.2.5. The speciﬁcation of the cricket bat sale example includes the 
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resources, capabilities, actions, goals and pre-commitments of the participating agents. The 
speciﬁcation of resources, actions, and capabilities was shown in Section 3.2.5. In this section, 
we will show the speciﬁcation of goals and pre-commitments which are derived from the 
corresponding capabilities. Pre-commitments of the agents in the example are designed from 
capabilities 1, 2, and 5. Other capabilities are used internally by the owner agents. 
At agent Mer 
In the example, some capabilities of participating agents can be turned into pre-commitments 
by the owner agent. 
Given capability 1 
η � [10$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@C ⊗ jr cb@MC C C M 
� 10 � $@M ⊗ �jr cb@C ⊗ �addr@M ]M C C 
the merchant pre-commits that if the customer X pays 10 dollars via Paypal or by credit card 
and provides its address, the customer will receive a junior cricket bat. The pre-conditions 
are the responsibility of the customer X in which X needs to reserve 10 dollars of its own and 
at its place (10$@XX ) to pay via a payment method to Mer (via P P @M or by cred@MX ),X 
and to send its own address (addr@XX ) to Mer. The post-conditions then contain the 
resulting resources for the customer (�jr cb@XX ) and for the merchant (�10$@M , and M �addr@MC ). The post-conditions also include the commitment of the merchant as part of 
the deal jr cb@M⊥
M 
. The pre-commitment is expressed as interaction rule 1 below 
Rule 1: 
[∀X, 10$@X ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MX ) ⊗ addr@Xη � X X X 
� 10 � $@M ⊗ �jr cb@X ⊗ jr cb@MM X ⊥M ⊗ �addr@M ]X 
Similarly, capability 2 
20 � [(20$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@M
C 
) ⊗ addr@C
C 
) ⊗ 2jr cb@M ⊗ gif t@M
C C M M 
� (20 � $@M ⊗ �2jr cb@C ⊗ �gif t@C ⊗⊗ � addr@M
C 
)]
M C C 
� 
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is turned into the following pre-commitment in which Mer pre-commits that if the customer 
pays 20 dollars via Paypal or by credit card and provides its address, Mer will give the cus­
tomer 2 junior cricket bats and a gift. 
Rule 2: 
20 � [∀X, (20$@X ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MX ) ⊗ addr@XX )X X 
� (20 � $@M ⊗ �2jr cb@X ⊗ 2jr cb@M ⊥
M 
⊗ �gif t@X ⊗ gif t@M ⊥ ⊗ �addr@MX )]M X X M 
At agent Ebank 
Rule 5: from capability 5, a pre-commitment is designed in which EBank pre-commits 
that if a quotation and credit number of the customer Y are given by the merchant X, it 
will either arrange credit payment or inform a disapproval of credit payment. 
η [∀X, ∀Y, quote@B ⊗ cred no@B ⊗ quote req@X⊥X Y B 
� �cred paym@X ⊕ �cred disappr@X ]B B 
At agent Cus 
Cus has a goal of obtaining 2 junior cricket bats and a gift at some time. They are 
supposed to be obtained at the same time: 
[�(2jr cb@C ⊗ gif t@CC )]⊥C 
The speciﬁcations of resources, capabilities and actions in Section 3.2.5 and the speciﬁ­
cations of pre-commitments (which replace the corresponding capabilities) and goals above 
together form a speciﬁcation of interaction of the cricket bat sale example. Given such a 
speciﬁcation of agent interaction, the next question is how to turn the speciﬁcation into 
interaction, which is discussed in the next section. 
4.3 From Speciﬁcation to Execution 
Agents interact with each other by sending and receiving messages in the form of a request, a 
proposal, an acceptance, , a rejection or a failure notice. Request messages typically contain 
goals or base commitments while proposal messages are pre-commitments. The way in which 
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agents make a request or a proposal or respond to these messages are guided by an interaction 
model discussed below. 
4.3.1 Interaction Model 
Overall, agents carry out interaction speciﬁcations by exchanging messages according to some 
interaction model. To serve the purpose of demonstrating how interaction is constructed 
based on speciﬁcations in our framework, we keep the interaction model simple. It has the 
following properties. 
When an agent can not achieve a commitment or a goal by itself, it will make a request 
for that commitment or goal to an appropriate agent. The requested agent searches for a 
relevant pre-commitment of its own to propose to the requesting agent. If the search can not 
ﬁnd any, a failure notice will be returned to the requesting agent. 
When a proposal is received, the recipient checks if the respective pre-commitment is rel­
evant to any of its current goals or commitments. If so and the recipient cannot achieve these 
goals or commitments by itself, then it will send a message of acceptance to the proposing 
agent. Otherwise, the recipient will send a message of rejection. 
Once the proposal is accepted, a conditional commitment is formed by the proposing agent 
to the recipient agent out of the pre-commitment of the proposal. When the recipient fulﬁlls 
the conditions in the proposal, the proposing agent will fulﬁll its respective commitments. 
If the recipient agent does not satisfy the requirements, then the conditional commitment 
remains inactive. Fulﬁlling the conditions and commitments of the proposal may in turn lead 
to further interaction. 
We discuss in detail the format of messages and issues related to request and proposal 
messages, as well as responses to a request and a proposal and relate these processes to the 
process of fulﬁlling commitments. 
4.3.2 Message Format 
To indicate the source and destination of messages, we use “Source to Destination:” prior to 
each message, where Source refers to the sender agent and Destination refers to the recipient 
agent. For example “Cus to Mer:” denotes that the message is sent from the agent Cus to 
the agent Mer. 
Request messages start with the key word REQUEST. The format is “REQUEST f ormula”, 
where f ormula in request messages normally refer to base commitments and hence is a neg­
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ative formula. An example is a request message of a junior cricket bat from a customer to 
the merchant: 
Cus to Mer: REQUEST jr cb⊥ 
Similar to request messages, proposal messages commence with “PROPOSE”. Formulas 
of proposals are typically pre-commitments. The form of proposal is: 
PROPOSE �n(Γ � Δ) or PROPOSE �(Γ � Δ) 
The time frame of the proposal is deﬁned as a particular time point �n for the proposed 
formula �n(Γ � Δ) and as a range of time points, starting from now if the proposed formula 
is �(Γ � Δ). The time when the implication of the proposal’s formula is carried out is within 
this time frame. 
In order to reply to a request, an agent sends back a proposal or a failure notice. A failure 
notice has the form: 
REQUEST f ormula FAILS 
where REQUEST f ormula is the original request. 
To make a response to a proposal, an agent indicates an acceptance by sending 
PROPOSE formula ACCEPT 
or sends a rejection 
PROPOSE f ormula REJECT 
where ”PROPOSE f ormula” is the original proposal. 
After an agent accepts a proposal, if the agent does not fulﬁll the proposal’s requirements, 
it sends back a message to indicate this. 
PROPOSAL formula FAILS 
where f ormula is the formula of the original proposal. 
Note that our approach does not specify the full details of message format, which is a 
typical part of designing an ACL and hence is beyond the scope of research. 
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4.3.3 Request Messages 
A request message is formed out of a base commitment of an agent for several reasons. 
The agent cannot ﬁnd a way to fulﬁll the base commitment internally using its own 
resources and internal capabilities and hence needs to send a request to seek outside possi­
bilities. 
Alternatively, the agent may prefer fulﬁlling the base commitment via interaction with 
other agents to explore others’ resources and capabilities and hence sends out the request. 
Even if some of its pre-commitments can be used to fulﬁll partly or wholly the base 
commitment, rather than using it, the agent can still send a request for the base commitment 
to other agents if it prefers to do so. 
Indeed, the decision to send a request is an internal deliberation process of the agent and 
is not within our scope. We assume that agents can decide by themselves if they should form 
a request from an unfulﬁlled base commitment. 
The request formula may contain multiple base commitments (negative formulas) con­
nected via multiplicative conjunction (⊗) or additive connectives (�, ⊕). For simplicity, 
however, we assume that each request is associated with only one base commitment. This 
does not place a limit on what agents can request as they can deploy a mechanism to break 
up a combination of base commitments into individual ones. Such a mechanism can be based 
on the work on splitting up formulas in Section 6.2. Under this assumption, each request 
contains only a single negative formula. 
Once forming a request message, the owner agent considers which agent to send it to. 
However, knowing which agent is relevant requires some knowledge of other agents’ resources 
and capabilities. We assume that agents do not know this information and hence agents send 
request messages to all other agents in broadcast mode to explore all the possibilities. This 
model also allows the sender agent to explore in parallel multiple opportunities with diﬀerent 
agents, which is useful when the whole request cannot be fulﬁlled by a single agent. 
To respond to a request from another agent, an agent does not try to fulﬁll the commit­
ment in the request using its own private resources, actions and capabilities but looks for a 
deal to oﬀer from its pre-commitments. If a pre-commitment is found relevant to the request, 
it will be proposed to the requesting agent as a partial (or total) solution. This is further 
discussed in Section 4.3.4. Otherwise, the agent replies with a message indicating a failure 
to meet the request. 
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4.3.4 Proposal Messages 
Each proposal message contains a pre-commitment of the sender. A pre-commitment can be 
proposed as a deal to another agent or as a service oﬀer in response to a previous request. 
In the former case, the deal on the pre-commitment is relevant to some goals and/or base 
commitments of the owner agent and/or to some requirements of another proposal that it 
wants to fulﬁll. Assuming that the owner agent does not have prior knowledge to determine 
if the pre-commitment is likely to be accepted by a particular agent, the pre-commitment is 
then proposed to all agents. In the latter case, the pre-commitment is found by the sender 
to be relevant to the goal/base commitment of a previous request and hence proposed to the 
requesting agent as a response. 
The relevance of a pre-commitment to a goal/base commitment is based on whether the 
pre-commitment’s post-conditions bring in some resources or make some actions available 
that fulﬁll partly or wholly the goal/base commitment. Further discussion on the relevance 
of a pre-commitment in Section 4.3.7. 
Upon receiving a proposal, an agent also considers if the pre-commitment of the proposal 
is relevant to any requests previously sent or any goals (or commitments) of the recipient. If 
so, the recipient could further examine to see if the exchange of the pre-conditions for what 
it gains in the post-conditions is beneﬁcial. However, we do not focus on such a mechanism 
to determine the beneﬁts and hence assume that agents have such mechanisms in place and 
focus instead on the relevance criterion. Hence, if the pre-commitment is considered relevant, 
the recipient sends a message to indicate its acceptance of the proposal. Otherwise, it sends 
a message of rejection. 
4.3.5 Fulﬁlling Conditions of Conditional Commitments 
Once a proposal is accepted, its pre-commitment (time proposed [Γ � Δ]) becomes a con­
ditional commitment. This commitment is that if the recipient provides the pre-conditions 
within the required time frame, then the proposing agent commits to deriving Δ at the cor­
responding time. In our framework, we only consider conditional commitments that are not 
broken. Hence, once the pre-conditions time applied Γ, which is also referred to as conditions 
of the proposal, are fulﬁlled by the recipient, the proposing agent will deﬁnitely fulﬁll its com­
mitment by applying the implication to transform the pre-conditions to the post-conditions 
and subsequently fulﬁll any base commitments in the post-conditions. 
The time that the conditions of a proposal must be satisﬁed depends on the time frame 
(�). 
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speciﬁed by time proposed, and in many cases depends on the desired time of the post-
conditions as well as the recipient’s choice. 
For conditional commitments of the form �n[Γ � Δ], the pre-conditions Γ of the linear 
implication must be provided at the time �n for the implication to be carried out. Hence, 
the conditions of the proposal are �nΓ. Note that being able to satisfy the conditions any 
time (i.e. deriving �Γ) is also acceptable because �Γ � �nΓ. 
For conditional commitments of the form �[Γ � Δ], if the desired time of the post-
conditions is �n, then the suitable time of the conditions is �n . If the desired time is �, 
then the time to satisfy the conditions should be either ”anytime” (�), ”sometime” (�), or 
a particular time (�n) of choice. If the desired time is �, then the time required of the 
conditions must be ”anytime” (�). 
The application time of the linear implication is at a speciﬁc time point and is determined 
by the time point the conditions are satisﬁed or chosen in the case of anytime (�) or sometime 
The conditions of a conditional commitment can be attempted by the recipient as new 
sub-goals. Indeed, if what the recipient gains in the post-conditions can be regarded as 
new goals then the requirements to get them can be turned into sub-goals. These sub-goals 
can also be implemented as base commitments. However, unlike other base commitments, 
these base commitments can be aborted without forcing the interaction to fail. As noted, 
unfulﬁlled conditions leave the conditional commitment inactive. Moreover, as new sub-goals, 
the conditions can be attempted by the recipient using its own internal resources, actions 
and capabilities or using other agents’ via further interaction. 
Once the conditions are fulﬁlled, the base commitments in the post-conditions become 
active and are subsequently attempted by the proposing agent. 
4.3.6 Fulﬁlling Goals and Base Commitments 
Base commitments may exist as a reason for interaction or as a result of some interactions. 
In the latter case, conditional commitments upon having their conditions fulﬁlled give rise 
to the base commitments speciﬁed in their post-conditions. We make the assumption that 
at the end of interaction, all the base commitments that result from the interaction must be 
fulﬁlled for the interaction to succeed. In other words, all the extra requirements as a result 
of the interaction must also be satisﬁed for the interaction to succeed. 
To fulﬁll a base commitment, the necessary resources must be provided and/or the nec­
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essary actions must be carried out at the right time. These resources and actions can be 
provided within the owner agent (internal fulﬁllment) or alternatively provided by other 
agents in a deal (conditional commitment). In the latter case, the owner agent can propose 
pre-commitments that are relevant to the base commitments or may prefer to send requests 
of the base commitments to other agents. Correspondingly, a proposal or a request is made 
to another agent and the process for producing and handling a proposal or request to follow 
is as discussed above. 
4.3.7 Utilizing Pre-commitments 
Agents utilize relevant pre-commitments to answer requests from other agents and fulﬁll 
their own goals and base commitments. Indeed, the ability to select a pre-commitment that 
is relevant to a goal/base commitment is one of the key factors in our interaction model 
discussed above. We now look at the process of determining a relevant pre-commitment. 
Relevance of a Pre-commitment to a Goal or Base Commitment 
Intuitively, relevance here means that the use of the pre-commitment is beneﬁcial to the 
fulﬁllment of the goal or base commitment. More precisely, the corresponding conditional 
commitment of the pre-commitment once fulﬁlled can produce the necessary resources and 
actions to fulﬁll part or all of the goal or base commitment. Correspondingly, (part of ) 
formulas in the post-conditions of the pre-commitment can be used in a proof of (a part 
of) formulas of the goal or base commitment. Hence, relevance refers to the potential of a 
pre-commitment for fulﬁlling a goal or base commitment. This potential is determined by a 
number of factors as described below. 
We ﬁrstly look at a fragment of TLL that is simple but powerful enough to examine the 
relevance relationship between a pre-commitment and a goal or base commitment. 
Note that in our framework, capabilities are design objects, and agents do not have the 
ability to derive new capabilities. This has two important consequences. The ﬁrst is that 
agents will not have any goals or base commitments to derive capabilities. Hence, formulas of 
goals or base commitments do not contain the connective �. The second is that conditional 
commitments among agents do not produce any capabilities. Therefore, formulas on the 
right hand side of � in all pre-commitments and subsequently conditional commitments do 
not contain the � connective. 
Furthermore, as requests contain only goals or base commitments, the request formulas 
�
�
�
� � �
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do not contain the � connective. Hence pre-commitments, whether being used to reply to a 
request or to fulﬁll a goal or base commitment, need to deal only with formulas that contain 
the connectives ⊗, � , ⊕, �, �, � and negation. Also, as will be discussed in Section 6.1, the 
modeling of the notions “anytime” and “sometime” can be made using only the connectives 
⊗, � , ⊕ and operator �, which further reduces the logic fragment of concern to the one 
that contains only the connectives ⊗, � , ⊕, � and negation. 
Therefore, we can focus on discussing the relationship between a pre-commitment and 
a goal or base commitment in the context that formulas of goals or base commitments and 
post-conditions of pre-commitments contain only the connectives ⊗, � , ⊕, � and negation. 
As will be discussed in Section 6.2, this logic fragment facilitates the splitting up of 
formulars and techniques for handing them in parts. The parts can be as simple as basic 
TLL formulas, which are of the form �iA, where A is an atomic LL formula (proposition). 
In particular, a formula Γ that contains �iA can be split up into two parts. One contains 
essentially �iA, possibly combined with constant 1, denoted as A, while the other is the 
remainder which does not contain this �iA (assuming that �iA at diﬀerent positions in the 
Γ − A. Formal deﬁnitions of �structure Γ are diﬀerent) and is denoted as � Γ − A and A are 
provided in Deﬁnition 11 and Deﬁnition 13 respectively in Chapter 6. 
Depending on the outcomes of internal choices and indeterminate possibilities that occur 
in A, the formula �iA may or may not eventually be retained. Note that these internal 
choices and indeterminate possibilities in A (and also �� Γ − A) are taken from the formula Γ. 
Further discussions on the conditions for the �iA to be retained in the part �A are in Section 
6.3. 
We now consider two formulas α and β in the fragment that contain a common basic 
TLL formula �iA. The two formulas α and β can then be split up with respect to the 
common part. We examine the provability relationship between their split ups that contain 
iA, denoted as Aα and Aβ respectively. If the retention of �iA is made in both of them, 
they both become �iA and hence one part can prove the other (�iA � �iA). Otherwise, 
one part does not prove the other unless both of them become �j 1 for some j. Note that �j 1, in terms of resources and actions, does not contain anything relevant and hence is of 
no interest. 
It can be seen that in determining if �iA is retained, there is some risk associated 
with making assumptions about the outcomes of indeterminate possibilities. Whether to 
be bold or cautious with respect to certain indeterminate possibilities is a matter for the 
agents’ internal deliberation and hence beyond the scope of the thesis. We further discuss 
� �
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a mechanism that reﬂects the agents’ strategies on determining choices and indeterminate 
possibilities in Chapter 5. 
We introduce the concept of proof relevance as follows. Consider a formula α and a 
formula β and their corresponding parts Aα and �� Aβ that contain a common TLL formula of 
the form �iA. If the agent regards the part of α ( � Aβ ) then Aα) proves the other part of β ( �
the formula α is considered as proof relevant to the formula β. 
Deﬁnition 1. Proof Relevance 
Let Γ and Δ be TLL formulas that have a common sub-formula A. Let AΓ and AΔ be two 
split ups of Γ and Δ respectively regarding A (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 13 in Chapter 6). If 
the agent regards AΓ � �� AΔ, then Γ is said to be proof relevant to Δ. 
� AΔ”, it may later turn out that AΓ � �Note that although “the agent regards AΓ � � � AΔ. 
Also, the notion of proof relevance can be implemented by a procedure that relies on proof 
search (for AΓ � �� AΔ) under a particular strategy on choices and indeterminate possibilities 
that are involved in the proof search. The key to implementing such procedure is choice 
calculus, which is discussed in Chapter 5. In particular, techniques for conducting proof 
search following a particular strategy can make use of the choice calculus sequent rules. It is 
important to note that checking for proof relevance between two formulas does not require 
any non-logical axioms to be used. To some extent, searching for a proof in this context can 
be understood as a uniﬁcation process between formulas on the right of � and those on the 
left. Potential techniques for choice calculus may be derived partly from existing techniques 
in linear logic, which are discussed in Section 2.5.2. Developing a proof search technique for 
the full fragment of TLL is however outside the scope of this thesis. 
Based on the notion of proof relevance, a pre-commitment is regarded as relevant to a 
goal/base commitment if the formula of the post-conditions is proof relevant to the formula 
of the goal/base commitment. 
It can be seen that whether a pre-commitment is relevant or not depends on the agent’s 
strategies with respect to the internal choices and the degree of risk taking in assuming the 
outcomes of the indeterminate possibilities involved. In particular, if the agent does not want 
to take risks, there must be a proof of (a part of ) the goal or base commitment formula using 
(a part of) the post-conditions formula for all the possible outcomes of any indeterminate 
possibilities involved. If the agent is willing to take risks, it allows some uncertainty in its 
assumptions on the outcomes of indeterminate possibilities. If the assumptions turn out to 
be wrong, then this also means that the pre-commitment turns out to be not relevant. In 
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other words, relevance does not always imply that the pre-commitment will be used (partly) 
in proving (part of) the goal or base commitment, but reﬂects that the agent is taking a 
chance that it might be so. 
In addition, a pre-commitment may fulﬁll one part of a goal or base commitment or 
a request while the other parts of the goal or base commitment or request are fulﬁlled by 
other pre-commitments. The fulﬁllment of a goal or base commitment or request can hence 
be regarded as a form of distributed concurrent problem solving with a dynamic arrange­
ment of tasks (handling pre-commitments) among multiple players. Further discussion about 
distributed concurrent problem solving is in Section 6.5. 
4.3.8 Integration of Changes into Protocol Execution 
Since agents operate in a multi-agent environment, they have to deal with not only changes 
from the environment but also changes introduced by other agents. Also, agents are likely 
to participate in multiple interactions with other agents and these interactions can aﬀect 
each other. Although changes might come from such diﬀerent sources, in our interaction 
framework, these changes manifest themselves by the changes occurring to the agents’ states. 
In other words, the states of the agents are the grounds for various sources to interact. These 
changes include those about resources, system properties, and commitments. 
Moreover, changes might also occur to the set of pre-commitments of each agent as new 
pre-commitments could be formed or existing ones merged or split up during interaction. 
Though it is also important to investigate how protocols evolve through changes in the agents’ 
pre-commitments, we assume that pre-commitments are designed beforehand by humans and 
do not change during the course of interaction. 
Hence, we examine the eﬀects of on-going changes from the environment and other agents 
on the agents’ resources, properties, base commitments and conditional commitments in their 
states. Changes are introduced to the agents’ states by the addition and removal of formulas. 
By taking into account the agents’ current states, the interaction process can reﬂect 
recent changes and adapt execution to take advantage of opportunities or deal with exceptions 
introduced by these changes. Speciﬁcally, in our framework, agents construct protocols based 
around speciﬁed pre-commitments. Changes in state may then remove some inputs and/or 
make others available, hence enabling and disabling the corresponding pre-commitments. 
State changes may also make some (part of) goals or base commitments fulﬁlled or some 
conditional commitments active or even introduce new goals or base commitments. In eﬀect, 
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by reasoning about changes in state formulas, agents guide the interaction in appropriate 
ways. 
Consider our cricket bat sale example. The addition of two junior cricket bats to the 
customer’s state as a result of another interaction thread allows the customer and merchant 
to skip the interaction. Another possibility is for the merchant to already know the cus­
tomer credit card number (perhaps retained from a previous transaction) and therefore their 
interaction can bypass the part that involves sending the credit card number to the merchant. 
4.3.9 Cricket Bat Sale Interaction 
Based on the speciﬁcation of the cricket bat sale example as described in Section 3.2.5 and 
Section 4.2.4, we examine how the interaction model in Section 4.3.1 is deployed to construct 
interaction sequences among agents. An example of such interaction is as follows. 
For simplicity, we make use of the following shortcut rules. Note that [n] in the title of a 
rule denotes multiple times of applications of that rule. 
Γ, �nF � Δ 
Γ, �F � Δ �� 
for some n is a shortcut for 
�FF �� FF �L �F � �nF n � Γ, �nF � Δ 
Γ, �F � Δ cut 
Γ � �nF, Δ 
Γ � �F, Δ �� 
for some n is a shortcut for 
F
F 
�
��FF �R �nF � �F n � Γ � �nF, Δ 
Γ � �F, Δ cut 
Γ, �n(F ⊗ G) � Δ 
Γ, �nF ⊗ �nG � Δ �(⊗)L 
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for some n is a shortcut for 
F � F G � G 
F, G � F ⊗ G ⊗R �nF, �nG � �n(F ⊗ G) n � Γ, �n(F ⊗ G) � Δ 
Γ, �nF, �nG � Δ cut 
Γ, �nF ⊗ �nG � Δ ⊗L 
Γ � �nF ⊗ �nG, Δ 
Γ � �n(F ⊗ G), Δ �(⊗)R 
for some n is a shortcut for 
F � F G � G 
F, G � F ⊗ G ⊗R �nF, �nG � �n(F ⊗ G) n � �nF ⊗ �nG � �n(F ⊗ G) ⊗L Γ � �nF ⊗ �nG, Δ 
Γ � �n(F ⊗ G), Δ cut 
� �nΓ �[Γ � Δ] � �nΔ app 
for some n is a shortcut for 
Γ � Γ Δ � Δ � LΓ ⊗ [Γ � Δ] � Δ �n(Γ ⊗ [Γ � Δ]) � �nΔ n� �nΓ ⊗ �n[Γ � Δ] � �nΔ �(⊗)L 
� �nΓ �nΓ ⊗ �[Γ � Δ] � �nΔ �� �[Γ � Δ] � �nΔ cut 
Moreover, in the illustration, we will make use of a splitting mechanism of a compound 
formula which will be discussed in Section 6.2. For example, a conjunct �nA can be extracted 
from a multiplicative conjunction �n(A ⊗ B ⊗ C). Hence, by saying “extract” a formula 
from a compound formula, we refer to the handling of splitting up formulas in Section 6.2 
which is not discussed in detail here. 
A summary of speciﬁcations of the cricket bat sale example is given in Table 4.1. The pre-
commitments and capabilities of participating agents are both named as rules. Also, the pre-
commitments and capabilities are given without using variables but the actual agent names 
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to indicate locations and ownerships of resources and actions. This is intended to simplify 
the illustration. However, the illustrated interactions can be extended using variables for 
locations and ownerships by simply adding the assignment of the variables as appropriate. 
In addition, resources and actions are shown together under category named “ResAct”. 
Mer 
ResAct 200 � jr cb@M ⊗ 300 � heavy cb@M ⊗ η � issue quote@MM M M 
Rule 1 η � [10$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@CC C C 
� 10 � $@M ⊗ �jr cb@C ⊗ jr cb@M ⊥ ⊗ �addr@MC ]M C M 
Rule 2 20 � [(20$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@CC )C C 
� (20 � $@M ⊗ �2jr cb@C ⊗ 2jr cb@M ⊥M C M ⊗ �gif t@C ⊗ gif t@M ⊥ ⊗ �addr@MC )]C M 
Rule 3 η � [(cred no@M � cred no@BC )⊥ ⊗ cred paym@MC B 
� �cred paym@MM ] 
Rule 4 η � [issue quote@M ⊗ quote req@M � �quote@BM ]M B 
Ebank 
Rule 5 η � [quote@B ⊗ cred no@B ⊗ quote req@M ⊥M C B 
� �cred paym@M ⊕ �cred disappr@MB ]B 
Cus 
ResAct �$50@C � addr@C � cred no@C � via P P @CC ⊗ η C ⊗ η C ⊗ η C 
Goal [�(2jr cb@C ⊗ gif t@CC )]⊥C 
Rule 6 η � [(cred no@C � cred no@MC )⊥ ⊗ cred paym@MC M 
� by cred@MC ] 
Table 4.1: Summary of Speciﬁcation for Cricket Bat Sale Example 
The customer Cus has a goal of having two junior cricket bats and a gift and cannot fulﬁll 
the goal by itself. The interaction can start by a request from the customer Cus of its goal 
to other agents. 
1. Cus sends a request for two junior cricket bats to be delivered at Cus and a gift at 
some time to other agents. Note that requests to agents other than Mer (for example agent 
O) will result in a failure: 
C to O: REQUEST [�(2jr cb@C ⊗ gift@CC )]⊥C 
X to O: REQUEST [�(2jr cb@C ⊗ gift@CC )]⊥ FAILS. C 
For simplicity, we will only show the requests that go to the correct agents. 
Consider a request to agent Mer 
C to M: REQUEST [�(2jr cb@C ⊗ gift@CC )]⊥C 
�[

�[
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Mer analyzes the request. 
� 2jr cb@C � gift@CC C 
� 2jr cb@C ⊗ gift@C ⊗R C C 
��n(2jr cb@C ⊗ gift@CC ) n �C 
� �(2jr cb@C ⊗ gift@CC ) ��C 
[�(2jr cb@C ⊗ gift@CC )]⊥ � −
⊥R −− (1∗) −− C 
Hence, to meet the request, Mer looks for rules that will allow it to derive 
�n2jr cb@C , and �ngift@C .C C 
For �n2jr cb@CC , there are two applicable rules - rule 1 and rule 2.

Two applications of rule 1 at the nth next time point can derive �n2jr cb@C . Denote rule
C 
1 as �[L1 � R1]. An application of rule 1 at the nth next time point is as follows: 
��nL1 
L1 � R1] ��nR1 app

Given that �nR1 can be derived from rule 1 where

�nR1 = �n[10 � $@M ⊗ �jr cb@C ⊗ jr cb@M⊥ ⊗ �addr@M ]M C M C 
at the (n)th next time point, we can extract �n � jr cb@C and make the derivation C �n � jr cb@C ��njr cb@C .C C 
Regarding rule 2, an application of the rule at the nth next time point can derive �n2jr cb@CC 
and �ngift@C . Denoting rule 2 as �[L2 � R2], we have C 
��nL2 
L2 � R2] ��nR2 app 
–(2*)– 
Given that 
M 
⊗gift@M⊥�nR2 = �n[20 � $@M ⊗�2jr cb@CC ⊗�gift@CC ⊗2jr cb@M⊥ M ⊗�addr@M ]C 
at the (n)th next time point, we can extract �n � 2jr cb@C , and �n � gift@C andC C 
make the derivations 
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�n � 2jr cb@C � �n2jr cb@C andC C �n � gif t@C � �ngif t@C .C C 
According to (1*), rule 2 can derive all of the Cus’ request while rule 1 can derive only 2 
junior cricket bats without a gift. Hence, rule 2 will be chosen to answer the Cus’ request. 
Mer will select an instance of this rule at the (n)th next time point to propose to Cus. 
2. Mer proposes to Cus that at the (n)th next time point, Mer will commit to giving 2 
junior cricket bats and a gift to Cus if Cus pays 20 dollars either via Paypal or by credit card 
and gives Mer its address. 
M to C: PROPOSE �n[20$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@CC C C 
� 20 � $@M ⊗ �2jr cb@C ⊗ �gif t@C ⊗ 2jr cb@MM C C ⊥M ⊗ gif t@M
⊥M ⊗ �addr@M ]

With similar reasoning as (1*), Cus determines that the proposal can help to derive its 
request. Hence 
C to M: ACCEPT 
The conditions of this proposal are those that enable the proposal to be applied. According 
to (2*), they are: 
�nL2 = �n[20$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MC ) ⊗ addr@CC ].C C 
Cus analyzes the conditions: 
� via P P @M or � by cred@M
C C 
� 20$@C � addr@C � via P P @M ⊕ by cred@M ⊕R 
C C C C 
� 20$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@M
C 
) ⊗ addr@C ⊗R 
C C C 
� �n[20$@C ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@M
C 
) ⊗ addr@C ] n �
C C C 
–(3*)– 
From (3*), one way to satisfy the conditions is that at the nth next time point, Cus will 
reserve 20 dollars, send its address to Mer, and carry out payment either via Paypal or by 
credit card. The choice is decided by Cus. 
3. To derive �n20$@C , Cus uses 20 dollars of its resources. C 
20 � $@C � �20$@C � �n20$@C. 
4. To derive �naddr@C , Cus uses its address as C 
C 
�[

107 From Speciﬁcation to Execution

�addr@C � �naddr@C .C C 
Note that an application of the rule as in (2*) will consume �naddr@C to derive C �addr@MC , which means sending Cus’s address to Mer. 
5A. Deriving �nby cred@M means that Cus chooses to pay by credit card to Mer at C 
the nth next time point. 
To derive �nby cred@MC , Cus can make use of rule 6. Denoting rule 6 as �[L6 � R6], 
an application of rule 6 at the nth next time point is as follows: 
� �nL6 
L6 � R6] � �nR6 app

where �nR6 = �n � by cred@M and
C 
�n � by cred@M � �nby cred@M .C C 
The conditions for the application of the rule are 
�nL6 = �n[(cred no@C � cred no@MC )⊥ ⊗ cred paym@MM ].C 
Cus analyzes the conditions 
cred no@C
C 
� cred no@M
C 
� (cred no@C � cred no@M
C 
� 
)⊥ 
−⊥L � cred paym@M
C M 
� (cred no@C � cred no@M
C 
)⊥ ⊗ cred paym@M ⊗R 
C M 
� �n[(cred no@C � cred no@M
C 
)⊥ ⊗ cred paym@M ] n � 
C M 
Hence, �n(cred no@C � cred no@MC ) will be inserted into Cus’s state formulas and C 
Cus has to derive �ncred paym@M .M

Denoting cred n@C as crC and cred no@MC as crM , we have
C 
crM � crM crM � crM 
crM, crC � crM � crC � L 
crM ⊗ (crC � crM ) � crC ⊗L �n[crM ⊗ (crC � crM )] � �ncrC n � 
� �ncrM �ncrM ⊗ �n(crC � crM ) � �ncrC �(⊗)L �n(crC � crM ) � �ncrC cut 
where �ncred no@C is further required to obtain �ncred no@MC , which means sending C 
Mer Cus’ credit card number at the nth time point. Given that Cus has �cred no@CC , we 
have 
�[
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�cred no@C � �ncred no@C . –(4*)–C C 
6A. Because Cus does not have any rule to derive cred paym@MM , it will send a request 
to another agent (Mer). 
C to M: REQUEST [�ncred paym@M ]⊥M 
In order to answer the request, rule 3 can be used. Denoting rule 3 as �[L3 � R3], then 
� �nL3 
L3 � R3] � �nR3 app 
where �nR3 can derive �ncred paym@M asM �n � cred paym@M � �ncred paym@M .M M 
The conditions are then

�nL3 = �n[(cred no@M � cred no@BC )⊥ ⊗ cred paym@MB ].
C 
Mer analyzes the conditions:

(cred no@M � cred no@B
C 
) �

C 
� (cred no@M � cred no@B
C 
)⊥ 
−⊥L � cred paym@M
C B 
� (cred no@M � cred no@B
C 
)⊥ ⊗ cred paym@M ⊗R 
C B 
� �n[(cred no@M � cred no@B
C 
)⊥ ⊗ cred paym@M ] n � 
C B 
Hence, �n(cred no@M � cred no@BC ) will be inserted into Mer’s state formulas and Mer C 
has to derive �ncred paym@M .B 
With similar reasoning to (4*), Mer can use

�n(cred no@M � cred no@BC ) and �ncred no@M
C C 
to derive �ncred no@BC , which means sending Cus’s credit card number to EBank at 
the nth time point. 
7A. Because Mer does not have any rule to derive �ncred paym@M , it will make a B 
request to another agent. 
Consider a request to Ebank. 
M to B: REQUEST [�ncred paym@MB ]⊥ 
�[
� 
�

� 
�[
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An application of rule 5 (denoted as �[L5 � R5]) may satisfy the request. 
� �nL5 
L5 � R5] � �nR5 app 
where �nR5 = �n[�cred paym@M ⊕ �cred disappr@MB ].B �n(�cred paym@M ⊕ 1) can be extracted from �nR5 and may turn out to be �n B 
cred paym@M andB 
�n � cred paym@M � �ncred paym@M .B B 
Hence, Ebank proposes rule 5 to Mer at the nth time point. If Mer provides a quote of 
sale and Cus’s credit number to Ebank, Ebank commits that it will arrange a credit payment 
(if Cus’s credit is approved) or send back its disapproval of Cus’s credit (otherwise). There 
is also a requirement of sending the quote of sale to EBank (quote req@M ) given to Mer. ⊥
B 
B to M: PROPOSE �n[quote@B ⊗ cred no@B ⊗ quote req@MM C �cred paym@M ⊕ �cred disappr@M ]B B 
⊥
B 
With similar reasoning on the suitability of the proposal to the request, Mer will accept 
the proposal. 
M to B: ACCEPT 
The conditions are 
�nL5 = �n(quote@B ⊗ cred no@B ⊗ quote req@MM C ⊥B ).

Mer analyzes the condition at the nth time point: 
quote req@M
B −⊥L 
⊗R
� quote@B � cred no@B @ ⊥Mquote � req
BM C 
� quote@B ⊗ cred no@B @ ⊥Mquote ⊗ req
BM C n �� �n[quote@B
M
⊗ cred no@B
C
@ ⊥Mquote ⊗ req
B
] 
Hence, �nquote req@M (a requirement of a quote of sale from EBank) will be inserted B 
into Mer’s state formulas and together with Mer’s resources, make the conditions of rule 4 
satisﬁed. Denoting rule 4 as �[L4 � R4], then an application of rule 4 is as follows 
� �nL4 
L4 � R4] � �nR4 app 
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where �nR4 derives �nquote@B asM 
�n � quote@BM � �nquote@B .M 
The conditions of the application of rule 4 are then

�nL4 = �n[issue quote@M ⊗ quote req@M ]
B 
which are analyzed as

� issue quote@M � quote req@M
B 
� issue quote@M ⊗ quote req@M ⊗R B 
� �n[issue quote@M ⊗ quote req@MB ] n � 
where Mer has �nquote req@M and �nissue quote@M is obtained from its resources as B �issue quote@M � �nissue quote@M . 
Hence, rule 4 can be applied to derive �nquote@B . Moreover, from the end result in M 
part 6A, �ncred no@B is also given. Together, they satisfy the conditions of the application C 
of rule 5 �nL5. 
Ebank can then apply the proposal or rule 5 to derive 
�n(�cred paym@M ⊕ �cred disappr@MB ).B 
As ⊕ indicates the choice is external to both agents. There are two cases. 
Case 1: at the nth time point, Cus’s credit is approved by Ebank. Then 
�n(�cred paym@M ⊕ �cred disappr@MB )B 
becomes

�n � cred paym@M � �ncred paym@M .
B B 
As a result, at the (n)th next time point, Ebank will arrange the credit payment, fulﬁlling 
the Mer’s request for �ncred paym@M .B 
Case 2: at the nth time point, Cus’s credit is not approved. Then 
�n(�cred paym@M ⊕ �cred disappr@MB )B 
becomes 
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�n � cred disappr@M � �ncred disappr@MB B 
EBank’s attempt at the Mer’s request for �ncred paym@M fails.B 
B to M: REQUEST [�ncred paym@M ]⊥ FAILS B 
As a result, Mer can not apply rule (3) and so fails to answer the Cus’s request for 
[�ncred paym@M ]⊥ in part 6A. M 
M to C: REQUEST [�ncred paym@M ]⊥ FAILS M 
A lack of �ncred paym@M means that rule 6 at Cus can not be applied and Cus fails M 
to derive �nby cred@M . Cus may backtrack to take the option to pay via Paypal. C 
5B. Deriving �nvia P P @M means that Cus carries out Paypal payment method to C 
pay Mer at the (n)th next time point. This happens when Cus chooses to pay via Paypal 
initially or as a result of backtracking from a failure in credit payment. 
As Cus can carry out the action �via P P @MC , deriving �nvia P P @M can be done: C 
�via P P @M � �nvia P P @M .C C 
8. Mer fulﬁlls Cus’ initial request. 
When any of �nvia P P @M or �nby cred@M is derived, together with the other condi-C C 
tions (�n20$@CC , �naddr@CC ) being satisﬁed, they allow Mer to apply the initial proposal 
of rule 1 to derive �nR1. From �nR1, �n � gif t@C and �n � jr cb@C can be extracted C C 
and because 
�n � gif t@C � �ngif t@C andC C �n � jr cb@C � �njr cb@CC ,C 
according to (1*), Cus’s initial request is satisﬁed. 
The interaction ends successfully as Cus’s initial request is satisﬁed and there are no 
pending commitments generated by the interaction. 
The interaction has achieved the ﬂexibility desired based on the encoding. In fact, � in 
�(2jr cb@C ⊗ gif t@CM ) allows Mer to have a time of its choice (n) to do the sale. Also, M 
a choice of which via P P @MC (Paypal payment) or by cred@M (credit payment) will be C 
derived can be decided by Cus. Similarly, the indeterminate possibility in the decision on 
credit payment (step 7A of the interaction) is also captured and for all the cases that might 
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happen, the merchant and customer have to deal with. In particular, when Cus’s credit 
payment can not be arranged, the customer has to backtrack to the point of making the 
choice of payment to take another option, which is reﬂected in the interaction. 
Moreover, those attempts to derive 20 dollars (�n20$@CC ), to send the address 
(�naddr@MC ), to reserve 2 junior cricket bats (�n2jr cb@MM ) and to arrange a payment 
method (�nvia P P @M or �nby cred@MC ) can occur in any order. This also adds to the C 
ﬂexibility of the interaction. 
In all, this section has demonstrated how an interaction might be constructed from a 
speciﬁcation in our framework based on our interaction model and by using proof search 
techniques. 
4.4 Summary 
The chapter described how protocols and interaction can be speciﬁed for a resource-conscious 
commitment-based agent. We also discussed several related issues involved with the goals or 
base commitments of participating agents. We also discussed a possible execution framework 
to realize such TLL speciﬁcations which enables agents to negotiate commitments among 
themselves and utilizing resources, actions, capabilities and pre-commitments to fulﬁll their 
goals and commitments. In the next chapter, we will explore a logic mechanism that can be 
used to enable agents to reason about their decisions about choices. 
Chapter 5

Modeling Decisions about Choices

In Chapter 3, we have presented a model of resource and commitment-based interaction 
in which internal choices and indeterminate possibilities are modeled simply as relationship 
between resources, actions, capabilities, goals and commitments. In Chapter 4, a speciﬁcation 
framework for interaction protocols is presented based around the central notion of pre-
commitments. We also introduced an interaction model to realize speciﬁcations based on 
utilizing pre-commitments to fulﬁll goal or base commitments of agents. Another important 
part of how an agent utilizes its resources, actions, capabilities and pre-commitments in 
interaction is making decisions on internal choices and handling indeterminate possibilities. 
Decisions on internal choices made now may aﬀect the future achievement of goals or base 
commitments or other threads of interaction. Agents should be enabled to make informed 
and sensible decisions about choices. In open and dynamic operating environments, changes 
from the environment occur frequently and often are unpredictable, which can hinder the 
accomplishment of the agents’ goals. How agents cope with changes, which are reﬂected 
in indeterminate possibilities, remains an open and challenging problem. On the one hand, 
agents should be enabled to reason about the current changes and act ﬂexibly. On the 
other hand, agents should be equipped with a reasoning ability to predict changes and act 
accordingly. 
These characteristics are desirable for a single agent. However, an agents’ decisions are 
not made in isolation, but in the context of decisions made by other agents, and as part of 
interactions between the agents. Thus, the challenging setting here is that in negotiation 
and other forms of agent interaction, decision making is distributed. In particular, the key 
challenges are: 
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•	 Distribution: choices are distributed among agents, and changes from the environments 
aﬀect each agent in diﬀerent ways. It is vital to capture these choices, their dependencies 
and the eﬀects of diﬀerent agent strategies on them. 
•	 Time: internal choices may be time-bounded and changes in the environment occur in 
time. Therefore, decisions on them should be made in a time-dependent manner. 
•	 Dependencies: i.e. capturing that certain decisions depend on other decisions. 
In order to address these challenges, one approach is using formalisms such as TLL to enable 
agent reasoning about choices and indeterminate possibilities. TLL is highly suitable here 
because it allows us to use time-dependent contexts. 
Given that the current state of an agent can be modeled as a collection of formulas, 
consequences of a particular decision on an internal choice or an indeterminate possibility 
can be explored via standard reasoning methods. Hence, we model agents’ decisions about 
choices and indeterminate possibilities in a way that allows distribution, dependencies, and 
time information to be captured. We discuss speciﬁc desirable properties of a formal model 
of agent decisions on choices and choice calculus in Section 5.1 and then present the formal 
model in Section 5.2 and the choice calculus in Section 5.3. 
5.1 Desiderata for a Choice Calculus 
Many unpredictable changes in the environment can be regarded as a set of possibilities 
for which the agents do not know the outcomes. There are several strategies for dealing 
with unpredictable changes. A safe approach is to prepare for all the possible scenarios, 
which is at the cost of extra reservation and/or consumption of resources. Other approaches 
are more risky in which agents make predictions about which possibilities will occur and 
act accordingly. If the predictions are correct, agents achieve their goals more eﬃciently. 
Underlying these varying approaches is a trade-oﬀ between resource eﬃciency and safety. 
Hence, it is important to model their predictions on the indeterminate possibilities of concern 
and allow them to reason about the consequences. 
In contrast to indeterminate possibilities, internal choices are what agents can decide by 
themselves. Decisions about choices can be based on what is best for the agents’ current 
and local needs. However, it is desirable that they consider the choices in the context of 
the other choices that have been and/or will be made to ensure the overall consistency. 
This requires an ability to make an informed decision on choices. If we record information 
��
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about internal choices as constraints associated with these choices then what is required is 
a model of internal choices with their associated constraints. This model will allow agents 
to reason about internal choices and decide accordingly. Also, in a distributed environment 
like a multi-agent system, this modeling should take into account further constraints such as 
dependencies between choices. 
In addition, as agents act in time, decisions can be made at the required time or can be 
made in advance. In some cases, agents may decide an internal choice in advance to save 
resources. For example, consider a goal [ 3(A ⊕ B)]⊥. This goal involves an internal choice 
(⊕) to be determined at the third next time point (�3). If the agent decides now to choose 
A and keeps that decision the same at the third next time point, then from now on, the agent 
only has to prepare resources for the goal of �3A. This also means that other resources can 
now be guaranteed to be exclusive from the requirements of [ 3(A ⊕ B)]⊥ and can be used 
to achieve other goals. This might not be the case if later �3(A ⊕ B) is decided as �3B. 
Hence, it is important to model the ability of agents to make decisions on internal choices 
and indeterminate possibilities in advance and remain consistent. 
As a running example, we consider the following scenario which illustrates various desir­
able strategies of agents on their decisions over internal choices and indeterminate possibili­
ties. 
Peter intends to organize an outdoor party in the next two days. He has a goal of providing 
music at the party. He also has a blank CD which he can use with his CD burner to burn 
music in CD format or mp3. His friend, John, can help by bringing a CD player or an mp3 
player to the party but Peter does not know which until tomorrow. In addition, there is an 
external request that David wants to borrow Peter’s CD burner today. Peter needs to consider 
achieving his goal and whether to let David borrow the CD burner. 
In this situation, there is an internal choice on the music format to be made by Peter and 
also an indeterminate possibility regarding the player. An encoding in TLL of the example 
is as follows. To focus on discussion about choices, for simplicity, we omit information on 
location and ownership. We also make some abbreviations for the purpose of presenting 
proofs. Note that the numbers in subscripts of the connectives � and ⊕ indicate IDs of the 
respective choices. 
Peter’s goal is to have music two days later 
2(� m)⊥ 
��
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Peter’s resources (denoted as P R): a blank CD and a CD burner (CDb) 
�CD ⊗ �CDb. 
Peter’s capability of burning music to CD (denoted as P B for ”Burn”): 
[CD ⊗ CDb � (�mp3 �1 �CDf)] 
i.e. at any time, Peter can convert a blank CD to either an mp3 or music format CD 
(CDf). The choice �1 is an internal choice. 
Peter’s capability of playing music (denoted as P P for ”Play”): 
�[[(mp3 ⊗ mp3p) ⊕2 (CDf ⊗ CDp)] � m] 
i.e. at any time, either using mp3 player (mp3p) on mp3 music or CD player on a CD, 
Peter can produce music (the choice ⊕2 here is internal). 
John’s resource (denoted as JR): 
[�mp3p ⊕3 �CDp] 
i.e. John can provide either an mp3 player or CD player after two days. ⊕3 is an 
indeterminate possibility to Peter and will be revealed tomorrow. 
We consider two strategies for Peter. If Peter does not let David borrow the CD burner, 
he can wait until tomorrow to learn what John will bring to the party and choose the music 
format to burn accordingly at that time. Otherwise, if he wants to let David borrow the CD 
burner, he can not delay burning the CD until tomorrow and so has to make a prediction on 
which player John will bring to the party, then decides the choice on the music format and 
burn the CD early (now). This corresponds to the second strategy. The question is then how 
to make such strategies available for agent Peter to explore. 
We consider how Peter reasons along these strategies using TLL sequent calculus rules. 
Speciﬁcally, consider the following rules of sequent calculus that govern choices: 
Γ, A � Δ Γ, B � Δ Γ � A, Δ Γ � B, Δ 
Γ, A ⊕ B � Δ Γ � A � B, Δ (set1) 
Γ, A � Δ Γ, B � Δ Γ � A, Δ Γ � B, Δ 
Γ, A � B � Δ Γ, A � B � Δ Γ � A ⊕ B, Δ Γ � A ⊕ B, Δ (set2) 
Formulas on the left hand side of � are considered as things that are available while 
formulas on the right hand side are considered as things that are in demand. Hence, � on 
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the left hand side of � marks internal choice and ⊕ marks indeterminate possibility and vice 
versa for when they are on the right hand side of �. 
The ﬁrst set of rules (set 1) reﬂects the strategy that agents prepare for all possible 
outcomes of indeterminate possibilities, whether they occur in formulas of what is available 
or what is in demand. The second set of rules (set 2) reﬂects agents’ decisions on internal 
choices at their associated times. 
In the ﬁrst strategy of Peter, he does not let David borrow the CD Burner. He can ﬁnd 
a proof using standard sequent rules to achieve his goal of providing music at the party two 
days later (a proof of �2m) as follows. Note that for space reasons, we combine a number 
of inference rule applications. 
mp3 � mp3 CDf � CDf 
PR, PB � mp3 �, �1, � PR, PB � CDf �, �1, � 
PR, PB, mp3p � mp3 ⊗ mp3p ⊗ �, �, ⊕2 PR,PB,CDp � CDf ⊗ CDp ⊗ 
PP, PR, PB, mp3p � m PP, PR,PB,CDp � m �, �, ⊕2 
PP, PR, PB, �mp3p � �m � PP, PR,PB,�CDp � �m � 
PP, PR, PB, �mp3p ⊕3 �CDp � �m ⊕3 
PP, PR, PB, JR � �2m � 
In this proof search, step two (labeled ⊕3) reﬂects that Peter prepares for all possibilities 
of the players (�mp3p ⊕3 �CDp) the next day. The proof search succeeds because for 
whichever possibility occurs, Peter can use his CD burner to burn the CD in the correct 
format (CD or mp3). 
However, in the second strategy where Peter makes his decision now, the search using 
standard TLL sequent calculus rules cannot ﬁnd a proof of the goal �2m. At the search step 
labeled ⊕3, it is necessary to deal with both cases of the music player, corresponding to two 
branches in the proof tree. In these branches, only the one in which Peter has chosen the 
correct music format succeeds. We present a proof search that reﬂects Peter’s choice of the 
music format as mp3 as an example. Note that in the proof search, the step labeled �1, � 
corresponds to Peter’s decision on the choice of music format. The search corresponds to the 
choice of CD format is quite similar. 
mp3 � mp3 mp3 � CDf �mp3 � mp3 � �mp3 � CDf � 
�, �, ⊕2 �mp3, CDp � CDf ⊗ CDp ⊗�mp3, mp3p � mp3 ⊗ mp3p ⊗ 
PP, �mp3, CDp � m �, �, ⊕2PP, �mp3, mp3p � m 
PP, �mp3, �mp3p � �m � PP, �mp3,�CDp � �m � 
PP,�mp3, �mp3p ⊕3 �CDp � �m ⊕3 
2PP, JR, �mp3 � � m � 
PP, JR, PR,PB � �2m �1, � 
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It can be seen that even though Peter chooses the music format that will correctly match 
with the player, the search using standard sequent calculus rules still fails. 
More generally, an important observation to make is that although (temporal) linear 
logic captures the notions of internal choice and indeterminate possibility, its sequent rules 
constrain decision making on them to certain strategies and to be done in isolation (subject 
only to local information). 
Speciﬁcally, though the strategy of rules in set 1 is preparing all possible cases and hence 
safe, it requires extra and unnecessary resources and actions. Moreover, the strategy does not 
take into account the agents predictions of the outcomes of some indeterminate possibilities 
in the environment (which in our example is Peter’s prediction of the player) and whether 
agents are willing to take some risks by following their predictions. This also means that the 
notion of proof needs to be extended to allow for cases where it is not necessary for the proof 
to cover all possible outcomes of indeterminate possibilities but only their actual outcomes. 
Furthermore, according to the second set of rules, the internal choices of agents are 
determined freely, without any guidance or constraints. Hence, such decisions about these 
choices may not be optimal. For example, if an agent decides an internal choice �A � �B 
to be �A via the third rule now and later realizes there are some goals that require �B 
then it misses the chance to obtain the necessary resource �A. Hence, it is important that 
information such as that about other goals is included in the agents’ consideration of decisions 
on internal choices. In addition, the sequent rules do not allow agents to explore the strategy 
of deciding choices in advance. 
Hence, we investigate how we can use TLL not only to model the diﬀerence between 
internal choice and indeterminate possibility with respect to time, but also to capture depen­
dencies among choices, constraints on how choices can be made and predictions and decisions 
of indeterminate possibilities. Such constraints may also reﬂect global consideration of other 
goals and other threads of interaction. We further consider strategies that can be used to 
deal with choices with respect to time, reﬂecting how cautious the agents are and whether 
the agents deal with them in advance. However, we will not discuss how agents can predict 
the environment outcomes correctly. 
5.2 Modeling Decisions about Choices 
In this section, we consider the modeling of choice decisions, how to express constraints on 
choice decisions, and their dependency on other choices’ decisions. 
��
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If we assume that the order of the operants is unchanged throughout the process, then the 
decision on choices and indeterminate possibilities can be regarded as selecting the left-hand 
side or the right-hand side of the connective. For simplicity, we shall refer to both internal 
choices and indeterminate possibilities simply as choices unless it is important to mention 
them distinctly. 
Each choice is associated with a particular time point. Due to the inherent property of 
TLL that formulas denoted at a speciﬁc time point exist only in that time point and becomes 
invalid afterward, we assume that outcomes of choices must be revealed at their associated 
times. To enable agents to decide internal choices in advance, we assume that agents can 
make decisions early and keep those decisions unchanged until the decisions become eﬀective. 
Regarding indeterminate possibilities, we assume that their outcomes are determined by the 
environment (or external factors) at their associated times, and only at these times do the 
outcomes become known to the agents. For example, given an indeterminate possibility 
4(A ⊕ B), after four time points, the environment determines that �4(A ⊕ B) becomes 
4A or becomes �4B. 
Hence, for a given choice at the time �x, x > 0, there are three distinct states — not 
determined, left chosen, and right chosen. 
We use the notation �
�x or �⊕x to record the outcomes on the choices �x and ⊕x respec­→ →
tively. The subscript indicates the ID of the connective. Base values for choice decisions can 
be encoded by TLL propositions as L for choosing the left, and R for choosing the right. 
For example, the base value for a decision on A � B is L (denoted as �� = L) if A results→ 
from deciding the choice A � B (by agents or by the environment) and is R (�� = R) if B→ 
results. Formally, we write � ��1 � L or �1 → �→ � L to denote that the left sub-formula of �1 
was selected. This notation distinctly captures the decision on choices out of their context 
of resource or action relations. 
Regarding internal choices, their decisions can be regarded as variables on which agents 
can decide the assignment of values. 
By modeling choices’ decisions explicitly, we can state constraints between them. For 
→ �→, need to be made consistently — either both right or both example, if two choices, ��x and �y 
=
�y
left — then this can be stated as �
�x 
�→ or in the logic encoding, �x � , �x �→.→ �→ � �y → �→ � �y 
More generally, we can state that a given internal choice �x (or ⊕x) should depend on 
a combination of other choices or some external constraints. We use condLx (respectively 
condRx) to denote the condition that should hold for the left side (respectively right side) of 
the internal choice to be taken. 
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Deﬁnition 2. Left Condition 
Let time op(Γ �x Δ) (or time op(Γ ⊕x Δ)) be a TLL formula, where time op is a temporal 
operator or a combination of temporal operators. The “left condition”, denoted as condLx, 
is deﬁned as the necessary and suﬃcient conditions that the choice �x (or ⊕x respectively) 
is determined such that time op(Γ �x Δ) (or time op(Γ ⊕x Δ)) becomes time opΓ. 
Deﬁnition 3. Right Condition 
Let time op(Γ �x Δ) (or time op(Γ ⊕x Δ)) be a TLL formula, where time op is a temporal 
operator or a combination of temporal operators. The “right condition”, denoted as condRx, 
is deﬁned as the necessary and suﬃcient conditions that the choice �x (or ⊕x respectively) 
is determined such that time op(Γ �x Δ) (or time op(Γ ⊕x Δ)) becomes time opΔ. 
Clearly, satisfaction of condLx means condRx can not be satisﬁed and vice versa. In other 
words, they should always be mutually exclusive. These conditions completely determine 
the results of the choices’ decisions. We encode these conditions as TLL sequents so that 
sub-conditions (sequents) can be found via proof search. As outcomes of indeterminate 
possibilities are not dependent on agents, for practical reasons, we do not specify constraints 
on indeterminate possibilities. 
Consider our running example. Peter’s internal choice about the music format depends 
on which player John will bring to the party. Speciﬁcally, �
�1 = L (mp3 format) if and only → 
if L ⊕3 R � R at the next day when Peter gets the information about the player from John. 
This dependency can be expressed as a constraint on the decision of �1. Speciﬁcally, the 
condition for the choice of �x being left chosen is deﬁned as 
condL1 =� �(�⊕3 � L)→
It can be seen that internal choices with constraints express richer forms of internal 
choices, varying from free choices to indeterminate possibilities. Speciﬁcally, in the absence 
of any constraints, internal choices are truly free choices for agents. If the constraints contain 
some indeterminate possibilities then the outcomes of the respective internal choices are 
beyond the agents’ control. In this case, the internal choices behave similarly to indeterminate 
possibilities and the agents can only make predictions. 
Hence, by modeling internal choices with constraints on their decisions, we naturally 
bridge the gap in the level of determinism between internal choices and indeterminate possi­
bilities. 
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5.2.1 Representative Choice of a Subformula 
Composite formulas, in general, contain sub-formulas that are interrelated. A sub-formula 
may be removed or retained after choices in the composite formula are decided. It is then im­
portant to state the conditions under which a sub-formula of interest is retained or removed. 
Based on such information, agents are then able to judge the signiﬁcance of a compound 
formula w.r.t. retaining the sub-formula of interest and exercise various strategies in dealing 
with the compound formula. 
Given the ability to model decisions about choices, especially representing constraints on 
decisions, we can capture whether a sub-formula is retained (or removed) in a composite 
formula by a choice. We can also express the conditions required to retain the sub-formula. 
We start from an observation that given a formula Γ which contains a sub-formula A, we 
can determine a sequence of decisions to be made to retain the sub-formula A. For example, 
if 
Γ = B �1 �a(�b(A ⊕2 C) �3 D) 
then in order to retain A, we need to choose the right hand side of �1, then, a time units 
later, choose the left side of �3, and b time units after that, have the left side of ⊕2 chosen 
by the environment (an indeterminate possibility). 
This sequence of decisions about Γ to obtain A can be captured by the sequent: 
� (��1 � R) ⊗ �a(��3 � L) ⊗ �a+b(�⊕2 � L)→ → →
Observe that if we compress the sequence of decisions to retain A in Γ into a single choice, 
then the above sequent can be regarded as the determining condition for that choice. 
In particular, in the above example, we can compress the decisions about Γ into a choice 
of the form �a+bA �r �y 1 where the choice �r is left chosen if �a+bA is retained in Γ and 
is right chosen otherwise. The condition sequent above then corresponds to condLr of the 
choice �r . Being mutually exclusive, condRr is captured as: 
� (��1 � L) ⊕ �a(��3 � R) ⊕ �a+b(�⊕2 � R)→ → →
Such a “compressed” choice is called a representative choice for A. As the same choices 
are formulated with diﬀerent notations on the left hand side and right hand side of �, we 
will deﬁne the notion of a representative choice in the context of program formulas and goal 
formulas respectively as follows. 
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Deﬁnition 4. Program Formula 
Let Γ � Δ be a TLL sequent. A (TLL) formula A is said to be a program formula w.r.t. the 
given sequent iﬀ A is an element of the multi-set Γ. 
Deﬁnition 5. Goal Formula 
Let Γ � Δ be a TLL sequent. A (TLL) formula A is said to be a goal formula w.r.t. the 
given sequent iﬀ A is an element of the multi-set Δ. 
In other words, program formulas appear on the left hand side of � while goal formulas 
appear on the right hand side. A “compressed” choice is then deﬁned. 
Deﬁnition 6. A representative choice �r with respect to a formula A in a program formula 
(respectively goal formula) Γ is a choice �xA �r �y 1 (respectively �xA ⊕r �y 1) whose 
decision is L if �xA is retained in Γ and is R otherwise (where �y 1 is retained instead), 
where x ≥ 0 is the time associated with A in Γ and y ≥ 0 is the time point associated with 1. 
Note that at the time of representing the choice �r (or ⊕r ), the value of y is not known. 
It will be known after all the decisions of internal choices and indeterminate possibilities in 
Γ are determined. 
The representative choice of a sub-formula reﬂects the relationship with the compound 
formula that contains it. We will discuss strategies for agents to deal with such relationships 
in Section 5.4. In the meantime we discuss how standard sequent calculus rules might be 
extended to accommodate more strategies concerning choices. 
5.3 Choice Calculus 
Proof search using the standard sequent calculus rules reﬂect the strategy of preparing for 
all possible cases, and do not allow agents to take risks by choosing to prepare for only 
certain cases. Hence an extension to the sequent calculus rules is required to accommodate 
the possibility for agents to follow a risky-taking strategy. 
In particular, we need to provide the proof steps in which agents can make predictions on 
the outcomes of indeterminate possibilities and follow only the search paths corresponding 
to the predicted ones. In other words, we need to provide inference rules for dealing with 
indeterminate possibilities such that the agents can decide on a particular branch to follow 
in proof search rather than preparing for all branches. We also need to keep track of the 
predictions that agents make. Sequent rules of this form are below. Note that �cc means � 
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in the choice calculus and a prediction of the outcome of an indeterminate possibility ⊕n is 
expressed in square brackets. 
Γ �cc F, Δ [���n � L] Γ �cc G, Δ [���n � R]→ →
Γ �cc F �nG, Δ Γ �cc F �nG, Δ 
Γ, F �cc Δ [��⊕n � L] Γ, G �cc Δ [��⊕n � R]→ →
Γ, F ⊕n G �cc Δ Γ, F ⊕n G �cc Δ 
The predictions are supposed to be evaluated independently from the main formulas in 
the inference rules and at the time when the environment reveals the outcomes. 
A prediction can be thought as an assumption that the search technique relies on and 
needs to be checked against the actual outcomes. If the predictions are correct, as in the 
standard case, a successful search will generate a proof. If the assumptions are not correct, 
then even if the search is successful, no proof is generated. Hence the existence of a proof 
depends on the agent’s predictions being correct. We will discuss the relationship between 
proofs using the extended inference rules and proofs using only standard sequent calculus 
rules in Section 5.3.1. 
Moreover, we allow agents to decide upon an indeterminate possibility beforehand, which 
is not possible using only the standard sequent rules of TLL. What is needed then are infer­
ence rules that permit agents to follow only the branches that correspond to their predictions 
on the indeterminate possibilities. Rules of this form are below. As above, predictions are 
in square brackets. 
Γ �cc �nF, Δ [� �n(��n � L)] Γ �cc �nG, Δ [� �n(��n � R)]→ →
Γ �cc �n(F �nG), Δ Γ �cc �n(F �nG), Δ 
Γ, �nF �cc Δ [� �n(�⊕n � L)] Γ, �nG �cc Δ [� �n(�⊕n � R)]→ →
Γ, �n(F ⊕n G) �cc Δ Γ, �n(F ⊕n G) �cc Δ 
Internal choices can be decided by the owner agent at the time associated with the choices, 
subject to any constraints (condLn or condRn) imposed on them. Accordingly, we derive 
new sequent rules for internal choices to reﬂect that such constraints need to be followed by 
attaching the corresponding conditions to the proof search steps. The new sequent rules are: 
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Γ, F �cc Δ [condLn] Γ, G �cc Δ [condRn] 
Γ, F �nG �cc Δ Γ, F �nG �cc Δ 
Γ �cc F, Δ [condLn] Γ �cc G, Δ [condRn] 
Γ �cc F ⊕n G, Δ Γ �cc F ⊕n G, Δ 
where condLn (respectively condRn) are conditions imposed on the internal choice n for 
the choice to be left (respectively right) chosen. These conditions may be absent. In their 
absence, the internal choices are truly free choices and the standard inference rules are used. 
Moreover, if the agent is to decide the choice in advance, it can use the choice’s outcome 
earlier in the search. Similar to the rules that allow agents to deal with indeterminate 
possibilities ahead of time, the rules should permit the agents to follow a particular choice 
while keeping track of the associated conditions. They are of the form: 
Γ, �nF �cc Δ [condLn] Γ, �nG �cc �nΔ [condRn] 
Γ, �n(F �nG) �cc Δ Γ, �n(F �nG) �cc �nΔ 
Γ �cc �nF, Δ [condLn] Γ �cc G, �nΔ [condRn] 
Γ �cc �n(F ⊕n G), Δ Γ �cc �n(F ⊕n G), Δ 
These above new sequent rules, together with standard TLL sequent rules, form the 
choice calculus. The new sequent rules are summarized in Table 5.1. 
Let us return to our running example. Recall that if Peter is to let David borrow the CD 
burner now, then he needs to make a prediction about the player that John will bring, and 
based on this prediction, decide on the indeterminate possibility early. For instance, Peter 
predicts that John will provide an mp3 player (i.e. L ⊕3 R � L). Using the choice calculus, 
this is captured by the following inference: 
2 2Γ, � mp3p �cc � m [� �(�⊕3 � L)]→
2Γ, �(�mp3p ⊕3 �CDp) �cc � m 
where Γ is some formula in the proof. 
Based on this prediction, Peter decides on the choice of music format �1 (mp3 format) 
now and burns the blank CD accordingly. As mentioned earlier, the imposed condition for 
the choice �1 is condL1 =� �(�⊕3 � L). Such a decision with a constraint is reﬂected in the →
following proof step in the choice calculus. 
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Γ, �mp3 � Δ [� �(�⊕3 � L)]→
Γ, �mp3 �1 �CDf � Δ 
where Γ and Δ are some formulas in the proof. 
By taking the risk in following his prediction, Peter then successfully obtains a proof of 
2m (given below). If his prediction is correct, which means that L ⊕3 R � L is provable, 
then a successful plan is obtained to achieve his goal. 
We have the following proof of �2m in the choice calculus where some inferences combine 
a number of rule applications. 
mp3 � mp3 mp3p � mp3p [� �(�⊕3 � L)]→
mp3, mp3p � mp3 ⊗ mp3p [� �(�⊕3 � L)] ⊗ 
mp3, mp3p � (mp3 ⊗ mp3p) ⊕2 (cd ⊗ cdp) 
→
[� �(�⊕3 � L)] ⊕2 
, �, �→
2�mp3, P, �2mp3p � � m [� �(�⊕3 � L)] �2 →
2�mp3 �1 �cd, P, �2mp3p � � m [� �(�⊕3 � L)] �1 → ⊗, �, �
2P R, P P, P B, �2mp3p � � m [� �(�⊕3 � L)] 
J R, P P, P R, P B � �2m → ⊕3 
In this example we begin (bottom-most inference) by making an “in-advance” decision for 
the indeterminate possibility ⊕3. Speciﬁcally, we predict that John will provide an MP3 
player. We then use standard the sequent rule for internal choice to decide on the format 
MP3. When the time comes to make a decision for ⊕2 we can select to use the MP3 player 
to produce music. As the condition condL1 = [� �(�⊕3 � L)] is the same as the condition of →
the prediction on ⊕3, we omit it for readability. 
As can be seen from the example, internal choices and indeterminate possibilities are 
properly modeled with respect to time. Moreover, several strategies are enabled for Peter 
due to the use of the choice calculus. If Peter is to take a safe approach, he should delay 
deciding the music format until tomorrow and ignores David’s request. If Peter is willing 
to take risks, he can predict the indeterminate possibility of which player John will bring to 
the party and act accordingly. Peter can also decide the choice on music early so as to lend 
David the CD burner. 
To illustrate the use of the choice calculus in handling choices modeled with constraints 
on their decisions, we give an example by considering the following formulas. 
(�nA �a 1) ⊗ (�nB �b 1) ⊗ (C �c 1) 
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where �a, �b, �c are internal choices. 
We consider some constraints for the internal choices which are speciﬁed out the outcomes 
of other choices, namely �1, ⊕2 and ⊕3 as follows. 
In particular, we deﬁne the conditions for the choice �a being left chosen as 
condLa = � �n(��1 � R) ⊗ (�⊕2 � L)→ →
The conditions for the choice �a being right chosen are deﬁned in a mutually exclusive 
manner as 
condRa = � �n(��1 � L) ⊕ (�⊕2 � R)→ →
Similarly for �b 
condLb = � �n(��1 � L) ⊗ (�⊕2 � L), condRb = � �n(��1 � R) ⊕ (�⊕2 � R)→ → → →
and �c 
condLc = ��⊕2 � R condRc = ��⊕2 � L→ →
To illustrate proof search in the choice calculus, we consider another formula that also 
has the choice ⊕3 - �nB ⊗ (�nA ⊕3 C) - and check if 
�nB �b 1, �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nB ⊗ (�nA ⊕3 C) 
is the case. 
One approach to proof search techniques in the choice calculus is to delay evaluation of 
all conditions until the search is complete. Such an approach is illustrated as below. 
A � A [condLa, condRc] �nA � �nA � 
1 �nA, 1 � �nA [condLa, condRc] 
B � B [condLb] �nA, C �c 1 � �nA [condLa] �c �nB � �nB [condLb] � �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nA �a �nB �b 1 � �nB �b �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nA ⊕3 C ⊕3 �nB �b 1, �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nB ⊗ (�nA ⊕3 C) ⊗ 
The conditions required on the proof are a conjunction of all the conditions of its branches. 
It is expressed in TLL as � condLb ⊗condLc ⊗condLa. A proof of the conditions then requires: 
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�1 �1 
�→� L � �→� R � ⊕2 ⊕2 ���1 � L→ �→� L � ���1 � R→ �→� L � 
� �n(��1 � L) � ��⊕2 � L ⊕2 � �n(��1 � R) � ��⊕2 � L→ →
� �n(��1 � L) ⊗ (�⊕2 � L) ⊗ ��⊕2 � L 
→ →
�→� L � 
� �n(��1 � R) ⊗ (�⊕2 � L) ⊗ → → → → →
� condLb � condRc � condLa 
� condLb ⊗ condRc ⊗ condLa ⊗ 
In order to satisfy all the conditions, the following decisions on choices need to occur: 
�
�1 = L, �⊕2 = L, �⊕2 = L, ��1 = R, �⊕2 = L,→ → → → → 
in which there is an inconsistency as �
�1 must have both values L and R. Hence, the → 
conditions cannot all be satisﬁed and so there is no proof. 
The proof search can backtrack at the proof step labeled ⊕3 to take the other path as 
follows. 
C � C [condRa, condLc] 
1
1, C � C [condRa, condLc] 
B � B [condLb] 1, C �c 1 � C [condRa] �c �nB � �nB [condLb] � �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � C �a �nB �b 1 � �nB �b �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nA ⊕3 C ⊕3 �nB �b 1, �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nB ⊗ (�nA ⊕3 C) ⊗ 
The conditions required on the proof are � condLb ⊗ condLc ⊗ condRa. A proof of the 
conditions is below 
�1 �1 
�→� L � �→� L � ⊕2 ���1 � L→ �→� L � ���1 � R→
� �n(��1 � L) � ��⊕2 � L ⊕2 � �n(��1 � L) � → → →
� �n(��1 � L) ⊗ (�⊕2 � L) ⊗ �→� R � � �n(��1 � L) ⊕ (�⊕2 � R) ⊕ ��⊕2 � R→ → → → →
� condLb � condLc � condRa 
� condLb ⊗ condLc ⊗ condRa ⊗ 
We then have the following requirements: 
�
�1 = L, �⊕2 = L, �⊕2 = R, ��1 = L,→ → → → 
from which we get that �
⊕2 must have both values L and R, which is inconsistent. The → 
proof search of the conditions then backtracks at the step labeled ⊕ to take the other path 
as follows. 
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�1 
�→� L � 
���1 � L ⊕2 ⊕2 → �→� L � �→� R � 
� �n(��1 � L) � ��⊕2 � L ⊕2 ��⊕2 � R→ → →
� �n(��1 � L) ⊗ (�⊕2 � L) ⊗ �→� R � � �n(��1 � L) ⊕ (�⊕2 � R) ⊕ ��⊕2 � R→ → → → →
� condLb � condLc � condRa 
� condLb ⊗ condRc ⊗ condLa ⊗ 
The corresponding requirements are: 
�
�1 = L, �⊕2 = L, �⊕2 = R, and �⊕2 = R,→ → → → 
from which we get that �
⊕2 must have both values L and R, which is inconsistent. Hence, → 
the conditions cannot all be satisﬁed and we cannot obtain any proof of �nB ⊗ (�nA ⊕3 C) 
whose conditions can be satisﬁed. 
Another possible proof search technique for the choice calculus is to evaluate conditions 
as they occur in proof steps. As newly formed conditions are satisﬁed, the proof search 
continues further. Otherwise, an unfulﬁlled condition will stop the search and causes it to 
backtrack if possible. The example below illustrates the technique. 
Assume that the search reaches this point 
B � B [condLb]
�nB � �nB [condLb] �
 ... �nB �b 1 � �nB �b �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nA ⊕3 C �nB �b 1, �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nB ⊗ (�nA ⊕3 C) ⊗ 
The condition that needs to be satisﬁed is condLb. A proof requires the decision on the 
choice �1 to be L and also the decision on the choice ⊕2 to be L as follows: 
�1
�→� L � ⊕2 ���1 � L→ �→� L � 
� �n(��1 � L) � ��⊕2 � L→ →
� �n(��1 � L) ⊗ (�⊕2 � L) ⊗ → →
� condLb 
The proof search goes further and reaches another condition condLc 
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... 
B � B [condLb] �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � C [condLc] �nB � �nB [condLb] � �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nA �c �nB �b 1 � �nB �b �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nA ⊕3 C ⊕3 �nB �b 1, �nA �a 1, C �c 1 � �nB ⊗ (�nA ⊕3 C) ⊗ 
The proof of condLc requires 
⊕2 
�→� R � 
��⊕2 � R→
� condLc 
which means the decision for the choice ⊕2 is R (�⊕2 = R). This is inconsistent with the → 
previous condition condLb in which the decision on the choice ⊕2 is L. As a result, the proof 
search stops and backtracks to take another path. 
The choice calculus allows agents to use various strategies for indeterminate possibilities 
and internal choices. These strategies make it more ﬂexible to deal with changes and handle 
exceptions with global awareness and dependencies among choices. Moreover, because each 
choice has one decision value (being left or right chosen), in order to keep decisions on choices 
consistent, there needs to be in place a mechanism that keeps track of all the decisions 
on choices and makes them consistent. Developing such mechanism is a straightforward 
implementation task and is not discussed in the thesis. In the next section, we show that 
proofs that also use the additional rules are, in a sense, equivalent to proofs in the original 
TLL sequent calculus. 
5.3.1 Soundness and Completeness of the Choice Calculus 
The intuition behind the soundness and completeness properties of proofs using these ad­
ditional rules with respect to proofs which only use original TLL sequent calculus is that 
eventually indeterminate possibilities will be determined. Hence, if the agents have made the 
correct predictions and followed them then they have successfully dealt with these indeter­
minate possibilities. 
The soundness and completeness properties are then evaluated and proved in this context. 
In particular, we introduce the concept of a revealed proof, which has all the internal choices 
and indeterminate possibilities replaced by their actual outcomes. Proofs under the choice 
calculus are then examined in relation to their corresponding revealed proofs. They are sound 
if all the assumptions they rely on turn out to be correct. If the assumptions turn out to be 
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unfounded, then the proofs under the choice calculus are not valid. 
We ﬁrstly deﬁne the concept of a revealed proof. 
Deﬁnition 7. Let Γ � Δ denote a sequent in TLL that does not contain any choice in the 
formula. A revealed proof of Γ � Δ is a proof under standard sequent calculus rules which 
does not contain any inference rules over choices. 
A formula appearing in a revealed proof is called a revealed formula. 
By deﬁnition, a revealed proof is also a valid proof under standard TLL sequent calculus 
rules. 
A proof under the choice calculus is then diﬀerent from its corresponding revealed proof 
essentially in that occurrences of choices have not yet revealed their outcomes. The process of 
revealing choices that turns a proof under the choice calculus into a revealed proof is deﬁned 
as follows. 
Deﬁnition 8. Let P be a proof of a sequent Γ �cc Δ in the choice calculus. A transformation 
process Rechoice applied to P replaces any occurrences of choices in all sequents in P by their 
actual outcomes. 
Note that, regarding additional inference rules in the choice calculus, by deﬁnition, the 
conditions attached to them hold if and only if the premise sequents correspond to the actual 
outcomes of the choices. As the transformation Rechoice turns all the choices in conclusion 
sequents to their actual outcomes, Rechoice makes the premise sequents the same as the 
conclusion sequents after the transformation. 
Such replacements by Rechoice manifest in changes to inference rules on choices as shown 
in the examples below. Indeed, if all the conditions of inference rules on choices in P are 
correct, these inference rules are turned into identity rules, which can be safely replaced by one 
sequent. We list a few cases and their corresponding identities rules are listed immediately on 
their right hand side. Listing the rest is straightforward and repetitive, and hence is omitted 
here. Let Γ�, F �, G� and Δ� denote the outcomes of replacing all choices in Γ, F, G and Δ by 
their actual outcomes respectively. 
Γ �cc F, Δ [���n � L] Γ� � F �, Δ�→
Γ �cc F �nG, Δ Γ� � F �, Δ� 
Γ �cc F, Δ [condLn] Γ� � F �, Δ� 
Γ �cc F ⊕n G, Δ Γ� � F �, Δ� 
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Γ, F �cc Δ [��⊕n � L] Γ�, F � � Δ�→
Γ, F ⊕n G �cc Δ Γ�, F � � Δ� 
Γ, G �cc Δ [condRn] Γ�, G� � Δ� 
Γ, F �nG �cc Δ Γ�, G� � Δ� 
Γ, �nF �cc Δ [condLn] Γ�, �nF � � Δ� 
Γ, �n(F �nG) �cc Δ Γ�, �nF � � Δ� 
Γ �cc �nF, Δ [condLn] Γ� � �nF �, Δ� 
Γ �cc �n(F ⊕n G), Δ Γ� � �nF �, Δ� 
Γ, �nG �cc Δ [� �n(�⊕n � R)] Γ�, �nG� � Δ�→
Γ, �n(F ⊕n G) �cc Δ Γ�, �nG� � Δ� 
Γ �cc �nF, Δ [condLn] Γ� � �nF �, Δ� 
Γ �cc �n(F ⊕n G), Δ Γ� � �nF �, Δ� 
Γ �cc F, Δ Γ �cc G, Δ Γ� � F �, Δ� 
Γ �cc (F �nG), Δ Γ� � F �, Δ� (F is the actual outcome) 
Γ, F �cc Δ Γ, G �cc Δ Γ� � F �, Δ� 
Γ, (F ⊕n G) �cc Δ Γ� � F �, Δ� (F is the actual outcome) 
It can be seen that as a result of such replacements, all the inference rules on choices 
collapse to identity rules. 
Consider the following proof steps in the choice calculus. 
C � C [� (�⊕1 � R)]→
B � B C�2D � C [� (�⊕1 � R)] �2 →
B, C�2D � B ⊗ C [� (�⊕1 � R)] ⊗R →
A ⊕1 B, C�2D � B ⊗ C ⊕1 
Applying the transformation Rechoice on the proof steps above will result in the following 
revealed proof (assuming that the conditions [� (�⊕1 � R)] are correct, which means that the →
indeterminate possibility A ⊕1 B turns out to be B). 
C � C 
B � B C � C 
B, C � B ⊗ C ⊗R 
B, C � B ⊗ C 
��
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which essentially is 
B � B C � C 
B, C � B ⊗ C ⊗R 
We then have the following result regarding the outcome of the transformation Rechoice. 
Note that for simplicity of discussion, regarding a sequent Γ �cc Δ we make use of the 
equivalent form Γ, Δ⊥ �cc. 
Theorem 5.3.1. Let P be a proof of a sequent Γn �cc under the choice calculus where Γn 
is a formula of TLL. Let rep(Γn) be the outcome of replacing all the choices in Γn by their 
actual outcomes. Let rep(P ) be the result of applying the transformation Rechoice to P . 
We have that if all the conditions associated with additional inference rules over choices in 
P (if exist) are correct, rep(P ) is a proof of rep(Γn) � in the standard TLL sequent calculus. 
Proof: 
The theorem is proved by induction on the proof length of P. 
The base case is P of length 1, which contains an axiom rule. rep(P ) is also the axiom 
rule and the theorem holds. 
We assume the theorem holds for all P of length up to and including n proof steps and 
try to prove the case for (n+1) proof steps. 
Let Pm denote a proof of length m proof steps. Let P � be the result of applying Rechoicem 
on Pm. Let Sm = Γm, Mm �cc be the last sequent of Pm after m proof steps. Let S� = m 
Γm
� , Mm �cc be the result of replacing all choices in Sm by their actual outcomes. 
Hypothesis: P � is a proof of S� = Γm� , M � � under standard TLL sequent calculus for m m m 
all values of m that 1 < m ≤ n. 
Let Pn+1 denote the proof P of length n+1 proof steps. Let Pn
�
+1 be the result of applying 
Rechoice on Pn+1.

Let n� + 1 denote the number of proof steps in Pn�+1. Let Rn+1 and R� denote the inference
n+1 
rules of Pn+1 and Pn
�
+1 respectively at step n + 1
th and n� + 1th respectively. 
Let Sn+1 = Γn+1, Mn+1 �cc be the last sequent of P after n + 1 proof steps, where 
Mn+1 and Γn+1 are the main formulas and context formulas with respect to Rn+1. Let 
S� = Γn� +1, M �n+1 �cc be the result of replacing all choices in Γn+1, Mn+1 �cc by their n+1 
actual outcomes. 
We need to establish that Pn
�
+1 is a proof of Γn
�
+1, Mn+1 � in the standard TLL sequent 
calculus. 
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We will do that by examining the premises and conclusion sequents with respect to various 
cases of the last inference rule in Pn
�
+1 . 
Firstly, because the transformation Rechoice maps a single conclusion sequent to another 
single conclusion sequent, the last sequent in Pn
�
+1 is also a single conclusion sequent. 
Secondly, we consider how the theorem holds with respect to the premises sequents of 
the last inference rule in Pn
�
+1. 
Note that for all inference rules, their premises contains at most two sequents. 
Let Γa,Ma �cc and Γb,Mb �cc be two premises sequents of Rn+1, where Ma, Mb denote 
the main formulas and Γa and Γb denote the context formulas with respect to the inference 
rule Rn+1 (note that Γb,Mb �cc may not exist). Rn+1 is 
. . . . . . . . 
Γa,Ma �cc Γb,Mb �cc 
Γn+1,Mn+1 �cc 
Under Rechoice, Rn+1 is turned into R� where R� isn+1 n+1 
. . . . . . . . 
Γa
� ,Ma� � Γb� ,Mb� � 
n+1,M
�Γ� n+1 � 
where we do not know if Rn+1 is valid as yet. 
Given that Pn+1 is a proof, each sequent of the premises of the inference rule Rn+1 is also 
a last sequent of a sub-proof in Pn+1 of length less than or equal to n. 
Denote Pa and Pb be the two sub-proofs in Pn+1 that have Γa,Ma �cc and Γb,Mb �cc as 
end sequents respectively (Pb will not exist if Γb,Mb �cc does not exist). 
Let P � and P � be the outcomes of the transformation Rechoice on Pa and Pb respectively. a b 
Let Γa
� , Ma� , Γ�b, and Mb
� be the outcomes of replacing all occurrences of choices in 
Γa,Ma,Γb and Mb respectively. 
Because Pa and Pb are proofs of length less than or equal to n, by the hypothesis, P � anda 
Pb
� are also proofs of the sequents Γa� ,Ma� �cc and Γb� ,Mb� � respectively in the standard TLL 
sequent calculus. 
134 Choice Calculus 
In other words, under Rechoice on Pn+1, Pa
� and P � result and are proofs of their last b 
sequents Γa
� ,Ma� �cc and Γb� ,Mb� �cc. Hence, Γa� ,Ma� �cc and Γb� ,M � �cc are also the two b 
premises sequents of R�n+1 (Γb
� ,Mb
� �cc will not exist if Γb,Mb �cc does not exist). 
Thirdly, given that the theorem holds for the premises sequents of Rn
�
+1, we will establish 
n+1,M
� � is the conclusion sequent, where Γ�that from these premises, Γ� n+1,M � �n+1 n+1 
results from replacing all choices in Γn+1,Mn+1 �cc by their actual outcomes by examining 
all possible cases of Rn+1. 
The inference rule Rn+1 can be either a choice rule (i.e. one from the choice calculus only) 
or a non-choice rule (i.e. one in standard TLL but not in the choice calculus). 
Case 1: Rn+1 is an inference rule on choice. 
There are two cases of Rn+1 in which the premises contain two sequents (note that 
Γa = Γb): 
Γa,Ma �cc Γa,Mb �cc 
Γa,Ma ⊕ Mb �cc ⊕L 
or 
Γa �cc Ma Γa �cc Mb 
Γa �cc Ma � Mb �R 
In these cases, Γn+1 = Γa = Γb, and hence the outcomes of replacing all choices in them 
by actual choice outcomes are the same, and so Γ� = Γ� = Γ�b.n+1 a 
By applying Rn+1, another choice is introduced in Mn+1, Mn+1 = Ma � Mb or Mn+1 = 
Ma ⊕ Mb. Assuming that the outcome of this choice is Ma, then replacing all the choices in 
Mn+1 by their outcomes results in Ma. Hence M � = Ma.n+1 
Furthermore, consider the transformation Rechoice on Rn+1. Rechoice turns the newly 
introduced choice in Mn+1 to its outcome, which means also that Mn+1 becomes Ma. After 
performing Rechoice, R� isn+1 
Γa
� ,Ma� �
Γa
� ,Ma� � 
Given that M � = Ma� as above, we have the following proof in the standard TLL n+1 
sequent calculus. 
Γa
� ,Ma� �
Γa
� ,M �n+1 � 
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which means that the theorem holds for these two cases of Rn+1. 
Consider all other cases of Rn+1 of inference rules over choices, the premises of Rn+1 then 
have only one sequent, denoted as Γa,Ma �cc. As the only choice introduced to Ma results 
in Mn+1, Γa is unchanged. Hence, Γn+1 = Γa, and the result of replacing all choices by their 
outcomes is the same, and so Γ� = Γ� .n+1 a
By applying the inference rule Rn+1, Ma becomes Mn+1. Now the only change in Mn+1 
from Ma is the newly introduced choice but it becomes its outcome under Rechoice. Given 
all the conditions associated with additional inference rules over choices in P are correct, 
the outcome of the newly introduced choice in Mn+1 is Ma. Consequently, the outcomes of 
replacing all choices in Ma and Mn+1 are the same, and so M � = M �a n+1.

We then have a proof under standard TLL sequent calculus as follows

Γa
� ,Ma� �
Γa
� ,M �n+1 � 
which means that the theorem holds for Rn+1. 
Case 2: Rn+1 is a non-choice inference rule. 
Among all non-choice inference rules, Rn+1 can have premises of two sequents or one 
sequent 
Γa,Ma �cc Γb,Mb �cc 
Γn+1,Mn+1 �cc 
or 
Γa,Ma �cc 
Γn+1,Mn+1 �cc 
Γn+1 can be either the same as Γa (and Γb if it exists) or combining them (Γn+1 = 
Γa,Γb). Correspondingly, Γ� can be either the same as Γ� and Γ� or combining them n+1 a b 
(Γ� = Γa� ,Γ�b).n+1 
Observe that in a proof Pn+1 under the choice calculus, after a choice is introduced, like 
A � B, its components (A or B) will never be used individually and the choice will be used 
as a single and indivisible unit in further inference rules. In fact, if we treat all the choices 
in all the sequents in Rn+1 as black boxes (i.e. without knowing the content inside), then the 
non-choice inference Rn+1 still holds. 
Consequently, the same non-choice inference rule as of Rn+1 in the standard TLL sequent 
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calculus can still be applied where, in the black boxes, choices are replaced by their actual 
outcomes. Hence, we have a valid inference rule as: 
Γa
� , Ma� � Γb� , Mb� � 
Γn
�
+1, M
�
n+1 � 
or 
Γa
� , Ma� �
Γn
�
+1, M
�
n+1 � 
Hence, for all the cases of Rn+1, we have further established that the sequent Γn
�
+1, M
�
n+1 � 
is the conclusion in the last inference step R� of P �n+1 n+1. 
Given also that the premises of Rn+1 are conclusion sequents of proofs that are sub-parts 
of Pn
�
+1 as established above, P 
� as a whole is a proof of Γn� +1, M �n+1 �. In other words, n+1 
we have shown that the theorem holds for proofs of length n + 1. 
By induction on the length of proofs, we can conclude that the theorem holds. � 
As a result of this theorem, it is straight forward to obtain the soundness property as 
follows. 
Theorem 5.3.2. (Soundness) Let P be a proof of Γ �cc Δ in the choice calculus where Γ 
and Δ are formulas of TLL. Let rep(Γ) and rep(Δ) be the outcomes of replacing all the 
choices in Γ and Δ respectively by their outcomes. Let rep(P ) be the result of applying the 
transformation Rechoice to P . 
If all the conditions associated with the additional inference rules on choices in P are correct, 
rep(Γ) � rep(Δ) 
is also provable in standard TLL sequent calculus by the proof rep(P ). 
Proof : Follows trivially from Theorem 5.3.1 � 
The completeness theorem is as follows. 
Theorem 5.3.3. (Completeness) Let Γ, Δ be formulas of TLL. If Γ � Δ is provable in the 
standard TLL sequent calculus then Γ �cc Δ is provable in the choice calculus. 
Proof : As the choice calculus also contains standard TLL sequent calculus rules, this is 
trivial. � 
Dealing with Choices and Changes 137 
5.4 Dealing with Choices and Changes 
The choice calculus lets agents exercise various strategies on choices, such as preparing for all 
possible cases (being cautious), or assuming some particular outcomes by making predictions 
(being bold). The rationale for the bold options is to save eﬀort by cutting down the number 
of possibilities to deal with. Similarly, deciding choices beforehand has the advantage of 
reducing the number of future options/possibilities that one has to prepare for. This applies 
particularly during interactions, in which resources and actions are oﬀered to other agents. 
As agents decide choices during interaction, there are two extreme cases. 
The ﬁrst is that all the choices and indeterminate possibilities (now and future) are 
decided. As a result, the resource requirements to fulﬁll commitments are at minimum and 
agents do not have to reserve more resources than what will be consumed. The requirements 
are also straightforward and agents can use resources to handle them with certainty. 
The other extreme is that all decisions for choices and indeterminate possibilities are 
left open. In this case, in order to fulﬁll goals and commitments, agents prepare for all 
possibilities. This requires excessive reservation of resources. Similarly, the required resources 
and actions cannot be speciﬁed completely due to the undetermined choices. Therefore, 
making sure that the required resources and actions are available in all cases also requires 
redundant resources and actions. 
Formulas involving choices can be classiﬁed as follows. 
1. A formula may contain no choice, which we call a deﬁnite formula. 
2. A formula may also contain only internal choices without conditions or with conditions 
that can be satisﬁed without imposing any constraints on the agents. The agents can 
decide these internal choices at will. We call this kind of formula a determinable 
formula. 
3. The third kind of formulas is the one that contains internal choices with conditions. 
These conditions put a constraint on the decisions on these internal choices. Such 
constraints completely determine the decisions on these choices but it is up to agents 
whether they want to satisfy the constraints or not. Constraints can arise from depen­
dencies, or other goal achievements, or other factors. Formulas of this kind are called 
constrained formulas. 
4. The fourth kind corresponds to those formulas that contains indeterminate possibilities 
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or contains internal choices whose constraints depend on indeterminate possibilities. We 
call these risky formulas. 
Note that in some cases, formulas that contain choices whose constraints include agent iden­
tifying conditions are also determinable formulas. An agent identifying condition requires 
a matching of given agent ID with the owner agent’s ID. If there is such a match, then 
the choice is a free choice to the owner agent and the formula is a determinable formula. 
Otherwise, the choice is an indeterminate possibility and the formula is a risky formula. 
It can be seen that these four types of formulas vary in the degree of certainty of their exact 
ﬁnal forms. Moreover, each kind of formulas might be subject to diﬀerent agent strategies 
about choices. Speciﬁcally, determinable formulas and constrained formulas are subject to 
strategies about deciding choices at their exact times or in advance. Note that deciding 
constrained formulas also involves the task of fulﬁlling the constraints. Risky formulas are 
subject to strategies concerning with whether to prepare for all possibilities or to make 
predictions. 
We consider some examples of applying agent choice strategies to these four kinds of 
formulas in the context of goal and base commitment formulas and resource formulas. 
Consider goal and base commitment formulas. To fulﬁll a deﬁnite commitment A⊥, the 
agent needs the resource A. To fulﬁll a determinable commitment such as [�nA � x1]⊥, 
the agent can decide the commitment to be A⊥ or 1⊥ (in eﬀect, ignoring the commitment) 
and hence needs A or 1 respectively. To fulﬁll a constrained or risky commitment such as 
[�nA ⊕x 1]⊥, there is a certain level of uncertainty involved. If the agent is taking risks, it 
can predict the commitment as being A⊥ or 1⊥ and act accordingly. If the agent wants to be 
safe, it must prepare for both cases, which means it can not ignore the commitment of A⊥. 
Resource formulas are similar. While having a deﬁnite resource A is certain, having a 
determinable resource [�nA � x1] means that the agent can freely decide to have the resource 
A or not. A constrained resource [�nA � x1] with some constraints on � x means that the 
agent must satisfy these constraints for A to result. In those cases where conditions can not 
be satisﬁed or involve indeterminate possibilities, constrained resources are treated in the 
same way as risky resources. A risky resource [�nA ⊕x 1] may turn out to be A or 1, which 
means no resource. Hence, taking [�nA ⊕x 1] as A for consideration is a risky strategy. 
Moreover, in the context of agent interaction, in order to deal with formulas from other 
agents, an agent can exercise various strategies depending on the particular kinds of the 
formulas to determine their ﬁnal forms. For example, an agent can take a bold strategy 
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toward a risky resource formula provided by another agent by assuming that the risky formula 
has a particular desirable form (i.e. some of its indeterminate possibilities have desirable 
outcomes). 
Agent choice strategies can be applied at various stages during an interaction, such as 
resolving a commitment internally, sending and receiving a request, sending and receiving a 
proposal, fulﬁlling a proposal’s conditions and carrying out an agreed proposal. Applications 
of these strategies remove choices and hence reduce the formula of concern further toward 
its ﬁnal form where all the decisions on choices are made. 
Furthermore, compound formulas may be arbitrarily complex and contain several choices 
in them. In many cases, the agents are only interested in some parts of the compound 
formulas. However, because the ﬁnal forms of these compound formulas may vary widely, 
the parts of interest may or may not exist in the ﬁnal forms. To facilitate agent decision 
making on strategies to deal with these formulas, we take a “divide and conquer” approach. 
Firstly, a mechanism for splitting up a compound formula into sub-formulas will be 
provided, as discussed in the next chapter. Secondly, given this ability to separate the 
parts (sub-formulas) of interest from the rest, we then allow agents to focus on these parts 
and consider each part together with its retention relationship with the composite formula. 
Moreover, as discussed in Section 5.2.1, whether a sub-formula is retained in a composite 
formula can be regarded as the decision of its representative choice. We will discuss further 
strategies of agents in dealing with representative choices of sub-formulas in Section 6.3. 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have addressed issues regarding modeling decisions of agents on internal 
choices and indeterminate possibilities. A choice calculus that lays a theoretical ground for 
agent reasoning about various strategies on choices was described. Such strategies include 
deciding choices in advance or at their associated times, and taking a safe approach or bold 
approach to indeterminate possibilities. 
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Γ �cc F, Δ [��n �→� L] 
Γ �cc F �nG, Δ Γ �cc G, Δ [�
�n 
�→� R] 
Γ �cc F �nG, Δ 
Γ, F �cc Δ [�⊕n�→� L] 
Γ, F ⊕n G �cc Δ 
Γ, G �cc Δ [�⊕n�→� R] 
Γ, F ⊕n G �cc Δ 
Γ �cc �nF, Δ [� �n(�n�→� L)] 
Γ �cc �n(F �nG), Δ Γ �cc �
nG, Δ [� �n(�n�→� R)] 
Γ �cc �n(F �nG), Δ 
Γ, �nF �cc Δ [� �n(⊕n�→� L)] 
Γ, �n(F ⊕n G) �cc Δ Γ, �
nG �cc Δ [� �n(⊕n�→� R)] 
Γ, �n(F ⊕n G) �cc Δ 
Γ, F �cc Δ [condLn] 
Γ, F �nG �cc Δ Γ, G �cc Δ [condRn] Γ, F �nG �cc Δ 
Γ �cc F, Δ [condLn] 
Γ �cc F ⊕n G, Δ 
Γ �cc G, Δ [condRn] 
Γ �cc F ⊕n G, Δ 
Γ, �nF �cc Δ [condLn] 
Γ, �n(F �nG) �cc Δ Γ, �
nG �cc �nΔ [condRn] 
Γ, �n(F �nG) �cc �nΔ 
Γ �cc �nF, Δ [condLn] 
Γ �cc �n(F ⊕n G), Δ Γ �cc G, �
nΔ [condRn] 
Γ �cc �n(F ⊕n G), Δ 
Table 5.1: New Sequent Rules of the Choice Calculus

Chapter 6

Partial and Concurrent Handling of 
Goals and Resources 
In a distributed environment such as a multi-agent system, an agent is likely to interact with 
several other agents. Often agents achieve one part of their goal in one interaction and other 
parts in other interactions. Accordingly, goals (or commitments) are likely to be worked on 
in a distributed and concurrent manner and similarly for resources and actions. Furthermore, 
the precise allocation of sub-parts to interactions may not be known in advance. It is then 
important to provide a mechanism for agents to dynamically divide compound goals and 
base commitments and compound resources and actions. 
Moreover, there are some desirable properties for this dynamic division. Firstly, the 
fulﬁlled parts of goals or base commitments (or the used part of resources or actions) should 
be removed from consideration, leaving only those unfulﬁlled (respectively unused) intact. 
Secondly, since parts of a compound goal or base commitment (or resource or action) are 
usually interdependent, updating one should inﬂuence the other. Especially in the context 
of choices, some parts may not only co-exist concurrently but also be mutually exclusive and 
subject to the agents’ decisions about choices. Hence, when agents make decisions about 
choices, it is important to ensure that the eﬀects are propagated to all relevant parts. 
We will discuss a suitable fragment of TLL in Section 6.1. Based on this fragment, a 
mechanism to divide formulas of goals or base commitments and resources or actions into 
multiple sub-formulas dynamically is described in Section 6.2. We also describe how the 
model of choices and their dependencies described in Chapter 5 can be used to capture 
dependencies among sub-parts. The relationship between a formula and its constituent parts 
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is further examined in a resource context. How the agents’ decisions about choices eﬀect 
the distribution of a formula is examined in Section 6.3. Applications of the splitting up 
mechanism to agent reasoning about partial handling of goals and base commitments or 
resources and actions, and to distributed concurrent problem solving are discussed in Section 
6.4 and Section 6.5 respectively. 
6.1 Restrictions on the Logic Fragment 
In this section, we discuss constraints on the fragment of TLL used to enable decomposition 
of a formula such that the sub-parts are equivalent to the original in terms of resources. In 
particular, given that the suitable connective for describing the co-existence among sub-parts 
in TLL is multiplicative conjunction ⊗, we consider equivalence between a compound formula 
and a multiplicative conjunction of its sub-parts from the perspective of resources. 
As discussed in Chapter 4 and especially in Section 4.2.1, our model of agent resources or 
actions and goals or base commitments makes use of the TLL connectives ⊗, �, ⊕ (without 
�) and temporal operators �, � and �. The relationships between the formulars in this 
fragment makes the decomposition of a compound formula into an equivalent multiplicative 
conjunction of sub-formulas a non-trivial task. In fact, there are cases where a multiplicative 
conjunction of sub-parts is not logically equivalent to the original formula. For example, 
1. �(A ⊗ B) � �A ⊗ �B 
2. �(A ⊗ B) � �A ⊗ �B 
3. �(A ⊗ B) � �A ⊗ �B 
4. �A ⊗ �B � �(A ⊗ B) 
While the ﬁrst three cases can be worked around (as discussed in Section 6.2.1), cases such 
as the fourth one remain a challenging problem. 
In order to overcome this, we revisit the model of “anytime” and “sometime”. While 
“anytime” refers to a particular time point of choice as decided by the agents, “sometime” 
refers to a time point that is not known and not decided by the agents. As discussed, � and 
� are used to intuitively capture these notions. However, this is not the only approach to 
modeling these notions. Indeed, in the context of discrete time as in TLL, “anytime A” can 
be intuitively interpreted as �xA, where x is a variable whose value is determined by the 
agents (x ≥ 0). “Sometime” A can be interpreted as �nA, where n is an unknown number 
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(n ≥ 0). Hence, the value of x is essentially the outcome of an internal decision by the 
agent, either now or the next time point or the second next time point, etc. The value of n 
is essentially the outcome of an indeterminate possibility, either now or the next time point 
or the second next time point, etc. Such interpretations enable a modeling of “anytime” 
(respectively “sometime”) as an internal choice (respectively indeterminate possibility) in 
time. Logically, such modeling is captured as follows: 
”anytime” A ≈ A � �(A � �(A � . . . ..�A)) 
which means that agents can choose either A now or A at the next time point or A at 
the second next time point, etc. It is an internal choice by the agent. 
”sometime” A ≈ A⊕ �(A⊕ �(A⊕ . . . ..�A)) 
which means that A possibly occurs now or will possibly occur at the next time point or 
at the second next time point, etc. When A occurs is an indeterminate possibility to agents. 
Such modeling of “anytime” and “sometime”, as compared to using � and �, emphasizes 
the operational aspect, i.e. what agents do when it comes to “anytime” and “sometime”. 
The modeling shows more explicitly the choices involved at each time point that agent has to 
deal with as time passes. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 5, agents can exercise various 
strategies in dealing with choices, their dependencies and constraints. Such explicit enumer­
ation on choices of “anytime” and “sometime” enables attachment of choice constraints and 
dependencies on individual choices and hence allows agents to reason about them in a richer 
manner. For example, “anytime A” may be enriched by some conditions as follows: 
”anytime” A ≈ A � 1 � (A � 2 � (A � 3 . . . ..�A)) 
awhere condL � 2 = � ( �� � L), for some choice � a.→ 
The attachment of this condition means that although the agent can have A anytime, at 
the next time point it must decide whether to have A or not consistently with the outcome 
of the choice � a (choosing the same side). 
Another example about “sometime A” is that agents can make predictions on some in­
determinate possibilities. 
� � �� � � 
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Given ”sometime” A ≈ A⊕1 �(A⊕2 �(A⊕3 . . . ..�A)) 
the agent can make a prediction on the choices ⊕2 and ⊕4 that the outcomes are the 
right side, which means A will not result at these times. Hence, “sometime A” is predicted 
as having A sometime, but not at the next time point nor the third next time point. 
Furthermore, as in practice most agent interactions occur within a predictable amount of 
time, it is acceptable to consider agent interactions in a bounded time context. In particular, 
we do not consider operations, resources and events that have inﬁnite time span but within a 
limited time range. Taking this as an assumption, the operating time of an agent interaction 
has a practical limit of T time points ahead, so that all events take place between now and 
T . Under this assumption, the intended meaning of � is “anytime” from now until T and 
respectively � is “sometime” between now and T . Hence, the modeling of “anytime” and 
“sometime” are re-written as: 
A ≈ A � �(A � �(A � . . . ..�A))� � �� � 
T number of �A ≈ A⊕ �(A⊕ �(A⊕ . . . ..�A)) 
T number of 
In addition, if we focus on formulas used for goals, base commitments, resources and 
actions, then the connectives used are ⊗,�,⊕,�,�,� and negation ⊥. Without loss of 
generality, splitting up a negative compound formula can be done with its corresponding 
positive form and followed by a negation. 
Hence, by making the assumption of bounded time for “sometime” and “any time”, the � 
and � operators can be replaced by a combination of the connectives �,⊕ and �. This has 
many advantages over the use of � and � discussed above and also enables the equivalence 
of a formula and a multiplicative conjunction of its split ups, as will be discussed in Section 
6.2.1. 
The logic fragment used for modeling can then be limited to the connectives ⊗,�,⊕ and 
time operator �. The fragment is formally deﬁned below. 
Deﬁnition 9. A formula F belongs to the logic fragment MCA (Multiplicative Conjunction 
Additives) iﬀ it is deﬁned by the following grammar: 
F ::== A (F ⊗ F ) (F � F ) (F ⊕ F )|1|⊥| � F | | |
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where A is an atom. 
We deﬁne a basic TLL formula as one of the form �nA, 0 ≤ n ≤ T . When n = 0, the basic 
TLL formula is simply A. In this fragment, the relationships between basic TLL formulas 
can be concurrently co-existing or be mutually exclusive, corresponding to the connectives 
⊗ or � and ⊕ respectively. 
6.2 Dynamic Division of Formulas 
In this section, we investigate how to turn a compound formula in MCA into its sub-parts. 
For a running example, we follow the example used in Chapter 5. Further to the de­
scription of the original example in Section 5.1, we assume that Peter now has an additional 
goal of having either Chinese or Thai food at the party. Deriving which goal – Chinese food 
(abbreviated as C) or Thai food (abbreviated as T ) – is an internal choice. Also, Peter 
adopts the goal of retaining his CD burner. Peter’s goal is then (CD burner is abbreviated 
as CDB, music is abbreviated as m) 
CDB ⊗ �2[m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T )] 
Note that strictly speaking Peter’s goal should be 
(CDB ⊗ �2[m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T )])⊥ 
However, for ease of discussion, we keep the negation −⊥ implicit by denoting the positive 
form above as a goal formula. 
Peter can provide neither of the food options, but his friend Ming can make Chinese 
food and another friend Chaeng can make Thai food. Hence, the overall goal requires Peter 
to interact with John and David as described in Chapter 5 and also with Ming or Chaeng 
regarding the provision of food. If this goal is sent as a request to any one of them, none 
would be able to fulﬁll the goal in its entirety. Hence, it is important that the goal can be 
split up and achieved partially via concurrent threads of interaction. 
Our approach to splitting up a compound formula into sub-formulas is to determine how 
to extract a basic TLL formula from a compound one. In other words, we look at how to 
turn a compound formula into a multiplicative conjunction of basic TLL formulas, and then 
how to remove a particular basic TLL formula from it. This approach can be extended to 
the general case of splitting up a compound formula w.r.t. an arbitrary sub-formula. Indeed, 
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by treating an arbitrary sub-formula as a single indivisible unit like a basic TLL formula, 
we can apply the same mechanism to separate the sub-formula from the rest of the formula. 
Hence, for simplicity of discussion and without losing generality, we focus on the case when 
the sub-formula is a basic TLL formula. 
A basic TLL formula A which is a sub-formula of a compound formula Γ may or may 
not be retained in Γ after all the outcomes of choices in Γ are determined. Hence, when we 
separate A from Γ, it is important to transform the retention relationship of A with Γ into 
the split up that contains A. 
Let Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA that contains A. We split up Γ into A, which 
contains A, and �Γ − A, which is the remainder.

The intuition behind �
Γ − A is that it is the formula Γ having undergone a single removal 
or substitution of the occurrence of A by 1 while the rest is kept unchanged. Speciﬁcally, 
Γ − A no longer contains the A but it still keeps all the choices that are related to the 
retention of A in Γ. In its place in the structure of Γ, if the immediate connective of A or �nA (for some n) refers to a choice then A is replaced by 1, whose occurrence in a context 
of multiplicative conjunction does not matter. 1 is used for technical reasons in order to 
retain the structure of the choice. Otherwise, if the immediate connective of A or �nA is 
a multiplicative conjunction, then A or �nA is removed. All other choices related to A are 
kept. 
In the example, let Γ = CDB ⊗ �2[m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T )]. The structure of Γ is depicted in 
Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1: Structure of Γ 
Γ − C is obtained by replacing C in the structure of Γ by 1, as in Figure 6.2. 
In general, �Γ − A is formed by performing one substitution in Γ at the point where A is 
in Γ. The substitution is deﬁned as below. 
Deﬁnition 10. (Immediate Sub-formula) 
�� ��
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Figure 6.2: Structure of �Γ − C 
Let Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA (deﬁnition 9) and A be a sub-formula of Γ. A 
formula S is called the immediate sub-formula in Γ that contains A iﬀ S is a sub-formula of 
Γ and S is formed by the grammar: 
S ::=== �A A ⊗ Δ A ⊕ Δ A � Δ| | | | � S 
where Δ is a sub-formula of Γ. 
Deﬁnition 11. ( �Γ − A) 
Let Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA (deﬁnition 9) and A be a sub-formula of Γ. Let S 
be the immediate sub-formula in Γ that contains A. Let �→ denote a substitution of formulas. 
Γ − A is deﬁned as follows according to the possible structures of S. 
• case S = A: then A �→ 1 
• case S = �A: then S �→ �1 
• case S = �xA ⊗ Δ: then S �→ Δ 
• case S = �xA Δ: then S �→ �x1 ⊕m Δ⊕m 
• case S = �xA Δ: then S �→ �n1 �n Δ�n 
where n, m are some numbers representing IDs of choices and Δ is a sub-formula in Γ. 
In other words, �Γ − A results from Γ by replacing the occurrence of A by 1 and then 
applying the equivalence 1 ⊗ Δ ≡ Δ, so that �xA ⊗ Δ �→ Δ where the substitution takes 
place in Γ. 
The intuition behind the formulation of A is that A not only represents A but also 
captures how A is retained in A the same way as in Γ. Speciﬁcally, the choices in Γ and 
�� �
� �
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the sequence of their decisions that make A retained in Γ also make A retained in A and 
vice versa. Hence, A should contain all the choices related to A in Γ organized in a similar 
structure. Also, if A is not retained in Γ, then formula A should reﬂect this, i.e. the neutral 
element 1. 
We look closely at how A is constructed by reconsidering the formulation of Γ − A. 
Rather than substituting A or �nA (for some n) as one side of a choice by 1, we keep it 
and substituting the other side by 1. Rather than removing A or �nA as one side of a 
multiplicative conjunction, we remove the other side. Regarding the rest of the formula, � Γ − A in that all the sides of choices that do not contain A areA should be diﬀerent to �
represented by 1 and all the sides of a multiplicative conjunction that do not contain A are 
removed. This makes A become �m1 (for some m) when A is not retained from Γ. As an 
example, we consider how �C is formed from Γ = CDB ⊗ �2[m⊗ (C ⊕3 T )] in ﬁgure 6.3. 
Figure 6.3: Structure of �C 
Moreover, after determining all the outcomes of choices in A, A should become either �nA or �m1, for some number n, m. Hence, the formula of A has the following grammar 
F ::== A 1 (F � F ) (F ⊕ F )| | � F | |
Note that the grammar above is diﬀerent from the grammar of the fragment MCA in 
that ⊥ and ⊗ do not occur. 
We then deﬁne A by ﬁrstly deﬁning how A is obtained in the splitting up of Γ. 
Deﬁnition 12. (SPLITUP(Γ, A))

Let Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA, and A be a sub-formula in Γ. Where appropriate,

let Γ� and Δ be sub-formulas of Γ that contains and does not contain A respectively.

SPLITUP(Γ, A) is deﬁned recursively as a transformation process on Γ according to the 
structure of Γ as follows. 
• if Γ = A, then SPLITUP(Γ, A)= A 
�
�
�
�
�
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• if Γ = �Γ�, then SPLITUP(Γ, A) = � SPLITUP(Γ�, A) 
• if Γ = Γ� ⊗ Δ, then SPLITUP(Γ, A) = SPLITUP(Γ�, A) 
• if Γ = Γ� �n Δ, then SPLITUP(Γ, A) = SPLITUP(Γ�, A) �n 1 
• if Γ = Γ� ⊕m Δ, then SPLITUP(Γ, A) = SPLITUP(Γ�, A) ⊕m 1 
where n,m are some numbers representing IDs of choices. 
The deﬁnition of A is then straightforward. 
Deﬁnition 13. ( �A ) 
Let Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA, and A be a sub-formula in Γ. A is deﬁned as the 
outcome of the transformation process SPLITUP(Γ, A). 
A = SPLITUP(Γ, A) 
Another view is that A is obtained by recursively replacing formulas that rest on the 
other side of connective (to the formula that contains A) by 1 if the connective is ⊕ or � 
and remove the formulas if the connective is ⊗. 
Returning to our running example, we consider how Peter’s goal formula G = CDB ⊗ 
2[m⊗ (C ⊕3 T )] can be split up. As we want the subgoal C to be attempted by Ming, we 
split the goal with respect to C: 
[G− C] = CDB ⊗ �2[m⊗ (1 ⊕4 T )] and 
C = 2(C ⊕5 1). 
Furthermore, the sub-goal T should also be separated for an interaction with Chaeng. 
Subsequently, �G− C is split into: 
T (of �� G− C) is �2(1 ⊕6 T ). 
2and [G−�C − T ] = CDB ⊗ � m. 
The choices ⊕4, ⊕5 and ⊕6 will then be determined as the same. 
��� �
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It can be seen from the deﬁnitions of �Γ − A and A that choices that are related to the 
A and retained in �retention of A in Γ are copied to � Γ − A. Indeed, outcomes of these choices 
in the two split ups must be consistent. Hence, decisions made on these choices in one split 
up must also be followed in the other. In other words, the sequence of decisions that would � Γ − A.apply to these choices in Γ now applies to the choices in both A and �
We consider in detail such dependencies on choices in � Γ − A that are related to the A and �
retention of A in Γ for one of the cases. Assume that �Γ − A is obtained from Γ by replacing 
in Γ the sub-formula A �n Δ by 1 �n Δ. From the deﬁnition of A, the choice �n (assumed 
as internal choice) is also present in A as A �n 1 . Hence, if the choice �n is made in A to � Γ − A has the be left chosen for A to be retained in A then as a result, the choice 1 �n Δ in �
outcome of being left chosen and Δ is not retained in �Γ − A. This correspondence ensures 
that A and Δ are still mutually exclusive even they are in two separate formulas. Similarly, 
if the choice 1 �n Δ in � Γ − A thenΓ − A is right chosen, which means that Δ is retained in �
decision on the choice A �n 1 in A must follow (choosing the right side). Moreover, instead 
of an internal choice �n, if the case is an indeterminate possibility ⊕n and it turns out that 
A is retained in A then the external choice 1 ⊕ Δ in �� Γ − A also has the outcome that Δ is 
not retained in �Γ − A and vice versa. 
A summary on the inter-dependencies between outcomes of related choices in the split 
ups is in Table 6.1. The leftmost column describes the cases of the substitutions in Γ that 
lead to �Γ − A. Other cases of substitutions do not directly involve a choice and hence are 
not listed. The two middle columns describe the corresponding choices in the two split ups. 
The rightmost column shows outcomes of the choice and what is retained from these choices 
in �Γ − A and A respectively. 
Γ � �Γ − A �A Result 
A �1 Δ � 1 �1 Δ A �1 1 �1�→ = L; 1 ; A 
A �1 Δ � 1 �1 Δ A �1 1 �1�→ = R; Δ; 1 
A ⊕2 Δ � 1 ⊕2 Δ A ⊕2 1 ⊕2 �→ = L; 1; A 
A ⊕2 Δ � 1 ⊕2 Δ A ⊕2 1 ⊕2 � = R; Δ; 1 → 
Table 6.1: Summary of Inter-dependencies on choices among split ups 
Referring to our running example, between the split ups, consistency in the corresponding 
choices must be maintained. In particular, the choices ⊕4 and ⊕5 must share the same out­
comes with the choice ⊕3. Moreover, the outcome of the choice ⊕6 must also be the same as 
�� �
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that of the choice ⊕5 and hence the same as that of ⊕3. More precisely, the split ups are then 
[G − C] = CDB ⊗ �2[m ⊗ (1 ⊕3 T )], 
C = 2(C ⊕3 1), 
T (of �� G − C) = �2(1 ⊕3 T ), and 
2[G −�C − T ] = CDB ⊗ � m. 
6.2.1 Equivalence between a Formula and Its Split Ups 
Given such a mechanism to split up a compound formula into sub-formulas and maintain 
the consistency between related choices, it is then important to establish the relationship 
between the formula and its split ups. In particular, we establish formal results for 
all the split up formulas ≈ original formula. 
The following theorem demonstrates that the two split ups can derive the original formula 
in the choice calculus. 
Theorem 6.2.1. Let Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA that contains A. Let Γ be split � Γ − A w.r.t. A, where A contains A and �up into A and � � Γ − A is the remainder. Then 
A, �� Γ − A �cc Γ

Proof:: the proof is by induction on the size of Γ.

Base step: Γ = A. We need to prove A, 1 � A, which is obvious. 
Induction step: 
Assume the hypothesis is true for Γ of size n, denoted as Γn . 
� nAn , [Γn� ] �cc Γn .− A
We need to prove that this holds for Γ of size n + 1, denoted as Γn+1.

In the fragment of consideration, given Γn has size n, possible structures for Γn+1 of size

n + 1 are:

� �� �
� �
��
�
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�
��
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�xΓn, Γn ⊗ B, Γn �1 B and, Γn ⊕2 B. 
An+1Note that for the ﬁrst case, � = 
An+1two cases � =
 An+1An �1 1 and � A
n+1An, for the second case, � = An and for the last �x 
An ⊕2 1 respectively. =

We will consider each case of the structure of Γn+1. In each case, we will reduce the (n+1) 
case to the hypothesis of n case by providing the relevant proof steps. Note that when an 
inference rule is labeled with [n], it means several applications of the rule. 
Case: Γn+1 = �xΓn . 
[Γn�− A An [Γn�− AAn 
Γn . It is straightforward to show that 
We need to prove �x ]n �cc �xΓn based on the hypothesis ], �x n �cc, 
n[Γn� ] �cc Γn− AAn 
An , �x , n �n[Γn� ] �cc �xΓn− A�x 
Other cases for Γn+1 are proved similarly. 
Case: Γn+1 = Γn ⊗ B. 
An [Γn�− AWe need to prove
 n] ⊗ B �cc Γn ⊗ B. This is straightforward, as follows. ,

nAn [Γn� ] �cc Γn− A B �cc B, ⊗R 
n ΓnAn [Γn� ] ⊗ B �cc− A ⊗ B, 
Case: Γn+1 = Γn �1 B. 
[Γn�− AAn 
whose conditions for being left chosen and right chosen are condL1 and condR1 respectively. 
We have 
We need to prove �1 1, n] �1 B �cc Γn �1 B. �1 corresponds to an internal choice 
[Γn� ]n �cc Γn [condL1]− AAn 
n ΓnAn �1 1, [Γn� ] �1 B �cc− A
, �1 �1 B 
B � B [condR1] 
1L 
B, 1 � B [condR1] 
nAn �1 1, [Γn� ] �1 B �cc Γn �1 B �1 − A
All the cases of the outcome of the internal choice that corresponds to �1 are proved. 
Case: Γn+1 = Γn ⊕2 B. 
�
��
�
� � 
�
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An ⊕2 1, [Γn�− AWe need to prove
 n] ⊕2 B �cc Γn ⊕2 B (⊕2 is an indeterminate possibility). 
We have 
n[Γn� ] �cc Γn [⊕2 ]− A �→� LAn 
n ΓnAn ⊕2 1, [Γn� ] ⊕2 B �cc− A
, ⊕2 
⊕2 B 
or 
B �cc B [⊕2 ]�→� R
1L 
1, B �cc B [⊕2 ]�→� R ⊕2 
n ΓnAn ⊕2 1, [Γn� ] ⊕2 B �cc− A ⊕2 B 
All the cases of the outcome of the indeterminate possibility that corresponds to ⊕2 are 
proved. 
Hence, for all the cases of Γn+1, we can establish that 
An+1 , [Γn+1 − A]n+1 �cc Γn+1 
By induction, we can conclude A, � �Γ − A � Γ. 
We now come to see if a multiplicative conjunction of the split ups ( � Γ − A) is derivative A⊗ �
from the original formula Γ. Speciﬁcally, we need to determine if the sequent: 
Γ � � Γ − AA ⊗ �
holds in the choice calculus. �A and �Γ − A =A = 
for this case as 
�(A ⊗ B) �cc �A ⊗ �B. 
Hence, we need to determine a weaker derivative property from Γ to its split ups. We 
ﬁrstly deﬁne other forms of the split ups. 
Consider Γ = �(A ⊗ B). Then
 The sequent does not hold �B. 
� )⊥ADeﬁnition 14. (

� is deﬁned as the result of replacing the single copy ⊥A ALet Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA (deﬁnition 9) and A be a sub-formula of Γ. Let
be a split of Γ that contains A. Then 
of A in A by A⊥. 
� �
� 
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Deﬁnition 15. (∗�Γ − A)

Let Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA (deﬁnition 9) and A be a sub-formula of Γ. Let

Γ − A be a split of of Γ that does not contain A. Then ∗�Γ − A is deﬁned as �
� Γ − A except

that where A is replaced by 1 in �
Γ − A, it is replaced by ⊥ instead. 
We have the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.2.2. Let Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA that contains A. Let Γ be split 
up into A and �Γ − A w.r.t. A, where A contains A and �Γ − A is the remainder. Then 
Γ,
�⊥A �cc ∗�Γ − A. 
The theorem means that using (a multiplicative conjunction of) Γ and 
∗�Γ − A. 
Proof: by induction on the size of Γ. 
Base step: Γ = A. 
We need to prove A ⊗ A⊥ �cc ⊥ which trivially holds. 
Induction step: 
Assume the hypothesis is true for Γ of size n, denoted as Γn, so that 
� nΓn , (�A⊥)n �cc ∗[Γn − A] . 
We need to prove for the case of Γ of size n + 1, denoted as Γn+1 . 
Possible structures of Γn+1 of size n + 1 are 
�xΓn, Γn ⊗ B, Γn �1 B, and Γn ⊕2 B. 
� , we can derive ⊥A
Note that for the ﬁrst case, (A�⊥)n+1 = �x(�A⊥)n, for the second case, (A�⊥)n+1 = (�A⊥)n and 
for the last two cases, (A�⊥)n+1 = (�A⊥)n �1 1 and (A�⊥)n+1 = (�A⊥)n ⊕2 1 respectively. 
We will consider each case of the structure of Γn+1. In each case, we will reduce the (n+1) 
case to the hypothesis of n case by providing the relevant proof steps. 
Case: Γn+1 = �xΓn . 
We need to prove �xΓn , �x(�A⊥)n �cc �x∗[Γn − A]n based on the hypothesis Γn , (�A⊥)n �cc 
∗[Γn − A� ]n. This is straightforward, as below. 
� 
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� nΓn , (�A⊥)n �cc ∗[Γn − A]
� n�xΓn , �x(�A⊥)n �cc �x∗[Γn − A] n � 
Other cases of the structure of Γn+1 are proved similarly.

Case: Γn+1 = Γn ⊗ B.

We need to prove Γn ⊗ B, (�A⊥)n �cc ∗[Γn − A]n ⊗ B. This is straightforward, as below. 
� nΓn , (�A⊥)n �cc ∗[Γn − A] B �cc B 
� nΓn ⊗ B, (�A⊥)n �cc ∗[Γn − A] ⊗ B 
⊗L 
Case: Γn+1 = Γn �1 B. 
� nWe need to prove Γn �1 B, (�A⊥)n �1 1 �cc ∗[Γn − A] �1 B. �1 corresponds to an 
internal choice whose conditions for being left chosen and right chosen are condL1 and condR1 
respectively. We have 
Γn , (�A⊥)n �cc ∗[Γn − A]� n [condL1] 
� nΓn �1 B, (�A⊥)n �1 1 �cc ∗[Γn − A] �1 B �1 
or 
B � B [condR1] 
1L 
B, 1 � B [condR1] 
� nΓn �1 B, (�A⊥)n �1 1 �cc ∗[Γn − A] �1 B �1 
All the cases of the outcome of the internal choice that corresponds to �1 are proved.

Case: Γn+1 = Γn ⊕2 B.

We need to prove Γn ⊕2 B, (�A⊥)n ⊕2 1 �cc ∗[Γn − A]
� n ⊕2 B (⊕2 is an indeterminate 
possibility). This is straightforward as below 
� n [
⊕2 ]Γn , (�A⊥)n �cc ∗[Γn − A] �→� L ⊕2
� nΓn ⊕2 B, (�A⊥)n ⊕2 1 �cc ∗[Γn − A] ⊕2 B 
or 
B �cc B [⊕2 ]�→� R
1L 
B, 1 �cc B [⊕2 ]�→� R
� ]n ⊕2 B 
⊕2 
Γn ⊕2 B, (�A⊥)n ⊕2 1 �cc ∗[Γn − A
�� 
�
�
�
� � �
�
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All the cases of the outcome of the indeterminate possibility that corresponds to ⊕2 are 
proved. 
Hence, for all the cases of Γn+1, we can establish that 
� n+1Γn+1 , (A�⊥)n+1 cc ∗[Γn+1 −A]
By induction, we can conclude Γ, �⊥A �cc ∗�Γ −A 
The result below then follows immediately. 
Corollary 6.2.3. Γ, A ��⊥A , cc A.∗�Γ −A ⊗ �
A in a resource conscious context. As they have 
the same structure except where A occurs in �A, A⊥ occurs in 
� �⊥A ⊗We further consider simplifying
 �⊥A . This also means that after
� can be either and respectively or 1⊥n n m⊥A A A� � �all choices are determined,
A and 
for some n, m ≥ 0. 
Consider the case where they become �nA and �nA⊥. We have �nA ⊗� nA⊥ � ⊥ 
but also �nA ⊗�nA⊥ � ⊥ because: 
A � A �nA �� nA � →� �nA � ⊥, � nA ⊥R �nA, �nA⊥ � ⊥ ⊗L �nA ⊗�nA⊥ � ⊥ 
which means that �nA⊥ can also be matched with �nA to produce ⊥. Hence, in our 
� also⊥Amodeling context, while �
nA is regarded as what is provided, �nA⊥ can be regarded as 
what is required, in the same way as � nA⊥. More generally, in this case, A and 
have similar dual relationship as described in the following theorem.

Theorem 6.2.4. Let Γ be a formula in the fragment MCA, and A be a sub-formula of Γ.

Let
A be a split up of Γ that contains A and 
structure of A by A⊥. 
� be the result of replacing the exact in the ⊥A A 
If A and A⊥ are chosen in all the choices in A and � respectively, ⊥A
then the sequent

is provable in TLL.

�⊥A �A ⊗ 
��
���
� � �
�
�
� � �� � � � 
� � 
�
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Note that the theorem holds under standard TLL sequent calculus. 
Proof: by induction on the length of A. 
We have �A ⊗ � is , which is an axiom. ⊥⊥A A A� ⊗ �Base step:
A = A, hence 
Induction step: 
�⊥A = A⊥. 
A of length n. 
� holds if A and A⊥ are chosen in all the choices in 
We assume that the hypothesis is true for the case of

An (�A⊥)nHypothesis: the sequent
 ⊗ 
An and (�A⊥)n respectively. 
For the case (n+1), possible structures of �An+1 are 
An An�n �1 1 and An ⊕2 1., 
In the last two cases of �An+1, one more choice is introduced as compared to An

Correspondingly, possible structures of (A�⊥)n+1 are

�n(�A⊥)n, (�A⊥)n �1 1 and (�A⊥)n ⊕2 1.

An+1
We need to prove that � ⊗ (A�⊥)n+1 � holds when A and A⊥ are chosen in all the 
choices in �An+1 and (A�⊥)n+1 respectively. 
. 
An+1Case � (A�⊥)n+1 = �n(�A⊥)n= �nAn: then also . 
(�A⊥)nAn 
(�A⊥)n � [ 
� 
⊥ −
⊥L 
An
, 
]
⊥ 
�L �n(�A⊥)n � � n[An
, �n(�A⊥)n ] −⊥R An 
An ⊗ �n(�A⊥)n �
n 
⊗L �n 
An+1 ⊗ (A�⊥)n+1 
An+1Case � (A�⊥)n+1 = (�A⊥)nAn 
nal choice whose conditions for being left chosen and right chosen are condL1 and condR1 
respectively. Note that for A and A⊥ to be chosen, �1 must be left chosen, i.e. [condL1] 
holds. 
�1 1: then also �1 1. �1 corresponds to an inter­=

���
� � 
�
���
� � 
��� �
�
�
� �
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An (�A⊥)n � [condL1], �1 
(�A⊥)nAn 
An �1 1] ⊗ [ 
[ �1 1], [ �1 1] � ⊗L 
(�A⊥)n �1 1] �[

An+1 ⊗ (A�⊥)n+1 
(A�⊥)n+1 = (�A⊥)nAn+1Case � An 
bility). Note that for A and A⊥ to be chosen, the outcome of ⊕2 must be left chosen, i.e. 
⊕2[�→� L]. 
⊕2 1: then also ⊕2 1 (⊕2 is an indeterminate possi­= 
[
⊕2 ](�A⊥)n � �→� LAn 
An ⊕2 1], [ 
, ⊕2L 
(�A⊥)n ⊕2 1] �[ ⊗L 
(�A⊥)nAn 
An+1 ⊗ (A�⊥)n+1 
Hence, by induction, the theorem is proved. � 
[ ⊕2 1] ⊗ [ ⊕2 1] � 
�⊥A �. � becomes 1 1 for some 0. In other words, the concurrent presence of m m⊥A � ⊗ � ≥m A ⊗ A ⊗ 
A and � together does not produce anything in terms of resources and actions. ⊥A
Hence, when A and A⊥ are chosen in all the choices, we have Otherwise, 
(Corollary 6.2.3). A � does not produce anything in terms of resources and actions, the resources ⊥A
∗�Γ − A ⊗ ��⊥A �ccA,We consider further in the context of a sequent Γ,

Given that, �A⊗ 
are essentially Γ. In other words, the concurrent A � acts like a catalyst and can be ignored in terms of resource or action ⊥Aand actions required to produce 
∗�Γ − A ⊗ �
A andpresence of 
requirements. Hence, in terms of resources and actions requirements, the sequent

Γ, �⊥A �ccA, A∗�Γ − A ⊗ �
is essentially 
Γ �cc ∗�Γ − A ⊗ �A. 
Consider our running example. The goal of Peter (Γ) is split up w.r.t. C to yield 
C = 2(C ⊕3 1), 
[G − C] = CDB ⊗ �2[m ⊗ (1 ⊕3 T )] 
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C, �We then have the property � G − C �cc G holds: 
C �cc C [⊕3 ]�→� R
1L 
C, 1 �cc C [⊕3 ]�→� L
C ⊕3 1, 1 ⊕3 T �cc (C ⊕3 T ) m �cc m 
⊕3 
C ⊕3 1, m, 1 ⊕3 T �cc m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T ) ⊗R 
C ⊕3 1, m ⊗ (1 ⊕3 T ) �cc m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T ) ⊗L �2(C ⊕3 1), �2[m ⊗ (1 ⊕3 T )] �cc 2[m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T )] CDB �cc CDB � �2(C ⊕3 1), CDB,�2[m ⊗ (1 ⊕3 T )] �cc CDB ⊗ �2[m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T )] ⊗R �2(C ⊕3 1), CDB ⊗ �2[m ⊗ (1 ⊕3 T )] �cc CDB ⊗ �2[m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T )] ⊗L 
C, �� G − C �cc G 
or at the choice ⊕3, another prediction is made 
T �cc T [⊕3 ]�→� L
1L 
1, T �cc T [⊕3 ]�→� R
C ⊕3 1, 1 ⊕3 T �cc (C ⊕3 T ) 
⊕3 
... 
C, � �The reverse direction G, � C⊥ �cc C ⊗ ∗G�− C also holds. 
[
⊕3

�→� L]

C, C⊥ �cc [⊕3 ⊥ �→� L] 
3

C ⊕3 T, C⊥ ⊕3 1 �cc 1 ⊕3 T 
⊕
m �cc m

m, (C ⊕3 T ), C⊥ ⊕3 1 �cc 3 T ) 
⊗R 
m ⊗ (⊥⊕

m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T ), C⊥ ⊕3 1 �cc
m ⊗ (⊥⊕3 T ) 
⊗L 
2 2� [m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T )], �2(C⊥ ⊕3 1) �cc � [m ⊗ (⊥⊕3 T )] � CDB �cc CDB 
2CDB, �2[m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T )], � (C⊥ ⊕3 1) �cc CDB ⊗�2 3 T )] ⊗R [m ⊗ (⊥⊕

CDB ⊗�2[m ⊗ (C ⊕3 T )], �2(C⊥ ⊕3 1) �cc CDB ⊗�2[m ⊗ (⊥⊕3 T )] ⊗L

G, � � CC⊥ �cc ∗�G − C C �cc �
C, � �G, � C⊥ �cc C ⊗ ∗�G − C ⊗L 
or at the choice ⊕3, another prediction is made 
[
⊕3 ]�→� R
T, 1 �cc T [⊕3 ]�→� R
C ⊕3 T,C⊥ ⊕3 1 �cc 
... 
⊥ ⊕3 T 
⊕3 
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�
�� � �
�
�
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6.3 Dealing with Choices in A 
From the deﬁnition of �A, A is eventually A or 1 at some time point, after all the outcomes of 
choices are revealed. Whether A is retained or not from �A depends on the sequence of choice 
decisions which may be complex as the structure of A can contain an arbitrary number of 
choices nested in time. To facilitate agent decision making on the outcome of �A (A is retained 
or not), it is convenient to compress all the choices in A as a single choice to be made. In 
particular, the agent decides A to be retained (or not) in a single choice and follows the 
consequences of such decision. If choices are spread in time, this also corresponds to the 
strategy of deciding choices in advance. 
Indeed, the notion of representative choice allows to compress all the choices in A into 
one representative choice and specify as its constraints the sequence of decisions on these 
choices in A. 
Consider the example of a formula being split up w.r.t. A as below 
G = �a(A ⊕1 B) �2 �bC 
A = �a(A ⊕1 1) �2 �b1. 
Eventually, �A can be either �aA or �b1 or �a1 depending the outcomes of choices. The 
sequence of decisions on choices to retain A is captured as 
(
�2 
� � L).�→� L) ⊗ �a(⊕1 →
A representative choice of A is expressed as �aA �r �y 1, where y = b or y = a and 
determining conditions for �r are: 
CondLr =� (�2 � � L)�→� L) ⊗ �a(⊕1 →
It can be seen that A is retained from A if and only if the representative choice of A in 
A is left chosen. Also, the outcome of A after all the choices in A are determined is also the 
outcome of this representative choice. Formally, we have the following result. 
Theorem 6.3.1. Let Γ be a formula in the MCA fragment and A be its split up w.r.t. A in 
Γ. We have 
A �cc�cc �aA �r �b1 
��
� ��
� �
�
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where �r is a representative choice of A in Γ, a indicates the corresponding time of the 
existence of A, and b is an appropriate time depending on the outcomes of choices in A. 
This theorem can also be viewed as ﬂattening the structure of A. 
Proof: we establish that �r is also a representative choice of A in A and given so, we 
prove the theorem by induction on the structure of A as described in Section A.1. � 
Applying the above theorem to our running example, we obtain the results: 
C = 2(C ⊕3 1) �cc�cc �2C �rc �21, 
where CondLrc = 2(�
⊕3 � L).� � →
T� = 2(1 ⊕3 T ) �cc�cc �21 �rt �2T 
where CondLrt = 2(�
⊕3 � L).� � →
where �rc, �rt are the representative choices of C and T in the goal of Peter respectively. 
Note that �rc and �rt are at the same time and have the same determining conditions, hence �rc is the same as �rt. 
2Apply this result, Peter can turn his goal into concurrent sub-goals CDB ⊗ � m ⊗ 
(�2C ⊕4 �21) ⊗ (�21 ⊕4 �2T ), where the decision on ⊕4 now is the same as that of ⊕3 
2at the next two days. Therefore, agent Peter can achieve the two sub-goals CDB ⊗ � m as 
discussed in Chapter 5 and sends the subgoal (�2C �rc �21) as a request to Ming and the 
subgoal (�21 �rt �2T ) as a request to Chaeng. 
If Ming makes Chinese food, then �2C [�rc ] is derived. As the choice �rc is left �→� L
chosen, the other subgoal (�21 �rc �2T ) becomes �21, which is also readily achievable. If �rc Ming does not make Chinese food, there is a proof of �21, where [ �→� R]. This decision on 
the choice �rc (choosing right) makes the subgoal (�21 �rt �2T ) becomes �2T . Thus if all 
the subgoals are successful, this mechanism ensures that only one kind of food is made. 
Hence, such splitting up of formulas allows Peter to concurrently and partially achieve 
his goal via diﬀerent threads of interaction. 
� � �
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6.4 Reasoning about Splitting Up 
In proof search based reasoning, reasoning is carried out by utilizing inference rules. To 
provide reasoning about splitting up goals or base commitments and resources or actions, we 
introduce inference rules that enable the splitting up. Speciﬁcally, the two theorems on the 
split ups 
Γ,
�⊥A �cc ∗�Γ − A or Γ �cc � �⊥A ∗�Γ − A and 
� A �cc ΓΓ − A ⊗ �
give rise to inference rules on splitting up as below. 
Let �Γ − A and AΓ denote the split ups of Γ. Let � be a formula resulted from replacing in⊥A AΓ AΔ and 
�Δ − A denote the split ups of 
Δ. Let AΓ 
(reading bottom up), such inference rules include the following 
Splitting up a goal or base commitment formula: 
� AΔΓ �cc Δ − A ⊗ �
Γ �cc Δ 
Combining split ups of a goal or base commitment formula: 
Γ �cc 
Γ �cc Δ 
�AΔ⊥ � ∗Δ�− A 
Γ �cc 
Γ, �AΔ⊥ �cc 
Δ 
∗Δ�− A 
Splitting up a resource or action formula: 
by A⊥. In terms of reasoning 
Π, ∗�Γ − A �cc Δ� �⊥AΓ ∗�Γ − A �cc 
Π, Γ �cc Δ 
Π,
 Δ 
Π, Γ, �⊥A �Γ cc Δ 
Combining split ups of a resource or action formula: 
Π, Γ �cc Δ 
Π, Γ − A, �� AΓ �cc Δ 
Given that an appropriate implementation of these inference rules is in place, these rules 
equip agents with a proof search technique that extracts pairs of corresponding parts in the 
antecedent and succedent of a sequent. This can also be viewed as partial handling, which 
� �
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is useful in a distributed and concurrent environment, as further discussed in Section 6.5. 
Moreover, because the theorems hold w.r.t. choice calculus, it is straightforward that these 
inference rules are sound in the choice calculus. 
6.5 Distributed Concurrent Problem Solving 
If we take the paradigm that problem solving is done via interaction among agents, then it is 
natural to explore distributed concurrent problem solving where goals or commitments and 
the resources or actions to fulﬁll them are distributed among concurrent interactions. 
The theorems on splitting up formulas support such interactions at several levels. 
Firstly, as mentioned, the theorems are applicable to splitting up an arbitrary sub-
formula. Also, from their deﬁnitions, it is quite possible that the split up parts can be 
constructed without requiring prior speciﬁcation on the number and forms of sub-parts but 
in an automated manner by agents. Hence, the division of a formula can be determined 
by agents in accordance with the situation. In other words, the division of formulas can be 
dynamic and an autonomous act by agents. 
Secondly, partial and concurrent achievement of goals is enabled among interactions. 
Particularly, a goal (or a base commitment) Δ is applicable to an interaction where a part 
A) can be fulﬁlled. Δ is then split up into A and � A can be fulﬁlled by of it ( � � Δ − A in which �
the interaction and hence removed and �Δ − A is what remains of the partially achieved goal 
A, B, C...) and these sub-parts Δ. Similarly, a goal can be split up into several sub-parts ( � � �
can be concurrently explored in diﬀerent interactions. Because the split ups are deﬁned with 
dependencies among them, the eﬀects of handling one part are reﬂected in the handling of 
others. When all sub-parts are concurrently or sequentially achieved, the original goal is 
fulﬁlled. This is formalized in the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.5.1. (Splitting up Goals or Base commitments)

Let Δ be a goal or base commitment. Let � Δ − A be split ups of Δ w.r.t. a sub-formula
AΔ and �
A in Δ. We say Δ is fulﬁlled by resources or actions Γ if Γ � Δ. 
Then Δ is fulﬁlled if the two goals or base commitments AΔ and �� Δ − A are fulﬁlled and the 
fulﬁllment of Δ uses the same set of resources or actions. 
Proof : based on the inference rules introduced in Section 6.4, the proof is straightfor­
ward. 
Let Π and Ξ be resources/actions that fulﬁll � Δ − A respectively. In sequent form, AΔ and �
we have Π �cc AΔ and Ξ �cc Δ − A. Then 
� �
� �
� �
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Π �cc Ξ �cc Δ − AAΔ 
� AΔΠ, Ξ �cc Δ − A ⊗ �
Π, Ξ �cc Δ 
⊗R

which means that the resources/actions required to fulﬁll Δ are Π and Ξ. �

Similarly, resources and actions can be partially and concurrently utilized among interac­

tions. In an interaction, a resource or action Γ can be split up into �Γ − A and A of which A 
can be utilized in an interaction of concern and subsequently removed. Split up parts can be 
utilized concurrently in diﬀerent interactions with dependencies among them being captured 
and respected in their handling. The original resource or action Γ is (fully) utilized when all 
of its sub-parts are utilized. This also is formalized in the following theorem. 
Theorem 6.5.2. (Splitting up Resources or Actions) 
∗�Γ − A be split ups of Γ w.r.t. a sub-formula A inAΓ and � be the result of replacing in⊥A AΓLet Γ be a resource or action. Let
 AΓ 
]⊥ and 
Γ. Let by A⊥. We say Γ fulﬁlls Δ if Γ � Δ. �⊥AΓ ∗�Γ − A fulﬁll a combination of goals or base Then if the resources or actions [ 
commitments then Γ also fulﬁlls that combination. 
Proof :

Due to the duality between goals or base commitments and resources or actions, the dual

of
 � is⊥AΓ [
�⊥AΓ ]⊥ and can be regarded as a resource or action. In fact, after having all the �⊥AΓ ]⊥ becomes either �nA orrelated choices decided and by applying De Morgan’s rules, [ �m1 for some n, m and hence represents resources or actions. 
Let Ξ and Δ be goals or base commitments that are fulﬁlled by [
�⊥AΓ ]⊥ and ∗�Γ − A �⊥AΓ ]⊥ �cc Ξ and ∗�Γ − A �ccrespectively. In sequent form, we have [
 Δ. Then based on the 
inference rules introduced in Section 6.4, we have 
�⊥AΓ ]⊥ �cc Ξ[ −⊥R�⊥AΓΞ⊥, [ ]⊥ �cc −⊥L 
∗�Γ − A �cc �⊥AΓΞ⊥ �cc Δ � L � �⊥AΓ ∗�Γ − A, Ξ⊥ �cc Δ 
Γ, Ξ⊥ �cc Δ 
which means that Γ can fulﬁll the goals/base commitments Ξ⊥ and Δ. � 
� �
� 
� �
�
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Given that goals or base commitments and resources or actions can be handled indepen­
dently, these parts can be put in concurrent interactions. This means that the handling can 
be done in a distributed and concurrent manner. With a proper implementation, agents are 
enabled to explore each other’s resources or actions and achieve their goals dynamically and 
ﬂexibly in a distributed manner among concurrent interactions. 
As an application, we revisit our interaction model regarding how agents consider a 
proposal relevant as discussed in Section 4.3.7. Speciﬁcally, agents can apply the following 
strategy to deal with a proposal w.r.t. a goal or base commitment Δ. The strategy explores 
partial achievement of the goal Δ with partial (or fully) utilization of the resources or actions 
provided by the proposal. 
1. If the proposal can produce a formula Γ which shares a sub-formula A with Δ then Γ 
is split into � A and Δ is turned into � AΓ − A ⊗ � Δ − A ⊗ ��. 
Applying A = �xA �rA �a1 and A� = �x� A �rA� �b1. If 
�xA �rA �a1 �cc �x A �rA� �b1 is provable or can be inferred from 
�a1 �cc �b1 
then accept the proposal, else reject the proposal. 
2. If the proposal is accepted, the original goal or base commitment is replaced by �Δ − A. 
Fulﬁll conditions of the accepted proposal. 
3. The accepted proposal is carried out and produces � A.Δ − A ⊗ �
Remove A and A�. 
Δ − A can be further fulﬁlled in other (possibly concurrent) interactions. 
6.6 Summary 
The chapter explored splitting up formulas with respect to an arbitrary sub-formula and 
deﬁned dependencies among the split ups in the context of choices and resources. In a 
restricted logic fragment, we proved the equivalence between a formula and its split ups. 
The split up mechanism enables agents to partially and concurrently utilize resources or 
actions and achieve goals or base commitments among multiple interactions, which in turn 
is a fundamental step toward distributed concurrent problem solving. 
Chapter 7

An Execution Model

Chapters 3 and 4 have introduced our framework for the speciﬁcation of agent interaction 
protocols. We have demonstrated how protocols are speciﬁed and how agents might conduct 
reasoning based on protocol speciﬁcations and agent states. The next question is how to 
deﬁne an execution model for such speciﬁcations. In this chapter, we address various issues 
concerning an appropriate execution model. 
In particular, Section 7.1 deﬁnes a fragment of TLL that is straightforward for execution 
purposes but still suitable for modeling in a ﬁnite time and resource context. The fragment is 
based on MCA (deﬁnition 9). Section 7.2 discusses a possible implementation by providing a 
mapping from the execution framework in Section 4.3 to pseudo-code provided in Appendix 
Chapter B. These describe in detail how agents interact based on acting to fulﬁll their goals 
and commitments. Section 7.3 discusses some further implementation issues. 
7.1 A Fragment of TLL for Execution 
Our modeling framework discussed so far has made use of a restricted form of ﬁrst order 
temporal linear logic. In particular, the modeling of resources, actions, capabilities, and 
commitments uses the connectives and operators ⊗, �, ⊕, �, �, � and the constants 1, ⊥. 
As noted previously, we use a purely propositional approach except for pre-commitments, 
in which universally quantiﬁed variables over agents are used for modeling location and 
ownership information. Consider the following example, where the merchant pre-commits 
that it will give a customer agent 2 junior cricket bats and a gift if that agent pays 20 dollars 
via Paypal or by credit card and provides an address. 
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20 � [∀X, (20$@X ⊗ (via P P @M ⊕ by cred@MX ) ⊗ addr@XX )X X 
� (20 � $@M ⊗ 2 � jr cb@X ⊗ 2jr cb@MM X ⊥M addr@MX ⊗⊗ ��gift@X ⊗ gift@MX ⊥M )]

The variable X represents an agent where the respective resource is located or whom it 
belongs to. Being quantiﬁed universally over a domain of agents allows X to be assigned 
to any agent and hence allows the corresponding proposal to be applied to any agent of 
interest. Here, X is not an arbitrary object but must fall within the domain of agents and 
X only occurs at speciﬁc places (as the location and ownership information of resources or 
actions). Note that this is the only use of variables, i.e. in the preliminary step of ﬁnding 
an appropriate instance of a pre-commitment to be used. Once this is done, all reasoning is 
based on the propositional fragment. In particular, when a pre-commitment is proposed by 
one agent to another, all of its variables have already been instantiated and hence formulas 
of the pre-commitment and any corresponding conditional commitments are propositional. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 6.1, it is necessary to restrict the logic fragment to 
ensure resource equivalence between a formula and its split ups. The resulting fragment is 
MCA which includes only the connectives ⊗, �, ⊕, � and negation. Modeling of the notions 
of “anytime” and “sometime” was also revised in Section 6.1 to be based within this fragment 
as follows. 
A ≈ A � �(A � �(A � . . . .. �A))� � �� � 
T number of �A ≈ A ⊕ �(A ⊕ �(A ⊕ . . . .. �A)) 
T number of 
This is based on the intuition that all agent interactions will occur within time and 
resource limits. The upper limit on time (T ) is used where T refers to the farthest possible 
time point that the whole system could possibly reach. Under this assumption, the modeling 
of “anytime” and “sometime” can be thought as approximations of � and �. 
With these alternative modeling of “anytime”, “sometime”, the expressive power regard­
ing non-determinism in time is still maintained. Indeed, the alternative modeling of � allows 
agents to make an internal choice about the exact moment of a formula A, which corresponds 
to outer non-determinism about time. Similarly, the alternative modeling of � expresses an 
external choice about the precise moment of a formula A, and so corresponds to inner non-
determinism about time. Under this assumption of bounded time, we can reasonably assume 
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that the approximations preserve the expressiveness of non-determinism in time for � and 
The resulting fragment of TLL for modeling is then essentially MCA with a constraint 
on the modeling such that for any �tΓ, 0 ≤ t ≤ T . 
For convenience, in our modeling, we use � and � as abbreviations of their corresponding 
approximations described above. 
The models of resources, actions, capabilities, goals, base commitments, and conditional 
commitments are then the same as described in Section 4.2.1 except that whenever formulas 
of �A and �A occur, they are replaced by their above approximations. 
Following on from the discussion about message formats in Section 4.3.2, we arrive at the 
following formats for requests and proposals. 
REQUEST Δ⊥ 
PROPOSE �n(Γ � Δ) or 
PROPOSE �(Γ � Δ) or 
where Γ, Δ are formulas of the MCA fragment and the symbol � is a shorthand for its 
approximation. Note that the proposed pre-commitment may be available at a speciﬁc time 
(�n) or any time (�). 
The simpliﬁed fragment of TLL makes the complexity of proof search more manageable 
as approximations of � and � now require choices to be made (internally or externally) over 
a bounded range. 
7.2 An Implementation Framework 
As proposed in Chapters 3 and 4, the agents’ states are encoded with formulas representing 
resources, actions, capabilities, goals and commitments of the agents. Hence, in an imple­
mentation framework, each agent can be deﬁned in terms of their resources, actions, rules 
(which refers to pre-commitments and capabilities), and goals or base commitments. 
Protocols are then speciﬁed as a set of pre-commitments (also referred to as interaction 
rules) and base commitments at participating agents according to their roles in possible 
interactions. Hence, protocol speciﬁcations are also included in speciﬁcations of participating 
agents. 
How agents interact by utilizing their own resources, actions and rules to fulﬁll their 
goals and commitments based on a protocol speciﬁcation in our framework was described in 
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Section 4.3. 
The activities of agents during interaction (as described in Section 4.3) can be organized 
into ﬁve groups as below. For each group of tasks, we also provide a detailed description for 
implementation in pseudo-code. 
•	 How the agent resolves a goal or base commitment, as described in Section 4.3.6 and in 
pseudo-code in Section B.2.6: 
In order to achieve a goal or base commitment, an agent can act on its own or via 
interaction or a combination of both. 
If the agent acts on its own, its resources and actions can be used with its capabilities 
to derive the goal or base commitment via proof construction.

If the agent cannot achieve a commitment or a goal by itself or if it so chooses, it will

interact with other agents by making a request or a proposal.

•	 How the agent makes a proposal, as described in Section 4.3.4 and in pseudo-code in 
Section B.2.3: 
If the agent can ﬁnd a pre-commitment whose resources or actions can fulﬁll a goal 
or commitment in a request, then the agent can propose that pre-commitment to 
the requesting agent. Also, if there is a pre-commitment whose resources or actions 
can fulﬁll a goal or commitment of the agent then the agent can propose the pre-
commitment to another agent. 
•	 How the agent makes a request for a goal or base commitment, as described in Sec­
tion 4.3.3 and in pseudo-code in Section B.2.2. 
If the agent cannot ﬁnd a relevant pre-commitment or if it so chooses, it will make a 
request for the commitment or goal to an appropriate agent. 
•	 How the agent responds to a request, as described in Section B.2.4: 
Upon receiving a request, the requested agent searches for a pre-commitment of its own 
that is relevant to the request. If one is found, then the pre-commitment is proposed 
to the requesting agent. Otherwise, a failure notice will be returned to the requesting 
agent. 
•	 How the agent responds to a proposal, as described in Section 4.3.4 and in pseudo-code 
in Section B.2.5: 
When a proposal is received, the recipient checks if there are some of its goals or base 
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commitments (including those in previous requests) that the respective pre-commitment 
is relevant to. If so, and the recipient cannot achieve these goals or base commitments 
by itself (or if it so chooses), the recipient will accept the proposal as described below. 
Otherwise, the recipient will send a message of rejection. 
•	 How the agent accepts a proposal : 
If a proposal is accepted, the agent sends back a message of acceptance to the proposing 
agent. A conditional commitment is then formed by the proposing agent to the recipient 
agent from the pre-commitment of the proposal. If the expected outcomes of the 
proposed pre-commitment can only fulﬁll a part of a goal or base commitment of the 
recipient, then the goal or base commitment is split up to separate this part from the 
remainder, which is subject to further processing. As long as the recipient agent does 
not satisfy its requirements in the proposal (which are also treated as a form of goal or 
base commitment), the conditional commitment remains inactive. When the recipient 
fulﬁlls the requirements as described in Section 4.3.5, the proposing agent will fulﬁll 
its speciﬁed commitments. If the outcomes of the conditional commitments are used 
partly then formulas of the outcomes can be split up to separate the parts to be used 
while the rest can be utilized elsewhere. 
The requirements and commitments of the proposal can be treated as new goals or base 
commitments and hence fulﬁlling them may start another cycle and involve further interac­
tions. Some further points of discussion about the execution framework are below. 
Firstly, in our interaction model, we make use of the notion of relevance which is described 
in Section 4.3.7. If a pre-commitment is relevant to a goal or base commitment, then the 
pre-commitment can either be used internally, be proposed or be accepted (if it comes from 
another agent’s proposal). Checking relevance is based on checking if parts of the outcomes 
of the pre-commitment can logically derive some parts of a goal or base commitment, given 
appropriate choice strategies are applied. A strategy for considering a pre-commitment of a 
proposal is described in Section 6.5. 
Secondly, the use of resource or action or the fulﬁllment of goal or base commitment can 
be either partial or total. Partial fulﬁllment (or use) is done by ﬁrstly separating the part to 
be fulﬁlled (or used) in the corresponding formula from the remainder via a split up, and then 
fulﬁlling (or using) the part. The theorems described in Section 6.5 on splitting up formulas 
of goals or base commitments and resources or actions enable the smooth integration of both 
partial and total handling of them. 
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Thirdly, for handling the fulﬁllment of goals or base commitments as a result of the pro­
vision of the necessary resources or actions, we deploy a mechanism based on modus ponens 
in TLL, where negative formulas are matched with the corresponding positive formulas to 
have the formulas of both removed. Removal of formulas means that the respective goals or 
base commitments are resolved or the respective resources or actions are consumed or carried 
out. In fact, the modus ponens A ⊗ (A � ⊥) � ⊥ essentially provides a matching pair of the 
form A, A⊥ � ⊥ where A⊥ represents the goals or base commitments which are dual to the 
resources and actions A that are required to fulﬁll these goals or base commitments. Note 
that ⊥ derives the empty succedent (⊥ �), which in practice indicates that the removal of A 
and A⊥ is complete. 
7.2.1 Agent Reasoning 
In our TLL framework, as we consider what is provided (Γ) and what is required (Δ) as 
two sides of a consequence relation in a sequent Γ � Δ, agent reasoning is then based on 
using inference rules to ﬁnd a proof of the sequent. What is provided include resources, 
actions, capabilities and conditional commitments. What is required can be goals or base 
commitments. Successful reasoning means a successful proof search which begins with an 
initial sequent and steps through inference rules and ends with axiom sequents. Having a 
proof of a sequent means that agents have a successful plan in that given what is provided, 
the agent can obtain what is required by following the proof steps. Each proof step, which 
is an inference rule, can be translated to actions to be carried out by agents in terms of, for 
example, preparing resources, performing actions and capabilities, and making decisions on 
choices among resources and actions. 
Apart from the standard inference rules of temporal linear logic sequent calculus, we 
provide the extra inference rules of choice calculus as described in Section 5.3 and for par­
tial handling as described in Section 6.5 which together enable further agent reasoning. In 
summary, agent reasoning includes 
• Reasoning about partial handling of resources or actions and goals or base commitments 
Agents can split up formulas of resources or actions and goals or base commitments 
and reason about using parts of them as discussed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.5. 
An example of reasoning steps that agents can carry out is as follows. Consider a 
sequent Π, Γ � Δ where Γ and Δ have a common basic TLL formula �nA, where n is 
the time when A exists. Denote � AΓ as the two splits up of Γ. Denote �Γ −A and � Δ −A 
�� � � �
� �
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and AΔ as the two split ups of Δ. The agent can reason about partial handling of Γ 
and Δ by performing the proof search steps as follows. 
AΓ �cc AΔ Π, Γ − A �cc Δ − A 
� AΓ �cc Δ − A ⊗ �Π, Γ − A, � � AΔ 
Π, Γ − A, �� AΓ �cc Δ 
The agent can then concurrently attempt to further reason about the two new sequents 
instead. Regarding the sequent 
AΓ �cc AΔ 
given that � AΔ are essentially �nA or �m1 for some m, n (as a result of having AΓ and �
all related choices determined), agents can reason about matching them up by applying 
the reasoning on the choices in them. 
Regarding the sequent 
Π, Γ − A �cc Δ − A 
the same steps of reasoning about partial handling of them can also be subsequently 
applied on these parts of Γ and Δ. 
• Reasoning about choices 
Agents can reason about how various strategies with respect to internal choices and 
indeterminate possibilities (including changes in the environment) can be applied and 
their consequences and hence determine the right strategies. Discussions on these 
strategies and the corresponding inference rules are in Section 5.3. 
In the example above, AΓ and AΔ contain choices and their outcomes are either �nA 
or �m1 for some m. The agent can apply its strategies over these choices using the 
choice calculus sequent rules to prove the sequent 
AΓ �cc AΔ 
or to infer it from the sequent 
�n1 �cc �m1 
� �
� �
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n1which does not hold logically but makes sense in the context of resources as �
means having no resource and just acts as a unit of the connective ⊗. In fact, the 
sequent corresponds to the case A is not retained in Γ and Δ and hence does not exist. 
Correspondingly, AΓ and AΔ will become �n1 and �m1 (for some n, m ≥ 0) which 
means no resource or action involved. Therefore, the strategy for agents in this case 
should be ignoring the parts AΓ and AΔ and continue with the sequent 
Π, Γ − A �cc Δ − A 
• Reasoning about Pre-commitments with respect to Achieving Commitments 
A combination of reasoning about partial handling and reasoning about choices like in 
the above example enables agents to reason about how a pre-commitment is relevant to 
a goal or base commitment. By reasoning about partial handling, the agent can bring 
up the pairs that contain a part from outcomes of the pre-commitment and a part from 
the goal or base commitment for consideration. By reasoning about various strategies 
on relevant choices in these parts, the agent can determine whether proof can be found 
AΓ �cc AΔ) and consequently if the relating these pairs (such as a proof of the sequent � �
pre-commitment is relevant. 
Being able to reason about the relevance of a pre-commitment to a goal or base com­
mitment further enables agents to reason about making proposals to other agents or 
accepting proposals from them. Hence, this reasoning ability promotes agent autonomy 
and makes interaction more ﬂexible. 
In addition, agent reasoning can also be based on customized rules which are those de­
ducible from the TLL sequent calculus rules and aimed at helping agents to ﬁnd shortcuts 
in proof construction especially in the resource context. These rules are (n ≥ 0): 
nBΓ � �nA Γ, �nA � Δ Γ � �nA ⊗ �
Γ � �A Γ, �A � Δ Γ � �n(A ⊗ B) 
nB Γ � �(A � B)Γ � �nA ⊕ �
n(A ⊕ B) BΓ � � Γ � �A � �
B B Γ � �(A � B) Γ � A Δ � BΓ � �A ⊗ � Γ � �A ⊕ �
Γ � �(A ⊗ B) Γ � �(A ⊕ B) B Γ � Δ � A � BΓ � �A � �
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Note that in the reasoning process, agents can plan for an application of a pre-commitment 
of the form �n(Γ � Δ) at any time between now and �n . Particularly, we can perform the 
linear implication now �nΓ ⊗ �n[Γ � Δ] ⇒ �nΔ, or at �n like �n[Γ ⊗ (Γ � Δ)] ⇒ �nΔ 
or at some time in between �m like �m[�n−mΓ ⊗ �n−m(Γ � Δ)] ⇒ �nΔ. In fact, the 
exact time is quite ﬂexible, depending on when the requirements of the linear implication �nΓ becomes available to the agent. 
7.3 Further Implementation Issues 
We discuss further issues regarding implementation of such an execution framework below. 
7.3.1 Proof Search in TLL 
Our execution framework is based on proof search in the MCA fragment of TLL. We have 
provided extra sequent rules in the choice calculus and partial handling as a basis for proof 
search techniques in our execution framework. Given the standard sequent rules and our 
extra rules in the fragment MCA, an implementation of such sequent rules is a straightfor­
ward implementation of existing theorem proving techniques and we believe the work can 
be carried out by a skilled programmer. Hence, our pseudo-code description of an execution 
framework is based on the assumption that the implementation of the appropriate proof 
search techniques is unproblematic. 
7.3.2 Mapping Diﬀerent Agents’ Time Systems 
Time in TLL is discrete and measured against a system of time points with reference to the 
time point “now”. Time points in TLL indeed have no absolute values but relative values 
with respect to now. Given an open system like a multi-agent system, each agent might have 
a diﬀerent period between one time point to the next in its time system. This discrepancy is 
likely to cause diﬃculties as three time points with a short period may be shorter than two 
time points with a long period. Therefore, this issue must be resolved in an implementation. 
One approach to ensure that a time point means the same across agents’ systems is to 
make sure that the period from one time point to the next is ﬁxed and constant among these 
time systems. This period can be regarded as a time unit. Hence, every reference to the time 
point “now” can be measured by the number of time points multiplied by the time unit and 
has the same value in all systems. Moreover, this requirement of a constant period between 
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consecutive time points can be placed at the design phase of the agent systems so that every 
formula will be assigned with the correct time points. 
Another approach is to map all agents’ time systems into the same time system so that 
any time reference is applicable and interpreted the same to all agents. In particular, time 
points of formulas of each agent are compared by their actual or absolute values and all 
mapped into one uniﬁed time system. This process bring formulas of agents to their correct 
time points. 
For example, let agent α have formulas A, �B and �� C while agent β has formulas �D, and �3E. Denoting the layout in time as follows: 
In agent α’s time system: 0α(A), 1α(B), 2α(C) 
In agent β’s time system: 0β , 1β (D), 2β , 3β (E) 
Such a time synthesis mechanism will collapse the two relative time systems into one 
system. By comparing their respective actual time, we can detect their relative order, for 
example, 0α is in between 1β , and 2β : 1β , 0α, 2β ; 2β , 1α, 3β ; and 2α is after 3β : 3β , 2α, the 
rearrangement will become: 
0αβ 1αβ (D) 2αβ (A) 3αβ 4αβ (B) 5αβ (E) 6αβ (C) 
The formulas of agents α and β are then adjusted as 
Agent α: �2A, �4B and �6C 
Agent β: �D, and �5E. 
Moreover, there are situations where � is locally interpreted, i.e. with respect to a 
local reference time point. Formulas nested inside a bracket are typically of this type. An 
example is �2(A ⊗ �B), where �B means local within the bracket and hence the absolute 
time should be �3B. In these cases, the actual time points is obtained by adding the local 
relative time to the actual time of the local reference time point. 
It can be seen that the ﬁrst approach does not require synchronization of time and 
adjustment of formulas of agents’ states but has to enforce the requirement of having constant 
period between consecutive time points. On the other hand, the second approach allows the 
freedom of designing formulas with a suitable local time system at the cost of synchronization 
for the whole system every time a new local time system is introduced. 
Note that operating in diﬀerent time zones does not cause any issue in TLL time systems 
because all the time points are referenced to the time point “now” such as “two time points 
from now”, “three time points from now”, etc. As now means the present time universally, 
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having the same reference point means that these time points can be interpreted in the same 
way. 
For the purpose of focusing on the interaction among agents, we assume that either one 
of the above mentioned approaches must be in place so that time references among agents’ 
systems are correctly interpreted. 
7.3.3 Derivations among Conjunctions and Disjunctions in Resource Contexts 
Further observations about deriving formulas in a resource context reveals some useful results. 
Although �nA ⊗ �pB � � pB, in terms of resources, having concurrently two nA � �
resources �nA and �pB will enable agents to derive anyone of �nA and �pB and hence 
can cope with an indeterminate possibility between them. Speciﬁcally, given 
pBpB � ��nA � � nA � �
, in order to make the derivation, the owner agent needs an ability to choose either �nA or 
pB to cope with any possibility of the requirement � pB being �nA or being �pB.� nA ��
A necessary condition to have such ability is having both �nA and �pB, or �nA ⊗ �pB 
available. 
As a result, in terms of resource derivations, from �m(�nA ⊗ �pB), agents can derive 
m(� pB). We denote �r as the resource derivation relationship then �m(�nA ⊗� nA � �
pB) �r m(� pB). Certainly, logical derivation implies resource derivation but � � nA � �
the reverse is not necessarily true. 
We then have the following: 
m+nA ⊗ �m+pB � �m(�nA ⊗ �pB) �r m(� pB) � � m+pB �� � nA � � m+nA � �

m+nA ⊕ �m+pB � �m(�nA ⊕ �pB)

Therefore, in order to derive a conjunction or disjunction, we can derive any of the 
precedents in this order of derivation. 
Moreover, according to the order of derivation, as a shortcut strategy, agents can try to 
derive 
m+nA ⊗ �� m+pB 
in order to meet any requirement of 
���
�
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m(�nA ⊗ �pB) or 
m(� pB) or � nA � �
m+pB�m+nA � �
and try to derive 
m+pB)�m+nA � �
to meet any requirement of: 
m+nA ⊕ �m+pB or 
m(�nA ⊕ �pB) 
One major beneﬁt of this shortcut strategy is that to deal with any conjunctions or 
disjunctions with reference to the future time, the agent can prepare a corresponding present 
multiplicative conjunction and hence can attempt to prepare each conjunct individually. 
Each conjunct can be subsequently dealt with in the same manner so that in the end, the 
agent has to prepare a set of basic TLL formulas of the form �iA, i ≥ 0, where A is a LL 
proposition. Consequently, dealing with an arbitrary goals or base commitments formula 
can be reduced to preparing all the corresponding basic TLL formulas of the goals or base 
commitments. 
The cost of this approach is the extra reservation of resources which comes directly from 
derivations of the form 
m+nA ⊗ �m+pA �r m(� pB)� � nA � �
which prepares both �m+nA and �m+pA while only one of them will be required. In fact, 
this can be regarded as a safe approach as it requires to prepare all possibilities. 
For example, consider a requirement of 
2B) ⊗ (C ⊕ �3D)�(�A � �
for a given current state of an agent 
( � T −1 i A) ⊗ �3B ⊗ C.i=0 
Using this approach, the requirement can be turned into another requirement 
2A ⊗ �3B ⊗ C. 
� �
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Hence, matching with the resources available at the current state can be straightforward, 
T −1given i=0 
i A � �2A. 
If this approach fails then the agent can attempt as normal via proof search. 
This shortcut approach to derivations of conjunctions and disjunctions can be imple­
mented as a heuristic which is supplementary to the standard implementation of proof con­
struction in the MCA fragment. In many cases, this approach can provide simple and elegant 
solution for agents when dealing with resources. 
7.3.4 Other issues 
There are other important issues for an implementation to address. Such issues, for instance, 
include handling concurrency, deadlocks, and processing message formats. However, these 
issues are typical in most multi-agent systems and not peculiar to our execution framework. 
Hence, our description of an execution framework is assumed to be combined with existing 
mechanisms that handle these issues. 
7.4 Summary 
The chapter addressed implementation issues for the execution framework described in Sec­
tion 4.3. A simple but eﬀective fragment of TLL for execution purposes which contains only 
the connectives and operators ⊗, � , ⊕, � and negation was discussed. On the one hand, 
the fragment allows distributed and concurrent handling of goals or base commitments and 
resources or actions based on the split up mechanism discussed in Chapter 6. On the other 
hand, the fragment is shown to retain enough expressive power for our modeling tasks. 
Moreover, various issues for the execution framework based on proof search were dis­
cussed. In particular, we discussed how proof search can be used to provide agents’ reasoning 
about the relevance of a resource or action or a pre-commitment with respect to a goal or 
base commitment, and to provide handling of fulﬁllment of a goal or base commitment given 
a provision of necessary resources and actions. We also discussed how a request is formed 
and responded to as well as how a proposal is formed and accepted. Underlying these issues 
are the strategies of agents in dealing with choices. 
Chapter 8

Examples and Discussion

In this chapter, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of modeling interaction in temporal 
linear logic (TLL) and the choice of execution framework for TLL speciﬁcations. Moreover, 
we discuss how our approach helps to obtain ﬂexibility in agent interaction. 
Section 8.1 introduces a detailed example of the modeling, speciﬁcation and highlights of 
execution of interaction among agents. Another example is provided in Section B.4. These 
examples provide a concrete basis for the reﬂective discussions in Section 8.2 on modeling 
and in Section 8.3 on ﬂexibility in agent interaction. Moreover, we examine an alternative 
approach to the execution framework that is based on timed Petri nets in Section 8.4 and 
discuss the diﬀerences with our choice of using proof search in TLL for executing speciﬁca­
tions. Timed Petri nets (TPNs) are visual and mathematical tools for modeling concurrent 
systems in time. By using TPNs as an execution model, we can take advantage of various 
existing tools and techniques for TPNs to address issues of execution and veriﬁcation of TLL 
speciﬁcations. 
8.1 Concert Ticket Example 
To facilitate discussions on our TLL modeling and execution framework for agent interaction, 
we will make use of the following example. Comparisons with traditional approaches to 
specifying protocols are also provided as part of the evaluation. 
Description 
Three agents, (a musician, a writer and an artist) try to exchange resources so that they 
can all satisfy their goals. 
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The musician agent has a goal of obtaining two tickets to the concert at the second next 
time point. It is willing to sell its music in mp3 format for 5 dollars per hour of music. It 
has 15 dollars, and also has a book that can be exchanged for 25 dollars. 
The writer agent does not have any money but has a ticket, which is available from now 
until the third next time point, a CD player, and an mp3 player. The writer can sell the 
ticket for 20 dollars and the mp3 player for 15 dollars. The writer likes to read books and 
listen to music and hence has a goal of doing these at the second next time point. Listening 
to music requires two hours of mp3 music or equivalent. The writer can choose to listen on 
the mp3 player or the CD player. It also has the capability to convert two hours of mp3 
music into a CD. 
The artist agent intends to give a performance at the third next time point. To do so, 
it requires an mp3 player, and two hours of mp3 music. The artist only has a ticket which 
is also available from now until the third next time point and can be exchanged for 25 dollars. 
One solution for the agents to interact to achieve their goals is as follows. 
Sale of a ticket from the writer to the musician 
- The musician makes a request for a ticket at the second next time point to the writer.

- The writer responds by proposing a sale of a ticket available from now until the third next

time point for 20 dollars.

- The musician accepts, commits to paying 20 dollars and gets the ticket.

Sale of a ticket from the artist to the musician 
- The musician makes a request for a ticket at the second next time point to the artist.

- The artist proposes the sale of a ticket available from now until the third next time point

for 25 dollars.

- The musician accepts, commits to paying 25 dollars and gets the ticket.

Sale of a book from the musician to the writer 
- The writer makes a request for a book to the musician.

- The musician proposes selling the book for 25 dollars.

- The writer accepts, takes the book and pays 5 dollars. The commitment of the musician

to pay 20 dollars to the writer is removed.

Sale of an mp3 player from the writer to the artist 
- The artist makes a request for an mp3 player to the writer. 
- The writer proposes selling the mp3 player for 15 dollars. 
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- The artist accepts, gets the mp3 player and pays 15 dollars to the writer. 
Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the writer 
- The writer makes a request for 2 hours of mp3 music to the musician.

- The musician proposes selling each hour of mp3 music for 5 dollars.

- The writer accepts, obtains the music and pays 10 dollars to the musician.

Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the artist 
- The artist makes a request for 2 hours of mp3 music to the musician.

- The musician proposes selling each hour of mp3 music for 5 dollars.

- The artist accepts, obtains the music and pays 10 dollars to the musician.

Hence, from the interaction, the artist gets 25 dollars from selling its ticket, pays 10 
dollars to the musician for 2 hours of mp3 music and 15 dollars to the writer for the mp3 
player. It does not have any more money but gets an mp3 player and 2 hours of mp3 music 
for its performance. Hence, the artist achieves its goal. The writer gets 20 dollars for selling 
its ticket, 15 dollars for selling the mp3 player, pays the musician 25 dollars for a book, 10 
dollars for 2 hours of mp3 music and hence gets no debt. The writer then has a book for 
reading and music for listening and therefore achieves its goal. The musician pays 45 dollars 
for two tickets, gets 20 dollars for selling mp3 music, 25 dollars for selling its book and hence, 
retains its 15 dollars. The musician also achieves its goal. 
It can be observed that the requirements for each sale are the item(s) for sale and a 
payment amount. Given the item(s) for sale can be made available later by the sale agent 
and the payment amount can be regarded as a debt, the sale can start anytime during the 
interaction. In other words, these sales are independent and are not subject to any constraint 
on the order of execution. Hence, interaction among the agents can vary in the order of sales 
of tickets, book, mp3 player and mp3 music while still achieving all agents’ goals. Also, some 
of the sales may be initiated by two options, a request or a proposal to sell goods (to gain 
money for the commitments to pay). Such ﬂexibilities should be captured in the speciﬁcation 
of the interaction. 
8.1.1 Our Approach to Specifying Concert Ticket Interaction 
A speciﬁcation of the interaction in our approach is detailed below. In the speciﬁcation, 
pre-commitments are also referred to as rules for interaction. 
Musician 
The musician has a goal of obtaining two tickets at the second next time point, which is one 
� �
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time point before the concert and has a book and 15 dollars, and unlimited access to mp3 
songs: 
[ 2ticket@MM ]
⊥ ⊗ [ 2ticket@MM ]⊥ ⊗ η � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M ⊗ 15 � $@MM M M 
The musician can oﬀer to anyone access to her mp3 music at 5 dollars per hour: 
Rule 1 - η � [∀X, 5$@X � �mp3@X ⊗ mp3@M ⊥ ⊗ 5 � $@M ]X X M M 
The musician can also oﬀer her book for 25 dollars: 
Rule 2 - [∀X, 25$@X � �book@X ⊗ book@M ⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@M ]X M M M 
Writer 
The writer has a goal of listening to music and reading a book at the third next time point. 
The writer has a ticket available from now until the next third next time point, a CD player 
and an mp3 player: 
[ 2music@WW ]
⊥ ⊗ [ 2book@WW ]⊥⊗ � 3 i≥0(�iticket@WW ) ⊗ �CD player@W ⊗ �mp3 player@WW W 
The writer can listen to music directly from either a CD music or 2 hours of mp3 music: 
Rule 3 - �[(CD@WW ⊗ CD player@WW )⊕ (2mp3@WW ⊗mp3 player@WW ) � music@W ]W 
The writer can write a CD from 2 hours of mp3 music: 
Rule 4 - η � [2mp3@W � CD@WW ]W 
The writer can sell his ticket for 20 dollars 
Rule 5 - [∀X, 20$@X � ticket@XX ⊗ ticket@W ⊥ ⊗ 20 � $@W ]X W W 
The writer can also oﬀer his mp3 player for 15 dollars: 
Rule 6 - [∀X, 15$@X � �mp3 player@X ⊗ mp3 player@W ⊥ ⊗ 15 � $@W ]X X W W 
Artist 
The artist has a goal of a performance at the second next time point and has a ticket to the 
concert which is available from now until the third next time point: 
[ 3perf orm@A ]⊥⊗ � i3 ≥0(�iticket@AA )A 
The artist can sell the ticket for 25 dollars: 
Rule 7 - [∀X, 25$@X � ticket@XX ⊗ ticket@A⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@A ]X A A 
The artist needs 2 hours of mp3 music and an mp3 player to perform 
Rule 8 - �[2mp3@A ⊗ mp3 player@A � perf orm@A ]A A A 
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At the end of the interaction, a successful protocol run must satisfy the criteria: all the 
commitments 
[�2ticket@MM ]⊥, [�2ticket@MM ]⊥, [�2music@WW ]⊥, [�2book@WW ]⊥ and 
[�3perf orm@A ]⊥A 
are fulﬁlled and there are no pending commitments resulting from applications of the 
rules during interaction. 
A summary of all the rules is provided in Table 8.1. Note that the set of all the rules 
(pre-commitments) also forms a speciﬁcation of the protocol for interaction scenarios of the 
example. 
Musician 
Rule 1 η � [∀X, 5$@XX � �mp3@XX ⊗ mp3@M⊥M ⊗ 5 � $@MM ] 
Rule 2 �[∀X, 25$@XX � �book@XM ⊗ book@M⊥M ⊗ 25 � $@MM ] 
Writer 
Rule 3 �[(CD@WW ⊗ CD player@WW ) ⊕ (2mp3@WW ⊗ mp3 player@WW ) 
� music@WW ] 
Rule 4 η � [2mp3@WW � CD@WW ] 
Rule 5 �[∀X, 20$@XX � ticket@XX ⊗ ticket@W⊥W ⊗ 20 � $@WW ] 
Rule 6 �[∀X, 15$@XX � �mp3 player@XX ⊗ mp3 player@W⊥W ⊗ 
15 � $@WW ] 
Artist 
Rule 7 �[∀X, 25$@XX � ticket@XX ⊗ ticket@A⊥A ⊗ 25 � $@AA ] 
Rule 8 �[2mp3@AA ⊗ mp3 player@AA � perf orm@AA ] 
Table 8.1: Summary of Speciﬁcation Rules for Concert Ticket Example 
8.1.2 Construction of Concert Ticket Interaction 
Given this speciﬁcation, this section demonstrates how interactions are constructed based on 
agents’ reasoning about their commitments, states, and which rules to use to fulﬁll them. A 
model for guiding reasoning about rules and for negotiation among agents was described in 
Section 4.3.1. 
To simplify the proof, we make use of some shortcut inference rules such as [��] and 
[app], which are described in Section 4.3.9. Note that [n] in the title of a rule denotes multiple 
applications of that rule. We also make use of the splitting mechanism of a compound formula 
described in Section 6.2. For example, a conjunct �nA can be extracted from a multiplicative 
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conjunction �n(A ⊗ B ⊗ C). For simplicity of discussion, we only mention the desired split 
ups without showing details of the corresponding proof search steps. 
1. Initial States 
Because none of the artist, musician and writer can achieve their goals by themselves, 
they will make a request for their goals to the other agents. 
Musician: 
The positive formula of [ 2ticket@MM ]
⊥ is �2ticket@M which the musician cannot derive M 
by itself. To fulﬁll the goal of having two tickets, the musician can make requests of the goal

formula to other agents. This is discussed further in step 2.

M to W: REQUEST [2 �2 ticket@M ]⊥ and
M 
M to A: REQUEST [2 �2 ticket@M ]⊥M 
Writer: 
The goal [�2music@WW ]⊥ can be fulﬁlled by deriving the corresponding resource 
2music@WW using an application of Rule 3 as follows. Denoting Rule 3 as �[L3 � R3], 
we then have 
app
[L3 � R3] � �2R3� �2L3 
where �2R3 = �2music@W .W

We abbreviate 2mp3@W as 2mw, CD@WW as cd, CD player@W as cpw,
W W 
mp3 player@W as mpw, and music@W as muw.W W 
The conditions for the application of Rule 3 are 
2L3 = �2[(cd ⊗ cpw) ⊕ (2mw ⊗ mpw)] 
which are further desired. The conditions can be analyzed into sub-conditions as follows. 
� �2cd � �2cpw � �22mw � �2mpw 
2� �2cd ⊗ �2cpw ⊗R 22mw ⊗ � mpw ⊗R 
2(cd ⊗ cpw) �(⊗)R or � � 2(2mw ⊗ mpw) �(⊗)R � �
2(cd ⊗ cpw) ⊕ �2(2mw ⊗ mpw) ⊕R � �
2[(cd ⊗ cpw) ⊕ (2mw ⊗ mpw)] �(⊗)R 
The writer then makes these sub-conditions as new subgoals, i.e. ([�22mp3@W ]⊥ andW 
[�2mp3 player@W ]⊥) or ([�2CD@W ]⊥ and [�2CD player@W ]⊥) and the writer can W W W 
make the choice. –(1)– 
�
�
�
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Regarding the former choice, the writer has 
�mp3 player@W � �2mp3 player@WW W 
but cannot derive �22mp3@W by itself. W 
Regarding the latter, �Cd player@W � �2CD player@W .W W 
2CD@WW can be derived by Rule 4 as follows. Denote Rule 4 as �[L4 � R4] then 
app
�2L4 
[L4 � R4] � �2R4 
where �2R4 = �2CD@WW . The conditions for the application of Rule 4 are �2L4 = �22mp3@W .W 
Therefore, either choice requires �22mp3@WW , which cannot be achieved by the writer 
alone. 
In order to derive �22mp3@WW , the writer can possibly make a request for [�22mp3@W ]⊥W 
to other agents. This is further discussed in step 6. 
W to A: REQUEST [�22mp3@W ]⊥ andW 
W to M: REQUEST [�22mp3@W ]⊥W 
The goal [�2book@WW ]⊥ cannot be derived by the writer alone. Consequently, he can 
possibly make requests of the book to other agents. This is discussed further in step 4. 
W to A: REQUEST [�2book@WW ]⊥ and 
W to M: REQUEST [�2book@WW ]⊥ 
Artist: 
An application of Rule 8 can help to achieve its goal of [�3perf orm@A ]⊥ as follows. A 
Denoting Rule 8 as �[L8 � R8], we then have 
app
� �3L8 
[L8 � R8] � �3R8 
where �3R8 = �3perf orm@A .A 
The conditions for the application of Rule 8 are �3L8 = �3[2mp3@A ⊗ mp3 player@AA ]. The conditions can be analyzed into sub-A 
conditions as below. 
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� �32mp3@A � �3mp3 player@A
A A 
� �32mp3@A ⊗ �3mp3 player@A ⊗R 
A A 
� �3(2mp3@A ⊗ mp3 player@A
A 
) 
�(⊗)R 
A 
Taking these sub-conditions as sub-goals means that the artist will look for subgoals of 
[�3mp3 player@A ]⊥ and [�32mp3@A ]⊥. As the artist cannot achieve these sub-goals by A A 
itself, it can make corresponding requests to other agents. This is further discussed in steps

5 and 7.

A to W: REQUEST [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥ and
A 
A to W: REQUEST [�3mp3@A ]⊥ andA 
A to M: REQUEST [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥ andA 
A to M: REQUEST [�3mp3@A ]⊥A 
Given the reasoning of the agents as above, the actual interaction can start with any of 
the requests above. Some of these requests will fail, because the requested agents do not 
have the corresponding resources available, as in the cases below. 
W to A: REQUEST [�22mp3@W ]⊥W 
A to W: REQUEST [�3mp3@A ]⊥A 
A to M: REQUEST [�3mp3 player@AW ]⊥ 
W to A: REQUEST [�2book@WW ]⊥ 
The other requests will involve the agents in more interaction. We present all the sections 
of sales below. Note that, the numbering only identiﬁes the sections and does not imply the 
sequence of them. 
2. Sale of a ticket from the writer to the musician 
The sale can start by a request from the musician or by a proposal from the writer to 
sell its ticket in order to gain some money if the writer has some commitments of deriving 
money. Either way, the interactions share a common part, starting from the proposal by the 
writer of Rule 5. 
The musician makes a request for a ticket to the concert which clearly speciﬁes that the 
ticket is desired at the second next time point. 
M to W: REQUEST [�2ticket@MM ]⊥ 
To fulﬁll [�2ticket@MM ]⊥, a proof can be constructed from Rule 5 of the writer to derive �2ticket@MM . 
��
� � [�
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Consider an application of Rule 5 as follows. Denoting Rule 5 (with the assignment 
X = M ) as �[L5 � R5], we then have 
app
[L5 � R5] � �2R5 � �2L5 
where �2R5 = �2[ticket@MM ⊗ticket@W ⊥W ⊗20�$@WW ], which can be split up to make the 
sub-part �2ticket@M available to fulﬁll [�2ticket@MM ]⊥. In other words, the outcomes M 
of an application of Rule 5 can be partially used to achieve [�2ticket@MM ]⊥. 
From the above reasoning, the writer can sell a ticket for 20 dollars to meet the request. 
An instance with X = M is proposed. 
W to M: PROPOSE �[20$@M � ticket@MM ⊗ ticket@W ⊥ ⊗ 20 � $@W ]M W W 
Given a possible proof of its request formula as described above, the musician will accept 
the sale 
M to W: ACCEPT 
The condition of the proposal �220$@M suggests that to carry out the sale, the mu-M 
sician needs to pay 20 dollars at the second next time point. If the musician does not 
have this amount at hand, it can make a commitment to pay such amount. A commit­
ment of [�220$@MM ]⊥ is formed. As a result of the presence of this commitment, the 
corresponding formula [ 220$@MM ] is available. If the musician still has 15 � $@M , it M 
only has to make �25$@M available and hence a commitment [�25$@MM ]⊥, because M 
[ 220$@MM ]
⊥ ⊗ 15 � $@M 25$@MM ]⊥.M 
The proposal can be applied to yield 
�2(ticket@M ⊗ ticket@W ⊥ ⊗ 20 � $@WW )M W 
As a result, the proposal gives the musician a ticket from the writer, the writer 20 dollars 
and yields a commitment of the musician to pay 20 dollars. 
As the musician has a commitment to pay 20 dollars [�220$@M ]⊥, if the musician does 
not have enough money, it will try to utilize other rules like Rule 1 (selling book) and Rule 2 
(selling mp3 music) which derive 5$@M and 25$@M respectively at the current time point, 
at the next time point or at the second next time point. 
3. Sale of a ticket from the artist to the musician 
This is similar to the sale of a ticket from the writer. 
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The sale can start by a request from the musician. It also might start by a proposal from 
the artist so as to satisfy its commitments to derive some money. Either way, the interactions 
share a common part, starting from the proposal of the artist. 
The musician makes a request for a ticket to the artist 
M to A: REQUEST [�2ticket@MM ]⊥ 
A proof can be constructed using Rule 7 to derive �2ticket@M . Other requirements M 
are also analyzed in a similar manner. Hence, the artist can sell his ticket for 25 dollars. An

instance of Rule 7 with X = M is proposed.

A to M: PROPOSE �[25$@M � ticket@MM ⊗ ticket@A⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@A ]
M A A 
With similar reasoning as in the section of ticket sale from the writer, 
M to A: ACCEPT 
This also requires the musician to pay 25 dollars at the second next time point 
(�225$@MM ). The musician can make the money amount available by committing to having 
it ([�225$@M ]⊥).M 
Hence, the proposal can be applied. As a result, at the time of application, the proposal 
gives the musician a ticket from the artist, a commitment to pay 25 dollars and the artist 25 
dollars. 
4. Sale of a book from the musician to the writer 
The sale can start by a request from the writer. It can also start directly from a proposal 
of Rule 2 from the musician so that the musician can gain some money it possibly needs to 
buy tickets. 
The writer may request from the musician a book. 
W to M: REQUEST [�2book@WW ]⊥ 
To fulﬁll [�2book@WW ]⊥, a proof can be constructed from Rule 2 of the musician to 
derive �2book@W .W 
Consider an application of Rule 2 as follows. Denoting Rule 2 (with the assignment 
X = M ) as �[L2 � R2], we then have 
app
� �2L2 
[L2 � R2] � �2R2 
where �2R2 = �2[�book@W ⊗ book@M ⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@MM ], which can be split up to make W M 
the sub-part �2 � book@W available to fulﬁll [�2book@WW ]⊥ as below W 
�
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2 � book@W � �2book@WW .W 
The condition for the application of Rule 2 is deriving �2L2 = �225$@W .W 
Given the suitability of Rule 2, the musician proposes the sale of the book for 25 dollars. 
M to W: PROPOSE �[25$@W � �book@W ⊗ book@M ⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@M ]W W M M 
W to M: ACCEPT 
If the writer does not have 25 dollars at the second next time point, to fulﬁll the require­
ment, the writer will make a commitment of [�225$@WW ]⊥. From the proof, after the rule 
application, a commitment �2book@M ⊥ of the musician is also required. The musician has 
M 
the book which can be sold at the second next time point: �book@M � �2book@MM ,M 
hence fulﬁlling the commitment �2book@M ⊥. 
M 
Hence, the proposal can be applied and will give the writer the book (�2book@WW ) and 
a commitment to pay 25 dollars (�225$@W ⊥) and the musician 25 dollars (�225$@MM ).W 
5. Sale of an mp3 player from the writer to the artist 
The sale can start by a request from the artist. It can also start directly from a proposal 
of Rule 6 from the writer so that the writer can gain some money if it has some commitments 
to derive money. 
The artist may ask the writer for the mp3 player. 
A to W: REQUEST [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥A 
A proof can be formed out of Rule 6. The proof further requires �3mp3 player@W .W 
Rule 6 suggests that the writer oﬀers an mp3 player for 15 dollars. 
If the writer already has a commitment to get some money at the second next time point, 
applying Rule 6 at the second next time point will help it resolve the commitment. On 
the other hand, if the writer does not yet have such commitments, applying Rule 6 at the 
third next time point will eventually cause the interaction to fail (as not all of its payment 
commitments will be resolved). 
We consider the case of rule application the second next time point where it is possible 
to succeed. Rule 6 is assigned with X = A and proposed to the artist: 
W to A: PROPOSE �2[15$@A � �mp3 player@A ⊗ mp3 player@W ⊥ ⊗ 15 � $@W ]A A W W 
Given that �2 � mp3 player@A � �3mp3 player@A , which can resolve the commit-A A 
ment of [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥, the artist replies: A 
A to W: ACCEPT 
If the artist does not have 15 dollars at the second next time point, it will make a 
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commitment: 
[�215$@AA ]⊥. 
The proposal can hence be carried out to yield an mp3 player for the artist (�3mp3 player@A) 
from the writer, a commitment to pay a debt of 15 dollars ([�215$@A ]⊥) and 15 dollars A 
for the writer (�2 � 15$@W ). 
6. Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the writer 
The sale can start by a request from the writer. It can also start from a proposal of Rule 
1 from the musician as the musician tries to derive money to buy tickets. 
The writer asks the musician for mp3 music. 
W to M: REQUEST [�22mp3@W ]⊥W 
A proof of �2mp3@W uses Rule 1 and �25$@W .W W 
The musician proposes to the writer a sale of each hour of mp3 music for 5 dollars to reply 
to the request or to gain some money. Rule 1 is assigned with X = M and proposed twice 
(note that two copies of Rule 1 in the proposal are used as a shorthand for two proposals): 
M to W: PROPOSE 2 �2 [5$@W � �mp3@W ⊗ mp3@M ⊥ ⊗ 5 � $@M ]W W M M 
W to M: ACCEPT 
The requirement of the proof of �25$@W can be resolved if the writer has 5 dollars at W 
the second next time point or makes a commitment: [�25$@WW ]⊥. 
Each instance of the proposal rule can be applied to yield one hour of mp3 music 
(�2mp3@WW ) to the writer from the musician and a commitment to pay 5 dollars 
([�25$@W ]⊥) of the writer, and 5 dollars for the musician (�25$@MM ). We thus have W �2mp3@W ⊗ �2mp3@W � �2(mp3@W ⊗ mp3@WW ), fulﬁlling the request for W W W 
[�22mp3@W ]⊥.W 
7. Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the artist 
The sale can start by a request from the artist. It can also start from a proposal of Rule 
1 from the musician as the musician tries to derive money to buy tickets. 
The artist may ask the musician for a sale of mp3 music. 
A to M: REQUEST 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥A 
A proof of �3mp3@A uses Rule 1. The outcome of Rule 1’s application at the third A 
next time point will make the musician failed to resolve all of its payment commitments, 
which are at the second next time point. As a result, Rule 1 should be applied at the second 
next time point. 
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M to A: PROPOSE 2 �2 [5$@A � �mp3@A ⊗ mp3@M ⊥ ⊗ 5 � $@M ]A A M M 
As the outcome provides 2 �2 �mp3@A 3 mp3@A , which fulﬁlls the commitment A � 2 � A 
of 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥,A 
A to M: ACCEPT 
The interaction continues in a similar manner as in the sale of mp3 from the musician to 
the writer. 
8. The writer listening to music 
Given that the writer has obtained mp3 music from the musician, it tries to apply Rule 
3 to derive music. There are two cases depending on the availability of resources. 
Case 1: if the writer has sold its mp3 player to the artist, it can not take the option of 
using the mp3 player in Rule 3. Therefore, the writer will apply Rule 4, given two hours of 
mp3 music available (�2mp3@WW ): 
2 �2 mp3@W ⊗ �[2mp3@W � CD@W
W 
] �
W W 
2 �2 mp3@W ⊗ �2[2mp3@W � CD@W
W 
] �
W W �2CD@W
W 
Rule 3 can be applied to derive �2music@W . Hence the writer can listen to the music W 
as desired. 
Case 2: if the writer has not sold the mp3 player, it can take the option of listening 
on CD player as above or choose to listen on mp3 player. Rule 3 can be applied to derive �2music@WW as above. However, if the writer chooses to do so, it cannot later sell the 
mp3 player to the artist to gain enough money to buy the book from the musician and 
hence satisfy its commitment of reading a book. Also, the artist will not be able to fulﬁll its 
commitment of carrying out a performance, which requires an mp3 player purchased from 
the writer. Taking this option therefore causes the interaction to fail. 
The interaction ends after Step 7. After Step 8, all of the agents’ goals and commitments 
are achieved. The results of the interaction are further considered in the following section on 
sequences of interactive actions. 
8.1.3 Sequences of Interactive Actions 
We have demonstrated the construction of an interaction among the agents following the 
speciﬁcation, based on the assumed interaction model. The interaction can be viewed as a 
sequence of all the steps discussed above. While Step 1 refers to the initial state of agents and 
��
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Step 8 refers to internal agent reasoning about fulﬁllment of the commitments, the interaction 
from Step 2 to Step 7 can be carried out in any order by the agents to achieve their goals. In 
fact, the interaction can start with any of the agents making a request for its goals. Hence, 
any of the sales can be the ﬁrst one. 
In this section, we examine the diﬀerent sequences that are allowed by the speciﬁcation. 
We abbreviate an interaction as a list of messages exchanged as follows. The status of each 
agent is also shown with respect to their resulting resources and commitments after each 
step. We will examine an interaction as a sequence of Steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. We 
then consider another arbitrary order of sales, such as the order of Steps 1, 5, 7, 3, 2, 6, 4 
and Step 8. This later sequence also leads to the same end results. 
Interaction as a sequence of Steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 
1. Initial States 
Musician: 
Resources: η � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M ⊗ 15 � $@M .M M M 
Commitments: [ 2ticket@MM ]
⊥ ⊗ [�2ticket@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: none. 
Writer: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@WW ) ⊗ �CD player@W ⊗ �mp3 player@W .W W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥⊗[CD player@WW ⊕mp3 player@W ]⊥⊗[�2book@WW ]⊥.W W 
Note that the choice between [�2mp3 player@W ]⊥ and [�2CD player@W ]⊥ can be ex-W W 
pressed as [�2mp3 player@W ⊕ �2CD player@W ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: none. 
Artist: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@AA ). 
Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥ ⊗ [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥.A A 
Rules used: 8. 
2. Sale of a ticket from the writer to the musician 
M to W: REQUEST [�2ticket@MM ]⊥ 
W to M: PROPOSE �[20$@M � ticket@MM ⊗ ticket@W ⊥ ⊗ 20 � $@W ]M W W 
M to W: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: η � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M .M M 
Commitments: [ 2ticket@MM ]
⊥ ⊗ [�25$@MM ]⊥. 
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Rules used: none. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W ⊗ �mp3 player@W ⊗ 20 � $@W .W W W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥⊗[CD player@WW ⊕mp3 player@W ]⊥⊗[�2book@WW ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 5. 
Artist: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@AA ). 
Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥ ⊗ [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥.A A 
Rules used: 8. 
3. Sale of a ticket from the artist to the musician 
M to A: REQUEST [�2ticket@MM ]⊥ 
A to M: PROPOSE �[25$@M � ticket@MM ⊗ ticket@A⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@A ]M A A 
M to A: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: η � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M .M M 
Commitments: [�230$@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: none. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W ⊗ �mp3 player@W ⊗ 20 � $@W .W W W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥⊗[CD player@WW ⊕mp3 player@W ]⊥⊗[�2book@WW ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 5. 
Artist: 
Resources: 25 � $@A .A 
Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥ ⊗ [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥.A A 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
4. Sale of a book from the musician to the writer 
(OPTIONAL)W to M: REQUEST [�2book@WW ]⊥ 
M to W: PROPOSE �[25$@W � �book@W ⊗ book@M ⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@M ]W W M M 
W to M: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: η � mp3@M .M 
Commitments: [�25$@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: 2. 
Writer: 
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Resources: �CD player@W ⊗ �mp3 player@W .W W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥ ⊗ [CD player@W ⊕ mp3 player@W ]⊥ ⊗ [�25$@WW ]⊥.W W W 
Rules used: 5. 
Artist: 
Resources: 25 � $@A .A 
Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥ ⊗ [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥.A A 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
5. Sale of an mp3 player from the writer to the artist 
(OPTIONAL) A to W: REQUEST [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥A 
W to A: PROPOSE �2[15$@A � �mp3 player@A ⊗ mp3 player@W ⊥ ⊗ 15 � $@W ]A A W W 
A to W: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: η � mp3@M .M 
Commitments: [�25$@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: 2. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W ⊗ 10 � $@W .W W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥ ⊗ [CD player@W ⊕ mp3 player@W ]⊥.W W W 
Rules used: 5, 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: 10 � $@A .A 
Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥.A 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
6. Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the writer 
(OPTIONAL) W to M: REQUEST [�22mp3@W ]⊥W 
M to W: PROPOSE 2 �2 [5$@W � �mp3@W ⊗ mp3@M ⊥ ⊗ 5 � $@M ]W W M M 
W to M: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 2) � mp3@M ⊗ 5 � $@M .M M 
Note that, for a shorthand, we denote η − 2 as the number (not the subtraction operation) 
that indicates the remaining copies of the formula �mp3@M . We make use of this notation M 
for the rest of the example.

Commitments: none.

Rules used: 1, 2.
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Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W .W 
Commitments: [CD player@W ⊕ mp3 player@W ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 5, 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: 10 � $@A .A 
Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥.A 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
7. Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the artist 
A to M: REQUEST 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥A 
M to A: PROPOSE 2 �2 [5$@A � �mp3@A ⊗ mp3@M ⊥ ⊗ 5 � $@M ]A A M M 
A to M: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 4) � mp3@M ⊗ 15 � $@M .M M 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 1, 2. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W .W 
Commitments: [CD player@W ⊕ mp3 player@W ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 5, 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: none. 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
8. Listening to music at the writer 
Musician:

Resources: (η − 4) � mp3@M ⊗ 15 � $@M .
M M 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 1, 2. 
Writer: 
Resources: none. 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 3, 4, 5, 6. 
Artist: 
��
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Resources: none. 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
The interaction in the order of sessions: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 ends and meets the 
criteria for a successful run, as there are no pending commitments. Hence, the interaction is 
successful. 
Interaction as a sequence of Steps 1, 5, 7, 3, 2, 6, 4 and 8 
1. Initial States 
Musician: 
Resources: η � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M ⊗ 15 � $@M .M M M 
Commitments: [ 2ticket@MM ]
⊥ ⊗ [�2ticket@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: none. 
Writer: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@WW ) ⊗ �CD player@W ⊗ �mp3 player@W .W W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥⊗[CD player@WW ⊕mp3 player@W ]⊥⊗[�2book@WW ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: none. 
Artist: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@AA ). 
Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥ ⊗ [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥.A A 
Rules used: 8. 
5. Sale of an mp3 player from the writer to the artist 
A to W: REQUEST [�3mp3 player@AA ]⊥ 
W to A: PROPOSE �2[15$@A � �mp3 player@A ⊗ mp3 player@W ⊥ ⊗ 15 � $@W ]A A W W 
A to W: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: η � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M ⊗ 15 � $@MM ,M M 
Commitments: [ 2ticket@MM ]
⊥ ⊗ [�2ticket@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: none. 
Writer: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@WW ) ⊗ �CD player@W ⊗ 15 � $@WW ,W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥⊗[CD player@WW ⊕mp3 player@W ]⊥⊗[�2book@WW ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@AA ). 
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Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥ ⊗ [15$@A ]⊥.A A 
Rules used: 8. 
7. Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the artist 
A to M: REQUEST 2[�3mp3@AA ]⊥ 
M to A: PROPOSE 2 �2 [5$@A � �mp3@A ⊗ mp3@M ⊥ ⊗ 5 � $@M ]A A M M 
A to M: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 2) � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M ⊗ 25 � $@MM ,M M 
Commitments: [ 2ticket@MM ]
⊥ ⊗ [�2ticket@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: 1. 
Writer: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@WW ) ⊗ �CD player@W ⊗ 15 � $@WW ,W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥⊗[CD player@WW ⊕mp3 player@W ]⊥⊗[�2book@WW ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@AA ). 
Commitments: [25$@A ]⊥.A 
Rules used: 8. 
3. Sale of a ticket from the artist to the musician 
(OPTIONAL) M to A: REQUEST [�2ticket@MM ]⊥ 
A to M: PROPOSE �[25$@M � ticket@MM ⊗ ticket@A⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@A ]M A A 
M to A: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 2) � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M .M M 
Commitments: [�2ticket@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: 1. 
Writer: 
Resources: � i3 ≥0(�iticket@WW ) ⊗ �CD player@W ⊗ 15 � $@W .W W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥⊗[CD player@WW ⊕mp3 player@W ]⊥⊗[�2book@WW ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: none. 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
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2. Sale of a ticket from the writer to the musician 
M to W: REQUEST [�2ticket@MM ]⊥ 
W to M: PROPOSE �[20$@M � ticket@MM ⊗ ticket@W ⊥ ⊗ 20 � $@W ]M W W 
M to W: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 2) � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M .M M 
Commitments: [�220$@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: 1. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W ⊗ 35 � $@W .W W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥⊗[CD player@WW ⊕mp3 player@W ]⊥⊗[�2book@WW ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 5, 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: none. 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
6. Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the writer 
(OPTIONAL) W to M: REQUEST [�22mp3@W ]⊥W 
M to W: PROPOSE 2 �2 [5$@W � �mp3@W ⊗ mp3@M ⊥ ⊗ 5 � $@M ]W W M M 
W to M: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 4) � mp3@M ⊗ �book@M .M M 
Commitments: [�210$@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: 1. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W ⊗ 25 � $@W .W W 
Commitments: [CD player@W ⊕ mp3 player@W ]⊥ ⊗ [�2book@WW ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 5, 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: none. 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
4. Sale of a book from the musician to the writer 
(OPTIONAL) W to M: REQUEST [�2book@WW ]⊥ 
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M to W: PROPOSE �[25$@W � �book@W ⊗ book@M ⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@M ]W W M M 
W to M: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 4) � mp3@M ⊗ 15 � $@M .M M 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 1, 2. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W .W 
Commitments: [CD player@W ⊕ mp3 player@W ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 5, 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: none. 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
8. Listening to music at the writer 
Musician:

Resources: (η − 4) � mp3@M ⊗ 15 � $@M .
M M 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 1, 2. 
Writer: 
Resources: none. 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 3, 4, 5, 6. 
Artist: 
Resources: none. 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
The interaction with a sequence of Steps 1, 5, 7, 3, 2, 6, 4 and 8 ends successfully as all 
the required commitments are fulﬁlled. 
As can be seen, all the interactions with diﬀerent sequences of sections end up success­
fully if the writer does not make the choice of listening to music on the mp3 player, which 
corresponds to using the resources �2[2mp3@W ⊗ mp3 player@W ] to apply Rule 3. W W 
In the case where the writer chooses to listen to music on its mp3 player, the corresponding 
interaction will fail. When the writer uses its mp3 player, the mp3 player is no longer available 
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for sale to the artist. As a result, the writer does not have enough money to buy book from 
the musician and the artist can not fulﬁll its commitment of a performance. The interaction 
then fails. 
8.1.4 Integration of Changes 
We now consider some changes in the environment for showing an integration of changes in 
protocol execution. Exemplar changes are the addition of an mp3 player available for use at 
the artist (�mp3 player@AA ) and 20 dollars for the writer (20 � $@WW ) during a protocol 
execution. We can pick a protocol run with a random sequence of Steps 2 to 7 (with Step 
1 beginning the sequence and Step 8 ending it). However, for showing the most eﬀects and 
for familiarity with the example, we consider such changes in Step 4 of the protocol as a 
sequence of Steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8. 
At the end of Step 4, the states of the agents are: 
4. Sale of a book from the musician to the writer 
(OPTIONAL)W to M: REQUEST [�2book@WW ]⊥ 
M to W: PROPOSE �[25$@W � �book@W ⊗ book@M ⊥ ⊗ 25 � $@M ]W W M M 
W to M: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: η � mp3@M .M 
Commitments: [�25$@MM ]⊥. 
Rules used: 2. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W ⊗ �mp3 player@W ⊗ 20 � $@W (newly included). W W W 
Commitments: [�22mp3@W ]⊥ ⊗ [CD player@W ⊕ mp3 player@W ]⊥ ⊗ [�25$@WW ]⊥.W W W 
Rules used: 5. 
Artist: 
Resources: 25 � $@A ⊗ �mp3 player@A (newly included). A A 
Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥ ⊗ [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥.A A 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
The next step in the sequence is Step 5 which is a sale of an mp3 player from the 
writer to the artist. However, because �mp3 player@A � �3mp3 player@A , the resource A A �mp3 player@A can satisfy the commitment [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥. Therefore, the artist A A 
does not need to request an mp3 player from any other agent. Moreover, the writer has 
�
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20�$@W , and therefore the commitment [ 25$@WW ]⊥ is fulﬁlled and 15�$@W remains.W W 
Thus, the writer does not have a monetary commitment as an incentive to propose Rule 6. 
Step 5 in the sequence is then skipped. 
6. Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the writer 
(OPTIONAL) W to M: REQUEST [�22mp3@W ]⊥W 
M to W: PROPOSE 2 �2 [5$@W � �mp3@W ⊗ mp3@M ⊥ ⊗ 5 � $@M ]W W M M 
W to M: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 2) � mp3@M ⊗ 5 � $@M .M M 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 1, 2. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W ⊗ �mp3 player@W ⊗ 5 � $@W .W W W 
Commitments: [CD player@W ⊕ mp3 player@W ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 5. 
Artist: 
Resources: 25 � $@A .A 
Commitments: 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥.A 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
7. Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the artist 
A to M: REQUEST 2[�3mp3@A ]⊥A 
M to A: PROPOSE 2 �2 [5$@A � �mp3@A ⊗ mp3@M ⊥ ⊗ 5 � $@M ]A A M M 
A to M: ACCEPT 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 4) � mp3@M ⊗ 15 � $@M .M M 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 1, 2. 
Writer: 
Resources: �CD player@W ⊗ �mp3 player@W ⊗ 5 � $@W .W W W 
Commitments: [CD player@W ⊕ mp3 player@W ]⊥.W W 
Rules used: 5. 
Artist: 
Resources: 15 � $@A .A 
Commitments: none. 
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Rules used: 7, 8. 
8. Listening to music at the writer 
The writer can use either the CD player or the mp3 player since it has both. For simplicity, 
we show the case that the writer uses CD player. 
Musician: 
Resources: (η − 4) � mp3@M ⊗ 15 � $@M .M M 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 1, 2. 
Writer: 
Resources: �mp3 player@W ⊗ 5 � $@W .W W 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 5. 
Artist: 
Resources: 15 � $@A .A 
Commitments: none. 
Rules used: 7, 8. 
As there are no pending commitments, the interaction ends successfully as a sequence of 
Steps 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8, without Step 5. The protocol run demonstrates that agents can 
take advantage of changes from outside (like the addition of resources) during the execution 
of the protocol to skip some parts of the protocol. 
8.1.5 Summary of Interactions 
In the case where the writer chooses to listen to music on its CD player, the various interac­
tions have the following properties. 
Throughout these interaction sessions, the musician has the original commitments: 
[�2ticket@MM ]⊥ and [�2ticket@MM ]⊥ removed. The purchases of tickets from the writer 
and from the artist require from the musician the commitments of [�220$@MM ]⊥ and of 
[�225$@MM ]⊥ respectively. The commitments then together become [�245$@MM ]⊥. On 
the other hand, the sales of mp3 music to the artist and the writer give the musician �210 � 
$@MM and �210 � $@MM , and the sale of the book gives the musician �225 � $@M , which M 
together yield �245 � $@M . This money amount can successfully remove the musician’s M 
commitment of [ 245$@MM ]
⊥ as �245 � $@M 245$@MM ]⊥ � ⊥.M� ⊗ [�
The writer, toward the end of the interaction, will have the original commitment of 
�
�
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[ 2music@WW ]
⊥ ⊗ [�2book@WW ]⊥ removed. The writer also has [�225$@WW ]⊥ from 
the purchase of the book and [�210$@WW ]⊥ from the purchase of two hours mp3 music. 
Together, they make up a commitment: [ 235$@WW ]
⊥. The writer also has �220 � $@WW 
from the sale of the ticket. Similarly the writer has �215 � $@W from the sale of the mp3 W 
player. The writer will have �235$@W and hence can remove the debt. W 
The artist has the commitment of [�3mp3 player@A ]⊥ andA 
[�32mp3@A ]⊥ eventually removed. The artist has a commitment of [�215$@AA ]⊥ fromA 
the purchase of the mp3 player and a commitment of 
[�210$@AA ]⊥ from the purchase of 2 hours of mp3 music. However, the artist gets from the 
sale of the ticket �225 � $@A . The commitments can be fulﬁlled by the money available A 
from the sale. 
Hence, given after all the interaction sessions, no commitments involved at any agents 
are pending, the interaction is successful. 
In the case where the writer chooses to listen to music on its mp3 player, the corresponding 
interactions have similar properties, except that in the end, there is a pending commitment 
[�2mp3 player@W ]⊥ at the writer, which makes the interaction fail. W 
8.2 Temporal Linear Logic (TLL) Modeling 
In this section, we present reﬂective discussions on our TLL modeling framework. Our 
modeling of agent interaction is resource-centric and reﬂects a view of agent interaction in 
terms of resource utilization and actions. 
We discuss the modeling of various interaction concepts based on temporal linear logic as 
introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 (which now is referred to as TLL modeling) from a resource-
conscious view. We also use the concert ticket example (abbreviated as CT example) to 
illustrate our discussions. 
8.2.1 Modeling of Resources 
The properties of interest for resources are when they are produced, when they are used and 
when they persist. Being produced can be readily captured by an introduction of the formula 
representing the resource and persisting means that the formula representing resource is left 
untouched until the resource is used. The use of linear logic and hence TLL in our modeling 
makes it quite natural to capture the use of resources. Because TLL treats formulas as 
resources, resources can be modeled as simply as propositional formulas. Consumption of 
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resources can be naturally modeled as the removal of the appropriate formula. TLL allows 
the removal of formulas via the use of linear implication, such as A ⊗A � ⊥ � ⊥. In classical 
logic or modal logic, once formulas are introduced, it is hard to remove them and hence other 
approaches to modeling resources using these logics require operations to change the values 
of the formulas to reﬂect that the resource formula is no longer available. 
In CT example, resources like money, books, music, mp3 songs, CD players, and so forth 
have been captured successfully by their respective TLL formulas. Whenever these resources 
are used, their formulas are removed as part of the application of rules. For example, an 
application of Rule 3 removes formulas of either (CD and CD player) or (mp3 song and mp3 
player). Similarly, applications of Rules 4 and 8 remove mp3 song and (mp3 song together 
with mp3 player) respectively. Conversely, applications of Rules 3, 4, and 8 introduce new 
resources, such as music (for listening) and CD and music (for performance) which have not 
existed before. 
Another important aspect of modeling resources is to allow direct handling of the quantity 
of resources. Unlike classical logic and modal logic, linear logic and hence TLL makes a 
distinction between having two copies of the same formula and only having one. This makes 
it easy in our modeling to express quantities of resources (by a multiplicative conjunction of 
copies of the same formula). For example, ﬁve dollars can be expressed as �$ ⊗ �$ ⊗ �$ ⊗ �$ ⊗ �$. 
Moreover, changes in resource locations and ownership are also reﬂected via applications 
of Rules 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7. Money are transfered between agents in accordance with the sale 
of goods. In particular, the correct amounts are credited to the sellers while commitments to 
pay are attributed to the buyers. New instances of resource formulas such as �2mp3@AA , �2mp3@WW , 2ticket@MM , and �2mp3 player@AA , are derived to reﬂect that these 
resources are now available and owned by these agents while corresponding commitments 
such as [�2mp3@M ]⊥, [�2mp3@M ]⊥, [�2ticket@AA ]⊥, and [�2mp3 player@W ]⊥ areM M W 
formed to remove those resources from the old owners and locations. 
8.2.2 Modeling Capabilities and Actions 
Modeling capabilities and actions can be done by modeling the eﬀects of them. Two impor­
tant kinds of eﬀects of capabilities and actions in agent interaction are resource transforma­
tions and state updates. While a resource transformation can be regarded as a consumption 
of some resources followed by a production of others, a state update can be regarded as a 
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replacement of the old state by a new state. Such eﬀects are naturally captured by the use of 
linear implication where the removal of old resources or the old state leads to the introduction 
of new resources or a new state. Other approaches using classical logic or modal logic require 
some further operations to change the values of old formulas appropriately. 
In the CT example, the capabilities of agents are encoded via rules that agents can 
perform at any time. The capabilities are to transform resources like Rules 3, 5, and 8 or 
relocate resources to other owners like Rules 1, 2, 4, 6, and 7. These capabilities can be 
used as services to oneself, like Rules 3, 4, and 8 or to other agents (and hence are also 
pre-commitments) like Rules 1, 2, 5, 6, and 7. 
8.2.3 Modeling Base Commitments 
A base commitment is a promise to bring about some resources or to perform some actions. 
On the one hand, it is important to capture the content of the promise as the desired resources 
and/or actions. On the other hand, the modeling should also diﬀerentiate between what is 
promised and the promise itself. 
These aspects are naturally reﬂected in the modeling of a base commitment as a negation 
of the formulas of what must be provided (sharing the same content). Moreover, unlike other 
logics like classical logic and modal logic, in linear logic and hence TLL, positive formulas and 
their negations can be thought as having a mutual causal relationship in that the presence 
of a commitment and the resources needed to fulﬁl it causes the removal of both, as in 
Γ ⊗ [Γ]⊥ = . This means that the presence of what must be provided Γ ⊗ Γ � ⊥ � ⊥
causes the commitment to be fulﬁlled and hence removed. Similarly, the presence of a base 
commitment causes the desired resources and/or actions to be consumed and/or carried out. 
Also, the relationship between a base commitment and what is required to fulﬁll it is also 
captured naturally in the logic modeling as one to one, which is important as it ensures that 
anything more than necessary – more commitments or more resources and actions – are left 
untouched. 
It can be seen that the duality between a base commitment and what must be provided 
is matched by the duality between positive formulas and negative formulas in TLL. This 
ensures that the duality between is maintained and respected in agent reasoning. Indeed, a 
base commitment and what must be provided can be expressed as two sides of a derivation 
in a sequent like 
what must be provided � base commitment 
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The inference rules of TLL and of choice calculus are in place to manipulate these sequents 
while preserving the duality between them. 
Furthermore, the task of fulﬁlling base commitments can then be reduced to simply 
removing negative formulas, which in turn, due to being dual to positive formulas, is es­
sentially deriving the corresponding positive formulas. In the CT example, there are some 
commitments like [�2ticket@MM ]⊥, [�220$@MM ]⊥ at the musician or [�2book@WW ]⊥, 
[�225$@WW ]⊥ at the writer, or [�215$@AA ]⊥ at the artist which can not be fulﬁlled by 
the owner agents alone. Other commitments like [�2music@WW ]⊥, and [�2perf orm@AA ]⊥ 
can be derived internally but require extra commitments which in turn can not be derived 
internally. Trying to remove these negative formulas exerts a pressure on the owner agents 
to seek relevant resources and actions by making requests or proposing to other agents any 
of their interaction rules which can derive these commitments. For example, regarding the 
commitment of [�220$@MM ]⊥, the musician can propose Rule 1 or 2 to sell mp3 music or a 
book to gain some money. Similarly, the commitments of the artist ([�25$@A ]⊥) and the A 
writer ([�25$@W ]⊥) resulting from purchasing music from the musician will prompt them W 
to propose selling their tickets. 
In addition, the duality property can be further explored in the context of proactive 
reasoning. When an agent considers the consequences of having a resource or doing an 
action, named A, it can create a base commitment A⊥ to derive that resource or to do that 
action, and continue further planning and reasoning with the presence of A. This can be 
regarded as simply adding A ⊗ A⊥. Because the concurrent existence of a formula and its 
dual does not produce anything signiﬁcant, like A ⊗ A⊥ � ⊥, assuming their concurrent 
presence then does not distort the overall outcomes, like [A ⊗ A⊥] . Moreover, , Γ � Γ ⊗ ⊥
by making the outcomes of base commitments available via the above-mentioned mechanism 
and reasoning about them with respect to fulﬁlling their goals, agents can reason about base 
commitments, such as which ones to make, and when to make them. This feature is also 
evident in the CT example. For example, in order to satisfy the conditions of Rule 1, the 
artist makes �25$@A available by also making a commitment of [�25$@AA ]⊥. Similarly, A 
the writer makes a commitment of [ 225$@WW ]
⊥ to have �225$@W available to satisfy W 
the condition of Rule 2. 
Moreover, representing base commitments as negative formulas is a stepping stone to­
ward providing a mechanism for expressing their dynamic relationships and manipulating 
them. Existing logic connectives like ⊗, � , ⊕, � are readily available for describing the 
relationships among base commitments. Base commitments can also be embedded in other 
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commitments. For example, an embedded commitment might be (A ⊗ com⊥)⊥, where com⊥ 
is a base commitment. 
However, modeling base commitments as negative formulas causes some diﬃculties in 
handling them. A positive formula A is equivalent to its double negation form: A ≡ (A⊥)⊥. 
Hence, a resource or action A might be interpreted as a base commitment to bring about A⊥, 
which in turn is a base commitment to derive A. On the one hand, this interpretation drives 
the agent to utilize the resource or action A by matching it with a commitment to derive A 
- A⊥. On the other hand, when A⊥ is not readily available, this interpretation complicates 
the utilization of the resource or action A. Therefore, extra caution must be taken in the 
implementation of base commitments as negative formulas to avoid such translation from A 
to (A⊥)⊥. 
Another limitation in our modeling of base commitments as negative formulas concerns 
breakable commitments. In Section 3.3.2, a modeling of breakable base commitments was 
introduced by including an internal choice on the ﬁnal outcome inside the base commitment’s 
formula. This modeling captures breakable commitments in the cases when an agent makes 
a base commitment and retains the choice whether to fulﬁll it or not. The modeling however 
does not capture the cases where the agent does not intend to break the commitment when 
making it. This remains an item of future work. 
Moreover, our modeling does not make a distinction between goals and base commitments. 
Where a distinction should be made between them, treating base commitments as negative 
formulas means that goals must be modeled diﬀerently. This is also an item of future work. 
8.2.4 Modeling Conditional Commitments 
A conditional commitment is essentially one or more base commitments that require prior 
conditions. It is important to capture the relationship between the conditions and the com­
mitment part. In particular, fulﬁllment of the conditions causes the commitment to be 
made. While it is possible to model similar rules in classical logic and modal logic, in TLL, 
conditions � commitments naturally expresses that one provision of the conditions always 
causes one occurrence of the commitment (whereas classically this needs not be the case). 
Also, our modeling expresses each conditional commitment naturally as a one-time relation­
ship between the conditions and the commitments, which prevents the case where the agent 
has to commit whenever the conditions are provided. 
The modeling of conditional commitments is also shown in the example. Rules 1, 2, 5, 6, 
��
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and 7 are also considered as potential conditional commitments of the corresponding owner 
agents. Conditions of these conditional commitments are the dollar amounts to be paid. The 
commitment parts include the dollar amounts the owner agents will receive, the goods for 
the paying agent, and commitments to send the goods from the owner agents. 
These conditional commitments have been formed out of proposals which are made in 
order for the agents to satisfy their commitments of deriving some dollar amount and/or to 
answer others’ requests such as [�2ticket@MM ]⊥ from the musician, [�2mp3@W ]⊥ andW 
[�2book@WW ]⊥ from the writer. In particular, when a proposal is formed toward another 
agent, the agent variable X in the proposal’s rule is assigned to the proposed agent. Once 
the proposal is accepted, the rule becomes a conditional commitment from the owner agent 
to the proposed agent. For example, Rule 1 becomes a conditional commitment from the 
musician to the artist (X is assigned to A) and in another case, from the musician to the 
writer (X is assigned to W ). 
The proposed agents are then responsible to derive the conditions of the conditional 
commitments. For instance, the artist needs to derive �25$@A for the proposal of Rule 1, A 
and �215$@A for the proposal of Rule 6 and the writer needs to derive �25$@W for the A W 
proposal of Rule 1, and �225$@W for the proposal of Rule 2. W 
Whenever these conditions are satisﬁed, the rules owner agents always fulﬁll their com­
mitments by making the commitment part available. This is ensured by the linear impli­
cation that deﬁnitely transforms conditions part to the commitment part. For instance, 
when the writer makes �225$@W available, Rule 2 is applied by the musician to derive W 
2[25 � $@M ⊗ �book@W ⊗ book@M ⊥].M W M 
In many cases, the commitment parts of the conditional commitments also include base 
commitments. For example, there are base commitments of [�2book@MM ]⊥ and 
[�225$@WW ]⊥ in Rule 2. These base commitments are added into the rule owner agents’ 
state formulas. Some of them are fulﬁlled immediately by available resources, like 
[ 2book@MM ]
⊥ being satisﬁed by �book@M . Others like [�225$@WW ]⊥ may require M 
further actions from the rule owner agents. 
8.2.5 Modeling Time 
It is important to be able to express things at speciﬁc time points, with a duration, and 
uncertainty in time as well as time relationships among them. 
Like many other temporal logics, TLL enables the modeling of speciﬁc time points as­
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sociated with an object or event, such as when an action is carried out, or when an event 
occurs. Speciﬁc time points are described by the use of � operator or multiple copies of it. 
For example, there are requirements at the second next time point of tickets at the musi­
cian ([�2ticket@M ]⊥), a book at the writer ([�2book@W ]⊥), and a performance at the M W 
artist ([�2perf orm@A ]⊥. Based on this ability to specify correct time points for actions or A 
events, time order or sequencing of them can also be captured. For example, the performance 
by the artist �3perf orm@A is after its purchases of mp3 music and mp3 player, which are A 
at the second next time point. 
Moreover, uncertainty in time can represented by the use of � and � and their combina­
tions with � in TLL modeling. � can be used to express the notion of “anytime” or outer 
non-determinism while � expresses “sometime” or inner non-determinism. 
In the CT example, resources such the book, mp3 music, mp3 player and CD player are 
available for use at any time, and hence the time of use is unknown but up to the owner’s 
choice and hence preceded by �. The actual time points of the availability of those re­
sources are decided by the owner (internally) as appropriate to their uses. For example, as 
decided by their respective owners, �book@M becomes �2book@MM , �mp3@M becomes M M �2mp3@M , and � i3 ≥0(�iticket@WW ) becomes �2ticket@W . Moreover, a combina-M W 
tion of � and � allows us to describe a resource starting available at any time from a time 
point. For example, after an application of Rule 2 at the second next time point, a book 
becomes available at any time from that time onwards for the writer: �2 � book@W .W 
However, as all the temporal operators in TLL refer to concrete time points, we cannot 
express durations in time faithfully. A duration of an event or a resource availability can 
be expressed by spreading copies of that event or resource over consecutive time points (like 
2A⊗. . .�10 A). In the CT example, tickets belonging to the writer and the artist that �A⊗�
are available from now until the third next time point are encoded as � 3 i≥0(�iticket@AA ) 
and � i3 ≥0(�iticket@WW ). One major disadvantage of simulating a duration is that it 
requires the time range to be provided explicitly. 
Similarly, the “until” relationship between two objects or events like an object A exists 
until an event B occurs can not be speciﬁed intuitively. An example of operational modeling 
of “A until B” is �A ⊗ �(B ⊗ A � B), which requires a provision of the operation to remove 
A whenever B comes into existence in addition to specifying that A exists anytime. This 
operational modeling, however, demands extra handling, such as knowing to reserve �A and 
apply the operation �(B ⊗ A � B) whenever B occurs. 
Another weakness of TLL modeling with respect to time is that there is a lack of a native 
Flexibility in Agent Interaction 210 
operator between the operator ! and � (or �). While �A and � allow only one use of A over 
in inﬁnite time range, !A provides inﬁnite number of A for use any time over inﬁnite time 
range. It then becomes hard in TLL to express such notion that at a speciﬁc time, anytime 
(or sometime), there are unlimited copies of A that can be used. 
Moreover, in TLL, it is diﬃcult to specify things (like formulas A, B, C) with reference 
to the same time point which is uncertain unless they can all be grouped together like 
�(A ⊗ �B ⊗ C). For example, in �(A � Γ) ⊗ � � B ⊗ �C, the occurrences of A, B and C 
need not be at the same time point. 
Moreover, the relationships with temporal operators impose on linear connectives some 
limitations on their interpretations. For example, in TLL, 
�(A ⊗ B) � �A ⊗ �B 
which makes it unusual for such interpretation that having both A and B at the next time 
point does not imply both having A at the next time point and having B at the next time 
point. In fact, ⊗ should be referred to as the co-existence property and hence it should be 
said that the co-existence at the next time point of A and B does not imply the co-existence 
of A at the next time point and B at the next time point. Therefore, care must be taken 
when associating ⊗ (concurrent existence) with the meaning of “and”. 
8.3 Flexibility in Agent Interaction 
We consider several points, including agent interaction and executing speciﬁcations, that can 
increase ﬂexibility. 
8.3.1 Flexibility in TLL Modeling 
Our use of TLL for modeling agent interactions provides ﬂexibility in several ways. 
Firstly, given that ﬂexibility includes the ability to make a sensible choice, having the 
choices expressed explicitly in the speciﬁcation of interaction protocols provides agents with 
an opportunity to reason about them during interaction. In our framework, � , ⊕, � and � 
represent choices of agents. � and ⊕ refer to internal choices and indeterminate possibilities 
on resources and actions, and � and � refer to internal choices and indeterminate possibilities 
with respect to time. 
In the CT example, many resources like the book, CD player, mp3 player, and music are 
available at any time point and hence can be used at any time. This is achieved by using � 
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in the encoding. Also, the writer has an internal choice that he can choose to listen to music 
on the mp3 player or on the CD player. The choice is realized by an encoding that uses ⊕ 
in Rule 3 and via the proof construction process which implements the choice. 
Secondly, the connective ⊗ naturally expresses concurrency, without any ordering con­
straints. This removes the need (such as in traditional approaches using ﬁnite state ma­
chines) to impose unnecessary constraints on the order of resources or actions. Hence, ﬂex­
ibility is obtained by allowing the interaction to determine an appropriate ordering. For 
example, two commitments of the writer in the CT example as described in Section 8.1 are 
[�2music@WW ]⊥ and [�2book@WW ]⊥, and do not require a particular order to be followed 
when fulﬁlling them. Connecting these commitments via ⊗ gives the writer the ﬂexibility to 
work on them in any order. 
8.3.2 Flexibility from Commitment-based Meanings 
Flexibility can also be gained from structuring agent interaction around commitment-based 
meanings as discussed by [Yolum and Singh, 2002a]. 
In our approach, protocols are also speciﬁed as a set of base commitments and pre-
commitments at participating agents. Pre-commitments are utilized to fulﬁll the agents’ 
base commitments and from these conditional commitments emerge. Execution of protocols 
is based on agents fulﬁlling their commitments. As a result, agents have the ﬂexibility 
to choose which actions to carry out to satisfy the commitments that have emerged from 
the protocol’s execution. In comparison to traditional approaches, our approach removes 
unnecessary constraints on which particular interactive actions to be executed by which 
agents and on the order among them. In other words, the speciﬁcation of protocols by using 
commitments gives agents the ﬂexibility to decide which interactive actions to follow. 
8.3.3 Flexibility from Negotiation on Pre-commitments 
In our framework, conditional commitments emerge from negotiations between agents about 
pre-commitments. Further ﬂexibility can be gained from the ability to choose a pre-commitment 
among potentially many proposals from various agents. Hence, agents do not have to follow 
an externally imposed sequence or a set of conditional commitments, but can ﬂexibly choose 
suitable ones from the set of pre-commitments via negotiation to satisfy their needs and cope 
with on-going changes in the environment. This approach also gives agents more autonomy 
in their utilization of conditional commitments. 
Flexibility in Agent Interaction 212 
8.3.4 Flexibility from Declarative Speciﬁcations 
Agent interaction in our approach are speciﬁed in a declarative manner as a set of base com­
mitments and pre-commitments at participating agents. Hence, rather than determining the 
details of interactive actions that agents should follow, the approach speciﬁes what should be 
achieved and what is the norm for engagement (via pre-commitments). The agents then have 
autonomy over how to use their resources, actions, capabilities and conditional commitments 
to fulﬁll their goals and commitments. In particular, as discussed in Chapter 7, agents can 
make use of proof search techniques to construct proofs of goals and base commitments from 
resources, actions, capabilities and conditional commitments. From such proofs, appropriate 
actions can be determined. 
Consider the CT example. There are several threads of interaction as follows. 
Sale of a ticket from the writer to the musician • 
Sale of a ticket from the artist to the musician • 
Sale of a book from the musician to the writer • 
• Sale of an mp3 player from the writer to the artist 
• Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the artist 
• Sale of mp3 music from the musician to the writer 
The peculiar property of the interaction is that these threads are relatively independent from 
each other, in that there is no requirement for other threads to be run prior to, during or 
after any thread. On the one hand, the speciﬁcation of interaction should not impose any 
constraints on the order of execution of threads, which is achieved in our approach by the 
use of the connective ⊗. 
On the other hand, the order among these threads and how they are triggered should be 
determined by the agents. In particular, each thread requires from one agent some commit­
ments to derive money for the application of its rule and brings some money to the other 
agent. These commitments to derive money in turn further cause other threads to occur so 
that the money (or resource in general) generated from the other threads can fulﬁll these 
commitments. The order or chaining of the threads can be determined in a manner similar 
to matching inputs of one process (thread) to outputs of another. Such matching can be 
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implemented based on proof search of the corresponding formulas as demonstrated in Sec­
tion 8.1.2 and exempliﬁed in Section 8.1.3. Moreover, it can be seen from the construction 
of the interaction that each thread can be invoked by either a request from an agent or by 
the rule owner agent making a proposal to fulﬁll its commitments. For example, the request 
[�2book@WW ]⊥ may invoke the thread “Sale of a book from the musician” or be initiated 
by the musician if he has a commitment to obtain some money. 
Flexibility is also provided by the ability to deal with unpredictable changes from the 
environment. In our approach, changes in the environment can be regarded as removing 
or adding formulas onto the state formulas. Because the proof construction processes take 
states into account, changes in the state will be reﬂected in how the proof may be obtained. 
How the proof is obtained in turn alters the sequences of actions of interacting agents either 
by introducing or skipping some actions. Hence, agents can ﬂexibly alter their behaviors to 
deal with changes. 
For example, as shown in Section 8.1.4, the agents artist and writer skip the interaction 
part corresponding to step 5 of the protocol when an mp3 player is brought to the artist 
during step 4. 
Furthermore, ﬂexibility in interaction is evident when protocols can be adjusted and 
merged by agents. Protocols are speciﬁed in terms of a set of base commitments and pre-
commitments that concurrently exist among agents. Hence, adding new base commitments 
(or pre-commitments) or removing existing ones means that the protocol is adjusted, ex­
tended or merged with another protocol. The key factor that enables the protocol with such 
additions or removals to work is the proof construction and negotiation process by agents 
which will determine how pre-commitments are utilized and combined with agents’ resources, 
actions and capabilities to fulﬁll base commitments. Variations amongst base commitments 
then means variations in the combinations that are required to fulﬁll them. Also, variations 
in pre-commitments means variations in the options for proof construction. In addition, a 
modular approach to protocol speciﬁcation can further improve the dynamic formation of 
protocols. Such a modular approach could be based on designing the speciﬁcation compo­
nents — base commitments and pre-commitments — to be independent of each other, which 
simpliﬁes their addition and removal. 
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8.3.5 Flexibility from Partial Handling 
The mechanism to enable partial handling of goals or base commitments and resources or 
actions has been discussed in Chapter 6. Such partial handling has an important conse­
quence for improving ﬂexibility in agent interaction. Speciﬁcally, the division of goals or 
base commitments and resources or actions can be done dynamically by agents rather than 
being speciﬁed by human designers. More importantly, because the division can be done 
with respect to an arbitrary sub-formula, it can be done quite ﬂexibly by agents as required 
by the context or as the agents choose. This means that in an interaction, depending on the 
context, agents can choose part of a goal or base commitment to fulﬁll and hence choose a 
part of the resources or actions available, as appropriate. 
8.3.6 Flexibility from Strategies to Deal with Choices and Changes 
Chapter 5 discussed how various strategies about choices can be enabled in agent reasoning. 
As a result agents can choose which strategies to follow in order to fulﬁl their goals or base 
commitments. Such strategies include deciding choices in advance or at their associated 
times, taking a safe approach by preparing for all the possibilities in advance or taking a 
bold approach by predicting some of the outcomes. Hence, ﬂexibility of interaction can be 
further gained by enabling various strategies in dealing with choices for agents. 
Moreover, as agents apply various strategies to decide on choices to fulﬁll their goals or 
base commitments, there is a trade-oﬀ between preserving resources or actions reservation 
and having choices. Consider the two extreme cases below. 
The ﬁrst case is that all the choices are decided. Hence, all the resources or actions and 
goals or base commitments are known precisely. This means that the resources and actions 
required will be the minimum. 
The other extreme is that all the choices are left undecided. In this case, in order to 
fulﬁll goals or base commitments, all possible cases of the goals or base commitments must 
be prepared. Also, as choices in resources or actions bring uncertainty, more resources or 
actions are required to make sure that these are suﬃcient for whatever choices are made. In 
this case, the resources and actions required will be maximal, as will the agents’ ﬂexibility. 
Between the two extremes are those cases where agents decide on some choices and 
postpone decisions on others. The choices decided will eliminate the need for reservation 
of the corresponding resources or actions and hence possibly reduce the possible interaction 
sequences. The choices postponed provide agents with ﬂexibility. Hence, agents can choose 
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the degree of ﬂexibility they determine is appropriate. 
8.4 Timed Petri Nets as Execution Models 
Chapters 4 and 7 have addressed a possible execution framework for TLL speciﬁcations based 
on proof search. To justify our choice of this framework, we consider an alternative approach 
which makes use of the well known formalism of timed Petri nets. 
Timed Petri nets (TPNs) have been used as a visual and mathematical tool for modeling 
concurrent systems. Given that TPNs and TLL have been shown to be strongly related 
[Hirai, 1999], it is worth investigating further the relationship between TPNs and TLL to 
take advantage of available techniques for TPNs to address issues of execution and veriﬁcation 
of TLL speciﬁcations. 
In particular, we investigate the mapping between TLL formulas and TPNs based on 
previous work on Petri nets as models of Intuitionistic linear logic [Engberg and Winskel, 
1994; 1993] and the equivalence result between reachability in timed Petri nets and provability 
in a fragment of TLL in [Hirai, 1999]. 
8.4.1 Deﬁnition of Timed Petri Nets 
We consider a description of a (place) timed Petri net (TPN) and related deﬁnitions based 
on [Hirai, 1999] as follows. 
Deﬁnition 16. A (place) timed Petri net is a tuple (Pl, Tr,Ar,Θ), where:

Pl is a ﬁnite set of places

Tr is a ﬁnite set of transitions (disjoint from Pl)

Ar: (Pl × Tr) ∪ (Tr × Pl) → N is a weighted set of arcs

Θ: Pl N is a function denoting the waiting time for a given token(s) to become available.
→ 
Transitions are deﬁned in Deﬁnition 19 below. 
A place p ∈ Pl can hold an arbitrary non-negative multiplicity of tokens. Each place rep­
resents a unique TLL formula type. A token at a place represents a copy of the corresponding 
formula type. Without being consumed, a token persists in time. 
For representation purposes, we denote a token at the place p as �p if p is available now 
or �i � p if p will become available from exactly the ith next time point with reference to 
the starting time of the net as 0. An untimed representation of a token at a place p in TLL 
is p. For simplicity, unless distinction must be made, we will use p to mean p. Representing 
{�
{�
� {�
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in TLL a token at the place p that becomes available from exactly the ith next time point is 
ithen straightforward as � � p. 
iWe further deﬁne a set Plt whose elements are of the form � �p for p ∈ Pl and 0 ≤ i ≤ n, 
where n is the upper bound in operation time of the net. We assume that the net operates 
in ﬁnite amount of time, and hence n is ﬁnite. This set hence represents all tokens which 
will become available at the i time points. 
A marking M of a net is a multiset of tokens. We deﬁne a marking at the ith next time 
point over the set Plt as follows. 
Deﬁnition 17. A marking at the ith next time point, denoted as �iMi is a multiset with 
an associate function M : Plt → N. 
Note that �iMi contains all the tokens which will become available exactly at the time 
i and are not available before that time. Tokens at a place p of a marking �iMi is denoted 
as �iMi(p). An example is 
i i i i i�iMi = � p1,� � p1,� � p2} and �iMi(p1) = {� � p1,� � p1}. 
The binary operation + on markings (as multisets) is deﬁned by 
(�iMi + �iMj )(p) = �iMi(p) + �iMj (p),∀p ∈ Plt. 
2 2 2M 2 2For example, let �2M2 = {� � p1,� � p2}, � 2� = � p2,� � p3} then 
2 2(�2M2 + �2M2�)(p2) = {� � p2,� � p2}. 
Hence, for all places p ∈ Plt, 
2 2 22M2 + �2M2� = 2 � p1,� � p2,� � p2,� � p3}. 
In TLL, a multiset represents a multiplicative conjunction of formulas. Hence we will 
write the binary operation + on multisets as the connective ⊗. 
We denote �iMi as the TLL formula corresponding to the marking �iMi. Given �iMi = 
i i i� p1,� � p1,� � p2}, for example, then �iMi = i i i � p2. Also, {� � � p1 ⊗ � � p1 ⊗ �
the correspondence between the multiset binary operation + and ⊗ yields 
�iMi + �j Mj = �iMi ⊗ �j Mj . 
During operation period of the net, as time passes, the number of time points after which 
tokens of a marking will become available is reduced. For example, after one time point 
ipassing, a token � � p becomes �i−1 � p. We denote a marking �iMi as �i−1Mi after one 
time point passes and similarly as �i−2Mi after two time points pass. 
� 
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Deﬁnition 18. A state S of a net is a multiset of markings in time and is deﬁned as 
S = M0 + �M1 + � + �nMn = n2M2 + · · · i≥0 �iMi, 
where �iMi is a marking at the ith next time points and n is the upper bound in operation 
time of the net. 
From the deﬁnition, a state contains all the markings associated with all the time points 
of the operation period. Given that each marking �iMi represents all the tokens that (will) 
become available at a speciﬁc time point, a state contains all the tokens that are currently 
available and will be available during the operation period of the net. In other words, a state 
is a distribution of tokens over places of the net in time. 
The TLL formula corresponding to a state S is: 
S + �nMn = M0 ⊗�M1 ⊗ . . .⊗�nMn.= M0 + �M1 + �2M2 + · · ·
The + operation among states is then deﬁned as (S+ S�)(a) = S(a) + S�(a),∀a ∈ Plt. In 
the notation of multisets, + is deﬁned as follows: 
iMS + S� = M0 + M0� + �M1 + �M1� + · · ·+ �iMi + � � + · · · = �i(�iMi + �iMi�).i 
The corresponding TLL formula is : 
S + S� = M0 ⊗M0� ⊗�M1 ⊗�M1� ⊗ . . .⊗�iMi ⊗�iMi� ⊗ . . . . 
Derivations of states can be of two forms: derivations due to ﬁring transitions and time 
derivations. 
Deﬁnition 19. Let �iτ+ be a multiset over Plt containing tokens which will become available i 
at the ith next time point. A ﬁring transition τ ∈ Tr of a (place) timed Petri net N is a 
mapping which takes a multiset of (−τ0) and gives another multiset (τ+ + �τ+ + �2τ+ +0 1 
n ).+ �nτ+ · · ·
A ﬁring derivation is enabled at S if and only if −τ ⊆ M0 or equivalently M0 = M0τ +− τ . 
If a ﬁring is enabled at an instant, it is ﬁred at that instant and will consume −τ . 
Denote S[δ� as a state reached by S via a ﬁring derivation τ . Then from the deﬁnition, 
S[τ� = [M0τ + �M1 + �2M2 + . . . ] + [τ+ + �τ+ + �2τ+ + . . . ]0 1 2 
= M0τ + τ+ + �M1 + �τ1+ + �2M2 + �2τ+ + . . . .0 2 
2 
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The TLL representation of a transition τ is 
τ = −τ � τ0+ ⊗ �τ1+ 2τ+ ⊗ . . .⊗ �nτ+ 2 n .⊗ �
Denote a state S in TLL as 
S = M0 ⊗ �M1 ⊗ �2M2 ⊗ . . . 
In TLL notation, a ﬁring derivation is expressed as 
S ⊗ τ = [M0τ ⊗ −τ ⊗ �M1 ⊗ . . . ] [−τ � τ+ ⊗ �τ1+ ⊗ . . . ]0⊗ 
[M0τ ⊗ �M1 ⊗ . . . ] [τ+ ⊗ �τ1+ ⊗ . . . ]0� ⊗ 
= M0τ ⊗ τ0+ ⊗ �M1 ⊗ �τ1+ ⊗ . . . 
= S[τ�. 
Deﬁnition 20. Let S = M0 + �M1 + �2M2 + . . . be a state in a (place) timed Petri Net 
N. A time derivation δ is deﬁned as having a reached state S[δ� at the next time point as 
follows: 
S[δ� = M0 + M1 + �M2 + �2M3 + . . . . 
In TLL notation, S[δ� = M0 ⊗ M1 ⊗ �M2 ⊗ �2M3 ⊗ . . . Note that S[δ� = �S as 
[M0 ⊗ M1 ⊗ �M2 ⊗ . . . ] = [ 2M2 ⊗ . . . ]� � M0 ⊗ �M1 ⊗ �
We denote that a state S� is reached from a state S by a sequence of ﬁring derivations 
tand time derivations over a period of t time units as S t S�. Note that, the notation → → 
does not impose any particular order in time of the ﬁring derivations. 
An example is S = {�p1,�p2}, which means the state has a token at place p1 and a token 
at place p2 at the initial time. 
A transition τ is given in which 
−τ = {p1}, and τ+ = {�p1},�τ1+ = 2 = ∅, . . . .0 {�� p2,�� p2},�2τ+ 
Hence, the transition τ is enabled at the time t = 0 and it is ﬁred. A state S� is reached. 
S� = The time derivation of S� at the time t+1 is S�� = S�[δ� ={�p1,� � p2,� � p2}. 
{�p1,�p2,�p2}. 
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8.4.2 Properties of (Place) Timed Petri Nets 
In order to provide the analysis of (place) timed Petri nets as models of a fragment of TLL 
(see Section 8.4.3), we formalize some properties of (place) timed Petri nets as follows. For 
consistency, we also re-establish the equivalence between reachability in (place) timed Petri 
nets and provability in TLL, which was established in [Hirai, 1999] in a diﬀerent manner. 
Lemma 8.4.1. Let �iMi be a marking in a place timed Petri Net as deﬁned above at the 
i i iith next time point. Let �iMi be � � p1 + � � p2 + · · ·+ � � pj + . . . .

Let �i−1Mi be the result of replacing every token in �iMi by a token at the same place but at

the (i−1)th next time point, so that �i−1Mi = i−1 � p1 + �i−1 � p2 + · · ·+ �i−1 � pj+ . . . .

Then we have �iMi � ��i−1Mi. 
Proof: We make use of the following result in TLL �A⊗�B � �(A⊗B). 
A � A B � B 
A,B � A⊗B ⊗L �A,�B � �(A⊗B) � �A⊗�B � �(A⊗B) ⊗L 
By applying this result repeatedly, we can prove 
�A⊗�B ⊗ . . . � �(A⊗B ⊗ . . . ). 
iThe TLL formula of �iMi is �iMi = i i � p2 ⊗ . . .⊗� � pj . . . .� � p1 ⊗�
Also, �i−1Mi = i−1 � p2 ⊗ . . .⊗�i−1 � pj . . . .�i−1 � p1 ⊗�
We have 
. . . . 
i � p1 ⊗ �i � p2 ⊗ . . .⊗ �i � pj . . . � �(�i−1 i−1 � p2 ⊗ . . .⊗ �i−1 � pj . . . )� � p1 ⊗ �
�iMi � ��i−1Mi−1

Theorem 8.4.2. Let S be a state of a place timed Petri net as deﬁned above. Let S[δ� be a 
state reached from S after a time derivation. Then 
S � S[δ� 
Proof: 
Denote the formula corresponding to the state S as 
S = M0 ⊗�M1 ⊗�2M2 ⊗ . . . . 
� 
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Then S[δ� = M0 ⊗ M1 ⊗ �M2 ⊗ . . . . 
As M0 contains tokens of the form �pi, M0 can be regarded as formula of the form �Π. 
Hence, M0 can act as a context formula (unchanged) in the � rule. We have the following 
proof: 
M0 ⊗ M1 ⊗ �M2 ⊗ . . . � M0 ⊗ M1 ⊗ �M2 ⊗ . . . (�) 
M0 ⊗ �M1 ⊗ ��M2 ⊗ . . . � �[M0 ⊗ M1 ⊗ �M2 ⊗ . . . ] 
M0 ⊗ �M1 ⊗ ��M2 ⊗ . . . � �S[δ� 
From Lemma 8.4.1, we have �iMi � ��i−1Mi. Hence, �M1 � �M1, �2M2 � ��M2, 
and so on. 
. . . M0 � M0 �M1 � �M1 �2M2 � ��M2 
M0 ⊗ �M1 ⊗ �2M2 ⊗ . . . � M0 ⊗ �M1 ⊗ ��M2 ⊗ . . . 
S � M0 ⊗ �M1 ⊗ ��M2 ⊗ . . . 
Hence, by the cut rule, we have a proof of the lemma 
S � [M0 ⊗ �M1 ⊗ ��M2 ⊗ . . . ] [M0 ⊗ �M1 ⊗ ��M2 ⊗ . . . ] � �S[δ� 
S � �S[δ� 
Lemma 8.4.3. Let S and S�� be states of a place timed Petri net as deﬁned above. Let S� be 
a state reached from S after ﬁring derivations and time derivations over a period of t time 
tunit(s). Let S��[δ� denote the state S�� after undergoing t unit time derivations. We have 
t tS S� = S + S�� t S� + S��[δ�→ ⇒ → 
Proof : Suppose that S reaches S� in n derivations, of which t derivations are time deriva­
tions. We proceed by induction on the length of the derivations. 
t tBase case: When n = 0, t = 0, we have S → S, S��[δ� = S��, and so S+ S�� → S+ S��[δ� . 
Hypothesis: The Lemma holds for the case of n − 1 ≥ 0 derivations in tn−1 ≥ 0 time 
units: 
S 
tn−1 
S� �n−1 = S + S�� 
tn−1 
Sn−1 + S��[δ�tn−1 .→ ⇒ → 
Induction step: we need to prove for the case of n derivations: 
tnS 
tn S� = S + S�� tn S� + S��[δ� .n ⇒ n→ → 
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Let S� 2n−1 = M0 + �M1 + �2M2 + . . . , and S��[δ�tn−1 = M0�� + �M1�� + �2M �� + . . . 
The state reached after n − 1 transitions Sn−1 + S��[δ�tn−1 is = (M0 + M0��) + (�M1 + �M1��) + (�2M2 + �2M2��) + . . . . (*) 
After n− 1 transitions, there are two cases of the next transition, either a ﬁring derivation 
or a time derivation. 
In the case when the next transition is a ﬁring derivation τ , we have 
τ = −τ � τ+ ⊗ �τ1+ ⊗ �2τ2+ ⊗ . . .⊗ �nτ+ n0 
then from (*), the state reached after n transitions from S + S�� is 
[S�n−1 + S��[δ�tn−1 ][τ� = (M0 −− τ + τ+ + M0��) + (�M1 + �M �� + �τ1+) + . . . .0 1 
Whereas S� = S�n−1[τ� = (M0 −− τ + τ0+) + (�M1 + �τ1+) + . . . .n 
tnAlso, because the transition is τ , there is no change in time, tn = tn−1, and so S��[δ� = 
S��[δ�tn−1 . 
tnHence, together, S� + S��[δ�n 
= [(M0 −− τ + τ0+) + (�M1 + �τ1+) + . . . ] + [M �� + �M �� + . . . ]0 1 
= (M0 −− τ + τ+ + M0��) + (�M1 + �M �� + �τ1+) + . . . .0 1 
Therefore, 
tn[Sn−1 + S��[δ�tn−1 ][τ� = S� + S��[δ� .� n 
In the case when the next transition is a time derivation δ of one time unit, we have from 
(*) that the state reached after n transitions is 
[S�n−1 + S��[δ�tn−1 ][δ� = (M0 + M �� + M1 + M1��) + (�M2 + �M2��) + (�2M3 + �2M3��) + . . . .0 
Whereas S� = Sn−1[δ� = M0 + M1 + �M2 + �2M3 + . . . .n 
Also, S��[δ�tn = S��[δ�tn−1 [δ� = M �� + M �� + �M �� + �2M �� + . . . .0 1 2 3 
tnThen together, S� + S��[δ�n 
= [M0 + M1 + �M2 + �2M3 . . . ] + [M �� + M �� + �M �� + �2M �� + . . . ]0 1 2 3 
= (M0 + M �� + M1 + M1��) + (�M2 + �M2��) + (�2M3 + �2M3��) + . . . 0 
Therefore, 
tn[S�n−1 + S��[δ�tn−1 ][δ� = S� + S��[δ� .n 
� 
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From the hypothesis and for all the cases of the next transition, we have 
tnS + S�� t S� + S��[δ� .n→ 
By induction, we can conclude that 
t tS S� = S + S�� t S� + S��[δ� .→ ⇒ → 
We consider further a proof system for Intuitionistic TLL discussed in [Hirai, 1999]. 
Deﬁnition 21. Let ITLLo be a subsystem of Instuitionistic TLL that is obtained by replacing 
the sequent rule 
Γ � F Δ � G ⊗RΓ,Δ � F ⊗ G 
by the sequent rule 
Γ, F � F Δ, G � G o 
Γ,Δ, F,G � F ⊗ G ⊗R
and in which all atoms are of the form �p. 
Also, we will write a sequent of the form 1 ⊗ S � �t(1 ⊗ S�) as S � �tS�. Sequents of 
the form S � �tS� are understood in this way unless otherwise stated. 
We also equip the proof system ITLLo with a set of axioms that are based on the set of 
transitions Tr of the net N. In particular, for each transition in Tr (in TLL notation) 
τ = −τ � τ+0 +1 +2 ⊗ . . .⊗ �nτ+ .n⊗ �2τ⊗ �τ
the following axiom is added: 
� −τ � τ+0 +1 +2 + n⊗ �2τ⊗ �τ ⊗ . . .⊗ �nτ
In this proof system, a correspondence between reachability in a (place) timed Petri net 
and provability of the corresponding state formulas in the logic fragment can be established 
[Hirai, 1999]. 
Theorem 8.4.4. Let N be a (place) timed Petri net. Let S, S’ be states of it and Tr be a set 
of its transitions. Let Ax be a set of axioms corresponding to Tr. Then S’ is reachable from 
S after a passage of t time units if and only if the sequent S � �tS� is provable in ITLLo 
using Ax. 
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Proof: a proof can be found in [Hirai, 1999]. � 
We consider a special case of the theorem. 
Corollary 8.4.5. S 0 S� ⇐⇒ S � S�.→ 
Moreover, we have following lemma regarding derivations of a combination of states. 
t tLemma 8.4.6. (S + S�)[δ� = S[δ�t + S�[δ�
Proof. S + S� = M0 + M0� + �M1 + �M1� + . . . . 
(S + S�)[δ�t = (M0 + M0� + M1 + M � + Mt + Mt�) + �Mt+1 + �Mt�+1 + . . . 1 + · · ·

S[δ�t = (M0 + M1 + · · ·+ Mt) + �Mt+1 + . . .

S�[δ�t = (M � + M � + Mt�) + �M � + . . . 0 1 t+1+ · · ·
tHence, S[δ�t + S�[δ� = 
(M0 + M0
� + M1 + M � + Mt + Mt�) + �Mt+1 + �Mt�+1 + · · · = (S + S�)[δ�1 + · · · t � 
8.4.3 Timed Petri Nets as Models of a Fragment of TLL 
Our approach extends the approach in [Engberg and Winskel, 1993; 1994] on Petri Nets as 
Models of Linear Logic to cover the relationships between Temporal Linear Logic and timed 
Petri nets. 
Firstly, we deﬁne a fragment of Intuitionistic TLL that is suitable for mapping. 
Consider a sub system PITLL of Intuitionistic TLL (ITLL). Its language is deﬁned as: 
A⊗A A � A A � AA ::= �|⊥|1| � a|� A| | |
where a ranges over linear logic atoms. 
Note that the symbol � is only used in atomic propositions. This together with a lack of 
the ⊕ connective makes this fragment fundamentally diﬀerent from MCA (deﬁnition 9). 
The sequent calculus corresponding to this fragment clearly can exclude the left and right 
introduction rules for ⊕, and the modal rules for left and right �. 
Interpretation on Timed Petri Nets 
In the fragment, all atomic TLL formulas are of the form �a, where a is a proposition. �a is interpreted as a singleton multiset denoted as �a. An assertion A (TLL formula) is 
considered at the present time. To consider an assertion A in the future, we use �tA. 
Similar to the approach in [Engberg and Winskel, 1993; 1994], we make use of the notion 
that denotation of an assertion (TLL formula) is a set of requirements (states) suﬃcient to 
� 
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establish it. Speciﬁcally, an assertion is denoted as a subset of states at the present time 
which is downward closed with respect to the reachability of the net with no time derivations. 
Here, a downward closure of a state S is deﬁned as: 
0 ↓ S = {S� S� → S}, where S is the set of all the states at present time. ∈ S|
Formally, we establish an interpretation of assertions in TLL as follows. 
Deﬁnition 22. Let N denote a (place) timed Petri net N as deﬁned in Section 8.4.1. Let 
S be all the states at the present, and 0 be the state corresponding to the empty multi-set. 
Then formulas in the fragment PITLL are interpreted in N as follows. 
[[�]]N = S 
[[⊥]]N = ∅ 
0[[1]]N = {S|S →
0 
0}
[[�a]]N = S{S| → �a}
[[�A]]N = S[δ� ∈ [[A]]}{S|
[[A⊗ B]]N = {S|∃SA ∈ [[A]] ,∃SB ∈ [[B]] , S 0 SA + SB }→ 
[[A � B]]N = {S|∀SA ∈ [[A]] , S + SA ∈ [[B]]}
[[A � B]]N = [[A]] [[B]]. 
With respect to this interpretation, we will establish that a timed Petri net N is a model 
of the fragment of TLL mentioned above by proving that if A � B then [[A]]N semantically 
entails [[B]]N and vice versa. 
Given that set inclusion corresponds to implication, a semantic entailment between as­
sertions A and B is given as: A �N B ⇐⇒ [[A]]N ⊆ [[B]]N 
Firstly, we consider soundness. Note that from now on, we write [[A]] for a shorthand 
and assume the reference to the net N is understood in the context. 
Theorem 8.4.7. (Soundness) If Γ � A then [[Γ]] ⊆ [[A]] 
Proof : We need to prove that each rule is sound under this interpretation. 
Case: 
A � A 
It is clear that [[A]] ⊆ [[A]]. 
Case: 
Γ � A Δ � B 
Γ,Δ � A⊗ B 
� �
� �
� 
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From S ∈ [[Γ ⊗Δ]] ⇒ ∃SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] , ∃SΔ ∈ [[Δ]] , S 0 S� + SΔ.� � Γ �→
Also, from Γ � A ⇒ ∀SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] , SΓ ∈ [[A]]. Given SΓ ∈ [[Γ]], then SΓ ∈ [[A]]. 
From Δ � B ⇒ ∀SΔ ∈ [[Δ]] , SΔ ∈ [[B]]. Given SΔ ∈ [[Δ]], then SΔ ∈ [[B]]. 
Hence, SΓ ∈ [[A]] and SΔ ∈ [[B]]. From the deﬁnition, we have S� + SΔ ∈ [[A⊗B]].� � Γ �
From S 0 S� + SΔ ∈ [[A⊗B]], then S ∈ [[A⊗B]].Γ �→
Case: 
Γ, A � C 
Γ, A � B � C 
We have S ∈ [[Γ ⊗ (A � B)]] ⇐⇒ ∃SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] ,∃SAB ∈ [[A]] � [[B]] , S 0 SΓ + SAB . � →
As SAB ∈ [[A]] [[B]] ⇒ SAB ∈ [[A]], we hence denote SA = SAB . 
0Hence, S 0 SΓ + SAB also means S → SΓ + SA. From the deﬁnition, SΓ + SA ∈ [[Γ ⊗A]],→
we then have S ∈ [[Γ ⊗A]]. In order to conclude Γ, A � B � C, we then need to establish 
that S ∈ [[C]]. 
In fact, the antecedent gives 
Γ, A � C �, S� ∈ [[Γ ⊗A]] ⇒ S� ∈ [[C]]⇐⇒ ∀S
As from above S ∈ [[Γ ⊗A]], let S� = S ∈ [[Γ ⊗A]] then we have S ∈ [[C]]. 
Case: 
Γ � A Γ � B 
Γ � A � B 
For any S ∈ [[Γ]], from the antecedents, Γ � A and Γ � B, we have S ∈ [[A]] and S ∈ [[B]]. 
Hence S ∈ [[A]] [[B]] ⇐⇒ S ∈ [[A � B]]. In other words, ∀S ∈ [[Γ]] , S ∈ [[A � B]] ⇐⇒ 
Γ � A � B. 
Case: 
Γ � A Δ, B � C 
Γ,Δ, A � B � C 
Consider S ∈ [[Γ ⊗Δ ⊗ (A � B)]] 
⇐⇒ ∃SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] ,∃SΔ ∈ [[Δ]] ,∃SA�B ∈ [[A � B]] , S 0 SΓ + SΔ + SA�B .→
We need to prove that S ∈ [[C]]. 
SA�B ∈ [[A � B]] ⇐ 0 SB ∈ [[B]].⇒ ∀SA ∈ [[A]] , SA + SA�B →
From the antecedent Γ � A, we have ∀S, SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] ⇒ SΓ ∈ [[A]]. Hence SΓ + SA�B 0 → SB ∈ 
[[B]]. 
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0We then have S 0 SΓ + SΔ + SA�B SΔ + SB from Lemma 8.4.3, which means that → → 
S ∈ [[Δ ⊗B]]. 
From the antecedent Δ, B � C, we have ∀S�, S� ∈ [[Δ ⊗B]] ⇒ S� ∈ [[C]]. Let S� = S then 
we have S ∈ [[C]]. 
Hence S 0 SΔ + SB ⇒ S ∈ [[C]].→
Case: 
Γ, A � B 
Γ � A � B 
We have to prove that for any S ∈ [[Γ]] ⇒ S ∈ [[A � B]]

⇐⇒ ∀S ∈ [[Γ]] ,∀SA ∈ [[A]] , SA + S ∈ [[B]].

We have that ∀S ∈ [[Γ]] ,∀SA ∈ [[A]] , S + SA ∈ [[Γ ⊗A]] from the deﬁnition.

From the antecedent Γ, A � B, then ∀S� ∈ [[Γ ⊗A]] , S� ∈ [[B]]. Let S� = SA + S, then also

SA + S ∈ [[B]].

Case: 
Γ,Ξ � A 
Γ,�Ξ ��A 
Note that Γ here contains token formulas all of which are of the form �pi. In other words,

Γ is of the form �Ψ. Because these tokens are unchanged as time passes, we have that

∀SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] , SΓ[δ� ∈ [[Γ]].

Consider ∀S ∈ [[Γ ⊗�Ξ]] ⇐⇒ ∀S, ∃SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] , ∃S�Ξ[δ� ∈ [[Ξ]] , S 0 SΓ + S�Ξ.
→
We need to prove that S ∈ [[�A]]. Given that SΓ[δ� ∈ [[Γ]] as above, SΓ[δ� + S�Ξ[δ� ∈ 
[[Γ ⊗ Ξ]]. 
From the antecedent, Γ,Ξ � A ⇒ ∀S� ∈ [[Γ ⊗ Ξ]] , S� ∈ [[A]]. 
Taking S� = SΓ[δ�+ S�Ξ[δ�, then SΓ[δ�+ S�Ξ[δ� ∈ [[A]] 
⇐⇒ [SΓ + S�Ξ][δ� ∈ [[A]], according to Lemma 8.4.6 
⇐⇒ [SΓ + S�Ξ] ∈ [[�A]]. 
As S 0 SΓ + S�Ξ, and [SΓ + S�Ξ] ∈ [[�A]], then S ∈ [[�A]].→
Case: 
Γ � C 
Γ, 1 � C 
∀S ∈ [[Γ ⊗ 1]] ⇐⇒ ∀S, ∃SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] , ∃S1 ∈ [[1]] , S 0 SΓ + S1.→
� 
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0 0We need to prove S ∈ [[C]]. Note that ∀S1 ∈ [[1]] , S1 0 0. Hence, S SΓ +S1 SΓ +0 = SΓ→ → →
from Lemma 8.4.3.

The antecedent Γ � C ⇒ ∀SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] , SΓ ∈ [[C]]. Let S� = SΓ then SΓ ∈ [[C]]. As S 0 SΓ,
� � Γ →
S ∈ [[C]]. 
Case: 
� 1 
This is obvious as an empty multiset 0 ∈ [[1]]. 
Case: 
Γ � � 
∀S ∈ [[Γ]] , S ∈ [[�]] as [[�]] is the set of all states. 
In order to prove the completeness theorem, we ﬁrst prove the following lemma. 
Lemma 8.4.8. [[Γ]] = {S|S � Γ}

Proof : We proceed by induction on the structure of Γ.

Base cases: We consider in turn the cases for Γ as �, ⊥, 1 and �a.

Case: [[�]] = {S .
|S � �}
[[�]] = S, which contains all the states at present time. We also have ∀S ∈ S , S � �. 
Case: [[⊥]] = {S .|S � ⊥}
Because there is no state such that S � ⊥, {S ∅ = [[⊥]].|S � ⊥} = 
Case: [[1]] = {S .|S � 1}
From the deﬁnition, [[1]] = {S S 0 . As S reaches a state corresponds to an empty mul-| → 0}
tiset 0, S must be empty. Hence, S � 1 corresponds to � 1, which is an axiom in TLL. 
Case: [[�a]] = {S .|S � �a}
0[[�a]] = {S S → �a}, from the deﬁnition ⇐ S � �a}, from Corollary 8.4.5. | ⇒ {S|
Induction step 
Hence we have that the lemma holds when Γ contains the basic forms above, i.e. that 
[[Γ]] = {S S ∈ [[Γ]]} = S � Γ}, for Γ ∈ {�,⊥, 1,�a}.| {S|
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We now proceed to the other cases for Γ. 
Case: [[�A]] = {S|S � �A}. 
We ﬁrst prove that if S ∈ [[�A]] then S � �A. 
[[�A]] = {S S[δ� ∈ [[A]]}, from the deﬁnition |
⇐⇒ [[�A]] = {S|∃SA ∈ [[A]] , S[δ� 0 SA}, from the deﬁnition of downward closure. → 
0 1 ⇒ [[�A]] = {S|∃SA ∈ [[A]] , S 1 SA}, as S[δ� SA means S SA.→ → → 
⇐⇒ [[�A]] = {S|∃SA ∈ [[A]] , S � �SA}, from theorem 8.4.4. 
⇐⇒ [[�A]] = {S SA � A; S � �SA}, from induction steps above. |
⇒ [[�A]] = {S � SA � �A; S � �SA}, applying � rule.| 
⇒ [[�A]] = {S S � �A}, applying cut rule. |
Next we prove that if S � �A then S ∈ [[�A]]. 
From corollary 8.4.5, S � �A S 1 A, where A corresponds to the state notation of ⇒ → 
formula A in the net. Consider S 1 A. Indeed, the sequence of transitions from S to A can→
1 0be expressed in a form S 0 S� → S�[δ� → A. Note that S� could be either the same as S→ 
or diﬀerent from it. From S�[δ� 0 A, we have S�[δ� ∈ [[A]], which also means S� ∈ [[�A]].→ 
Moreover, as ∃S� ∈ [[�A]] , S 0 S�, we have S ∈ [[�A]] from the deﬁnition of download → 
closure. 
Case: [[A⊗ B]] = {S|S � A⊗ B}
We ﬁrst prove that if S ∈ [[A⊗ B]] then S � A⊗ B. 
[[A⊗ B]] = {S|∃SA ∈ [[A]] , SB ∈ [[B]] , S 0 SA + SB }, from the deﬁnition. → 
⇐⇒ [[A⊗ B]] = {S|∃SA, SB ; SA � A; SB � B; S 0 SA + SB }, from induction steps above. → 
⇐⇒ [[A⊗ B]] = {S|∃SA, SB ; SA � A; SB � B; S � SA + SB }, from corollary 8.4.5. 
⇒ [[A⊗ B]] = {S|∃SA, SB ; SA ⊗ SB � A⊗ B; S � SA ⊗ SB }, applying ⊗ rule and the corre­
spondence between ⊗ and +. 
⇒ [[A⊗ B]] = {S S � A⊗ B}, applying cut rule. |
Next we prove that if S � A⊗ B then S ∈ [[A⊗ B]]. 
[[A⊗ B]] = {S
|S � A⊗ B}

⇐⇒ [[A⊗ B]] = {S S 0 A⊗ B}, from corollary 8.4.5. |
0 
→ 
⇒ [[A⊗ B]] = {S S A+ B}, from the correspondence between ⊗ and +. | → 
⇒ [[A⊗ B]] = {S S ∈ [[A⊗ B]]}, from the deﬁnition and given that A ∈ [[A]] and B ∈ [[B]].|
� 
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Case: [[A � B]] = { S S � A � B}|
We ﬁrst prove that if S ∈ [[A � B]] then S � A � B. 
[[A � B]] = { S|∀ SA ∈ [[A]] , S + SA ∈ [[B]]} , from the deﬁnition. 
[[A � B]] = { S|∀ SA ∈ [[A]] , S + SA 0 SB ∈ [[B]]} , from the deﬁnition of downward ⇐⇒ → 
closure.

⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S|∀ SA ∈ [[A]] , S + SA � SB ; SB ∈ [[B]]} , from corollary 8.4.5.

⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S|∀ SA ∈ [[A]] , S ⊗ SA � SB ; SB � B} , from the induction steps above

and the correspondence between ⊗ and +.

⇒ [[A � B]] = { S S ⊗ A � B} , from choosing SA = A and applying cut rule. | 
⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S S � A � B} .| 
Next we prove that if S � A � B then S ∈ [[A � B]]. 
[[A � B]] = { S S � A � B}| 
⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S| S ⊗ A � B} 
⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S|∀ SA ∈ [[A]] , SA � A; S ⊗ A � B} , consider further SA ∈ [[A]] and from 
the induction steps above. 
⇒ [[A � B]] = { S|∀ SA ∈ [[A]] , SA ⊗ S � B} , applying cut rule. 
⇒ [[A � B]] = { S|∀ SA ∈ [[A]] , SA + S � B} , from the correspondence between ⊗ and +. 
[[A � B]] = { S|∀ SA ∈ [[A]] , SA + S 0 B} , from corollary 8.4.5. ⇐⇒ → 
⇒ [[A � B]] = { S|∀ SA ∈ [[A]] , SA + S ∈ [[B]]} , from the deﬁnition of downward closure. 
⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S S ∈ [[A � B]]} , from the deﬁnition. | 
Case: [[A � B]] = { S| S � A � B}
We ﬁrst prove that if S ∈ [[A � B]] then S � A � B. 
[[A � B]] = { S S ∈ [[A]] [[B]]} , from the deﬁnition. | 
⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S S ∈ [[A]] ; S ∈ [[B]]}| 
⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S S � A; S � B} , from the induction steps above. | 
⇒ [[A � B]] = { S S � A � B} , applying � rule.| 
Next we prove that if S � A � B then S ∈ [[A � B]]. 
[[A � B]] = { S| S � A � B} 
⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S S � A � B; A � B � A; A � B � B}| 
⇒ [[A � B]] = { S S � A; S � B} , applying cut rule. | 
| � 
� 
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⇐⇒ [[A � B]] = { S S ∈ [[A]] ; S ∈ [[B]]} , from inductions steps. 
Theorem 8.4.9. (Completeness) 
[[Γ]] ⊆ [[A]] .⇒ Γ � A
Proof: 
We ﬁrstly establish that for any formulas Γ and A, 
if [[Γ]] ⊆ [[A]] then 0 ∈ [[Γ � A]]. 
Indeed, from the deﬁnition.

S ∈ [[Γ � A]] ⇐⇒ ∀ SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] , S + SΓ ∈ [[A]].

If [[Γ]] ⊆ [[A]], then ∀ SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] , SΓ ∈ [[A]]. Because 0 + SΓ = SΓ, we have 0 + SΓ ∈ [[A]].

Hence, we have 0 satisﬁes the property

∀ SΓ ∈ [[Γ]] , 0 + SΓ ∈ [[A]], which means that 0 ∈ [[Γ � A]].

Now consider [[Γ � A]]. From Lemma 8.4.8, we have [[Γ � A]] = { S S � Γ � A} .|
Furthermore, given that 0 ∈ [[Γ � A]], we have 
0 � Γ � A. 
As 0 is a state of an empty multiset, 0 corresponds to no formula, and so 0 � Γ � A means 
� Γ � A .⇐⇒ Γ � A
Therefore, we can conclude that if [[Γ]] ⊆ [[A]] then Γ � A. 
Hence from the soundness and completeness theorems, with respect to the interpretation, 
we have that 
[[Γ]] ⊆ [[A]] iﬀ Γ � A. 
8.4.4 Discussion 
We have demonstrated how a mapping between a form of (place) timed Petri nets and a 
fragment of TLL (which does not contain ⊕ ) is obtained, and that this mapping is sound 
and complete. From the mapping, we believe that it is possible to form an eﬀective procedure 
for constructing an equivalent (place) timed Petri net from a protocol speciﬁcation in TLL. 
Execution of the protocols can then be based on execution of the equivalent TPNs. 
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However, to use a richer fragment of the logic, from the results obtained in [Engberg 
and Winskel, 1990] between linear logic and Petri nets, it is likely to require a restriction 
on the Petri nets to be atomic nets and so similarly on timed Petri nets. An atomic net 
has a property that every transition leads to a non-empty multiset of markings. Also, this 
restriction on Petri nets enables such interpretations of !A as A � 1. Such restrictions on 
Petri nets and possibly timed Petri nets make it quite limited for application of timed Petri 
nets as an execution framework for our particular TLL speciﬁcations described in Chapters 3 
and 4. Hence, we believe it is better to use inference systems of TLL as a basis for executing 
TLL speciﬁcations of interaction protocols. 
8.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we provided detailed examples of typical interaction scenarios among agents 
to demonstrate how interactions can be constructed from such speciﬁcations. We also brieﬂy 
discussed how ﬂexibility of interaction is gained in these examples. Following the examples, 
an analysis of the TLL modeling framework and ﬂexibility gained was provided. We also 
explored an alternative approach to protocol execution that makes use of timed Petri nets. 
Our ﬁndings suggest that using a proof search systems in TLL is likely to be more appropriate 
for our speciﬁcation framework. 
Chapter 9

Conclusion and Future Work

We have investigated a framework for modeling and speciﬁcation of interaction among agents 
in a resource-conscious context. We have also discussed a suitable execution framework for 
such speciﬁcations based on proof search in TLL. Overall, the frameworks for speciﬁcation 
and execution of agent interaction aim at providing ﬂexibility in interaction. This chapter 
concludes our work, discusses related work and describes possible future research. 
9.1 Conclusion 
Our research questions, as stated in Chapter 1, were: 
1. What is an appropriate framework for specifying ﬂexible interactions that naturally 
deal with resources with respect to time? 
2. What is an appropriate execution framework for turning such speciﬁcations into ﬂexible 
interaction? 
3. What is a framework that enables agents to reason about their choices and changes 
from the environment to take advantages of opportunities and deal with exceptions? 
Flexibility in agent interaction has been considered with respect to two criteria as described 
in [Yolum and Singh, 2002b]. One is to preserve agents’ autonomy in their interactive actions 
and remove unnecessary constraints such as in traditional approaches to protocol speciﬁca­
tions. The other is to enable agents to take advantage of opportunities and/or deal with 
exceptions that arise due to ongoing changes in dynamic multi-agent systems. 
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In order to answer the research questions, our work has used temporal linear logic (TLL), 
which is resource-conscious and deals with time, to model agent interaction. Interaction 
protocols are speciﬁed declaratively and executed by means of proof search. 
We have demonstrated in Chapter 3 how TLL modeling can capture the dynamics of re­
source use, such as resource consumption, resource relocation, change of resource ownership, 
and resource transformation. Other concepts such as updating states, actions, goals and 
commitments can also be expressed naturally in this framework. In particular, the modeling 
of base commitments as negative formulas in TLL reﬂects the duality and causal relationship 
between what is provided in terms of resources and actions and what is required as base 
commitments. The modeling of conditional commitments makes use of a linear implication 
to naturally express the one to one causal relationship from the conditions to the commit­
ment part. The notion of pre-commitment is considered as a potential form of conditional 
commitment and is expressed as having variables over the agents which may participate in 
the conditional commitment. 
The modeling of various interaction concepts gives rise to a speciﬁcation framework based 
on TLL as described in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2. We take the approach that interaction 
protocols are to be structured via the commitments of the participating agents. Agents then 
perform means-end reasoning over commitments in order to fulﬁl them. Our approach also 
allows agents to negotiate over commitments with respect to their current goals and base 
commitments, which reﬂects their reactions to on-going changes. Hence, agent protocols are 
speciﬁed in terms of goals and base commitments and pre-commitments, which reﬂect the 
services agents can provide to each other. 
Chapter 3, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 have provided answers to the ﬁrst research question, 
as discussed in Section 8.2. Flexibility in agent interaction that can be gained from the 
speciﬁcation framework includes 
•	 using a declarative approach to specifying what is to be achieved (goals and base 
commitments) rather than specifying a sequence of interactive actions for agents to 
carry out; 
•	 having choices (among things and in time) expressed explicitly in speciﬁcations so that 
agents can reason about them; 
•	 removing unnecessary order constraints by a connective of concurrency ⊗; 
•	 using commitments as an abstraction mechanism to structure protocols and allowing 
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means-end reasoning over them. 
The second research question is addressed in Section 4.3 and Chapter 7. An execution 
model is introduced which describes how agents exchange messages containing requests and 
proposals whose contents are goals or base commitments and pre-commitments respectively. 
Speciﬁcations can then be executed based on proof search. Speciﬁcally, agents reason about 
how to ﬁnd a proof of their goals or base commitments based on the available resources, ac­
tions, capabilities and pre-commitments. Pre-commitments of other agents can be provided 
as services and will form conditional commitments via negotiation among agents, which gen­
erate further interactions. In these concurrent interaction threads based around conditional 
commitments, resources and actions as well as goals or base commitments can be partially 
handled by the mechanisms described in Chapter 6. We have demonstrated that an im­
plementation of this execution framework is possible via pseudo-code descriptions in the 
Appendix and discussions on implementation issues in Chapter 7. 
Flexibility in agent interaction is hence further provided by 
•	 allowing agents to negotiate over commitments, to choose which ones that satisfy their 
needs and help to cope with changes, rather than making them follow pre-determined 
commitments; 
•	 providing smooth integration between handling changes from the environment and 
protocol execution; 
•	 allowing agents to partially handle resources, actions and goals or base commitments. 
Given that the division is done by the agents, partial handling gives agents ﬂexibility 
in utilizing resources and actions and fulﬁlling goals or base commitments. 
Chapter 5 addresses the third research question by the modeling of the internal choices 
of agents and indeterminate possibilities which represent changes from the environment as 
well as various strategies for agents in dealing with them. Such strategies can be reasoned 
about and exercised by agents by using extra inference rules. A framework based on the 
choice calculus is provided to enable agents to reason about choices and changes and hence 
enable them to take advantage of opportunities and handle exceptions. 
Chapter 8 discusses strengths and weaknesses of our work. We have demonstrated that 
TLL is a good candidate to capture various concepts used in agent interactions, such as 
resources, capabilities, and commitments. Our speciﬁcation and execution frameworks are 
Related Work 235 
capable of bringing ﬂexibility to agent interaction as mentioned above. There are several 
weaknesses in our approach, of which a signiﬁcant one is modeling time aspects using TLL. 
9.2 Related Work 
In this section, we discuss related work. Section 9.2.1 refers to related work that also uses 
temporal linear logic and linear logic to model interaction and reasoning. Section 9.2.2 then 
corresponds to related work that uses commitments to achieve ﬂexibility. 
9.2.1 Temporal Linear Logic Based Modeling of Agent Interaction 
The work in [Ku¨ngas, 2003] describes a model of cooperative problem solving among agents 
using a partial deduction technique built on linear logic. Resources and capabilities in 
[Ku¨ngas, 2003] are modeled as linear logic propositional formulas and linear implications 
respectively. Capabilities are modeled in a form of a sequent: 
� A � B 
where A and B are multiplicative conjunctions of literals in linear logic. Also, the states of 
agents (current state and goal state) are modeled as a multiplicative conjunction of resources 
formulas and do not contain capabilities. 
Partial deduction principally comprises a backward chaining step and a forward chaining 
step, expressed in linear logic as below [K¨ ungas and Matskin, ungas and Matskin, 2005; K¨
2006b]: A forward chaining step is deﬁned as 
B ⊗ C � G 
A ⊗ C � G �f (Li) 
A backward chaining step is deﬁned as 
S � A ⊗ C 
S � B ⊗ C �b(Li) 
where Li is a label of a linear logic sequent of the form � A �Li B, and A, B, C and G are 
multiplicative conjunctions. S and G are multiplicative conjunctions corresponding to the 
current state and goal state of agents respectively. 
Though our framework has similar modeling for certain types of resources and capabilities, 
it signiﬁcantly extends the modeling of agent systems. 
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Modeling capabilities as extra-logical axioms (as in [Ku¨ngas, 2003]) is applicable to ca­
pabilities with unlimited applications. In reality, however, there are capabilities that can be 
applied only a limited number of times and their modeling should reﬂect that. We therefore 
model capabilities as linear implications from pre-conditions to post-conditions. Those ca­
pabilities with unlimited applications are denoted by !. Also, capabilities are included in the 
agent’s state in our framework, which is diﬀerent from [K¨ ungas and Matskin, ungas, 2003; K¨
2005; Ku¨ngas, 2004a]. The inclusion of capabilities in the agent state is important because 
the use of capabilities with limited applications needs to be monitored. For example, the 
system state should reﬂect how many logins remain (applications of the login capability) 
after a series of failures. 
Furthermore, as discussed in Section 3.2 we cater for a much wider range of concepts 
in agent interaction, include the modeling of inﬁnite resources, status information, actions, 
choices, indeterminate possibilities and more importantly the modeling of base commitments, 
pre-commitments and conditional commitments. Given its foundation for agent interaction, 
using commitment-based modeling is a signiﬁcant stepping stone toward modeling ﬂexible 
agent interaction. 
In addition, [Ku¨ngas, 2004b] extends the modeling of resources, capabilities and state 
information to include the time dimension by using temporal linear logic. A capability is 
denoted as I � O where in I and O are formulas in conjunctive normal form and the time 
operator � is only be allowed in O. This is the only use of time operators in [Ku¨ngas, 
2004b] and therefore only describes a ﬁxed allocation of resources in time. Our framework 
includes also the time operators � and � to account for modeling with uncertainty in time. � and �, together with �, form a much richer framework to describe (ﬁxed and ﬂexible) 
temporal constraints and ordering. We also allow � to be included in describing both the pre­
conditions and post-conditions (I and O) of capabilities so that non-monotonic relationships 
in time between them can be captured. For example, our modeling of capability allows the 
preconditions to include a commitment to pay in the next three days while the post conditions 
say the customer can have the sale item the next day. 
Partial deduction techniques [K¨ ungas and Matskin, 2005; K¨ungas, 2003; K¨ ungas, 2004a] 
can be used for agent reasoning to ﬁgure out the missing capabilities when moving from the 
current state to the goal state. This can also be achieved in our framework. In particular, the 
backward chaining and forward chaining steps correspond to series of applications of sequent 
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calculus rules as follows. A forward chaining step corresponds to: 
B ⊗ C � G 
A � A B, C � G 
A � B, A, C � G � L 
A � B, A ⊗ C � G ⊗L 
A backward chaining step corresponds to: 
A � A B � B 
A, A � B � B � L C � C 
A, C, A � B � B ⊗ C ⊗R 
S � A ⊗ C A ⊗ C, A � B � B ⊗ C ⊗L 
A � B, S � B ⊗ C cut 
where A � B corresponds to the capability in use. Thus by using the sequent calculus rules, 
proof search can detect the capability A � B required for the change in states. 
The partial deduction approach is revised and extended with the inclusion of the temporal 
operator � and ! in [Ku¨ngas, 2004b]. These steps can be similarly translated back to the 
standard sequent calculus rules of temporal linear logic and hence can be applied in our 
framework. 
In addition, the partial deduction technique supports the detection of subgoals and helps 
solve the problem partially [Ku¨ngas and Matskin, 2005]. Partial deduction can generate 
transformations from the current state towards the desired goal states and vice versa. How­
ever, it can only provide parts of the link between the current state and goal state. If the 
whole path is not found yet between the states then partial deduction may not provide any 
concrete solution because whether the partial path will be a part of the ﬁnal solution is not 
yet known. 
Our approach to the partial handling of goals can be seen as orthogonal to the partial 
deduction approach. We provide a logical technique (Chapter 6) to divide goals (resources) 
into subgoals (resource parts). Therefore, if a solution for a subgoal (or a utilization of 
a resource part) is found, then this partial solution can be applied (completeness), and 
the remainder of the goal (or resource) can be processed later. Partial handling has an 
important advantage over partial deduction with respect to ﬂexibility in agent interaction. 
Indeed, the division of goals or base commitments and resources or actions can be performed 
dynamically by agents, subject to the current context, rather than being pre-speciﬁed by 
human designers with limited awareness of possible changes. In other words, depending on 
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the interaction context, agents can ﬂexibly choose a part of their goals or base commitments to 
fulﬁll and choose a part of the resources or actions available. More importantly, as discussed 
in Section 6.5, these can occur in a distributed manner among concurrent interactions. 
Hence, it can be seen that our framework supports both partial deduction from goals or 
resources formulas - via the standard sequent calculus rules - and partial handling of them, 
which when being combined together potentially increases the overall interaction ﬂexibility. 
Another advantage of our framework is the use of capabilities. In [Ku¨ngas, 2003; 2004a; 
Ku¨ngas and Matskin, 2005], capabilities required can be matched against those of other 
agents as a starting point for symbolic negotiation, cooperative problem solving and for 
coalition formation [Ku¨ngas and Matskin, 2006a;b]. In our framework, a similar but more 
general form of negotiation is used. Capabilities are modelled in our framework as pre-
commitments, which require resources or actions in exchange for a capability. This method 
not only tracks the usage of capabilities but also makes the negotiation process more eﬀective 
and more realistic. 
To conclude, our framework, compared to that of [K¨ ungas and ungas, 2003; 2004a; K¨
Matskin, 2005; K¨ ungas and Matskin, 2006a;b] has many similarities in mod­ungas, 2004b; K¨
eling resources and capabilities, partial deduction reasoning, symbolic negotiation and coop­
erative problem solving. Our framework has additional features which include a variety of 
concepts relating to time; partial handling of resources and goals, which can be used in con­
junction with partial deduction; and using a richer mechanism for negotiation over services 
based on capabilities. 
9.2.2 Commitment-based Interactions 
Another line of work [Yolum and Singh, 2002a;b; 2004; Chopra and Singh, 2004; Mallya 
et al., 2003; Wan and Singh, 2003; Flores and Kremer, 2004; Mallya and Singh, 2007] that has 
similar approaches to ﬂexible interactions are those based on the notion of social commitment. 
Generally, the notion of social commitment is utilized to capture the meanings of states and 
actions of protocols. As a result, agents can reason about interactive actions and events 
in terms of their eﬀects on commitments. Interactions are then essentially the creation, 
manipulation, exchange and resolution of commitments in a distributed manner. Agents act 
to fulﬁll their commitments but are not blindly committed to them and hence a certain level 
of ﬂexibility is maintained. The use of commitments also provides greater ﬂexibility than in 
following predeﬁned sequences of interactive actions. 
239 Related Work 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss some issues related to commitment-based work 
on protocols and how our framework has addressed them. 
Approaches based on Commitment Machines 
A commitment is a formula [Singh, 1999; Venkatraman and Singh, 1999; Yolum and Singh, 
2002a] commonly written as C(x, y, p), where the debtor agent x becomes responsible (com­
mitted) to the creditor agent y for satisfying the proposition p. Operations on commitments 
include creation, discharge (when p holds), cancellation, release (of x from the commitment), 
assignment (transferring the commitment from y to another creditor) and delegation (trans­
ferring the commitment from x to another debtor). These operations are deﬁned in terms 
of states of commitments. As a result, protocol actions have two eﬀects: one is as intended 
by the protocol designers and users, and the other is the eﬀect on the commitments of the 
various agents involved. This duality, whilst intuitive, can ultimately complicate the under­
standing of the protocols. Also, the modeling of discharge operation is often indirect [Singh, 
2007]. 
In our framework, we take an alternative approach where we deﬁne commitments as the 
dual of the resources, actions and capabilities (RACs) that are required to fulﬁll them. 
The interaction between commitments and the RACs that fulﬁll them can then be handled 
directly in the logic via sequent calculus. The advantage of our approach is that we not only 
include actions but also include resources, capabilities and system properties in account for 
the fulﬁllment of commitments. In this aspect, commitments have much richer and more 
realistic meanings. Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4 on modeling commitments provide details. Our 
work can further be improved by examination of the modeling of the changes of debtor and 
creditor of commitments. 
In [Yolum and Singh, 2002a], a commitment machine is given to capture the set of legal 
states for the protocol, the meanings of actions and the ﬁnal states (i.e. those in which the 
protocol can terminate). These meanings are deﬁned in terms of commitments. The meaning 
of states is the set of active commitments. Agents can enter into protocols by accepting active 
commitments in a state. Due to the explicit meanings, a new state can be logically inferred 
from the old state and a given set of actions. Specifying protocols via commitment meanings 
rather than specifying detailed sequences of actions to be performed is a step forward to 
achieve ﬂexibility. To this end, our framework has also achieved similar results. [Yolum 
and Singh, 2002a] further provides a translation of a speciﬁcation in terms of commitment 
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machine into a speciﬁcation based on Finite State Machines (FSMs), which is an advantage 
from both execution viewpoint (FSMs are readily executable) and design viewpoint (changes 
to FSMs can be made at the commitment machine level). 
Several meta-level rules are in place to govern the operation of commitments. These 
rules include that a commitment ceases to exist when its proposition p becomes true; that 
a conditional commitment ceases to exist when its condition c becomes true and its base 
commitment becomes active; and that a conditional commitment ceases to exist when its 
base commitment is fulﬁlled. Although such meta-level rules enable the operations on com­
mitments to have correct and consistent eﬀects on commitments, they demand non-logical 
axioms to be in place, acting as global constraints over the operations. In our framework, 
however, such meta-level rules are already reﬂected in the modeling of commitments and 
hence their enforcement is done directly by the sequent calculus rules. It should be noted 
that our modeling of commitments as a negation of formulas of the RACs required is natural 
and simple. Speciﬁcally, that a base commitment ceases to exist when it is fulﬁlled is simply 
handled in the logic as the removal of the relevant negative formulas together with the corre­
sponding positive formulas of the RACs required to fulﬁll them. Also, it is simple to enforce 
that the fulﬁllment of the conditions in a conditional commitment will automatically lead to 
the activation of the base commitment. More details are discussed later and in Sections 3.3.2 
and 3.3.4. 
[Yolum and Singh, 2002b; 2004] improve further the commitment machine formalism by 
deﬁning commitments and their operations using the event calculus [Kowalski and Sergot, 
1986], which is a formalism to reason about events, instead of classical logic. In particular, 
predicates of the event calculus are used as the building blocks for constructing commitment-
based protocols. Commitments are then represented as properties and operations on com­
mitments are deﬁned via temporal statements (axioms) about the corresponding changes 
in values of these commitment properties over time. Reasoning rules are provided also in 
the form of non-logical axioms to realize the operational semantics of commitments which 
includes, for example, that a commitment is discharged when its proposition holds. It is 
demonstrated in [Yolum and Singh, 2004] that the speciﬁcation and execution framework 
can handle various exceptions, accommodate diﬀerent sequences and skip actions as neces­
sary. 
However, there are restrictions such as no concurrency among actions and that base 
commitments and conditional commitments are not broken. Our framework does not have 
these restrictions. Also, whilst unexpected changes can be integrated into protocol runs by the 
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introduction of particular actions, how these actions aﬀect commitments needs to be coded 
in advance, and hence anticipated. Similarly to [Yolum and Singh, 2002a], these approaches 
require an extra layer of handling for correct manipulation of commitments and hence create 
unnecessary overheads. Also their framework does not allow agents to dynamically form 
protocols via reasoning. 
In [Chopra and Singh, 2004], non-monotonic commitment machines are proposed, in 
which the underlining classical logic is replaced with Nonmonotonic Causal Logic [Giunchiglia 
et al., 2004]. Protocol speciﬁcations then further include protocol-independent theories on 
representing commitments and dealing with their operations, which corresponds to an extra 
layer of processing. In many ways, this approach has similar drawbacks to the use of meta-
level rules over commitments in [Yolum and Singh, 2002a]. The advantages of the approach 
include a careful modeling of systems in terms of causality, a clear distinction between the 
concepts of ﬂuents and actions, a rich modeling of actions, an ability to capture the persistence 
of commitment (inertial Fluents), and modeling of non-deterministic causality (may or may 
not cause). For example, [Chopra and Singh, 2004] provides a simpler and more natural way 
than [Yolum and Singh, 2002a] to express the idea that returning goods within 10 days causes 
the customer’s commitment to pay to be canceled. Though our framework has a natural way 
of capturing causality via linear implication, our modeling does not include causal concepts 
such as “every fact that obtains is caused and every fact that is caused obtains” as in ([Chopra 
and Singh, 2004]). 
[Mallya et al., 2003] introduces a time perspective into representing and reasoning about 
commitments. A discrete and time branching temporal logic, which is an extension of CTL, 
is used as a representation logic. This approach represents a richer set of time concepts, 
especially time intervals and the operator Until, compared with ours. Extending our mod­
eling of time is one of our directions for future work. This approach associates operations 
on commitments with commitment predicates to keep track of these operations. It then de­
ﬁnes formally the semantics for the language that expresses commitment and its operations. 
The semantics lays the groundwork for establishing domain-independent properties of com­
mitments, and provides a mechanism for expressing deadlines and evaluating commitment 
satisfaction with respect to these. This approach also allows temporal quantiﬁcation to be 
dealt with independently from the associated propositions. 
[Singh, 2007] developed Generalize Commitment Machines (GCMs) which extend com­
mitment machines. GCMs are speciﬁed by states, actions, an action theory (capturing eﬀects 
of actions on states) for transitions between the states and a set of “good” states. GCMs 
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have a signiﬁcant advantage over commitment machines in that they can also be applied to 
non-terminating protocols. Operations on commitments are deﬁned over the eﬀects on com­
mitments, similarly to other approaches. Protocol messages also have semantics in GCMs 
such that they can be directly operationalized. Messages in our framework are similar, but 
we have not considered the formalization of messages in this thesis. 
The modeling of conditional commitments [Singh, 2007] allows them to be discharged 
either when the condition becomes true or when the base commitment becomes true. How­
ever, this is inapplicable to the case when one party fulﬁlls the base commitment only if 
the other party satisﬁes the conditions. This kind of conditional commitments is extremely 
useful to capture exchange activities in agent interaction. The problem is that this approach 
permits the case of having the base commitment fulﬁlled without prior satisfaction of the con­
ditions. Also, the fulﬁllment of the base commitment removes the conditional commitment 
and in eﬀect, removes the conditions required of the other party. Such issues are avoided 
in our framework because of the way that the relationship from the conditions to the base 
commitment is maintained. 
GCMs can be translated into deterministic Bu¨chi Automata (BA) [Thomas, 1990]. One 
advantage of these machines over Finite State Machines is that they can express non­
terminating computations. Speciﬁcally, an acceptance condition for a BA can be given as 
visiting “good” states inﬁnitely often rather than terminating in a given ﬁnal state. With 
some restrictions on GCMs, the translation to BA is shown to be sound and complete. Our 
framework also explores similar translation of protocols in TLL into timed Petri nets for 
execution purposes but further work is still required to accommodate the full MCA logic 
fragment. 
Commitment machines and similar approaches [Yolum and Singh, 2002a;b; 2004; Chopra 
and Singh, 2004; Mallya et al., 2003; Singh, 2007] have several general issues. 
They normally require prior speciﬁcation of the meanings of all states in the protocol, 
particularly for the status of commitments. It should be noted that agents enter these 
states and progress towards resolving the corresponding commitments, but they have no 
ability to negotiation about these commitments. These predeﬁned legal meanings act as 
prior constraints on the variations and development of the protocol and hence reduce the 
ﬂexibility of interaction. 
We overcome these limitations in our framework by not pre-deﬁning legal meanings for 
protocols to follow. Instead, in our framework, some commitments act like goals and natu­
rally reﬂect the roles of an agent in the interaction. Other commitments are generated as a 
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result of interaction amongst agents. These commitments are speciﬁed as pre-commitments, 
i.e. potential commitments. By reasoning about the relevance of pre-commitments (Sections 
4.3.7 and 7.2.1) to current goals and pending commitments, subject to availability of RACs 
and possibly other factors, agents can dynamically select commitments from potential com­
mitments. By negotiation with other agents, the selected pre-commitments can be turned 
into commitments. This selection and negotiation mechanism produces potentially greater 
variations for the protocol and the execution of protocols can be much more dynamic. 
Moreover, when it comes to merging or extracting protocols, approaches based on com­
mitment machines would normally require a signiﬁcant level of human involvement to syn­
thesize the set of legal meanings. When adding or removing commitments from protocols, it 
is likely that the task of adjusting the legal meanings would also involve signiﬁcant human 
involvement. In this aspect, these approaches do not promote agent autonomy. In partic­
ular, agents should be able to dynamically manage protocols, as the on-going interaction 
may involve diﬀerent objectives and causes. Agents should also be able to add and remove 
commitments in an active protocol as changes from the environment or other agents may 
make some commitments obsolete or better resolved by the agents alone. 
To address these concerns, our framework promotes a dynamic formation of protocols as 
changes in the set of active commitments might arise for a number of reasons. The formation 
of protocols generally begins by agents introducing commitments. This is equivalent to 
entering a particular state in a commitment machine. Agents then enter further commitments 
as they attempt to fulﬁll existing goals and commitments. Also, the need to exchange 
resources, or to fulﬁl existing commitments may introduce more commitments. Unexpected 
changes from the environment or from other agents may lead to changes in the agents’ current 
set of resources, capabilities and goals and consequently, the agents may undertake further 
commitments or abandon existing ones. 
Our framework supports changes in the set of active commitment by providing agents the 
ability to introduce new commitments if suitable pre-commitments are negotiated success­
fully, and also the ability to break existing commitments (technically possible as discussed 
in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4). 
In addition, commitment machine approaches typically lack an intermediate concept for 
an agent to reason about before entering a conditional commitment with other agents. In our 
framework this concept is pre-commitment. Our framework makes use of pre-commitments 
to allow agents to reason about which conditional commitment to form. In particular, this 
provides a means for agents to know if the other agent(s) also wants the conditional commit­
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ment (and hence is likely to fulﬁll its conditions) before forming the conditional commitment. 
This is useful when the agent has multiple options for a conditional commitment and wants 
the other agents to pick the one that they prefer. Should the other agent disagree on the 
proposed pre-commitment, it can counter-propose another pre-commitment of its own. This 
helps increase agent autonomy over conditional commitments. 
Other Commitment-based Approaches 
[Fornara and Colombetti, 2003] extends the work in [Fornara and Colombetti, 2002] on deﬁn­
ing an Agent Communication Language (ACL) in which the semantics of communicative acts 
is based on commitments. Speciﬁcally, the execution of communicative acts is regarded as 
actions which manipulate commitments. [Fornara and Colombetti, 2003] speciﬁes interac­
tion protocols as a set of rules regulating the performance of communicative acts of the ACL. 
Interaction diagrams are the main artifacts that specify which action can be performed by 
which agent at every protocol stage. Application-independent soundness criteria are also 
proposed for veriﬁcation so that the design of protocols can ensure some desirable properties 
for successful interaction. 
Compared to our approach, [Fornara and Colombetti, 2003] appears to have several re­
strictions. For example, the approach requires a large amount of work for protocol designers 
rather than promoting autonomy for agents. This work includes identifying every state; 
associating with every protocol state the set of all facts that hold, including the set of all 
commitment objects, temporal proposition objects, variables and domain speciﬁc objects; 
and creating transitions according to the (appropriate) execution of communicative acts and 
environmental events. 
Commitments are modeled as structures whose ﬁelds include content, status (unset, can­
celled, pending, active, etc) and conditions. Commitment contents are separated from their 
status, which requires a mechanism to be in place to update the status according to changes 
in the content. Even though the modeling of commitments is very detailed, tasks involved in 
handling commitments, such as creating them, changing status, and adding conditions, are 
carried out by non-logical means, unlike our approach. 
[Mallya and Singh, 2004; 2005; 2007] aim to provide a formal framework for merging and 
reﬁning existing protocols for a given business process. The mechanism is an algebra based 
on commitments [Mallya and Singh, 2007]. Comparisons between protocols are made on 
the basis of checking similarity between their runs (executed sequences of states) using state 
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similarity functions. These are based on criteria such as having the same creditor for every 
commitment or having the same roles in all commitments. Run subsumption is deﬁned as 
including matches for every state while preserving temporal order between states. Merging 
protocols is then a matter of deriving a protocol consisting of runs that subsume some runs 
in every component protocol. The “choice” of two protocols is a protocol consisting of runs 
that subsume a run from either of the component protocols. The merge and choice operators 
are then shown to be idempotent, commutative and associative. Merge also distributes over 
choice. Together they form an algebra over protocols which allows protocols to be combined 
to give more options and functionalities, and hence ﬂexibility. 
Though our work does not provide such an elegant formal framework for the merging 
and reﬁnement of protocols, we do support modular design of protocols as sets of pre-
commitments. In principle, protocols can be expanded, contracted and merged, by a corre­
sponding manipulation over the set of potential commitments (pre-commitments). How to 
support such a modular design of protocols is discussed in Section 4.2.3. 
Our approach has certain advantages over [Mallya and Singh, 2007; 2004; 2005]. In par­
ticular, these approaches do not take into account other important factors in protocol ma­
nipulation such as changes of resources and capabilities (apart from changes in commitments 
and their status). Furthermore, examining all runs of all component protocols for similarity 
checking and computing subsumption run sets are very likely to be ineﬃcient, which makes 
it less attractive in practice. Our approach does not rely on runs but on the higher-level and 
more intuitive concept of pre-commitment. The highly demanding task of determining which 
runs are suitable for the new protocol is replaced by ﬁnding the relevant pre-commitments 
to negotiate about for inclusion in the protocol. Checking pre-commitments for relevance is 
discussed in Section 4.3.7. This checking can in fact be reduced to checking the relevance 
of particular sub-formulas in pre-commitments and goals, which is likely to be signiﬁcantly 
more eﬃcient. 
General Remarks on Our Improvements 
The improvements that our work has made to existing work on commitment-based approaches 
to ﬂexible interactions are largely due to our use of TLL to model commitments, and express 
resource concerns, choices, concurrency and time constraints. 
Firstly, as discussed in Section 2.6, representing protocols in TLL makes it easier and more 
natural to express and handle resources. In approaches that use classical logics, representing 
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resources directly as formulas would normally require extra handling of the formulas when 
resources are used up. In our framework, the consumption of resources can be simply handled 
by an automatic removal of the corresponding formulas, as in A ⊗ (A � B) � B. 
Secondly, base commitments in the above approaches are typically modeled without a 
speciﬁcation of what is required to fulﬁl them. Also, there is a need to design speciﬁc 
operators to handle the resolution of base commitments with the appropriate resources. In 
our approach, base commitments are modeled constructively as duals of the required RACs. 
Base commitments and what is required to fulﬁll them then have a natural symmetry. TLL, 
unlike other logics like classical logic and modal logic, provides a simple way to express this 
relationship. For example, Γ ⊗ [Γ]⊥ = Γ ⊗ Γ � ⊥ � ⊥. 
Thirdly, conditional commitments are used to ensure that the respective base commit­
ments only come to existence when the conditions are fulﬁlled. However, the condition is 
modeled using classical logic, and hence does not provide a direct mapping between the con­
dition and base commitments. In our framework, this mapping is expressed via the TLL 
connective �. 
Fourthly, in those approaches that are based on other logics, expressing concurrency of 
processes would typically require extra handling to make sure that these processes are not 
required to occur in a particular sequence. ⊗ naturally expresses concurrency by ensuring 
that two processes must have separate contexts, which is reﬂected in the following sequent 
calculus rule 
Γ � A, Δ Γ� � B, Δ� 
Γ, Γ� � A ⊗B, Δ, Δ� ⊗R 
Fifthly, the above-mentioned approaches to ﬂexible interaction using other logics usually 
lack a mechanism to express and reason about choices by agents. For example, interpreting 
the ∨ operator as choice does not distinguish between choices that agents can decide and 
possibilities that agents do not know and cannot decide. In our framework using TLL, 
(internal) choices can be expressed via the connectives � and � and reasoned about in a 
distributed and timely manner using sequent calculus rules, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Sixthly, the approaches that use other logics also have diﬃculties in reasoning about 
changes. In our framework, such desirable reasoning about changes is provided by using 
TLL to express (identiﬁable) changes in the form of indeterminate possibilities and using 
choice calculus rules to predict changes and act on predictions in a distributed and concur­
rent manner (as discussed in Chapter 5). The connectives in TLL that naturally express 
indeterminate possibilities are ⊕ and �. 
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Finally, together, reasoning about choices and reasoning about indeterminate possibilities 
can produce fruitful results. In particular, several strategies are possible for agents. These 
include deciding choices in advance or at their associated times, taking a safe approach 
by preparing all the possibilities or taking a bold approach by predicting the outcomes of 
possibilities and following them. As agents apply these strategies, they explore the trade-oﬀ 
between RACs reservation and having choices (or taking risks). While agents decide on some 
choices or indeterminate possibilities and leave decisions on others open, those decided will 
eliminate reservation for RACs and hence possibly reduce the interaction sequences. The 
open choices remain as ﬂexibility that the agents can explore. 
9.3 Future Work 
We have discussed some weaknesses and limitations of our work in Chapter 8. Our future 
work partly aims to overcome them and also explore other potential outcomes. Major direc­
tions of further work are described as below. 
9.3.1 Work Related to Modeling 
Our current modeling of breakable commitments makes an explicit use of choices on the 
expected outcome as a means for agents to alter the outcomes and hence break the com­
mitments. However, this only covers intensional breaking of commitments. Unintentional 
breaking of commitments is a useful notion in agent interaction, especially among cooper­
ative agents. Further work will attempt to capture the notion naturally, possibly based on 
the use of indeterminate possibilities. 
The existing connectives in TLL like ⊗, � , ⊕, � can be used for describing the rela­
tionships among base commitments. It is a natural step forward to enrich our model by 
allowing a greater range of base commitments, such as allowing a base commitment inside 
another base commitment. For example, an embedded commitment might be (A ⊗ com⊥)⊥, 
where com⊥ is a base commitment. Manipulation of commitments can then be performed via 
transformations such as De Morgan’s laws and together with manipulation of the necessary 
resources and actions to fulﬁll them via standard proof search systems. Further investigation 
in this area is desirable. 
Modeling the location and ownership of resources and actions using variables (and quan­
tiﬁcation of these variables over the domain of agents), such as resource@agentX agentY , 
makes it easy to express the dynamic changes in location and ownership. However, we have 
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not investigated deeply issues related to the handling of variables in various domains such as 
resources. 
As discussed in Section 8.2.5, there is a need to extend TLL to capture intuitively the 
notion of “until” and to address the notion of having unlimited copies (of the formulas) at a 
ﬁnite time. Moreover, the new logic should allow the statement of properties such as “having 
both A and B at the next time point implies having A at the next time point and having B 
at the next time point”: 
�(A ⊗ B) � �A ⊗ �B 
and “having both A and B anytime implies both having A anytime and having B anytime”: 
�(A ⊗ B) � �A ⊗ �B 
which is convenient in the resource context but is not supported by TLL. 
Furthermore, it is also important to be able to specify a time point that is unknown, but 
must be the same for several things (for synchronisation). In TLL, to specify that A, B and 
C are at the same time point which is unknown in a formula like �A � (�B ⊗ �C) requires 
grouping them as �[A � (B ⊗ C)], which has a diﬀerent meaning because the time at which 
� can be applied is now unknown. 
A further direction of future work is to express time constraints as �xA, where x is a 
variable that can be chosen or unknown, at the logic level. Apart from being able to express 
a speciﬁc time point by a certain value of x, this representation of time can be used to model 
the notion of “anytime” as ∀x �x A, which means x is universally quantiﬁed over the time 
domain, and model the notion of “sometime” as ∃x �x A, which means x is existentially 
quantiﬁed over the time domain. It can be seen that a particular time, “anytime” and 
“sometime” can be modeled in a consistent manner using the form of �xA where x is a 
variable. 
Moreover, such a representation of time can easily express a duration by giving the time 
range for the variable x. Being concurrent at a speciﬁc time is also easily captured as in �xA � (�xB ⊗ �xC), where A, B and C are at the same time (i.e. the next xth time 
point), which may be known or unknown. In addition, this representation can be used to 
express relative relationships with reference to an uncertain time point. For example, to 
specify that B and C occur one time point later than A but the exact times of A, B and C 
are not known, we can use �xA � (�x+1B⊗�x+1C) where x is unknown and x ≥ 1. Hence, 
the expressiveness of the representation �x makes it attractive for future investigation. 
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A signiﬁcant trend in IT industry is using service-oriented computing. Services are usually 
designed according to existing business rules in the domain. Hence, making interaction among 
agents more service-oriented and reﬂect business practice is desirable. Agents can then be 
naturally considered in terms of resources and capabilities. Services of agents that can be 
provided to other agents would naturally arise from the agents’ capabilities and are encoded 
with the logic of business rules. Protocols can then be designed in this a service-oriented 
manner as constraints on the services. 
In our approach, pre-commitments are essentially what agents can provide to help others 
(post-conditions) at a cost (pre-conditions), and hence can be thought as services. These 
services are then proposed and negotiated among agents with respect to what they can 
provide and what is required. Moreover, the notion of pre-commitment helps to bridge the 
gap between agent capabilities and services provided to others. In particular, a discussion on 
how pre-commitments and hence conditional commitment can be designed based on agent 
capabilities and knowledge of business rules about fair exchanges is provided in Section 4.2.3. 
It can be seen that our approach is a step toward service-oriented interaction based on 
utilizing agents’ resources and capabilities. 
Further work will investigate how speciﬁcations of service-oriented interaction can be 
done directly at the level of capabilities. In addition, in [K¨ ungas and ungas, 2003; 2004b; K¨
Matskin, 2005], it has been demonstrated how agents can explore capabilities of each other 
to identify potential for cooperation. This suggests some further work along the lines of 
dynamically converting speciﬁed capabilites into agent services. 
9.3.2 Work Related to the Execution of Speciﬁcations 
A natural and important step is to build an execution platform for speciﬁcations in TLL. 
Once such a platform is in place, it is then possible to investigate mechanisms to verify spec­
iﬁcations of protocols and examine properties of protocol execution such as safety, liveness 
and conservation of resources. 
Another aspect is the evolution of protocol speciﬁcations. In multi-agent systems, agents 
may enter into various interactions involving diﬀerent protocols at the same time. Also, 
agents may acquire new capabilities or services which might result in changes to protocol 
execution. Synthesizing these protocols enables agents to deal with dependencies among 
interactions eﬀectively, and to reason about their commitments and the uses of resources in 
a consistent and more eﬃcient manner. 
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The precise method of agent reasoning is another item of future work. Agent reasoning 
involving backward- and forward-chaining has been investigated for linear logic in [Harland 
and Winikoﬀ, 2004]. These techniques are quite relevant to agent reasoning as they realize 
proactive and reactive behaviors of agents. The development of backward-chaining and 
forward-chaining techniques for TLL is an open problem. 
In addition, timed Petri nets (TPNs) are well known tools for modeling concurrent, and 
time dependent systems but speciﬁcations on TPNs do not enjoy the beneﬁts of being declar­
ative, natural and modular like speciﬁcations in TLL. Therefore, combining speciﬁcations in 
TLL and execution in TPNs brings the beneﬁts of both and provides links to visual repre­
sentations and existing tools and techniques on TPNs. TPNs have been shown in Chapter 8 
to be models of a fragment of intuitionistic TLL. It is then possible to map speciﬁcations in 
this fragment of TLL onto TPNs and vice versa. Our future work will explore such mappings 
to derive procedures that can turn a speciﬁcation in TLL into TPNs and possibly vice-versa. 
Lastly, speciﬁcations in our TLL framework require some detailed knowledge about the 
logic. Clearly, it would be beneﬁcial to have a visual tool similar to those for UML diagrams 
which would allow non-expert users to specify protocols without having to learn the details 
of the formulas themselves. 
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Appendix A

Proof 
A.1 Proof of A �cc�cc �aA �r �b1 
Theorem A.1.1. Let Γ be a formula in the MCA fragment and A be its split up w.r.t. A 
in Γ. We have 
A �cc�cc �aA �r �b1 
where �r is a representative choice of A in Γ, a indicates the time of the existence of A, and 
b is an appropriate time depending on the outcomes of choices in A. 
Proof: we ﬁrstly establish that �r is also a representative choice of A in A and then 
prove the theorem by induction on the structure of A. 
By deﬁnition of A, all the choices related to A in Γ are copied into A without switching 
the order of their two sides. Hence, the sequence of decisions on choices that retains A in Γ 
also retains A in A and vice versa. In other words, �r is also the representative choice of A 
in A. 
A proof by induction on the structure of A is as follows. 
Base step: The structure of A is A. The representative choice of A in A is A �r 1, 
where CondLr � 1, which is immediately fulﬁlled. This also means �r We then have �→� L. 
A �cc A �r 1 because 
[
�r ]�→� L
A �cc A [�r ]�→� L �R 
A �cc A �r 1 
which forms a valid proof as the condition is satisﬁed. 
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Proof of the reverse direction A �r 1 �cc A is trivial: 
A �cc A 
A �r 1 �cc A �R 
Induction step: We assume that the hypothesis holds for An of n structure levels: 
An �cc�cc �aA �r n �b1 
where �r n is the representative choice. Denote its determining conditions CondLr n as 
� conditionL and CondRr n as � conditionR. 
We then consider two cases where each of the conditions holds. Note that conditionL 
and conditionR are mutually exclusive. 
nWhen � conditionL, which means [���r � L], we have → 
An �cc�cc �aA 
from 
n
An �cc �aA [���r � L]→ 
An �cc �aA �r n �b1 �R 
and 
An 
An�aA �r n �b1 �cc [� conditionL]�
aA �cc �L 
nWhen � conditionR, which means [���r � R], we have → 
An �cc�cc �b1 
from 
and 
nb1 [���r � R]→An �cc � �R 
An �cc �aA �r n �b1 
b1 �cc An 
An�aA �r n �b1 �cc [� conditionR] �L 
We need to prove in the case that � has n+1 structure levels: +1An
�+1An b� 1�cc�cc �a� A �r(n+1) �
�� � � �
� � �
�
�
�
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�
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� of (n+1) structure levels are: +1AnNote that possible structures of

An An �1 1, and An ⊕1 1.,

The determining conditions CondLr(n+1) of the representative choices of A in these struc­
tures are (respectively): 
� �conditionL, � conditionL ⊗ (��1 � L), and � conditionL ⊗ (�⊕1 � L).→ →
The determining conditions CondRr(n+1) are (respectively):

� �conditionR, � conditionR ⊕ (��1 � L), and � conditionR ⊕ (�⊕1 � L).
→ →
�+1An .
We consider the two conditions for each case of the structure of

�+1An An
In this case, a�, b� are a + 1 and b + 1 respectively as 
Case:
 = .

An 
When � �conditionL, which means � [�r�(n+1) � L]. We have the proofs as follows. → is one time point earlier.

An �cc �aA [� conditionL] 
An �cc �aA [�r(n+1)� � L]→ 
�cc �a+1A [�r(n+1) � � L]→ 
b+11 
�R An 
An �cc �a+1A �r(n+1) �
An 
An �cc �aA [� �conditionL] �cc �
aA [� conditionL] 
�L An 
An�a+1A �r(n+1) �b1 �cc � �cc �
a+1A [� �conditionL] 
When � �conditionR, which means � [�r�(n+1)� R]. We have the proofs as follows. → 
�
�
�
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An �cc �b1 [� conditionR] 
b1 [�
�r(n+1)
� � R]→An �cc � �r(n+1) � 
� � R
b+11 
�R An �cc �b+11 [
 ]→ 
An �cc �a+1A �r(n+1) �
An 
An �cc �aA [� �conditionR] �cc �
aA [� conditionR] 
�L An �a+1A �r(n+1) �b+11 �cc �An �cc �
a+1A [� nextT conditionR] 
Hence, in all the cases of the conditions, and from the hypothesis we have

An �cc�cc �a A �r(n+1) �b� 1 
�+1An An 
In this case, a� is a and b� is b or 0. 
Case: �1 1= 
The proof for the
 �+1An case can be obtained from the proof for the hypothesis and

includes the following steps. 
When � (��1 � L), these steps are as follows. →
An 
�cc �aA [CondL1 � conditionL] �cc �
aA [� conditionL] 
An 
An �cc �aA [CondL1 � conditionL ⊗ (��1 � L)]→ �R 
An �cc �aA �r(n+1) �b1 [CondL1] 
b1 
�L 
An �1 1 �cc �aA �r(n+1) �
or at the rule �R, the agent follows the other possibility.

An 
An �cc �
b1 [� conditionR]�cc �
b1 [CondL1 � conditionR] 
b1 [CondL1 � conditionR ⊕ (��1 � R)]→An �cc � �R 
An �cc �aA �r(n+1) �b1 [CondL1] 
b1 
�L 
An �1 1 �cc �aA �r(n+1) �
�
�
�
�
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�
�
�
� �
Proof of A �cc�cc �aA �r �
and 
b1 255 
�aA �cc [� conditionL]
An 
[� (��1 � L), � conditionL]→An 
[� (��1 � L), � conditionL ⊗ (��1 � L)]→ →
�aA �cc 
An �aA �r(n+1) �
�aA �cc �L 
� (��1 →An 
b1 �cc 
b1 �cc � L)]
[ �R 
An �1 1�aA �r(n+1) �
or at the rule �L, the agent follows the other possibility.

An 
� (��1 →
b1 �cc [� conditionR] 
An 
� (��1 � L), � conditionR ⊕ (��1 → →
b1 �cc � L), � conditionR[ ] 
An �aA �r(n+1) �
b1 �cc � R)][ �L 
� (��1 →An 
b1 �cc 
b1 �cc � L)]
[ �R 
An �1 1�aA �r(n+1) �
When � (��1 � L) does not hold, by mutual exclusion, this means � (��1 � R) holds. The → →
steps are (note that b� = 0) 
CondR1 
[CondR1, � (��1 � R)]→
1 �cc 1 [CondR1, � conditionR ⊕ (��1 � R)]→
1 �cc �aA �r(n+1) 1 [CondR1] �R �L 
An �1 1 �cc �aA �r(n+1) 1 
� (��1 � R)→
[� (��1 � R), � (��1 � R)]→ →
1 �cc 1 [� (��1 � R), � conditionR ⊕ (��1 � R)]→ → �L �aA �r(n+1) 1 �cc 1 [� (��1 � R)]→ �R �aA �r(n+1) 1 �cc An �1 1 
Hence, in all the cases of the conditions, and from the hypothesis we have

� b� 1An �1 1 �cc�cc �a A �r(n+1) �
Case: An+1 = An ⊕1 1 
��
�
�
� �
�
�
�
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a� is in this case a and b� is b or 0. 
Similarly, the proof for the �An+1 case can be obtained from the proof for the hypothesis 
and includes the following steps. 
When the outcome of ⊕1 is the left hand side, which means � (�⊕1 � L), we have the →
following proof steps. 
An 
�cc �aA [� (�⊕1 � L), � conditionL]→
�cc �aA [� conditionL] 
An 
An �cc �aA [� (�⊕1 � L), � conditionL ⊗ (�⊕1 � L)]→ → �R 
An �cc �aA �r(n+1) �b1 [� (�⊕1 � L)]→
b1 
⊕L 
An ⊕1 1 �cc �aA �r(n+1) �
or at the rule ⊕R, the agent follows the other possibility.

An �cc �b1 [� conditionR] 
b1 [� (�⊕1 � L), � conditionR]→An �cc �
b1 [� (�⊕1 � L), � conditionR ⊕ (�⊕1 � R)]→ →An �cc � �R

An �cc �aA �r(n+1) �b1 [� (�⊕1 � L)]→ ⊕L 
b1An ⊕1 1 �cc �aA �r(n+1) �
and 
An 
[condL1 � conditionL] 
[� conditionL]�aA �cc 
An 
[condL1 � conditionL ⊗ (�⊕1 � L)]→
�aA �cc 
An �aA �r(n+1) ��
aA �cc �L 
An 
Anb1 �cc 
b1 �cc [condL1] ⊕R 
⊕1 1�aA �r(n+1) �
or at the rule ⊕L, the agent follows the other possibility. 
An 
[condL1 � conditionR] 
b1 �cc [� conditionR] 
An 
condL1 � conditionR ⊕ (�⊕1 →
b1 �cc 
An �aA �r(n+1) �
b1 �cc � R)][ �L 
An 
Anb1 �cc 
b1 �cc [condL1] ⊕R 
⊕1 1�aA �r(n+1) �
��
� 
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When the outcome of ⊕1 is the right hand side, which means � (�⊕1 � R), we have the →
following proof steps, (note that b� = 0). 
��⊕1 � R1→
[��⊕1 � R, � (�⊕1 � R)]→ →
1 �cc 1 [��⊕1 � R, � conditionR ⊕ (�⊕1 � R)]→ → �R 
1 �cc �aA �r(n+1) 1 [��⊕1 � R]→
An ⊕1 1 �cc �aA �r(n+1) 1 �L 
� (�⊕1 � R)→
[condR1, � (�⊕1 � R)]→
1 �cc 1 [condR1, � conditionR ⊕ (�⊕1 � R)]→�aA �r(n+1) 1 �cc 1 [condR1] �L �aA �r(n+1) 1 �cc An ⊕1 1 �R 
Hence, in all the cases of the conditions, and from the hypothesis we have 
� � b� 1An ⊕1 1 �cc�cc �a A �r(n+1) �
Appendix B

Implementation Remarks

B.1 Data Structure 
/***DATA TYPE***/

INTEGER AGENTID; /* data type of agents’ IDs */

AGENTID AGENTS[]; /* a list of all agents’ id */

ALL = AGENTS[0]; /* constant represents that all agents are considered */

AGENT {

/* RESOURCE represents a multiset of formulas of the resources and actions that the agent

has. */

. FORMULA RESOURCE; 
/* RULES[] represents a set of formulas of the pre-commitments that the agent has. */ 
. FORMULA RULES[]; 
. /* COMS[] represents a set of base commitments or goals of the agent which have not been 
fulﬁlled yet.*/ 
. FORMULA COMS[]; 
. /* the array DECISIONS contains elements as tuples that each contains three elements ­
a commitment formula, a boolean expression that indicates if the commitment is fulﬁlled or 
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not, and a boolean expression that tells if such indication is valid. Validity of the indication 
depends on whether all the choices in the indication boolean expression have all been decided 
or not. */ 
. (FORMULA, BOOLEAN, BOOLEAN) DECISIONS[]; 
} 
/* end of AGENT deﬁnition */ 
/* we assume that choice are properly IDed and their identiﬁcations managed properly 
so that each appearance of choice (� or ⊕) in formulas is externally attached with its ID and 
as a result, the choice’s other attributes can be retrieved appropriately. */ 
R = 1; /* constant representing a decision to choose right */ 
L = 2; /* constant representing a decision to choose left */ 
U = 3; /* constant representing an undecided choice */ 
CHOICE {

. INTEGER VALUE=L, R, U;

. FORMULA COND;

. INTEGER ID;

. INTEGER TIME; /* time of the choice */

. BOOLEAN decided;

}

EXPRESSION {

. BOOLEAN c 1;

. BOOLEAN c 2;

. VALUE={c 1
→ c 2} 
}

FORMULA {

Logic formula which contains literals and connectives and operators ⊗, ⊕, �, � as in the

fragment MCA discussed in section 6.1. }

PROPOSITION {

Linear logic proposition which contains only an atom. }
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B.2 Functions for Agent Interaction 
B.2.1 How to Fulﬁll (Partly) a Goal/Base Commitment 
/******************-FULFILL-******************/

/* FULFILL receives a resource formula (res) and a commitment formula (com⊥). FULFILL

ﬁnds common basic linear logic formulas at the same time point among the two formulas.

Based on such basic linear logic formulas, FULFILL attempts to resolve all the possible parts

of the commitment using the resource formula provided, based on agents’ decision making

on choices involved in both the resources and the commitment.

FULFILL calls a function APPLY STRATEGY to further resolve the sub-commitment using

the matched resource to reﬂect the agent’s strategies in dealing with the choices involved.

FULFILL returns TRUE if a matching is found between a part of the commitment formula

and a part of the resource formula and FALSE otherwise.*/

BOOLEAN FULFILL(FORMULA res, FORMULA com⊥) {

. INTEGER idx a, idx b;

. PROPOSITION pro;

. FORMULA part res; /* part of the resource formula that contains a basic linear logic

formula and/or 1s */

. FORMULUA part com; /* similarly is the part for the commitment formula */

. BOOLEAN return;

. return := FALSE;

. pro := MATCH(res, com, idx a, idx b);

. WHILE (pro = NIL) DO {

. . SPLIT(res, part res, idx a);

. . SPLIT(com, part com, idx b);

. . APPLY STRATEGY(part res, part com⊥);

. . pro := MATCH(res, com, idx a, idx b); /* ﬁnding further common proposition */

. . return := TRUE; /* the formula com⊥ may be fulﬁlled in part or wholly*/

. }

. RETURN return;

} 
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B.2.2 How To Make a Request 
/********************-REQUEST-********************/

/* REQUEST receives an agent and a commitment formula com⊥. REQUEST makes a

request for the commitment to the agentTo or to each agent in the operating environment if

agentTo = ALL until the request is resolved or there is no more agent to send to. REQUEST

returns TRUE if the commitment is resolved via the request and FALSE otherwise.

Replies to a request might be an indication of request failure or a proposal. In the later case,

the success of the request depends on the success of the proposal. In case agentTo is ALL,

having a failure indication for the request message or failure in the reply proposal, the agent

can send the request to other agents. */

BOOLEAN REQUEST(AGENTID agentTo, FORMULA com⊥) {

. AGENTID requested agent;

. BOOLEAN return;

. STRING reply;

. INTEGER agent idx;

. BOOLEAN continue;

. BOOLEAN prop succ; /* if a proposal is succesful */

. RULE pro rule;

. return := FALSE;

. agent idx := 1;

. continue := FALSE;

. IF (α = ALL) THEN �

. . requested agent := agentTo;

. ELSE

. requested agent := AGENTS[agent idx]; /* get the ﬁrst agent in the list of all agents

involved */

. /* consider two cases, one is for proposing to a single agent and the other is proposing to

each agent until the proposal is carried out. */

. REPEAT {

. . SEND(requested agent, ”REQUEST ” + TO STRING(com⊥);
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. . WAIT();

. . reply := RECEIVE();

. . /* if the reply indicate failure */

. . IF (reply = ”REQUEST ” + TO STRING(com⊥) + ” FAILS”) THEN {

. . . IF (agentTo = ALL) THEN {

. . . . agent idx := agent idx + 1;

. . . . requested agent := AGENTS[agent idx];

. . . . IF (requested agent = NULL) THEN �

. . . . . continue := TRUE;

. . . . ELSE

. . . . . continue := FALSE;

. . . }

. . ELSE {/* reply is a proposal */

. . . pro rule := GET RULE(proposal);

. . . prop succ := RECEIVE PROPOSAL(owner, pro rule, com⊥);

. . . /* if the proposal is not successful */

. . . IF NOT pro succ THEN {

. . . . IF (agentTo = ALL) THEN {

. . . . . agent idx := agent idx + 1;

. . . . . requested agent := AGENTS[agent idx];

. . . . . IF (requested agent = NULL) THEN �

. . . . . . continue := TRUE;

. . . . . ELSE

. . . . . . continue := FALSE;

. . . . }

. . . }ELSE /* the proposal is fulﬁlled and hence the request is satisﬁed */

. . . . return := TRUE;

. . }

. UNTIL (NOT continue);

. RETURN return;

} 
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B.2.3 How To Make a Proposal 
/********************-PROPOSE-********************/ 
/* PROPOSE receives an agent (agent to), a rule and a commitment (com⊥) (possibly 
NULL). There are two cases. If the variable agent to refers to a particular agent, then the 
function makes a proposal forming out of the given rule to the agent agent to. If agent to 
= ALL, then PROPOSE sends a proposal to each agent until the proposal is accepted and 
carried out completely or there is no more agent to send to. 
PROPOSE returns TRUE if the proposal is accepted and carried out completely and 
FALSE otherwise. 
There are two stages of completing a proposal. The ﬁrst is an acceptance of the proposal, 
which is indicated by the ”ACCEPT” response. The second is a receipt of the conditions of 
the proposal (LEFT(rule)) from the proposed agent. After the two stages are completed, the 
proposing agent will carry out the proposal. 
Note that com⊥ refers to a commitment of the request whose reply is the proposal. Hence, 
if the proposal is not a reply to a request, com⊥ is NULL and agent to can be ALL. */ 
BOOLEAN PROPOSE(AGENTID agent to, RULE rule, FORMULA com⊥) { 
. AGENTID proposed agent; /* the proposed agent */ 
. BOOLEAN return; 
. STRING reply; 
. INTEGER agent idx; 
. return := FALSE;

. agent idx := 1;

. IF (agent to = ALL) THEN

. . proposed agent := AGENTS[agent idx]; /* AGENTS is a list of all agents involved */

. ELSE

. . proposed agent := agent to;

. /* consider two cases, one is for proposing to a single agent and the other is proposing to

each agent until the proposal is carried out. */

. REPEAT {

. . SEND(proposed agent, ”PROPOSE ” + TO STRING(rule) +
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. . . TO STRING(com⊥));

. . IF NOT WAIT(proposed agent, rule) THEN

. . . break;

. . reply := RECEIVE();

. . IF (reply contains ”REJECT”) THEN {

. . . IF (agent to = ALL) THEN {

. . . agent idx := agent idx + 1;

. . . proposed agent := AGENTS[agent idx];

. . . }

. . }ELSE IF (reply contains ”ACCEPT”) THEN{

. . . IF NOT WAIT(proposed agent, rule) THEN

. . . . break;

. . . reply := RECEIVE();

. . . IF (reply = TO STRING(LEFT(rule))) THEN {

. . . . APPLY(LEFT(rule), rule);

. . . . SEND(proposed agent,

. . . . . TO STRING(OWNED(proposed agent, RIGHT(rule))));

. . . . return := TRUE;

. . . } ELSE {

. . . . IF (agent to = ALL) THEN {

. . . . . agent idx := agent idx + 1;

. . . . . proposed agent := AGENTS[agent idx];

. . . . }

. . . }

. . }

. UNTIL (proposed agent = NIL) and (agent � to = ALL);

. RETURN return; 
} 
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B.2.4 How to Respond to a Request 
/********************-RECEIVE REQUEST-********************/

/* RECEIVE REQUEST receives a requesting agent and a commitment as a content of a

request. RECEIVE REQUEST ﬁnds among its interaction rules a relevant rule to propose

to the requesting agent. Relevance for a rule here is based on whether the outcome of the

rule (RIGHT(rule)) is relevant to the commitment.

If a rule is found and the proposal of that rule is successful, the function returns TRUE.

RECEIVE REQUEST sends a message of failure indication and returns FALSE if no rule is

found or all the proposals of all relevant rules fail. */

BOOLEAN RECEIVE REQUEST(AGENTID agent req, FORMULA com⊥) {

. INTEGER rule no;

. INTEGER idx res, idx com;

. STRING reply;

. RULE rule;

. FORMULA rightR;

. PROPOSITION pro;

. BOOLEAN failed; /* if the request fails */

. BOOLEAN pro succ; /* if the proposal is successful */

. rule no := 0;

. failed := TRUE;

. rule := NEXT RULE(owner, rule no); /* get ﬁrst rule of the owner agent*/

. /* search for rules that match the commitment */

. WHILE (rule = NIL) DO {

. . rightR := RIGHT(rule);

. . IF CHECK RELEVANCE(rightR, com⊥) THEN {

. . . pro succ := PROPOSE(agent req, rule, com⊥);

. . . IF NOT pro succ THEN

. . . . rule := NEXT RULE(owner, rule no);

. . . ELSE {

. . . . failed := FALSE;

. . . . rule := NIL; /* propose no more rule */

. . . }
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. . }ELSE

. . . rule := NEXT RULE(owner, rule no);

. }

. IF failed THEN

. . SEND(”REQUEST ” + TO STRING(com⊥) + ” FAILS”);

. RETURN NOT failed;

} 
B.2.5 How To Respond to a Proposal 
/********************-RECEIVE PROPOSAL-********************/

/* RECEIVE PROPOSAL takes as arguments an agent as the proposing agent, a proposed

rule, and a commitment com⊥ (possibly NULL) that might be of the request whose rely is

the proposal.

If com⊥ is not NULL, which means that the proposal is a reply to a request of the commitment

com⊥. RECEIVE PROPOSAL then checks if the proposed rule is relevant to the commit­

ment. Relevance for a rule here is based on whether the outcome of the rule (RIGHT(rule))

is relevant to the commitment.

If com⊥ is NULL, which means that the proposal is not related to any previous requests.

RECEIVE PROPOSAL then searches any pending commitment to which the proposed rule

is relevant. If there is such a commitment, the proposal is accepted. Else, the proposal

is rejected. After the proposal is accepted, the agent will attempt to fulﬁll the proposal’s

conditions. If the conditions are fulﬁlled, the formulas of the conditions are sent to the

proposing agent. Else, the agent sends an indication of failure and the proposal is abandoned.

RECEIVE PROPOSAL returns TRUE if there is a commitment to which the proposed rule

is relevant and the conditions of the proposal are fulﬁlled and FALSE otherwise. */

BOOLEAN RECEIVE PROPOSAL(AGENTID proposing agent , RULE proposed rule, FOR­

MULA com⊥) {

. INTEGER idx com, idx a, idx b;

. FORMULA pend com;

. BOOLEAN found, success;

. BOOLEAN return;

. idx com := 0;
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. found := FALSE;

. return := FALSE;

. /* if there is no particular commitment, ﬁnd a relevant pending one */

. IF (com⊥ = NIL) THEN {

. . pend com := NEXT COM(owner, idx com); /* get ﬁrst pending commitment */

. . WHILE (pend com = NIL) AND NOT found DO {

. . . IF CHECK RELEVANCE(OWNED(owner, RIGHT(proposed rule)), pend com)

THEN {

. . . . SEND(agent pro, ”ACCEPT”);

. . . . found := TRUE;

. . . . success := TRANSACTION(RESOLVE(owner,(LEFT(proposed rule))⊥));

. . . . IF success THEN {

. . . . . SEND(proposing agent, TO STRING(LEFT(proposed rule));

. . . . . return := TRUE;

. . . . } ELSE

. . . . . SEND(proposing agent, ”PROPOSAL ” + TO STRING(rule) + ” FAILS”);

. . . }ELSE {

. . . . idx com := idx com + 1;

. . . . pend com := NEXT COM(owner, idx com);

. . . }

. . }

. . IF NOT found THEN

. . . SEND(proposing agent, ”REJECT”); /* the proposal is not relevant */

. }ELSE { /* the proposal is a reply to a request of the owner agent */

. . IF CHECK RELEVANCE(OWNED(owner, RIGHT(proposed rule)), pend com) THEN

{ 
. . . SEND(proposing agent, ”ACCEPT”);

. . . success := TRANSACTION(RESOLVE(owner,(LEFT(proposed rule))⊥));

. . . IF success THEN {

. . . . SEND(proposing agent, TO STRING(LEFT(proposed rule));

. . . . return := TRUE;

. . . }
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. . }ELSE 
. . . SEND(proposing agent, ”REJECT”); /* the proposal is not relevant */ 
. } 
. RETURN return; 
} 
B.2.6 How to Resolve a Goal/Base Commitment 
/********************-RESOLVE-********************/ 
/* RESOLVE receives as arguments an agent agent host and a commitment formula. RE­
SOLVE represents attempts of the agent agent host to resolve the commitment in several 
ways. 
The ﬁrst way is for the agent agent host to use internal resources to resolve the commit­
ment. In particular, possible parts of the commitment formula are matched with resource 
formulas to ﬁnd common linear logic formulas at the same time point. Such matching and 
resolution are as is described in FULFILL. 
After this attempt, if the commitment formula is still remained wholly or partly, the 
agent agent host will interact with other agent(s). Interaction can be initiated by a request 
or a proposal or both sequentially if the ﬁrst one fails. The preference over a request or 
a proposal resides at the agent host. For simplicity, we describe one case where making 
a request is following making a proposal if the ﬁrst one fails to resolve the commitment 
completely. 
Given the commitment unfulﬁlled, agent host then ﬁnds an interaction rule that is rele­
vant to the commitment. Such relevant interaction rule is then proposed to each agent in the 
operating environment until the proposal is accepted and carried out successfully or there is 
no more agent. 
If after the attempt(s) of making proposals, the commitment still remains partly (or 
wholly), agent host will make a request for such commitment to each agent in the environment 
until the request is fulﬁlled or there is no more agent. 
After all, if the commitment still remained partly (or wholly) then RESOLVE returns 
FALSE, otherwise, it returns TRUE. */ 
BOOLEAN RESOLVE(AGENTID agent host, FORMULA com⊥) { 
. RULE rule; 
. INTEGER rule no; /* keep track of the number of current rule */ 
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. FORMULA rightR, res;

. INTEGER idx res, idx com;

. PROPOSITION pro;

. BOOLEAN return;

. BOOLEAN continue;

. rule no := 1;

. return := FALSE;

. not search all := TRUE;

. FULFILL(agent host.resource, com⊥); /* fulﬁll the commitment locally */

. use rules to resolve the commitment */

. REPEAT

. . not search all := FALSE;

. . rule := NEXT RULE(agent host, rule no);

. . /* search all the rules until one can resolve the commitment */

. . IF (rule = NIL) DO {

. . . rightR := RIGHT(rule);

. . . IF CHECK RELEVANCE(rightR, com⊥) THEN {

. . . . IF (PROPOSE(ALL, rule, NULL)) THEN {

. . . . . res := OWNED(agent host, RIGHT(rule));

. . . . . FULFILL(res, com⊥); /* rightR is already added to resource */

. . . . . IF (res = NIL) THEN �

. . . . . . ADD(res, agent host.resource);

. . . . . . not search all := TRUE /* maybe partial fulﬁllment, hence try more*/

. . . . }ELSE { /* attempt to apply the rule internally */

. . . . . FORMULA com r; /* commitment corresponds to LEFT(rule) */

. . . . . com r := [LEFT(rule)]⊥;

. . . . . TRANSACTION(RESOLVE(agent host, com r));

. . . . . IF (com r = NULL) THEN /* com r is completely resolved */ {

. . . . . . APPLY(LEFT(rule), rule);

. . . . . . res := OWNED(agent host, RIGHT(rule))

. . . . . . FULFILL(res, com⊥); /* rightR is already added to resource */

. . . . . . IF (res =� NIL) THEN
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. . . . . . . ADD(res, agent host.resource);

. . . . . . not search all := TRUE /* maybe partial fulﬁllment, hence try more*/

. . . . . }ELSE

. . . . . . rule := NEXT RULE(agent host, rule no);

. . . . }

. . . . . rule := NEXT RULE(agent host, rule no);

. . . }ELSE

. . . rule := NEXT RULE(agent host, rule no);

. . }

. UNTIL (com⊥ = NIL) OR NOT not search all

. /* Failed to resolve completely via internal interaction rules, try to request */

. IF (com⊥ = NIL) THEN �

. . return := REQUEST(ALL, com⊥);

. ELSE

. . return := TRUE;

. RETURN return;

} 
B.3 Utility Functions 
In this section, we will describe the supporting functions for the functions described in the 
previous section for agent interaction. Our purpose is to demonstrate that an implementation 
platform is possible given an implementation of relevant proof search techniques. Hence, an 
implementation of these functions is outside the scope of the thesis and so many functions 
are mentioned with only their descriptions (without content). 
/********************-TRANSACTION-********************/ 
/* Transaction receives a function with associated arguments and executes that function. If 
the execution is successful then TRANSACTION returns TRUE. Successful execution means 
that there is no exception that occurs during the execution and the executed function returns 
TRUE. Otherwise, TRANSACTION returns FALSE and undos all the changes introduced 
by the function/procedure f. */ 
BOOLEAN TRANSACTION(FUNCTION f) { 
. EXCEPTION exception; 
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. TRY

. . EXEC(f);

. CATCH(exception);

. IF exception = NIL THEN �

. . ROLLBACK;

. RETURN (exception = NIL);

}
/********************-WAIT-********************/

/* WAIT receives as arguments an agent agentTo and a message msg. WAIT waits for the

response from the agentTo in a certain amount of time. If the time limit is over, WAIT will

send a message to the agent agentTo with the content is the ”msg” + FAILS. In this case,

WAIT returns FALSE. If WAIT receives a response within the time limit then it returns

TRUE.

Note that, WAIT does not consume the response message but does the checking only. Hence,

subsequent call to RECEIVE() still gets the response message that WAIT gets.*/

BOOLEAN WAIT(AGENTID agentTo, STRING msg) {

}
/********************-SEND-********************/

/* Procedure SEND takes as arguments an agent name, and a message msg. SEND will

send a message of the content msg from agent α (host agent) to agentTo. A primitive

function SEND MESSAGE is assumed present and handles sending messages from one agent

to another. We assume that the sending always succeeds.*/

SEND (AGENTID agentTo, MESSAGE msg) {

...SEND MESSAGE(agent α, agentTo, msg);

}
/********************-RECEIVE-********************/

/* Function RECEIVE inputs an agent name and returns a message if it receives successfully

from that agent or returns NULL otherwise.

RECEIVE will wait for a maximum σ time to detect signal. It checks for signal at every

predeﬁned period. It makes use of the primitive function RECEIVE SIGNAL that receives

and transforms signals from an agent into a message. CHECK SIGNAL listens and detects

any relevant signal. It returns TRUE if a signal is detected and FALSE otherwise.*/

STRING RECEIVE(AGENTID agentFr) {

...time expire := σ;
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...clock := TIME();

...WHILE CHECK SIGNAL(agentFr) = FALSE {

......IF (TIME() > clock + time expire) THEN

.........RETURN NULL;

......ELSE

.........WAIT(1);

...}

...msg := RECEIVE SIGNAL(agentFr);

...RETURN msg;

} 
B.3.1 Functions on Rules 
/********************-LEFT-********************/

/* The function LEFT receives a rule and returns all formulas on the left side of the linear

implication � of the rule. */

FORMULA LEFT (RULE rule) {

}
/********************-RIGHT-********************/

/* The function RIGHT receives a rule and returns all formulas on the right side of the

linear implication � of the rule. */

FORMULA RIGHT (RULE rule) {

}
/********************-GET RULE-********************/

/* GET RULE receives a proposal message and returns the proposed rule inside the message.

*/

RULE GET RULE(STRING proposal) {

}
/********************-NEXT RULE-********************/

/* NEXT RULE receives an agent and a number referring to the current position in the list

of rules of that agent and returns a rule corresponds to the next position in the list. Also,

the current position is increased by 1. */

RULE NEXT RULE(AGENTID α, INTEGER rule no) {

. RULE r ;
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. r := α.RULES[rule no]; 
. rule no := rule no + 1; 
. return r; 
} 
B.3.2 Functions for Commitments 
/********************-ADD COM-********************/ 
/* ADD COM adds to the agent’s pool of commitments a new commitment which is recorded 
as a tuple in the global variable DECISIONS[]. The ﬁrst element of a tuple refers to the 
commitment. The second and third elements are boolean expressions. The second element is 
evaluated to TRUE if the commitment is fulﬁlled and FALSE otherwise. The third element 
is used to indicate if the second element is a valid indication. */ 
ADD COM(FORMULA com⊥, BOOLEAN exp, BOOLEAN decided) { 
}
/********************-NEXT COM-********************/

/* NEXT COM receives an agent α and a position number idx com and returns the next

pending commitment in the list of pending commitments COMS[] of the agent α, counting

from the given position number idx com.*/

FORMULA NEXT COM(AGENTID α, INTEGER idx com) {

} 
B.3.3 Functions for Choices 
/********************-GET CHOICE-********************/

/* GET CHOICE receives a formula ”for” and a position number ”idx” and returns a data

structure CHOICE corresponding to the connective (⊕ or �) at that position number idx in

the formula “for”. */

CHOICE GET CHOICE(FORMULA for, INTEGER idx) {

}
/********************-CHECK CHOICE-********************/

/* CHECK CHOICE receives a choice ”c” (data structure CHOICE) and a choice decision

”dec” and returns TRUE if the decision on the choice ”c” is the same as the decision ”dec”

and FALSE otherwise. CHECK CHOICE works under the condition that the choice ”c” has
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been decided. */

BOOLEAN CHECK CHOICE(CHOICE c, INTEGER dec) {

}
/********************-NEW CHOICE-********************/

/* NEW CHOICEID generates and returns a newly created choice of data structure CHOICE

with a unique ID. */

CHOICE NEW CHOICE() {

}
/********************-BOOL EVALUATION-********************/ 
/* BOOL EVALUATION takes as argument a string and considers it as if it is a boolean 
expression and evaluates the string to a boolean value and returns that value. The argument 
string ”exp” may as well contains calls to functions that return boolean value. */ 
BOOLEAN BOOL EVALUATION(STRING exp) { 
}
/********************-GET STRATEGY-********************/ 
/* GET STRATAGY receives condition formula that contains a series of decisions on choices 
and indeterminate possibilities. GET STRATEGY will determine the overall strategy of the 
agent toward all the choices in the condition formula. 
GET STRATEGY returns TRUE if the agent is willing to accept the conditions and 
FALSE otherwise. */ 
BOOLEAN GET STRATEGY(FORMULA cond) { 
} 
B.3.4 Functions for Formulas 
/********************-LENGTH-********************/

/* LENGTH receives a formula and returns the length, measured in the number of characters,

of that formula.*/

INTEGER LENGTH(FORMULA for) {

}
/********************-GET CHAR-********************/

/* GET CHAR receives a formula and a position number and returns the character inside

the formula at that position number. */

STRING GET CHAR(FORMULA for, INTEGER idx) {
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}
/********************-OWNED-********************/

/* OWNED receives an agent and a formula and returns a formula which is formed by a

multiplicative conjunction of all the parts of the formula that belongs to agent α.

Note that the ownership of a basic TLL formula is denoted by the subscript bearing the 
name of the agent that owns the formula. 
If the formula contains additive conjunctions/disjunctions of basic TLL formulas owned 
by diﬀerent agents, OWNED will split all these additive conjunctions/disjunctions. These 
additive conjunctions/disjunctions are turned into additive conjunctions/disjunctions which 
are formed out of a basic TLL formula with �x1. */ 
FORMULA OWNED(AGENTID α, FORMULA for) { 
}
/******************-GET TIME-******************/

/* GET TIME receives a formula ”for” and a position number idx. The function returns the

absolute time (time points) associated with the basic LL formula in the formula ”for” and

located at the position number idx.

Note that the time operator � either is associated with a basic LL formula or a compound.

In the latter, there are �(s) immediately preceding an opening round bracket(s). These
�(s) are also counted together with those immediately before the proposition. */

INTEGER GET TIME(FORMULA for, INTEGER idx pro) {

. STRING char;

. INTEGER idx;

. INTEGER time; /* the number of next time points */

. idx := idx pro - 1;

. time := 0;

. char := GET CHAR(for, idx);

. /* get all the � associated with the proposition */

. WHILE (idx > 0) AND (char = ”(”) DO {

. . time := time + 1;

. . idx := idx - 1;

. . char := GET CHAR(for, idx)
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. } 
. /* traverse backward starting from the ﬁrst ”(” before the proposition */

. WHILE (idx > 0) DO {

. . idx := idx - 1 ;

. . char := GET CHAR(for, idx);

. . . /* get all � immediately before ”(” */

. . IF (GET CHAR(for, idx + 1) = ”(”) THEN {

. . . WHILE (idx > 0) AND (char = ” �”) DO {

. . . . time := time + 1;

. . . . idx := idx - 1 ;

. . . . char := GET CHAR(for, idx);

. . . }

. . }

. }

. RETURN time;

}
/********************-NEXT PRO-********************/

/* NEXT PRO receives a formula and a position number idx pos in the formula and returns

an immediate basic LL formula at or after that position inside the formula. */

PROPOSITION NEXT PRO(FORMULA for, INTEGER idx pos) {

. STRING char;

. INTEGER idx;

. PROPOSITION pro;

. pro := NIL;

. idx := proposition;

. char := GET CHAR(for, idx);

. /* ignore all the characters that do not belong to the proposition */

. WHILE (char in [”)”, ”(”, ” ⊗”, ” ⊕”, ” �”]) DO {

. . idx := idx + 1;

. . char := GET CHAR(for, idx);
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. } 
. REPEAT

. . pro := NIL + char;

. . idx := idx + 1;

. . char := GET CHAR(for, idx);

. UNTIL (char in [”)”, ” ⊗”, ” ⊕”, ” �”])

. RETURN pro;

}
/******************-PROVE-******************/ 
/* PROVE receives a resource formula and a commitment formula and returns a condition 
formula for the resource formula to logically derive the commitment formula. If there is no 
condition then the condition formula is assigned as � 1. If the resource formula can not 
derive the commitment formula then the condition is assigned as NULL. 
PROVE can be thought as acting like a theorem prover. PROVE makes use of TLL 
sequent calculus rules extended with choice calculus rules in order to search for a proof of 
the commitment formula. */ 
FORMULA PROVE(FORMULA res, FORMULA com⊥) { 
}
/********************-CHECK RELEVANCE-********************/ 
/* CHECK RELEVANCE receives a resource formula and a commitment formula and de­
termines if the resource formula is relevant to the commitment formula. If so, the function 
returns TRUE and returns FALSE otherwise. Relevance here is based on whether the re­
source formula and the commitment formula both have a common basic linear logic formula 
of the same time point and based on the strategies the agents apply on the choices involved 
in the common formulas. 
For each of the matching pairs of the resource and commitment formulas on basic linear 
logic formula A, CHECK RELEVANCE performs the following operations: 
1. splitting up the resource formula and the commitment formula with respect to the 
common linear logic formula A. Denote the two respective split ups that contain only 
Ares and �A and 1s are � Acom. 
2. considering strategies on choices that aﬀect the provability of the sequent � Acom.Ares � �
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CHECK RELEVANCE returns TRUE if the agent is willing to act on the assumption of � Acom and FALSE otherwise. */ 
BOOLEAN CHECK RELEVANCE(FORMULA res, FORMULA com⊥) { 
. FORMULA part res; /* part of the resource formula that contains a basic linear logic 
formula and/or 1s */ 
. FORMULUA part com; /* the part for the commitment formula that contains a basic LL 
formula and/or 1s */ 
. INTEGER idx res, idx com; 
. FORMULA baseLL; /* the common basic linear logic formula */ 
. FORMULA cond; /* conditions for the derivation */ 
. BOOLEAN return; 
Ares � �
. return := FALSE; 
. REPEAT

. . baseLL := MATCH(res, com, idx res, idx com);

. . IF (baseLL = NULL) THEN {

. . . SPLIT(res, part res, idx res);

. . . SPLIT(com, part com, idx com);

. . . cond := PROVE(part res, part com⊥);

. . . IF (cond = NULL) AND GET � STRATEGY(cond) THEN

. . . . return := TRUE;

. . . ELSE

. . . . baseLL := MATCH(res, com, idx res, idx com);

. . }

. UNTIL (res = NULL)

. RETURN return;

}
/******************-APPLY STRATEGY-******************/

/* APPLY STRATEGY receives a resource formula (res) and a commitment formula (com⊥).

If by using the resource formula to fulﬁll the commitment formula requires some certain

decisions on choices, the commitment, together with those decisions are added to the variable

DECISIONS[] via ADD COM for future reconciliation with other choices’ decisions.

Note that making the decisions on choices to have the commitment fulﬁlled by the resource 
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is the agent’s internal deliberation. How the agent considers to apply a particular choice 
strategy is not considered in the scope of the thesis. */ 
APPLY STRATEGY(FORMULA res, FORMULA com⊥) { } 
/********************-SPLIT-********************/ 
/* SPLIT receives two variables and a position number and performs the splitting on the 
variable res into two parts with respect to the basic LL formula located at the position 
number idx. The part that contains only the basic TLL formula and 1s is assigned to the 
variable ”split”. The remaining part is assigned to the variable ”res”. 
SPLIT ﬁrstly locates the basic TLL formula in the formula from the given position number 
of the starting point of the basic LL formula. It then uses two other functions to generate 
the split ups. 
The underlying assumption is that formulas are all well formed formulas in which for each 
connective, its two operands are only basic TLL formulas (of the form �xA) or well formed 
formulas. Formally, well formed formulas are constructed as following: 
1. F = A 
2. F = � F 
3. F = (F � F ) (F ⊕ F ) (F � F )| |
where A is basic linear logic formula (proposition). */

SPLIT(FORMULA res, FORMULA split, INTEGER idx) {

. PROPOSITION pro; /* the proposition of concern, at the position idx */

. INTEGER i;

. STRING char;

. INTEGER start, end; /* starting and ending positions of the formula � pro */

. pro := NEXT PRO(res, idx);

. /* ﬁnd the end position of the proposition */

. i := idx + 1;

. REPEAT

. . char := GET CHAR(res, i);

. . i := i + 1;

. UNTIL NOT (char in [a-z]) OR (char = NULL)

. end := i - 1;

. /* get all the � associated with the proposition pro */

�� 
� 
� 
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. i := idx - 1;

. REPEAT

. . char := GET CHAR(res, i);

. . i := i - 1;

. UNTIL (char = �) OR (char = NULL)

. start := i + 1;

. /* char can only be in [”�”, ”(”, ” ⊕”, ” �”, ” ⊗”] */

. IF (char = NULL) THEN /* i.e i = 1 and the formula is of the form �x pro */ {

. . split := res;

. . res := 1;

. }

. /* generate formula res := res − pro */ 
. res := GENERATE RES(res, start, end); 
. /* generate formula split := �pro */ 
. split := GENERATE SPLIT(res, start, end); 
}
/********************-GENERATE RES-********************/ 
/* GENERATE RES receives a formula res, starting and ending position numbers then 
returns a formula that is a split up of the formula res with respect to the basic LL formula 
located between the start and end positions and does NOT contain that basic LL formula. 
If the basic LL formula is A then the split up is of the form res − A. 
The steps for generating the split up res − A are: 
1/ traverse left or right to get the connective whose �xA is one of its operands 
2/ get the other operand of the connective. 
3/ if the connective is one of �, ⊕ or none then replacing A by 1 
else (connective is ⊗), remove both �xA and the connective. */ 
FORMULA GENERATE RES(FORMULA res, INTEGER start, INTEGER end){ 
. INTEGER i; 
. STRING char; 
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. i := start - 1; /* traverse to the left */

. char := GET CHAR(res, i);

. IF (char = ”(”) THEN {

. /* focus on those characters within the brackets ”(...)” */

. . i := i + 1;

. . char := GET CHAR(res, i);

. . WHILE (char = ”)”) DO {

. . /* character in [”�”, ” ⊕”, ” �”, ” ⊗”, a-z] */ 
. . . IF (char in [”⊕”, ” �”]) THEN { 
. . . . res := REPLACE(res, idx, end, 1); /* replace the proposition by 1 */ 
. . . . break; 
. . . } ELSE IF (char = ⊗) THEN { 
. . . . res := REPLACE(res, start, end + 1, NULL); /* remove the whole proposition with 
its time and the connective */ 
. . . . break; 
. . . } ELSE { 
. . . . i := i + 1; /* ignore characters that are not connectives */ 
. . . . char := GET CHAR(res, i); 
. . . } 
. . } 
. }ELSE /* char in [”⊕”, ” �”, ” ⊗”] */ { 
. . IF (char in [”⊕”, ” �”]) THEN { 
. . . res := REPLACE(res, idx, end, 1); /* replace the proposition by 1 */ 
. . . break; 
. . } ELSE IF (char = ⊗) THEN { 
. . . res := REPLACE(res, start - 1, end, NULL); /* remove the whole proposition with 
its time and the connective */ 
. . . break; 
. . } 
. } 
. RETURN res; 
}
/********************-GENERATE SPLIT-********************/ 
��
�
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/* GENERATE SPLIT receives a formula ”split”, starting and ending position numbers then 
returns a formula that is a split up of the formula split with respect to the basic LL formula 
located between the start and end positions and contains that basic LL formula. If the basic 
LL formula is A then the split up is of the form A. 
The steps for generating the split up A are: 
1/ traverse left or right to get the connective whose �xA is one of its operands 
2/ get the other operand of the connective 
3/a if the connective is either of �or⊕ or none then replace the other operand by 1 
3/b else (connective is ⊗), remove both the other operand and the connective. 
4/a get the immediate opening and closing brackets for the additive conjunction/disjunction 
and assign the whole group as B, adjusting the values of start and end accordingly. If there 
is no more formulas outside apart from B, terminate. 
4/b remove the immediate opening and closing brackets for the multiplicative conjunction 
and assign the whole group as B, adjusting the values of start and end accordingly. If there 
is no more formulas outside apart from B, terminate. 
5/ repeat the process from step 1 for B instead of �xA. */ 
FORMULA GENERATE SPLIT(split, start, end) { 
. INTEGER i; 
. STRING char; 
. STRING con; /* the current connective */ 
. INTEGER brack no; /* the number of opening (closing) brackets that haven’t been 
matched by closing (opening) brackets */ 
. WHILE (GET CHAR(split, start-1) = NULL) DO { 
. . i := start - 1;

. . char := GET CHAR(split, i);

. . IF (char = ”(”) THEN {

. . . /* traverse forward to the corresponding closing bracket */

. . . REPEAT

. . . . i := i + 1;

. . . . char := GET CHAR(split, i);

. . . . /* character in [”�”, ” ⊕”, ” �”, ” ⊗”, ”(”, ”)”, a-z] */

. . . . IF (char in [”⊕”, ” �”, ” ⊗”] THEN

. . . . . con := char;
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. . . . IF (char = ”(”) THEN

. . . . . brack no := brack no + 1;

. . . . IF (char = ”)”) THEN

. . . . . brack no := brack no - 1;

. . . UNTIL (char = ”)”) AND (brack no = 1)

. . . /* i is the position of the closing bracket corresponding to the ﬁrst opening bracket */

. . . IF (con in [”⊕”, ” �”]) THEN {

. . . . split := REPLACE(split, end+2, i-1, 1); /* replace the other operand by 1 */

. . . . start := start - 1; /* now include the opening bracket */

. . . . end := end + 3; /* now cover also the operand 1 and the closing bracket */

. . . } ELSE IF (con = ⊗) THEN {

. . . . /* remove the other operand and closing bracket */

. . . . . split := REPLACE(split, end+1, i, NULL);

. . . . /* remove the opening bracket */

. . . . split := REPLACE(split, start-1, start, NULL);

. . . }

. . }

. . /* char in [”⊕”, ” �”, ” ⊗”, NULL] */

. . ELSE IF (char = NULL) THEN {

. . . con := char;

. . . bracket no := 0;

. . . i := start - 1;

. . . /* traverse backward to reach the beginning of the other operand */

. . . REPEAT

. . . . i := i - 1;

. . . . char := GET CHAR(split, i);

. . . . IF (char = ”)”) THEN

. . . . . brack no := brack no + 1;

. . . . IF (char = ”(”) THEN

. . . . . brack no := brack no - 1;

. . . UNTIL (char = ”(”) AND (brack no = 0)

. . . /* i is now at the opening bracket right before the other operand */

. . . IF (con in [”⊕”, ” �”]) THEN {
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. . . . split := REPLACE(split, i+1, start-2, 1); /* replace the proposition by 1 */

. . . . start := i; /* now include also the operand and the opening bracket */

. . . . end := end - [(start-2) - (i + 1)]; /* updating end position after the replacement of

[(start-2) - (i + 1) + 1] characters by 1.*/

. . . . end := end + 1; /* now cover the closing bracket */

. . . }

. . . ELSE IF (con = ⊗) THEN {

. . . . /* remove the other operand and opening bracket */

. . . . . split := REPLACE(split, i, start-1, NULL);

. . . . /* remove the closing bracket */

. . . . split := REPLACE(split, end+1, end+2, NULL);

. . . }

. . }

. } 
. RETURN split; }
/********************-REP CHOICE-********************/ 
/* REP CHOICE receives a formula ”for” that contains only a basic TLL formula, possibly 
interconnected with multiple 1s via connectives ⊕ and/or �. The function returns a choice 
that is a representative choice of the basic TLL formula. 
REP CHOICE goes through each choice and indeterminate possibility in the formula and 
determines the decision for them (LEFT or RIGHT) so that the basic TLL formula is kept 
remained. The sequence of decisions such that TLL formula remains in the end (all choices 
are decided) is turned into the condition for deciding LEFT of the representative choice. 
Condition for deciding RIGHT is also determined accordingly.*/ 
CHOICE REP CHOICEFORMULA for) { 
. INTEGER pro idx; /* starting position of the proposition */

. INTEGER i;

. INTEGER length; /* the number of characters of the proposition */

. STRING char;

. STRING cond;/* determining conditions for the representative choice */

. INTEGER dec; /* a decision on a choice */

. CHOICE c cur;

. CHOICE c rep;
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. BOOLEAN decided; /* whether all the choices in the formula have been decided */ 
. i := 1;

. pro idx := 1;

. decided := TRUE;

. /* get to the position of the proposition */

. WHILE (i ¡ LENGTH(for)) DO {

. . char := GET CHAR(for, i);

. . IF (char in [”(”, ”)”, ” ⊕”, ” �”, ” �”, ”1”]) THEN

. . . i := i + 1;

. . ELSE

. . . break;

. } 
. pro idx := i; 
/* get the length of the proposition */ 
. WHILE (i ¡ LENGTH(for)) DO { 
. . char := GET CHAR(for, i); 
. . IF NOT (char in [”(”, ”)”, ” ⊕”, ” �”, ” �”, ”1”]) THEN 
. . . i := i + 1; 
. . ELSE 
. . . break; 
. }

. length := i - pro idx + 1;

. i := 1;

. WHILE (i ¡ LENGTH(for)) DO {

. . /* bypassing the proposition */

. . IF (i = pro idx) THEN

. . . i := i + length;

. . char := GET CHAR(for, i);

. . /* encounter a choice */

. . IF (char in [”⊕”, ” �”]) THEN {
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. . . c cur := GET CHOICE(for, i);

. . . IF (i ¡ pro idx) THEN /* IF the proposition is on the right hand side of the choice */

. . . . dec := R;

. . . ELSE

. . . . dec := L;

. . . IF (cond = NULL) THEN �

. . . . cond := cond + ” ∧” + ”CHECK CHOICE(c cur, dec)”;

. . . ELSE

. . . . cond := ”CHECK CHOICE(c cur, dec)”;

. . . decided := decided AND c cur.DECIDED; /* requiring all choices having been decided

*/

. . }

. . i := i + 1;

. }

. c rep := NEW CHOICE();

. c rep.DECIDED := decided;

. c rep.COND := cond;

. IF (decided) THEN

. . c rep.VALUE := BOOL EVALUATION(cond);

. ELSE

. . c rep.VALUE := L; /* a default value, only valid when DECIDED is TRUE */

. c rep.TIME := GET TIME(for, pro idx);

. RETURN c rep; }

/********************-MATCH-********************/

/* MATCH receives two formulas, and their respective inner position numbers, and compares

the two formulas to see if they contains a common basic linear logic formula of the same time

point.

MATCH searches for each basic linear logic formula in the ﬁrst formula fora a basic 
linear logic formula in the formula for b that is the same and at the same time point. If the 
search does not ﬁnd any matching basic linear logic formula, it returns NIL. Otherwise, the 
function returns the matching common basic linear logic and the associated number positions 
of them in their respective formulas. */ 
PROPOSITION MATCH (FORMULA for a, FORMULA for b, INTEGER idx a, INTE­
��
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GER idx b) {

. i := 0;

. WHILE (i ¡ LENGTH(for a) ) DO {

. . for ta := NEXT PRO(for a, i);

. . i := i + LENGTH(for ta);

. . IF for ta = NIL THEN {

. . . j := 0; 
. . . /* search for each proposition in for b */ 
. . . WHILE (j ¡ LENGTH(for b) ) DO { 
. . . . for tb = NEXT PRO(for b, j); 
. . . . IF for tb = NIL THEN { 
. . . . . IF (for tb = for ta) THEN { 
. . . . . . time 1 := GET TIME(for a, i); 
. . . . . . time 2 := GET TIME(for b, j); 
. . . . . . IF (time 1 = time 2) THEN { 
. . . . . . . idx a := i; 
. . . . . . . idx b := j; 
. . . . . . . RETURN for ta; 
. . . . . . } 
. . . . . } 
. . . . . j := j + LENGTH(for b); 
. . . . } ELSE 
. . . . RETURN NIL; 
. . . } 
. . } ELSE 
. . . RETURN NIL; 
. } }
/*********************-END-*********************/ 
B.4 CD Player & Book Example 
Description 
The example is similar to that of [Ku¨ngas, 2003]. 
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John has 10 dollars and a CD and wants to listen to music at the 8th next time point but 
his CD player is broken. John also intends to return books at the third next time point and 
can return books of others in the same visit. It takes a period of one time point to arrive at 
the library. 
Peter intends to spend a day with his friends. He needs 20 dollars to cover the expenses 
(beer) but only has 15 dollars. Peter also has a book to be return before the ﬁfth next time 
point and the transportation fee is 10 dollars. Peter has skills and can repair John’s CD 
player within a period of one time point. 
Therefore, John and Peter can help each other to achieve goals. A protocol for their 
interaction is following. John returns the book for Peter in exchange for 10 dollars cost of 
transportation. Peter ﬁxes John’s broken CD player and we assume that Peter charges 20 
dollars for repairing the CD player. 
B.4.1 Specifying Protocol 
The interaction protocol between John and Peter is speciﬁed in our TLL framework as below. 
John 
John has 10 dollars, a broken CD player and a CD available for use at any time. 
10 � $@J ⊗ �broken player@J ⊗ �CD@JJ J J 
John has a commitment (goal) of listening to music at the 8th next time point. 
(�8music@JJ )⊥. 
Rule 1 - John can visit the library at the third next time point and return a book for 10 
dollars. It takes a duration of one time point for John to arrive at the library. 
∀X, �3[book@X ⊗ 10$@X � �� book@L ⊗ 10 � $@JJ ].X X X 
Rule 2 - John can use a CD and a CD Player to play some music.

[CD@J ⊗ CD player@J � music@JJ ]
J J 
Peter 
Peter has 15 dollars, and a book available at any time. 
15 � $@P ⊗ �book@PP P 
Peter has commitments (goals) of having the book returned to library before the ﬁfth 
next time point, and enjoying some beer at the 9th next time point. 
[⊕4 i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥ ⊗ (�9beer@PP )⊥, 
where ⊕n . . . i≥0 �i A = A ⊕ �A ⊕ �n A 
Rule 3 - Peter can repair a CD player for 20 dollars and make it ready at the following 
�� �
� �
� �
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time point.
�[f orallX, broken player@X ⊗ 20$@X � �� CD player@X ⊗ 20 � $@P ]
X X X P 
Rule 4 - Peter can return the book to the library but it costs him 10 dollars for trans­
portation fee and a travel time of one time point. �[book@P ⊗ 10$@P � �� book@L ]P P P 
Rule 5 - Peter can buy a case of beer for 20 dollars. �[20$@P � �beer@P ]P P 
B.4.2 Reasoning Prior to Interaction 
Peter and John both look for a way to derive their respective commitments but they failed 
due to a lack of resources. 
At John 
In order to fulﬁll his commitment of (�8music@JJ )⊥, John can apply Rule 2 as follows : 
� �8(CD@J ⊗ CD player@JJ )J app
[CD@J ⊗ CD player@J � music@JJ ] � �8music@JJJ J 
(1) 
The application requires the conditions �8(CD@J ⊗ CD player@JJ ). Given that J 
� �8CD@J
J 
� �8CD player@J
J 
� �8CD@J
J 
⊗ �8CD player@J ⊗R 
J 
� �8(CD@J ⊗ CD player@J
J 
) 
�(⊗)R 
J 
John needs to derive �8CD@J and �8CD player@J .J J 
John already has �CD@J 8CD@JJ but can not derive �8CD player@J by him-J J 
self. 
At Peter 
To satisfy the commitment of (�9beer@PP )⊥, Peter can apply Rule 5 as follows 
�k 20$@P
P app �[20$@P � �beer@P ] k � beer@P
P P P 
and �k � beer@P 9beer@PP , 0 ≤ k ≤ 9.P 
The application of Rule 5 requires �k 20$@PP , 0 ≤ k ≤ 9 or a commitment of 
(�k 20$@PP )⊥, 0 ≤ k ≤ 9. 
Fulﬁlling a commitment of (�k 20$@PP )⊥, 0 ≤ k ≤ 9, with k can be any value of choice 
��
� �
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⊕9is equivalent to fulﬁlling a commitment of [ k≥0(�k 20$@PP )]⊥. 
If the commitment of [ 9 k 20$@PP )]
⊥ is fulﬁlled partly by 15 � $@P , then later, k≥0(� P⊕
Peter will not have the money �310$@P to have the book returned. At that point, Peter P 
has to backtrack and choose not to fulﬁll the commitment immediately. 
⊕4Also, to satisfy the commitment of [ i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥, Rule 4 can be applied as 
follows 
��i−1(book@P ⊗ 10$@PP )P app �[book@P ⊗ 10$@P � �� book@L ] i � book@LP P P P 
iwhere � � book@LP i4 ≥0(�ibook@LP ), 1 ≤ i ≤ 4� ⊕
Peter analyzes the conditions: 
��i−1book@P
P 
��i−110$@P
P 
R ��i−1book@P
P 
⊗�j 10$@P ⊗
P 
��i−1(book@P ⊗ 10$@P
P 
) 
�(⊗)R 
P 
Because Peter has the book, �book@P i−1book@PP , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, Peter can look P 
for �i−110$@PP , 1 ≤ i ≤ 4 or equivalently a commitment of [ 4 i−110$@PP )]⊥ toi≥1(�⊕
completely satisfy the conditions. 
Hence, the following commitments are possibly in place. 
John: (�8CD player@JJ )⊥. 
9Peter: [ k≥0(�k 20$@PP )]⊥ and ⊕ ⊕4[ [ 4 ⊕ ibook@LP )]⊥ or (if the rule 4 is used) [ i≥1(�i−110$@PP )]⊥]. (2)i≥0(�
B.4.3 Construction of Interaction 
Reparing the Broken CD Player 
There are two ways to start this section of interaction.

First is that John can make a request for �8CD player@J to other agents (including
J 
Peter). 
J to P: REQUEST (�8CD player@JJ )⊥ 
Peter looks for a rule to derive �8CD player@J and ﬁnds Rule 3 applicable. J 
An instance of the rule can be proposed to John (with X = J ): 
P to J: PROPOSE �[broken player@J ⊗ 20$@J � �� CD player@J ⊗ 20 � $@P ]J J J P 
The second way is that (in order to gain some money to fulﬁll its commitments of 
9[ k≥0(�k 20$@PP )]⊥ or possibly [ 4 i−110$@PP )]⊥) Peter advertises its capabilities i≥1(�⊕ ⊕
� �
�� � �
� �
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to John. An instance with X = J of Rule 3 is proposed to John:

P to J: PROPOSE �[broken player@J ⊗ 20$@J � �CD player@J ⊗ 20 � $@P ]
J J J P 
Either way, John’s commitment of (�8CD player@JJ )⊥ can be achieved by applying an 
instance of Peter’s proposal at the mth next time point (0 ≤ m ≤ 7), m is at John’s choice) 
as follows. 
Denote Peter’s proposal as �[Lp � Rp] then 
mLp� �
app �[Lp � Rp] mRp 
From �mRp =

m(�� CD player@J ⊗ 20 � $@PP ), �m+1 � CD player@J can be extracted and
J J 
m+1 � CD player@J 8CD player@JJ , 0 ≤ m ≤ 7. (3)J 
Given that, John will accept the proposal. 
J to P: ACCEPT 
Given the analysis of the proposal as in (3), the conditions of the proposal are: 
mLp = m(broken player@J ⊗ 20$@JJ ).J 
As
 � �mbroken player@J � �m20$@J
J
J 
� �mbroken player@J ⊗ �m20$@J
J 
⊗R 
J 
� �m(broken player@J ⊗ 20$@J
J 
) 
�(⊗)R 
J 
John has a broken CD player and �broken player@J � �mbroken player@J . Then there J J 
only requires �m20$@J or a commitment of (�m20$@JJ )⊥, 0 ≤ m ≤ 7.J 
As m is at John’s choice, fulﬁlling the commitment is then equivalent to fulﬁlling the com­
mitment of [⊕7 m 20$@JJ )]⊥. (4)m≥0(�
If John has enough money, Peter then applies his proposal and derives �m+1�CD player@JJ �and �m20 � $@PP , 0 ≤ m ≤ 7 or 7 m20 � $@PP ). (5)m≥0(�
Hence, from (3) and (1), John now fulﬁlls his commitment of (�8music@JJ )⊥. 
If John does not have enough money, John can disclose its capabilities to Peter to seek 
more money as in section “Returning Book to Library by John”. 
Returning Book to Library by John 
This section is applicable if the commitment of [⊕4 i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥ is present. In other 
words, Rule 4 is not used, which means that Peter does not return the book by himself. 
The section can start in two ways. 
��
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⊕4Either Peter makes a request for its commitment [ i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥ to John. 
P to J: REQUEST [ 4 i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥⊕
John ﬁnds Rule 1, �3[book@P ⊗10$@P � �� book@L ⊗10 �$@JJ ], applicable and P P P 
proposes it to Peter. 
The second way is that John does not have enough money and hence proposes Rule 1 to 
gain some money. 
From this point, the two ways proceed similarly. 
An instance of John’s Rule 1 with X = P is proposed to Peter. 
J to P: PROPOSE �3[book@P ⊗ 10$@P � �� book@L ⊗ 10 � $@J ]P P P J ⊕4Peter has a commitment of [ i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥ and this proposal rule can help it 
achieve this goal as follows. 
Denote the proposal rule as �[L1 � R1] then 
app
[L1 � R1] ��3R1��3L1 
(6) where �3R1 = �3(�� book@L ⊗ 10 � $@JJ ), �4 � book@L can be extracted and P P 
4 � book@L 4 ibook@LP ).P� � ⊕i≥0(�
Hence, 
P to J: ACCEPT 
The conditions are, according to (6), �3L1 = �3(book@P ⊗ 10$@PP ). Peter analyzes P 
the conditions: 
��3book@P
P 
��310$@P
P 
R ��3book@P
P 
⊗�310$@P
P 
⊗
��3(book@P ⊗ 10$@P
P 
) 
�(⊗)R 
P 
Given that Peter has a book to be returned, �book@P ��3book@PP . There requires only P 
310$@PP or a commitment of (�310$@PP )⊥. (7) 
If Peter has enough money, he will fulﬁll the conditions. John then applies the proposal 
and gains 10 dollars at the third next time point, �310 � $@J . (8)J ⊕4As a result of the rule application, Peter fulﬁlls his commitment of [ i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥. 
If Peter does not have enough money, the proposal can not be applied and there are still 
pending commitments at the end of interaction. In this case, the interaction will fail. 
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B.4.4 Sequences of Interaction 
Two threads of the interaction “Reparing Broken CD Player” and “Returning Book to Li­
brary by John” can occur in any order. This can be seen via a summarized version of the 
interaction as below. The question of whether these threads are successful (and so is the 
interaction), which means that agents have enough money to exchange for the services, is 
also answered. 
Before the interaction 
From (2),

At John, [state]: 10 � $@J ⊗ �broken player@JJ ; [commitment]: (�8CD player@JJ )⊥;
J 
[rules used]: 2.

At Peter, [state]: 15 � $@P ⊗ �book@PP ; [commitment]: [ 9 k 20$@PP )]⊥ and
P k≥0(�⊕
[ [ 4 ibook@LP )]
⊥ or (if Rule 4 is used) [ 4 i≥1(�i−110$@PP )]⊥]; [rules used]: none. i≥0(�⊕ ⊕
We consider ﬁrstly the sequence “Reparing Broken CD Player”, then “Returning Book 
to Library by John”. 
Reparing Broken CD Player 
(OPTIONAL) J to P: REQUEST (�8CD player@JJ )⊥ 
P to J: PROPOSE �[broken player@J ⊗ 20$@J � �CD player@J ⊗ 20 � $@P ]J J J P 
J to P: ACCEPT 
7At John, as John only has 10 � $@J m≥0(�m 10$@JJ ), in order to fulﬁll the J � ⊕
7proposal’s conditions, from (4), he must make a commitment of [ m≥0(�m 10$@JJ )]⊥. 
7 
⊕
Hence, [state]: none; [commitment]: [ m≥0(�m 10$@JJ )]⊥; [rules used]: 2. ⊕
At Peter, from (5) and given that � 7 m≥0(�m20 � $@P 9 k 20$@PP ),P ) � ⊕k≥0(�
[state]: 15 � $@PP ⊗�book@PP ; [commitment]: [ i4 ≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥ or (if Rule 4 is used) ⊕
[ 4 i≥1(�i−110$@PP )]⊥; [rules used]: 3. ⊕
Returning Book to Library by John 
⊕4(OPTIONAL) P to J: REQUEST [ i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥ 
J to P: PROPOSE �3[book@P ⊗ 10$@P � �book@L ⊗ 10 � $@J ]P P P J 
P to J: ACCEPT 
7At John, as from (8) and �310 � $@J m≥0(�m 10$@JJ ),J �⊕
[state]: none; [commitment]: none; [rules used]: 2, 1. 
At Peter: from (7) and given that 10 � $@P ��310$@PP ,P 
[state]: 5 � $@PP ; [commitment]: none; [rules used]: 3. 
The interaction ends successfully by both parties fulﬁlling all of their commitments. 
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We consider further the sequence “Returning Book to Library”, then “Reparing Broken 
CD Player”. 
Before the interaction 
At John, [state]: 10 � $@J ⊗ �broken player@JJ ; [commitment]: (�8CD player@JJ )⊥;J 
[rules used]: 2.

At Peter: [state]: 15 � $@P ⊗ �book@PP ; [commitment]: [ 9 k 20$@PP )]⊥ and
P k≥0(�
4 
⊕
[ [ i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥ or (if Rule 4 is used) [ 4 i≥1(�i−110$@PP )]⊥]; [rules used]: none. ⊕ ⊕
Returning Book to Library by John 
⊕4(OPTIONAL) P to J: REQUEST [ i≥0(�ibook@LP )]⊥ 
J to P: PROPOSE �3[book@P ⊗ 10$@P � �book@L ⊗ 10 � $@J ]P P P J 
P to J: ACCEPT 
At John, from (8), [state]: 10�$@JJ ⊗�broken player@J 310�$@JJ ; [commitment]: J ⊗�
(�8CD player@JJ )⊥; [rules used]: 2, 1. 
At Peter: from (7), Peter has a commitment and it is resolved as 10�$@P ��310$@PP ,P 
[state]: 5 � $@PP ; [commitment]: [ 9 k 20$@PP )]⊥; [rules used]: none. k≥0(�⊕
Reparing Broken CD Player 
(OPTIONAL) J to P: REQUEST (�8CD player@JJ )⊥ 
P to J: PROPOSE �[broken player@J ⊗ 20$@J � �CD player@J ⊗ 20 � $@P ]J J J P 
J to P: ACCEPT 
7At John, the commitment from (4) is resolved: 10�$@J 310�$@J m≥0(�m 20$@JJ ),JJ ⊗� �⊕
[state]: none; [commitment]: none; [rules used]: 2, 1. 
At Peter: from (5) and given that 
9 
m≥0(�m20 � $@P� 7 P ) � ⊕k≥0(�k20$@PP ), 
[state]: 5 � $@PP ; [commitment]: none; [rules used]: 3. 
The interaction ends successfully by both parties fulﬁlling all of their commitments. 
However, if Peter decides to return the book by himself, which means Rule 4 is applied. 
John will not return Peter’s book and hence can not gain 10 dollars from it. John therefore 
does not have enough money (20 dollars) for Peter to repair the broken CD player and 
consequently can not fulﬁll his commitment of (�8CD player@JJ )⊥. Peter does not earn 
20 dollars from repairing the CD player, and so has only 15 dollars. Hence, he can not fulﬁll 
4all of his commitments of [ i≥0(�i10$@PP )]⊥ and [ 9 k 20$@PP )]⊥. Consequently, k≥0(�⊕ ⊕
the interaction will fail. 
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B.4.5 Discussion 
Partial deduction in [Ku¨ngas, 2003] allows John and Peter to associate all the unused re­
sources with the missing resources or capabilities (money) for trading. For example, 10 
dollars of John is deduced for getting the broken CD player ﬁxed. However, a simple and 
direct implementation of the technique may not be fair to the proposing agent nor to the 
proposed agent in real life. In fact, if John has 300 dollars, the same partial deduction step 
would allocate the whole 300 dollars to the trading for the capability to repair the broken 
CD player. 
In our approach, apart from allowing agents to ﬁgure out the missing capabilities, we 
predeﬁne various desired oﬀers that agent can make. This requires extra information, such 
as the price Peter would expect in return for ﬁxing a broken CD player, to make sure that 
oﬀers are reasonable. 
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